In both everyday and theoretical discourse about law, we often refer to legal systems that belong to imagined or constructed worlds, ranging from ideal social models such as perfectly democratic regimes to legal orders portrayed in fiction, including movies, anime, comics, and games. However, although general jurisprudence has long engaged with legal fictions in actual institutional contexts, it has rarely examined the metatheoretical criteria that determine how statements about law can be properly represented in imagined or constructed worlds. In this paper, I examine the representation of law in such contexts. I suggest that the traditional problem of legal existence should be replaced by a broader problem of representation across multiple worlds. This approach adopts a broadly Goodmanian metaphysical irrealism, according to which the actual world does not enjoy privileged metaphysical exclusivity in the investigation of the concept of law. Practices of fictional worldmaking are not merely argumentative or expressive devices, but constitute genuine objects of jurisprudential inquiry. They allow us to treat complex fictional world-building as contributing to the revision of legal theory and to its aspiration to universality, while also inviting a reconsideration of the philosophical space occupied by general jurisprudence.