WordPress plugins often implement their own roles, permissions, customer identities, and staff-account models on top of the native WordPress authorisation system. While these plugin-local models enable domain-specific workflows, they can also create unsafe authorisation boundaries that let plugin-level accounts influence platform-level identities. This paper presents CVE-2026-6741, an improper privilege management vulnerability in the LatePoint appointment-booking plugin for WordPress, affecting versions up to and including 5.4.1. The flaw enabled an authenticated agent-level user to link a LatePoint customer record to an arbitrary WordPress user account, including an administrator account. Under the vulnerable configuration, the customer password-reset workflow could propagate a new password to the associated WordPress user account, escalating privileges to administrator.
We present this vulnerability as an end-to-end case study of AI-assisted source-code auditing. Specialised audit agents reviewed the plugin codebase and constructed a source-to-sink hypothesis involving customer-to-user account linking and password propagation. We did not treat the generated finding as conclusive; instead, we validated it through manual source review, role and capability analysis, controlled proof-of-concept testing, and examination of the security boundary between LatePoint customer records and WordPress user accounts. This work provides a validated case study showing how AI-generated source-to-sink hypotheses can expose logic and authorisation flaws in plugin-local account models when model outputs are treated as hypotheses requiring independent verification. The case also motivates a security takeaway for WordPress plugin development: treat account-linking fields and cross-model identity mappings as authority-bearing state, and treat password-propagation routines as privileged operations, even when exposed through plugin-local roles or workflows.