Stable matching with an entrance criterion for teams

EasyChair Preprint no. 732

Abstract

 In this paper we generalize the results of former papers that dealt with the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion–Israel Institute of Technology, under an entrance criterion. Here, we consider the case where students may apply in groups, thereafter called teams, each consisting of one or more students. A team-application means that students from any given team, want to be assigned together to the same dormitory-group. More specifically, students of the same team prefer living off-campus rather than living in different dormitory-groups.
 
 The underlying assumption in our model is that the dormitory-groups share a common preference over the teams, which is  given by a strictly increasing ranking of the teams' credit scores. We adjust the definition of a quasi-stable outcome to incorporate team applications, and show that a quasi-stable outcome always exists. Furthermore, an algorithm that finds all the quasi-stable outcomes, is presented. Apparently, some of the properties of the model for teams of a single student, continue to hold also under the model of team applications. In addition, we consider the incentive compatibility property of the outcomes generated by the proposed algorithm, and show, in particular, that the algorithm that produce a specific quasi-stable outcome, is manipulation-proof, i.e., no subset of teams can gain by misrepresenting their preferences over the dormitory-groups.

Keyphrases: dormitory assignment, entrance criterion, stable matching, team assignment

@Booklet{EasyChair:732,
  author = {Nitsan Perach and Shoshana Anily},
  title = {Stable matching with an entrance criterion for teams},
  howpublished = {EasyChair Preprint no. 732},

  year = {EasyChair, 2019}}