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Why Attackers Lose: Design and Security Analysis of Arbitrarily Large XOR Arbiter PUFs

16 pagesPublished: October 4, 2017

Abstract

In a novel analysis, we show that arbitrarily many Arbiter PUFs can be combined into a stable XOR Arbiter PUF. To the best of our knowledge, this design cannot be modeled by any known oracle access attack in polynomial time.

Using majority vote of Arbiter Chain responses, our analysis shows that with a polynomial number of votes the XOR Arbiter PUF stability of almost all challenges can be boosted exponentially close to 1; that is, the stability gain through majority voting can exceed the stability loss introduced by large XORs for a feasible number of votes. Hence, our proposal enables the designer to increase the attacker's effort exponentially while still maintaining polynomial design effort for all known oracle access modeling attacks. This is the first result that relates PUF design to this traditional cryptographic design principle.

Keyphrases: machine learning, PAC learning, Physical Unclonable Functions, security analysis

In: Ulrich Kühne, Jean-Luc Danger and Sylvain Guilley (editors). PROOFS 2017. 6th International Workshop on Security Proofs for Embedded Systems, vol 49, pages 68--83

Links:
BibTeX entry
@inproceedings{PROOFS2017:Why_Attackers_Lose_Design,
  author    = {Nils Wisiol and Christoph Graebnitz and Marian Margraf and Manuel Oswald and Tudor Soroceanu and Benjamin Zengin},
  title     = {Why Attackers Lose: Design and Security Analysis of Arbitrarily Large XOR Arbiter PUFs},
  booktitle = {PROOFS 2017. 6th International Workshop on Security Proofs for Embedded Systems},
  editor    = {Ulrich K\textbackslash{}"uhne and Jean-Luc Danger and Sylvain Guilley},
  series    = {EPiC Series in Computing},
  volume    = {49},
  pages     = {68--83},
  year      = {2017},
  publisher = {EasyChair},
  bibsource = {EasyChair, http://www.easychair.org},
  issn      = {2398-7340},
  url       = {https://easychair.org/publications/paper/qVqr},
  doi       = {10.29007/7nl2}}
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