An Algebraic Approach for Reasoning About Information Flow

EasyChair Preprint 442

Abstract

This paper concerns the analysis of information leaks in security systems. We address the problem of specifying and analyzing large systems in the (standard) channel model used in quantitative information flow (QIF). We propose several operators which match typical interactions between system components. We explore their algebraic properties with respect to the security-preserving refinement relation defined by Alvim et al. and McIver et al. We show how the algebra can be used to simplify large system specifications in order to facilitate the computation of information leakage bounds. We demonstrate our results on the specification and analysis of the Crowds Protocol. Finally, we use the algebra to justify a new algorithm to compute leakage bounds for this protocol.

Keyphrases: Channel Composition, Crowds, g-leakage, quantitative information flow

@booklet{EasyChair:442,
  author    = {Arthur Américo and Mario S. Alvim and Annabelle McIver},
  title     = {An Algebraic Approach for Reasoning About Information Flow},
  doi       = {10.29007/zxv3},
  howpublished = {EasyChair Preprint 442},
  year      = {EasyChair, 2018}}