ABSTRACT. My work is motivated by the belief that justice theory should not only help us understand abstract concepts, but should also provide us with practical guidance to address real-world problems. Even though thinkers like Iris Young and Charles Mills have tried to distance themselves from the Rawlsian tradition, rejecting ideal theory and other key concepts, I hold that their accounts of justice are still unable to provide us with this guidance we need. The practical applicability of even these more recent theories is limited, I argue, because, even as their projects are framed in opposition to Rawls, they still retain a key vestigial element from Rawlsian theory: they accept the foundational premise that we should take institutions (more specifically, the ‘basic structure of society’) to be the ‘primary subject’ of justice.

In my paper, I challenge this basic, widely-accepted premise, and argue that we have good reasons to develop theories that ascribe a primary role, not to institutions, but to interpersonal interactions. I discuss two main reasons to shift the focus of justice theory to these interactions, one strictly theoretical and one practical. First, I make the theoretical argument that an account of the justice of interpersonal interactions holds primacy over that of institutions because it is presupposed by an account of the justice of institutions: a theory of the justice of institutions, I hold, is unintelligible if we do not first understand what it means for one person to treat another justly. Second, my practical argument puts forward the idea that, while institution-centered theories suggest that injustices should be corrected by amending institutions we deem unjust, ‘corrections’ at the level of institutions may not provide us with guidance specific enough to remedy injustices in a satisfactory manner. It is important to be able to identify specific people responsible for committing injustices, as well as specific people entitled to compensation, and this requires that we start by examining, not our institutions, but how interactions between individuals under those institutions lead to just or unjust consequences. In sum, I believe that a theory of justice that sees interpersonal interactions as primary not only acknowledges how an account of just interactions comes prior to an account of just institutions, but may also provide us the specific prescriptions for action that could bring theory closer to practice.

ABSTRACT. Harms such as image-based sexual abuse, online harassment, and coercive control are proliferating in an increasingly interconnected world. Yet laws grounded in traditional definitions of personhood struggle to recognise these as serious wrongs against persons. This paper argues that liberal democracies should adopt relational personhood as the theoretical foundation for law, enabling law to better identify and address both digital and non-digital relational harms.

The atomistic definition of personhood traditionally prevalent in liberal democracies conceives persons as self-contained individuals whose rights derive from their mental capacities (Locke, 1690). Because this definition sees persons as fully contained by their bodies, it cannot recognise non-physical presence—such as online representation through images, avatars, or livestreams—as genuine presence. Consequently, laws grounded in atomistic personhood cannot adequately capture harms that violate relational integrity without necessarily affecting mental capacities or physical bodies. The criminal law's hierarchical approach to gauging harms prioritises physical harms over relational ones (Von Hirsch and Jareborg, 1991; Herring, 2024), rendering non-physical wrongs like image-based sexual abuse difficult to justify as serious offences against the person.

By contrast, relational personhood defines persons as socially embedded beings whose identity, autonomy, and value emerge through networks of care and interdependence. On this definition, anything that represents us to others—from physical presence to digital representations—constitutes part of our personhood because it enables the relationships through which we are enacted (Kyselo, 2014). Drawing from biology (Varela, 1979), cognitive science (Shotter, 1984), and legal theory (Nedelsky, 2012; Herring, 2019), this paper demonstrates that relational personhood better reflects how persons actually develop and exist and provides a more robust legal foundation for addressing contemporary and non-physical harms.

Although the digital age highlights the limitations of atomistic personhood, the case for relational personhood extends beyond digital contexts. We have always been relational beings: patients make medical decisions through deliberation with families (Zhang, 2003); migrants describe relocation as collective choice (Cocomá Ricaurte, 2025); voting behaviour is influenced by relational surroundings (Foos, 2017). 'Who cooked Adam Smith's dinner?' (Marçal, 2015) unveils the relational embeddedness even of atomistic theorists. Liberal democracies grounded in atomistic personhood are not equipped to capture and address potentially severe relational harms and cannot protect what matters most to persons. Grounding law in relational personhood enables legal systems to recognise genuine harms and protect the relational conditions through which persons actually exist and flourish.

ABSTRACT. What are the distributive demands of relational equality, that is, the idea that a just society is one in which individuals relate as equals and thereby sustain self-respect? Recent literature suggests, for example, sufficientarian and limitarian thresholds (Axelsen & Neilsen, 2015; 2024).

Additionally, thinkers, including Anderson (1999), suggest that relational equality demands responsibility-sensitive distributive principles to be applied to at least some parts of the distribution (e.g., Heilinger, 2024). The responsibility-sensitivity proposed here is rooted in relational equality (Schmidt, 2022) and, hence, is coherently subject to deriving from other relational concerns, unlike when justified by luck egalitarianism.

The demand for responsibility-sensitivity resurrects the luck egalitarian debate on where the “responsibility-cut” should be drawn: should individuals be held responsible for their choices fully (i.e., preference approach: Dworkin, 1981) or only to the extent they choose free from the effects of brute luck (i.e., control approach: Cohen, 1989)? While the former emphasizes the importance of respecting preferences and avoiding paternalism, the latter stresses the need to account for adaptive preferences, the occurrence of which is corroborated by experimental studies (e.g., Foley & Radl, 2025).

I propose the self-respect approach, a middle-way between these two approaches, coherent with the relational egalitarian grounding. It argues that individuals are not held responsible for their choice insofar as that is conditioned by their lack of self-respect due to inegalitarian relationships (e.g., oppression, discrimination) based on uncontrollable circumstances (e.g., gender, race). From the flipside, individuals’ preferences are respected insofar as they are not formed, for example, by gender oppression that harms self-respect.

This approach is inspired by a feminist innovation overlooked in theories of justice, that is, the idea of relational autonomy; particularly, its weak-substantive version (Mackenzie, 2008), which grounds autonomy in self-concepts formed via social relationships, and thereby overcomes the “agency dilemma”. Similarly, my self-respect approach, by grounding the responsibility-cut in self-respect, accounts for adaptive preferences due to damaged self-respect, while safeguarding individuals from objectionable paternalism by vindicating the state-intervention’s justifiability based on individuals’ conditions of self-respect.

After defending it from potential objections (e.g., objections from the strong-substantive version of relational autonomy, the control approach, and anti-paternalism), I illustrate my approach’s policy-implication by applying it to employment insurance, which legally discriminates between voluntary and involuntary job separations. If one resigns due, for example, to racial discrimination or sexual harassment, she should, my approach suggests, receive a similar amount of benefit as those who were fired.

ABSTRACT. Contemporary theories of human dignity equivocate between two major meanings, namely equally elevated status and intrinsic worth of humanity, which are extracted from the conceptual history of dignity. Yet most analytical theories help little to shed light on the immensely rich usage of human dignity in comparative constitutional jurisprudence around the world. In this chapter, I take a different approach. I take a historical-contextual approach. I narrate the development of the concept of human dignity in the unfolding of liberal modernity. The complex meanings of dignity make the most sense when they are embedded in the body of thoughts or world views in its time. Such narrative reveals the complex dynamics of the politics of dignity. I argue that the history of elevated status involves the politics of honor or pride, which harbors a fighting energy at risk of exclusion, coercion and violence. This fighting energy could be tempered by the “intrinsic worth” strand of dignity, but it requires a very thick understanding of human worth, such as that in Catholic personalism that facilitated emergence of human rights after WWII. In post-industrial liquid modernity, where social fabric is seriously frayed and politics polarized, construction of common public philosophy based on a rich understanding of human dignity is very difficult. Still this may be the only way forward.

ABSTRACT. Famously, Adam Smith proposed the concept of ‘impartial spectator’ (hereafter ‘IS’) to explain the intersubjective standard of moral judgements, and legal philosophers, including H. L. A. Hart, Neil MacCormick, and Maksymilian Del Mar, have engaged with IS for investigating the nature of law and judicial reasoning. However, it remains under-examined whether—and in what ways—Smith’s original thoughts on IS can clarify the foundations of legal normativity because of the insufficient interactions between historical Smithian scholarship and contemporary philosophical readings of IS. Therefore, this paper aims to explore how the Smithian conception of IS can illuminate the normativity of law by analysing it in light of historical Smith scholarship and placing it in the contemporary debates among (legal) philosophers. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, I examine how Smith himself formulated IS in his ethical work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, especially drawing on historical Smithian studies by Tom Campbell, D. D. Raphael, and Hiroshi Mizuta. I argue that the Smithian IS comprises four characteristics: (1) a plurality of disinterested, uninvolved persons; (2) the regulation of the passions; (3) the restraint of selfishness; and (4) a concern for generality. Second, I explicate the distinctiveness of Smith’s IS by comparing it with contemporary ideal-observer theories formed by Roderick Firth and other theorists directly and indirectly under the influence of Smith. I explain a fundamental divergence: whereas ideal-observer accounts presuppose a passionless observer from a superhuman standpoint, Smith’s IS is rooted in the experiences of impartial people within ordinary social life. Moreover, I reveal that this difference, which Campbell and Raphael already pointed out, poses philosophical problems for understanding the normativity of law in the Smithian theory of IS, stemming from its plural characteristics in comparison to ideal-observer theories. Third and finally, I construct a theory of legal normativity by interpreting the Smithian concept of IS philosophically, and I assess its strengths and limitations by situating it within contemporary discussions about the normativity of law. Also, I demonstrate that weaknesses inherent in Smithian IS for elucidating legal normativity can be productively refined by his legal philosophy in his Lectures on Jurisprudence.

ABSTRACT. The establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine within the framework of the Council of Europe marks a turning point in the evolution of international justice and in the consolidation of the rule of law beyond national borders. The initiative emerged from political and legal efforts that gained momentum throughout 2025. Both the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament issued resolutions in support of creating such a tribunal, while Ukraine actively engaged partners worldwide to build consensus. A Core Group of around forty states, working together with Ukrainian authorities, the Council of Europe, and the EU’s legal services, prepared the necessary legal instruments. On 25 June 2025, the President of Ukraine and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe signed the bilateral Agreement, thus setting the stage for the Tribunal’s creation.

This new body is intended to prosecute senior political and military leaders responsible for the decision to launch the war of aggression against Ukraine. While the International Criminal Court retains jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, it lacks competence over the crime of aggression in this specific case. The Special Tribunal is therefore designed to close this accountability gap, ensuring that the architects of aggression do not enjoy impunity.

The Tribunal’s significance goes beyond the Ukrainian conflict. It embodies the essence of the rule of law: the principle that no individual or state stands above legal norms. By criminalising the very act of aggression, it reaffirms that international law is not merely declaratory but enforceable through impartial adjudication. It also enhances the credibility of international legal order by countering the perception of selective enforcement, one of the major critiques directed at international justice mechanisms.

Furthermore, the creation of the Tribunal illustrates Europe’s ability to adapt its institutional architecture to unforeseen challenges. It strengthens the key dimensions of the rule of law—legality, accountability, equality before the law, and institutional innovation—while reinforcing Europe’s identity as a community grounded in democracy, human rights, and justice.

This paper will examine the Tribunal’s mandate, the obstacles faces, and its broader implications. It argues that this initiative not only provides Ukraine with a path to justice but also represents a milestone in consolidating the international rule of law, bridging domestic and international legal orders in the face of aggression.

ABSTRACT. This paper examines the question of why we should care about the authority of international law through some responses to philosophical anarchism. In the modern society, while the importance of international law continues to grow, it seems that the number of states, groups, and politicians resisting international law’s authority is also increasing. When witnessing actions that violate international law, the peoples including legal scholars proclaim that international law is ineffective. Certainly, instances where international law is not being complied with, or is being violated, may be increasing as a matter of people's experiential reality. Reconstructing such an observation as a philosophical argument, it may be termed the conceptual brand of philosophical anarchism. What I have in mind here is a form of philosophical anarchism such that when the law appears to impose an obligation, it is not actually doing so; law cannot create any new obligations where none existed before. In other words, the philosophical anarchism we have in mind here is the view that there are no individuaed obligations in law, and that the normativity of law is derived entirely from some other non-legal reasons lying in the background. Therefore, the question is how international law is individuated from other non-legal reasons, which is the question of how the authority of international law creates legal reasons for its subject. This constitutes the first point of this paper and the first reason why we should care about the authority of international law. The second point of this paper concerns the relationship between authority and legitimacy. In the conventional understanding, legitimacy requires authority understood as a normative power to change normative conditions such as the rights and obligations of subjects. Importantly, many philosophical anarchists think that legitimacy without authority is impossible, or a practically marginal phenomenon. Therefore, unless the concept of the authority of international law and its moral and normative structure can be plausibly elucidated, the legitimacy of international law itself will be defeated. This paper examines these two issues concerning the authority of international law through a critical response to philosophical anarchism, thereby clarifying why we should care about the authority of international law.

ABSTRACT. This paper presents Second World Approaches to International Law (SWAIL) as a framework for adopting cognitive postures that disclose how the normative content of international law is shaped by historical trajectories of power and knowledge production. SWAIL brings into view a dimension largely absent from prevailing scholarship: modes of thought attuned to perspectives that resist easy placement within canonical narratives forged in the epistemic frames of former European empires and their colonies. I advance the ‘Second World’ as an analytical category for tracing patterns of attitudes to international law otherwise obscured in standard accounts, foregrounding vantage points rooted in Eastern and Central Europe and other discursively marginal locations. The framework does not arise ex nihilo or as doctrinal invention. It follows, rather, from reading existing discourses of international law through a tradition that affirms the plurality of defensible world-concepts, articulated here via Gadamerian hermeneutics. The inquiry begins with an inward turn—professional self-reflection—as a necessary point of departure for grasping international law’s fuller meaning. It then moves outward to the self-validating epistemic circuit through which dominant understandings of the discipline (and its history) reinforce one another while obscuring alternative horizons. These alternative horizons are not offered as mere ‘translations’ of divergent views but as invitations to dialogical engagement with dominant frames, even without consensus. I close with a critical-ethical postulate: international lawyers must cultivate awareness not only of their own but also of multiple epistemic horizons and the perspectives that shape them, as a step toward the fusion of horizons. This postulate addresses both those who articulate dominant understandings and those who believe they are engaged in open interpretation. The latter often find their positions absorbed without reciprocity, through frames that misrecognize or flatten their situatedness.

ABSTRACT. Natural disasters cause damage to people's lives and property, sometimes even paralyzing social functions. Therefore, national and local governments implement disaster-prevention measures to protect the lives and property of their citizens. Specifically, various measures have been implemented, ranging from soft measures such as developing evacuation plans and creating hazard maps to hard measures like constructing levees and retrofitting buildings for earthquake resistance. In recent years, advances in science and technology have significantly impacted disaster-prevention measures. More significantly, technologies that intervene in natural phenomena themselves could have an even greater impact. Among various disasters, meteorological disasters are highly predictable, making intervention more feasible. For instance, techniques like seeding clouds with substances such as silver iodide to induce artificial rainfall already have a track record of use. In recent years, research has advanced on geoengineering—attempting global-scale interventions—as a countermeasure to worsening climate change, as well as on artificially intervening in extreme weather events like torrential rains and typhoons to mitigate damage. Furthermore, beyond meteorological disasters, research on planetary defense—aimed at preventing asteroid impacts on Earth—also continues to progress. However, these technological possibilities raise ethical dilemmas. Even if aimed at disaster-prevention, is human intervention in natural phenomena acceptable? Environmental ethics has long sought to move beyond anthropocentrism. Isn't artificially intervening in natural phenomena anthropocentric? On the other hand, Naomi Zack argues that "Fairly Save All Who Can Be Saved with the Best Preparation" is the best principle of disaster planning as disaster ethics (Zack 2023). If artificial intervention in natural phenomena is technically feasible, does undertaking it constitute "the Best Preparation"? At the heart of these questions lies a tension between the imperative to protect human lives and property and the ethical concerns about intervening in natural systems. Stephen M. Gardiner identified the conditions under which geoengineering might be "the lesser evil" (Gardiner 2011). Is artificial intervention in natural phenomena for disaster-prevention also "the lesser evil"? Does being "the Best Preparation" make such interventions morally acceptable despite its anthropocentric nature? In other words, can the framework of "the lesser evil" bridge the gap between disaster ethics and environmental ethics? This presentation examines the implications of artificial intervention in natural phenomena for disaster-prevention from both environmental ethics and disaster ethics perspectives.

ABSTRACT. The implementation of new technologies such as typhoon control is inevitably accompanied by multiple layers of uncertainty. While scientific and technical uncertainty is widely acknowledged, a less visible but equally vital challenge is moral uncertainty. That is, people hold differing views on what is morally permissible, and we often lack definitive knowledge about which ethical position is ultimately correct. Therefore, decision-making in the ELSI (Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications) context involves not only empirical uncertainties, but also moral uncertainty.

How should we approach this kind of uncertainty in the context of implementing typhoon control technologies? In this presentation, I draw on the work of William MacAskill and colleagues, who have developed a normative framework for reasoning under moral uncertainty. According to their view, when faced with conflicting ethical theories, we should consider how confident we are in each of them and aim to choose the action with the highest expected moral value (MacAskill 2024). I will explore how MacAskill’s framework and moral uncertainty can be applied to the ELSI of typhoon control technologies.

Building on this idea, I will make two implications about implementing typhoon control. Firstly, while I admit that moral uncertainty might give us another reason to hesitate a deployment of typhoon control, I want to show such objection based on moral uncertainty is too hasty, given lots of ethical issues are interconnected.

Secondly, from a methodological standpoint, MacAskill’s framework suggests that, at least in some cases, we can make ethically informed decisions without resolving fundamental moral disagreements. This approach does not render the exploration of moral theories meaningless. On the contrary, it underscores the need to investigate what theories exist, how plausible they are, and how different ethical considerations interrelate. We ought to gather not only empirical data but also ethical insights—and ideally, include voices from people who hold diverse ethical views in the deliberative process.

ABSTRACT. Ronald Dworkin’s foreword to Extreme Speech and Democracy inaugurated a new chapter in hate speech debates. His democratic legitimacy-based argument against restrictions has since been contested and refined, culminating in what I call the Waldron–Weinstein Exchange. In this article, I use the label ‘Waldron–Weinstein Exchange’ to denote not merely the discourse between Waldron and Weinstein, but also a wider body of scholarly argument spanning more than a decade, widely recognized as one of the most significant debates on hate speech regulation. Rather than reducing this exchange to a binary victory, this article extracts an analytical framework instructive for liberal democracies grappling with enacting hate speech laws. The analysis proceeds in three distinct stages. First, it reconceptualizes the transatlantic clash by shifting the analytical focus from defining hate speech to conceptualizing hate speech regulation. The article constructs a Three-Tier Spectrum to isolate the specific regulatory interventions championed by proponents and rejected by skeptics. This is the genuinely contested scope of hate speech regulation. Second, the article assesses the exchange’s core arguments—contrasting Jeremy Waldron’s Dignity and Manner theses with James Weinstein’s practical critiques. By examining the actual operation of speech laws, the analysis reveals that while theories may conceive and defend a tightly circumscribed scope of regulation, legal practice inevitably expands the restrictive footprint, generating systemic chilling effects that far exceed theoretical control. Furthermore, the rationale of content neutrality demonstrates why such content-based regulations uniquely threaten systemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, the article terms its observations the ‘Symbolic Case Fallacy’: the tendency to grasp hate speech regulation through a wishful, prototypical lens, thereby neglecting the multifaceted complexity of the issue. Aware that this critique might risk its own Symbolic Case Fallacy, the article does not categorically reject the legitimacy of all hate speech regulations. Rather, it cautions against elevating the enactment of such laws to a universal mandate, advocating instead for a pragmatic approach grounded in the concrete realities of individual political communities. Taiwan provides a case in point.

ABSTRACT. This paper purposes to analyze the interactions between artistic expressions challenging to existing moral norms and legal institutions trying to maintain existing moral orders. Thereby we try to achieve a better understandings of processes by which two social systems, law and art, shape and reproduce moral norms. Artists can play roles as norm entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs doubt the legitimacy of existing moral norms and try to make people rethink about our conventions by attracting people's attention through their charisma. Further, they try to promote new moral alternatives, which are currently minor opinions, to mainstream common sense in the future. For instance, recent rapid changes of our opinions about gender role models or harassments are the results of activities of a few norm entrepreneurs being accepted by people in society widely. In this sense, norm entrepreneurs are innovative and taboo-violating. On the other hand, legal institutions often try to regulate extreme expressions in order to maintain existing moral orders. Of course, it is possible for artists to behave conservatively or, more likely, for legal institutions to behave progressively. However, art is usually avant-garde bad-boy and legal institution is usually conservative good-boy. The important point here is to understand the reason why these two social systems, law and art, have such kinds of interactions. This paper claims that the difference between law as a good-boy and art as a bad-boy does not result from their intrinsic natures but from the structures of their practices. Protesting activities by norm entrepreneurs are basically bottom-up practices which are carried out by individuals or small groups. On the other hand, maintenance of existing orders is generally implemented through combinations of top-down and bottom-up practices of many stake holders. Therefore, the tendency of art being a bad-boy and law being a good-boy occurs just because artistic expressions often take the first structure and legal institutions often take the second. If law took the second structure, like policy-making litigation, law would be a bad-boy, and if art took the first, like a big project of large scale artists’studio, art would be a good-boy. According to this model, this paper explores Japanese and Korean cases in which artistic expressions challenge to existing sexual morality and legal institutions try to regulate them. A criminal case of publication of sexually indecent novel in Japan and legal regulations of comic books or internet in South Korea are examined.

ABSTRACT. Criminalization generally refers to the process of classifying certain acts as crimes, regulating them through criminal law, and responding with sanctions in the form of punishment. Criminalization theory can be defined as a theory that establishes and systematizes the principles regarding what acts should be criminalized. This report aims to reconsider whether it is actually possible to construct a theory of criminalization. The Hart-Devlin controversy, a well-known debate in the field of legal philosophy, involved a debate over the appropriateness of enforcing morality through criminal law. Hart points out that the Wolfenden Report, which examined the legal treatment of homosexual crimes and prostitution and which considered the debate, supports Mill's harm principle. The harm principle is a principle that indicates when others or the government can legitimately interfere with a person's freedom of action. According to Mill, the only purpose for which such interference is permissible is to prevent harm to others. This harm principle can be seen as the starting point for discussions of criminalization. However, although the harm principle was later refined by Feinberg, it did not become a principle capable of explaining all aspects of criminalization. Furthermore, the limitations of the harm principle have come to be clearly recognized. Currently, the view of legal moralism, which holds that the immorality of an act is the basis for criminalization, is being actively discussed. This view originated in Devlin's argument and was initially dismissed. But why has legal moralism once again come into the spotlight? This report aims to answer this question by drawing on recent Anglo-American discussions of legal moralism. Although criminalization has been discussed and developed by many theorists, no systematic theory of criminalization has been constructed. So, how is legal moralism thought to be able to explain criminalization? Because legal moralism is a view that holds that the immorality of an act is the basis for criminalization, it can be said that the view is based on the hypothesis that the standard for criminalization can be determined by whether or not an act is immoral. However, I believe it is difficult to base criminalization criteria on legal morality, and so I would like to explore more complex theoretical grounds for criminalization to determine whether they can contribute to the construction of criminalization theory.

ABSTRACT. According to the legal doctrine of causation, an intervening cause is an act or event that breaks the causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the resulting harm. However, it is puzzling how the causal connection can break off suddenly with the intervention of human agency. This paper employs the causal modeling framework to dissolve this puzzle by treating intervening causes as exogenous interventions on intermediate variables in causal chains. Drawing on the distinction between the observer’s and the deliberative agent’s perspectives, we explain why voluntary actions constitute intervening causes that cut off the causal influence of prior events on subsequent outcomes.

ABSTRACT. Recent work in criminal law scholarship has called for a shift towards the democratization of criminal law (Kleinfeld et al. 2017; Kleinfeld 2017b; 2017a; Robinson 2017). These theories rely not only on philosophical claims about why the law ought to reflect the values of the people but also on empirical assumptions about public opinion. Specifically, they presuppose broad public agreement (specifically, supermajority agreement) regarding what acts should be punished and the severity of those punishments (see Kleinfeld 2016, 1555).

In our talk, we argue that while democratic theories of criminal law are right to consider public opinion as an important component, we contend that there are important gaps between the empirical assumptions they make and the empirical data that is available. We will develop our argument in three steps.

First, democratic theorists need to specify what the agreement should be about. Paul Robinson, for example, argued that there is wide agreement on a set of core crimes (e.g., murder, assault, property damage), both in terms of which acts to criminalize and on ordinal proportionality (Robinson 2017). Against this, we argue that a consensus on these core crimes leaves many other types of criminal wrongdoing unaddressed, and that agreement on ordinal proportionality is silent on concrete punishment severity.

Second, democratic theorists need to clarify which populations should exhibit broad agreement, as public opinion on punishment can vary widely between and within countries. For example, research on the death penalty shows that support differs not just between retentionist and abolitionist nations, but also within these groups (McCarthy and Brunton-Smith 2024). These differences highlight the need for democratic theorists to specify the level at which consensus should be measured.

Third, we argue that democratic theorists need to pay close attention to the type of public opinion data that they use. This is because opinion surveys about punishment are shaped by many subtle design decisions including the specific wording of questions, abstract policies vs. concrete scenarios, etc. (see Walker and Hough 1988). Therefore, democratic theorists must carefully assess whether the empirical studies they rely on meet the standards of agreement their theories require.

We conclude that while public opinion is undoubtedly relevant for democratic theories of criminal law, the gaps between what these theories demand and what the data can reliably show necessitate a more cautious approach to integrating empirical data into democratic legal theory.

ABSTRACT. The parent–child relationship is among the most consequential human relationships: parents exercise authority over children that is rarely matched elsewhere. That authority can nurture, but it can also be abused, sometimes culminating in grave violations of children’s rights. In response, a growing literature argues that holding a “right to parent” should depend on conditions beyond mere biological parenthood. This paper contends that such right-to-parent theories misidentify the central normative task. Rather than pursuing indirect, parent-mediated child protection, we should develop a framework that specifies, prioritizes, and enforces children’s rights directly.

After surveying three influential models—the Dual-Interest (DI) view, which balances children’s and would-be parents’ interests; the Best Available Parent (BAP) view, which selects the best available parent for each child; and the Licensing Parents (LP) view, which proposes ex ante competence screening—the paper reconstructs a common architecture: (A) a purported independence from the substantive content of children’s rights and of parental authority (parental powers), and (B) a once-and-for-all, ex ante eligibility assessment.

Two core arguments follow. First, the Epiphenomenality Argument shows that each model covertly imports the very children’s-rights standards it claims to bracket: DI fixes “sufficiently good” thresholds by appeal to children’s interests; BAP’s feasibility presupposes prior compromises about the scope and stringency of children’s claims to secure a viable candidate pool; and LP’s cut-offs must be relaxed to avoid candidate scarcity, relying on parallel children’s-rights protections and supports. In each case, the normative outcomes for children are largely settled by the background children’s-rights framework, rendering allocation theories epiphenomenal rather than independently action-guiding.

Second, the Dispensability Argument contends that, once children’s rights are specified and credibly enforced through ongoing, proportionate, and revisable interventions (support, guidance, graduated restrictions, and—where necessary—reassignment), the initial allocation of the parental role loses decisive importance for the child. Even in non-ideal contexts, investments in ex post enforcement and service infrastructure typically dominate the moral value of ex ante allocation rules; at best, right-to-parent proposals serve as provisional heuristics under severe enforcement shortfalls.

The paper concludes that a children’s-rights-driven framework—with continuous oversight and corrigibility—offers a more direct and effective route to children’s justice than further refinements of right-to-parent allocations.

ABSTRACT. In Japan, drawing on Anglo-American political philosophy, liberal, feminist, and queer critiques of the marriage institution have accumulated and increasingly press for its dismantling. Building on this literature, my work sketches—admittedly in broad strokes—what a “marriage-free state” would require: How should the state regulate adult co-living once marriage is abolished, and how should it assign parents to children? Against the backdrop of intensifying campaigns across Northeast Asia for the recognition of same-sex marriage, this presentation invites participants to consider marriage from a slightly different angle: not whether to extend it, but whether we should move beyond it. I first revisit Martha Fineman’s influential proposal to abolish civil marriage, to leave adult intimate and domestic arrangements to private ordering—primarily contract law—and to reconstruct family law as a public infrastructure for addressing dependency and caring. I then identify two design tasks that arise when making this proposal concrete. The first concerns the contractualization of adult co-living: what reforms to contract doctrine and adjacent private-law fields are needed to secure relational equality between parties with systematically asymmetric bargaining positions? The second task concerns parental allocation once marital presumptions are gone: by what standards should the state assign parental status? I map the main options, contrasting child-centered approaches (grounded in children’s rights) with approaches that also weigh procreators’ right or responsibility to parent.

ABSTRACT. This paper explores how a liberal democratic state can legitimately intervene in the regulation of family relationships, against the backdrop of the normative tension between individual freedom, political neutrality, and public intervention. The central claim is that the state’s regulation of families can be justified insofar as it protects and promotes care as a public good. Drawing on feminist ethics of care and political liberalism, the paper conceptualizes families as intimate associations of care: relationships marked by intimacy, commitment, and both the practice and disposition to care. This conception captures the moral distinctiveness of family life while remaining compatible with pluralism about the good life, without reducing the family to biological or dyadic models. The first part of the work preliminarily reconstructs the normative tension between state neutrality and the need for family law, distinguishing between coercive and non-coercive interferences, and between recognition and regulation. It points out that in pluralist societies characterized by reasonable disagreement about the good life, political liberalism requires justification of family law based on shared public interests rather than comprehensive moral doctrines. Hence, as contemporary societies witness an expanding plurality of family forms, the traditional legal model, centered on marriage and biological parenthood, appears increasingly inadequate. The work then argues that family relationships deserve legal protection when they fulfil socially valuable functions that sustain individual autonomy and equality. Second, the paper identifies care as the normative foundation that legitimizes such intervention. The argument unfolds through three claims. First, as Elizabeth Brake pointed out, relationships of care are primary goods in the Rawlsian sense: they provide the conditions for autonomy, self-respect, and the pursuit of diverse life plans, and thus the state has a duty to secure their existence. Second, caring relationships involve vulnerability and dependence, making legal protection necessary to prevent abuse and injustice within families. Third, families’ caring work also serves public welfare by relieving the state of some care functions, which reinforces (but should not replace) the duty to provide universal forms of social care. Ultimately, recognizing and regulating families as intimate associations of care reconciles liberal neutrality with the democratic value of protecting human relationships essential to individual flourishing and social cohesion. The paper thus offers a theoretical framework for rethinking family law as a legitimate domain of liberal-democratic regulation: one that protects the relational conditions of autonomy and equality rather than enforcing any moralized ideal of the family.

ABSTRACT. In October 2024, the Tokyo High Court, like the Sapporo High Court previously, found the lack of legal protection for same-sex couples in Japan unconstitutional. Since then, the Fukuoka, Osaka, and Nagoya High Courts have also issued similar decisions. These judicial outcomes are hard to fault. The Tokyo High Court’s decision, for example, hits all the right notes. It is textually plausible, commonsensical, just and respectful of the principles of legality, separation of powers and institutional competence. But it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court of Japan will affirm these judgements. More significantly, perhaps, the LDP governing elite has long been resistant to same-sex marriage. This paper maintains that the failure to provide same-sex relationships with legal protection is a failure of democracy. This is not so much because a majority of Japanese people happen to in fact support same-sex marriage — though that is obviously noteworthy, too. Rather, I invoke the late Ronald Dworkin’s partnership conception of democracy to justify my claim, arguing that the value of democracy cannot be properly accounted for without a political community’s equal concern for the fate of each of its members. My paper also elaborates on the Fukuoka High Court finding that lack of legal protection for same-sex couples impinges on the right to happiness. I will argue that, apart from the crucial practical consequences attaching to same-sex relationship recognition, recognition also has more intangible, but equally important, benefits for the well being of same-sex attracted people. I will draw on Raz’s conception of personal well-being to argue that same-sex relationship recognition enables same-sex attracted people to integrate their same-sex desire into valuable forms of life.

ABSTRACT. Courts and scholars widely rely on proportionality, but they often lack clear instructions for cases in which the factual basis of a justifiability and principle-interfering measure is uncertain. This paper reconsiders Robert Alexy’s index model of the ideal ought and its connection to proportionality balancing and the weight formula, then specifies a transparent step that links the reliability of empirical assumptions to the permissibility of interferences. Reliability, which is the certainty of the evidence supporting reasons for and against restrictions is assessed on a triadic scale (e.g., high / medium / low), and is applied symmetrically to both sides, and the chosen level and reasons are stated expressly. As uncertainty increases, the abstract importance of the competing principles remains stable, and the core of rights is preserved. Concretely, the review step is as follows: for each side of the balance, the court records the intensity of interference, the abstract importance of the relevant principle, and the degree of reliability of the empirical assumptions, states reasons for each, and derives the scope of justified restrictions. The approach is shown with freedom of expression in conflicts with privacy and reputation. This paper shows how making reliability explicit and applying it symmetrically to both sides channels outcomes, analyzing outcomes toward narrow remedies when evidence is weak and allows for more targeted measures only where reliability is high. Applied to examples of defamation and insult cases, it will reach the court decision while forcing explicit reliability findings, preventing the conflation of evidentiary weakness with abstract importance, and doing so without reconsidering the weighting of rights or resorting to full numerical quantification.

ABSTRACT. This paper aims to explore the legal theory of the German jurist Werner Maihofer (1918–2009). It argues that Maihofer’s legal theory begins with the question of why law exists in society, emphasizing that the purpose of law is to address the problem of coexistence between the ego and alter ego within a social context. From an existentialist philosophical perspective, Maihofer contends that the aim of law is to establish a free order in society. This legal order enables two or more individuals, who is subjects of freedom, to coexist. This paper will demonstrate that Maihofer’s legal theory in order to explain the importance of the concept of sociality in his Teory, it will also argue that the purpose of law should be to facilitate the coexistence of diverse subjects within society, rather than to serve merely as an instrument of social control or tool for the politcal policy. Although his theory has been neglect by contemporary legal theories, his view holds significant relevance in contemporary democratic societies.

ABSTRACT. This paper explores the conceptual parallels between the early philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Pure Theory of Law developed by Hans Kelsen, focusing on their shared Viennese intellectual context. While there is no direct influence traceable between the two thinkers, their respective projects reveal striking structural and methodological affinities that go beyond coincidence.

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus conceives the world as the “totality of facts, not of things” – a formulation that resonates deeply with Kelsen’s vision of the legal order as a normative system grounded in the interpretation of acts, not in metaphysical entities. Both thinkers begin from a rejection of essentialism and orient their theories around formal structures: logical form in Wittgenstein, normative form in Kelsen.

This affinity is further underscored by their respective treatments of representation. For Wittgenstein, the function of language is pictorial – propositions "mirror" reality by sharing a logical form with the facts they represent. For Kelsen, legal norms function not by reflecting reality, but by framing it interpretively through hierarchical relations of validity (the Stufenbau). In both systems, the structural relation between elements is what confers meaning or validity – not the elements themselves.

Finally, both thinkers distinguish sharply between what can be said and what must be shown. Wittgenstein famously concludes that "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent," while Kelsen rigorously demarcates the domain of legal science from ethics, politics, or metaphysics. Yet both ultimately point – whether they admit it or not – to the limits of language and conceptual analysis as a way of touching the "sense" that lies beyond form.

This paper argues that despite their different disciplinary orientations, the thought of Kelsen and early Wittgenstein share a philosophical DNA – one shaped by the broader epistemological and formalist currents of early 20th-century Vienna. This affinity invites a reexamination of legal normativity as not merely a social or institutional fact, but as a problem of form, structure, and meaning in its own right.

ABSTRACT. The aim of this presentation is to reevaluate two classical approaches in comparative legal studies from the perspective of legal reform through legal mimesis. These approaches are: (1) the genealogical (or, family-tree) approach to understanding the world's legal systems, and (2) the typology of legal families. Contemporary comparative legal studies have reached a common understanding of the phenomenon of cross-societal legal transfer. This understanding has been shaped by several key developments: the legal transplant debate since the 1970s, studies on the pluralistic coexistence of law in postcolonial contexts, mixed and mixing laws paradigm emerging from research on mixed jurisdictions, which offer valuable insights into “Transfrontier Mobility of Law”, and lessons learned from the "Law and Development" movement and legal development assistance. According to this understanding, while legal rules, institutions, and concepts can be transferred across social and cultural boundaries, they are first decontextualized during the transfer process and subsequently recontextualized to fit the socio-cultural environment of the receiving country. As a result, the transferred laws acquire meanings and forms distinct from their originals. Therefore, legal diffusion does not lead to convergence of legal forms; rather, it is a divergent process that produces unique hybrids (or “an original blend”) through interaction with existing legal elements in the receiving country. This view, while acknowledging the cross-societal transfer of law, emphasizes significant discontinuities. This view is grounded in a postmodern critical comparative law that highlights the distinctiveness among legal systems and cultures. In contrast, genealogical approach and typology of legal families assume continuity and genealogical identity among different legal systems. From the postmodern standpoint, such approaches may be criticized as overly simplistic, potentially obscuring meaningful differences. Nevertheless, the notion of continuity and genealogical identity can offer valuable insights when assessing legal compatibility and the challenges of legal mimesis in the context of legal reform. It also enables cross-temporal mimesis (or “legal revivals”) by tracing the historical lineage of legal traditions. In this presentation, I will illustrate the usefulness of the genealogical approach and typology of legal families through some examples. I will then argue that legal family trees and typologies should not be treated as static constructs; rather, to remain analytically relevant, they must be continuously revised and updated through ongoing research.

ABSTRACT. This paper examines the influence of early modern natural law theory on English colonization of North America and on Japan's modern claims to sovereignty and property over Hokkaido and Okinawa. The ancient Roman lawyers developed complicated and sophisticated property law, which included theory of first possession of bona vacantia (vacant goods). According to this theory, vacant goods nobody occupies or owns can be acquired by first possession. But it seems that ancient Roman lawyers considered that this theory can be applied to only movable and personal properties, like wild animals or fruits. In early modern ages, the doctrine of first possession was utilized by Western jurists to justify the acquisition of overseas territories and colonies. According to their terra nullius (vacant land) theory, vacant lands which nobody occupies or owns can be acquired by the first discovery and possession. Particularly notable are the natural law theories of Hugo Grotius and John Locke. They said that unowned land becomes the property of the first person to occupy it or invest labor in it. Such theories of land acquisition apply only to lands no one already owns or occupies. However, Grotius and Locke thought that indigenous peoples did not settle and cultivate the lands, and therefore these lands were terra nullius. Such arguments were employed when English settlers colonized North America. For instance, settlers like John Cotton asserted that colonization was legally allowed precisely because America was terra nullius. Conversely, others argued that American lands belonged to the indigenous peoples and could only be acquired through purchase (or conquest via just war). The United States Supreme Court ultimately resolved this issue in its 1823 landmark decision Johnson v. McIntosh. During Japan's modernization in the late 19th century, European jurisprudence was imported. To justify Japan's claim to Hokkaido, arguments based on the doctrine of terra nullius and natural law theory were employed. Amane Nishi, who succeeded in introducing and translating Western international law in modern Japan, drew analogies between the Ainu of Hokkaido and the Native Americans of North America to justify the Japanese government's development of Ezochi (Hokkaido). But it seems that natural law theory declined in the 19th century, and modern Japanese arguments deeply relied on the civilization arguments, which justified to civilize the savage. Japanese modern theory tends to be more racist than early modern natural law theory of Grotius and Locke.

ABSTRACT. This study examines the lagged restructuring of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s co-citation network over a ten-year horizon, with a focused lens on the housing and credit domains. A stochastic block model (SBM) applied to annual snapshots of the Court’s citation graph, complemented by descriptive network analytics and a core–periphery decomposition. Our dataset includes Court judgments only (excluding the General Court and Advocates General), harmonized to a case–year structure and annotated thematically for housing/credit through rule-based and lexical filters. Methodologically, we estimate SBMs separately for each year to recover evolving block memberships and to identify a core of high-interoperability precedents. We then track transitions across blocks and core status, producing descriptive lag profiles (t to t+1…t+5) for (i) entry into core, (ii) persistence within core, and (iii) diffusion of cross-block ties. These profiles are non-parametric and do not claim causal identification; rather, they summarize the temporal regularities by which precedents accumulate network authority after institutional or doctrinal impulses. Three results stand out. First, core consolidation is not immediate: a substantial share of nodes that ultimately stabilize in the core do so with a multi-year delay, with the modal transition occurring between years 3 and 5 after initial uptake in citations. Second, the core shows selective thickening around blocks that bridge regulatory silos; within these bridges, housing and credit function as doctrinal infrastructures, supplying transferable legal reasoning to adjacent regulatory problems (e.g., market organization, consumer protection, and enforcement). Third, “foundational” cases retain high symbolic centrality, but the operational core is increasingly composed of mid-range precedents whose reasoning is versatile across domains and thus more frequently co-cited in applied disputes. Legally, the findings support a model of interpretive authority as lagged operationalization: precedents become authoritative not by instantaneous canonization but by accumulating cross-context usability over several years. For housing and credit, this dynamic yields a stable corridor of interoperability that structures judicial problem-solving across otherwise fragmented regimes. The paper contributes a temporally explicit, legally grounded account of how EU precedents attain and exercise authority within a complex, evolving network—without resorting to event-study identification, and strictly through SBM-based mapping, descriptive metrics, and core–periphery analysis.

ABSTRACT. The expanding use of artificial intelligence (AI) in legal work raises profound questions about autonomy, responsibility, and the relational foundations of justice. While legal systems increasingly integrate AI tools for drafting, analysis, and decision support, the emotional and ethical implications of this transformation remain underexplored, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. This paper presents a study of 1,214 Polish legal professionals, including judges, prosecutors, attorneys, and legal advisors, designed to examine how legal practitioners perceive and emotionally respond to AI. Building upon Wang and Wang’s (2022) multidimensional model of AI anxiety, the study investigates (a) differences in anxiety profiles across legal professions, (b) associations between AI-related anxiety, trust in AI systems, and openness to their use, and (c) moderating effects of demographic and professional factors such as gender and career stage. The research further explores how practitioners justify or resist AI-assisted legal work—whether by invoking efficiency, ethical caution, or the preservation of professional autonomy—and how these orientations reflect differing conceptions of responsibility and trust within the legal profession. By situating emotional and ethical reactions to AI within the context of a European democracy with rapidly evolving digital and institutional infrastructures, the study highlights that the future of AI in law depends not only on regulation or technical design, but also on the emotional climate and relational trust that underpin professional legitimacy in the age of intelligent technologies.

ABSTRACT. Deliberative democracy has become a prominent field of study in contemporary political thought. In Taiwan, many citizens have come to realize that “without discussion, there is no democracy,” and they now closely monitor the performance of legislators in the national parliament. However, in an increasingly individualized and opinion-divided society, achieving a certain level of consensus on specific social or political issues through collective deliberation has become a difficult task. To address this challenge, scientists at Google DeepMind have proposed a method by which artificial intelligence can assist in the deliberative process. Inspired by Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, they developed an AI-mediated tool designed to facilitate complex group discussions—what they call the “Habermas Machine.”

The Habermas Machine is a negotiation-oriented artificial intelligence (AI) system based on large language models (LLMs). It is capable of iteratively generating and refining position statements within groups on particular social or political issues, thereby helping participants identify common ground and promoting the formation of consensus. In a series of experimental deliberations involving more than 5,000 participants, researchers tested the capabilities of the Habermas Machine. The results showed that most participants preferred AI-generated statements over those written by human mediators, finding the AI’s outputs to be more informative, clearer, and more impartial. Furthermore, participants were more likely to modify their views after the discussions, converging toward shared positions. The research team concluded that AI can help people discover a common foundation in deliberative democratic discussions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine, on the basis of Habermas’s theory, whether and in what sense AI can facilitate mutual communication, rational debate, and ultimately the achievement of consensus. Section II introduces the Theory of Communicative Action, which inspired the Habermas Machine project, along with its subsequent influence on Habermas’s legal and political thought, illustrating how he conceptualizes deliberative democracy. Section III explores the mechanism of the Habermas Machine, focusing on how AI can enhance deliberative efficiency, mediate differences, and foster the integration of diverse opinions. Section IV evaluates the Habermas Machine through the lens of Habermas’s theory, aiming to identify its strengths and limitations. Finally, the paper offers reflections on the potential role of AI in the practice of deliberative democracy.

ABSTRACT. As artificial intelligence technology is developing, customization technologies are also becoming increasingly advanced. Consequently, the utility of individuals and society is also increasing. The notion that individualization leads to greater social progress is gaining traction. For that reason, attempts are being made to apply this individualization to law. In other words, the possibility of individualizing law is being explored. The argument is that individualizing law can create a rule of law that is responding to each individual, and even to society. This paper examines the feasibility and validity of that argument. By exploring the idea and background of the rule of law, this paper would like to handle whether the rule of law and the individualization of law are truly possible, and if so, how they can be justified. To this end, it draws upon the theories of the German legal philosopher Klaus Guenther.

ABSTRACT. Structural injustice has become one of the most widely discussed topics in contemporary normative theory. I. M. Young introduced this conception of injustice and proposed a new model of responsibility - the social connection model - which, Young argues, provides an appropriate basis for grounding and assessing individuals’ responsibility for structural injustice. Since the publication of Young’s posthumous book, numerous theorists have criticized and sought to refine Young’s ideas. One of the most compelling critiques concerns a key presupposition in Young’s account: namely, that people in society recognize the existence of structural injustice. In reality, however, neither all of the oppressed nor - perhaps even more so - the privileged are necessarily aware of such circumstances. In response, several theorists, including C. Hayward, T. Jugov, and L. Ypi, have examined the epistemic dimension of structural injustice, that is, how and what kinds of ignorance arise within structural injustices, and how individuals should discharge their responsibilities in light of such epistemic limitations. In this presentation, I aim to clarify this epistemic dimension by exploring the relationship between structural injustice and epistemic injustice. While many epistemologists - most notably M. Fricker - emphasize the importance of individual epistemic virtues in addressing epistemic injustice, E. Anderson instead directs attention to its structural sources. Following Anderson’s line of argument, I will explain how structural injustice is intertwined with epistemic injustice. I then argue that disruptive politics, as proposed by Hayward, is required as an initial step toward transforming social structures and overcoming structural injustice. As Hayward suggests, disruptive politics has the potential - not only to challenge people’s ignorance of injustice, but also to reshape the very social structures that sustain it.

ABSTRACT. Conscientious objection arises when individuals strongly disagree with social norms that they deem incompatible with their personal beliefs. In the medical context, accommodating conscientious objections means that healthcare professionals are allowed to refuse to participate in medical procedures that conflict with their deeply held moral convictions. The most commonly objected medical services are related to the physician-patient relationship. Examples include pregnancy termination, in vitro fertilisation, and assisted suicide. Nonetheless, the conceptual parameters of conscientious objection and the relevance of the concept of conscience in its justification might enable its application to other practices outside such a relationship – for instance, practices related to a commitment to sustainability. This paper explores how the passive, non-confrontational, and individual nature of conscientious objection – among other conceptual parameters – and the broadening of the concept of conscience to include sustainability commitments might lead to the justification of healthcare professionals’ refusals to participate in studies involving unsustainable practices, to use non-eco-friendly medical products or those produced in environmentally harmful ways, and to prescribe medications from companies known for unsustainable practices. The analysis proceeds on the assumption that, should conscientious objection to abortion, in vitro fertilisation, or assisted suicide be legally accepted, the healthcare professional’s sustainable conscientious objection ought to be accepted as well. This follows because the core justification for traditional conscientious objection – respect for deeply held moral or ethical convictions – applies equally to sustainability-driven refusals. If the legal and ethical grounds are sufficient to allow one form of objection, consistency requires that similar protections be extended to sustainability-based objections.

ABSTRACT. The question of well-orderedness is of particular importance in liberal democratic societies. Stability depends on citizens’ support for the principles underpinning the institutional framework. I examine what conditions need to obtain to enable ordinary citizens - those who aren’t amongst the worst-off, but do not possess scarce talents either - to cultivate an endorsement of the principles of justice. I argue for the significance of the recognition of pro-social behaviours.

I examine two related problems. First, the question of self-respect. Rawls states it is the most important primary good. He argues it is guaranteed by equal citizenship for all and a limitation on distributional inequalities. But who may obtain additional resources, and how much exactly? In a Rawlsian society, only those with scarce productive talents can access incentives and through them, an improved standard of living. This privileged position of the talented risks damaging the sense of equal citizenship for all.

I present a thought experiment to illustrate that it is possible to conceive of pro-social behaviours that affirm the guiding principles of society and better the situation of the worst-off, but do not necessitate the use of incentives or the application of scarce talents or skills. I will argue that society should publicly recognise pro-social, principle-affirming behaviour, regardless of whether the behaviour is an application of scarce talents or not. This allows for the potential for recognition of ordinary citizens, regardless of their morally arbitrary characteristics, thereby providing a more robust base for self-respect.

Second, I look at the question of stability. Rawls argues that citizens have a duty to justice, to work towards the establishment and maintenance of just institutions. This necessitates well-orderedness. Rawls derives well-orderedness from the effect the institutional framework has on people’s values and the social ethos of society, reproducing support for the principles of justice. In other words, the guiding principles of society must be internally consistent, to enable to development of a societal ethos that allows for reproduction of the just institutional framework.

I argue that the formal recognition of pro-social, principle-affirming behaviour within the institutional framework is necessary for allowing citizens to develop an appreciation for the guiding principles of their society. Additionally, the recognition and potential rewarding of such behaviour must be promoted over other bases of legitimate inequalities, to help the reproduction of “a certain form of culture shared by persons with certain conceptions of their good.” (Rawls, Political Liberalism)

ABSTRACT. Global challenges such as climate change, refugee protection, and international aid are persistently characterized by widespread non-compliance with moral duties. This gap between normative ideals and reality, known in political philosophy as "partial compliance," raises urgent questions about the appropriate normative guidance for those agents (compliers) who are willing to do their part. The debate on this issue has been dominated by two conflicting positions: the Fair Share View (FSV) and the Slack-Taking View (STV). The Fair Share View (FSV) maintains that compliers sufficiently discharge their duties by fulfilling their predetermined fair share of the collective burden. On this view, the failures of others do not expand one's own duties. In contrast, the Slack-Taking View (STV) argues that the failure of some agents to comply generates additional duties for compliers to "take up the slack." This view emphasizes the moral urgency of the collective goal (e.g., mitigating climate change), suggesting that compliers must contribute more than their initial fair share. This paper challenges the fundamental dichotomy presented by FSV and STV. Both views implicitly assume that the "fair share" itself, typically calculated under conditions of full compliance, remains a stable benchmark. This paper proposes a novel third position: under partial compliance, the fair share demanded of compliers may itself be reduced. This alternative view is grounded in the principle of fair play and its foundational ideal of reciprocity. I argue that "intuitions about fairness" that motivate both FSV and STV are most accurately explained by the principle of fair play. However, extending this principle to the non-ideal context of partial compliance requires careful consideration of the constraints imposed by reciprocity. Specifically, the principle of fair play generates duties only when others are also doing their part. When non-compliance is widespread, the expectation of reciprocity is fundamentally violated. This paper shows that this violation alters the very demands of fair play, potentially diminishing the original fair share required of compliers. This analysis provides a distinct account of how moral duties should be redefined in our non-ideal world.

ABSTRACT. We tend to conjoin democracy and the rule of law when describing good government. This article proposes one of its own explanation for the confluence of democracy and the rule of law. The two complement each other because they rationalize the government power. The rationalization of policy rely on the constitutive and normative nature of the principles of the rule of law. The principles of the rule of law are constitutive because the constitute legal and political practice, but also the values inherent to this practices. The principles of the rule of law are normative because they provide reasons for the actions of public authorities, or more precisely, they provide reasons for action in view of the values expressed by these principles. The rule of law is an excellent political institution because it forces the government to exercise power in a reasonable and rational manner and in accordance with inherent values of legal practice. The constitutive and normative nature of the rule of law is also the main factor causing the phenomenon of synergy between the rule of law and democracy.

ABSTRACT. John Dewey conceived of democracy not merely as a system of government, but as a way of associated living. For Dewey, democracy is as an ongoing process of creating shared experiences and communication through which individuals participate in shaping their conditions by engaging with shared problems. A central desideratum of the Deweyan project, therefore, is to develop ways of rendering new forms of this democratic way of life intelligible. In this presentation, I will show how “narrative inquiry” – a methodology in the social sciences developed by Jean Clandinin and F. Michael Connelly – offers a means of examining how Dewey’s idea of democracy may be taking shape in contemporary contexts. I first outline Dewey’s conception of democracy, focusing on his unique understanding of the “social” as the formation of new relationships. I then introduce narrative inquiry” as a method for exploring emerging modes of living that express and sustain democratic values in every experience. By bringing Dewey’s philosophy into conversation with “narrative inquiry,” I aim to show how stories of lived experience can illuminate the ongoing formation of democratic ways of living.

ABSTRACT. The statutory legislative model represents one of the most traditional and historically entrenched approaches to law-making. At its core, this model vests primary responsibility for creating legal norms in national or local representative assemblies, which bear the central regulatory burden. Its foundational premise is that elected representatives, acting through detailed statutory rules, should comprehensively regulate social and economic life within their constitutional competences. Anything not explicitly covered by statutory provisions is presumed to fall outside the regulatory domain, thereby preserving zones of individual autonomy. This feature can be seen clearly in many legal, where constitutional traditions and legal safeguards ensure that fundamental domains, such as criminal and taxation law, are subject to detailed statutory legislation. The model’s reliance on highly specific provisions and textualist interpretative principles significantly limits the discretionary authority of courts, agencies, or other non-legislative actors. In this sense, the statutory model enhances legal certainty, predictability, and democratic accountability by tying the content of law directly to elected legislatures. However, this very strength also raises important challenges when viewed through the lens of participatory democracy. This theory underscores that democratic governance is not exhausted by representative institutions but extends to the active involvement of citizens in law-making, implementation, and adjudication. Participatory democracy emphasizes inclusion, transparency, and procedural fairness, requiring that citizens not only choose their representatives but also meaningfully engage in the processes that shape their lives. By contrast, the statutory model often narrows the space for such engagement. When legislative assemblies assume a monopoly over rule-making, avenues for citizen input may become confined to electoral cycles or lobbying within highly formalized parliamentary procedures. Moreover, the reliance on exhaustive statutory detail may inadvertently stifle citizen and civil society participation in interpreting or adapting legal norms to emerging contexts, leaving little room for dialogical governance. The tension between the statutory model of legislative policy and participatory democracy is thus twofold. On the one hand, the statutory model secures democratic legitimacy by grounding law in representative institutions, offering clarity and equality before the law. On the other hand, it risks rendering democratic participation overly rigid, centralized, and procedurally distant from ordinary citizens. The presentation will explore these tensions by situating the statutory legislative model within the contemporary debate on participatory democracy, highlighting both its indispensable role in safeguarding certainty and rights, and its limits as a vehicle for inclusive, dialogical governance.

ABSTRACT. This research aims to reconstruct the legal institution of marriage by examining the development of marriage law in Taiwan. It explores how the concept of marriage has been reshaped by principles of autonomy and caring relationships, and seeks to propose how marriage law might be reformed in Taiwan in the future.

The landmark Constitutional Court Interpretation No. 748 in 2017 legalized same-sex marriage, marking a pivotal moment in the rule of law in Taiwan. This decision opened the “Taiwan model” of marriage reform, an approach that integrates judicial leadership, legislative action, and insights from feminist and queer theories. Following Interpretation No. 748, the Court issued Interpretation No. 791 in 2020, which decriminalized adultery and reinforced constitutional protections for the right to sexual autonomy. This, in turn, weakened the traditional responsibilities associated with marriage and further redefined it as a relationship grounded in intimacy, rather than procreation or sexual exclusivity. Together, these legal developments reflect a significant departure from the traditional, heteronormative model of marriage toward one rooted in autonomy and caregiving relationships.

Thus, the legalization of same-sex marriage in Taiwan is not merely a matter of inclusion, but signals a deeper normative transformation of the institution of marriage itself. Increasingly, marriage in Taiwan is viewed as a flexible, welfare-oriented institution capable of accommodating diverse and care-based relationships. By reimagining marriage and family through the lens of autonomy and care, this research aims to contribute to future directions in the restructuring of marriage law in Taiwan.

ABSTRACT. Typically, affirmative action takes the form of preferential treatment based on socially salient group membership such as race or sex. A common way of criticizing them is pointing out the mismatch between the aims they aspire to and the means they employ. If the aim of gender quotas is to address obstacles women typically suffer from when accessing higher social positions, it goes, why not directly consider the fact of candidates, whether female or male, engaging in caregiving, of their being “effeminate” and vulnerable to gender harassment, and so on, instead of (or in addition to) their sex? Considering all the relevant characteristics when implementing affirmative action has widely been assumed infeasible. However, the idea of “personalized law” may change this intellectual spectrum. Personalized law is a name characterizing the legal practices where a decision for an individual is made based on all the information available about this person relevant to the aims of the law, with the aid of big data and AI algorithms. In this presentation, I examine whether “personalized” affirmative action, considering all the characteristics of different individuals relevant to the policy’s avowed justifications, can be a morally better alternative to its conventional counterpart, that uses only socially salient features such as race or sex. I classify different justifications for affirmative action into two categories: justifications aiming at directly benefiting the candidates from disadvantaged groups by the preferential treatment and those aiming at indirectly addressing the further problems by the preferential treatment (e.g., providing role models), and contemplate upon whether the personalized version can meaningfully be pursued under these two categories respectively. One can easily make an argument in favor of the personalized one with the former category, but I argue that we can make a similar argument even with respect to the latter. A tricky case arises when a number of minorities (irrationally) regard as better role models even those members of their group hostile to racial or gender justice than those members of majority promoting justice, in which case the claimed advantage of personalized over conventional affirmative action is meager at best. I argue that this case shares similarity with the one where the stigma or anti-balkanization objection to affirmative action is made; in both cases, the prospect of irrational reactions is taken as a given. This insight leads us to a further question whether there is any moral asymmetry between the two.

ABSTRACT. The legal person per se is understood to be an individual – and thus, while not divisible in itself, very much divided from others. When the law recognises individuals’ actions and consequently ascribes them subjectivity, that subjectivity is conceived of as independent, autonomous, and self-governing. In line with this understanding, the legal capacity of a natural person under civil law commences at the moment of their birth, i. e., (ostensibly) at the first ascertainable instantiation of complete separation from another person. Familial, personal, and social bonds are thus, prima facie, privatised and removed from state control; conversely, the individual is left alone before Kafka’s gatekeeper of the law. However, no area of law can function without the recognition and re-establishment of numerous relationships. In tort law, this is clearly evident in duties of care, which impose ever higher, ever more personalised obligations on potential tortfeasors. This development, largely driven by courts, increasingly places relationships between tortfeasor and plaintiff, claimant and defendant at the centre of attention, displacing seemingly absolute individual detachment. Acknowledging the diverse relationalities that exist within law and legal scholarship, we wish to explore how a perspective from care ethics (following Gilligan 1982 and Noddings 1984) can improve our understanding of base structures in the law, particularly in currently accepted interpretations of tort law, by shifting our focus from individualisation to relational constructions of the law. This informs a democratised understanding of tort law: Unmasking the relationalities already inherent to tort(ious) thinking allows us to de-privatise (true) duties of care for each other. In this way, our contribution reinterprets a legal order based on individualisation from a care ethics perspective. Shifting our gaze away from (legal) isolation, this perspective can also fortify democratic foundations by retracing the relationships of care we owe to each other as persons before the law.

ABSTRACT. This paper revisits the classic distinction between rules and principles in legal theory and offers a conceptual clarification grounded in possible worlds semantics. While both are legal norms, they function at different levels of ideality and perform distinct roles within a legal system.

Rules are treated as conditional normative propositions that describe the “second-best world” — a legally acceptable state slightly better than the actual world. They prescribe specific actions under particular conditions and are essential for institutional decision-making and legal certainty.

Principles, by contrast, are unconditional normative propositions that describe the “best possible world” from the perspective of the actual one. They set aspirational standards that legal rules should approximate. Importantly, these principles are not merely moral ideals external to law; they are internal components of the legal system itself.

Why must principles be included within a legal system? The answer lies in the assumptions of consistency and completeness that underpin any legal order. Without principles, the system lacks internal coherence and normative guidance in hard cases. Rather than themselves being in conflict, principles provide a coherent ideal against which competing rule-based outcomes can be assessed. They thereby enable the evaluation and selection of alternative ways of approximating the ideal under conditions of constraint.

Formally, rules may be expressed as O(p → q), while principles take the form OOp. This layered structure reveals how rules are derived from and constrained by principles within a dynamic normative framework.

This paper thereby contributes to the clarification of legal reasoning by explaining how the rule–principle distinction supports both the operational function and the normative integrity of legal systems.

ABSTRACT. Modern legal systems are built upon a paradox. They seek certainty through language, yet language itself is uncertain. Every act of legislation aims to stabilise meaning, but in doing so it also opens an infinite field of interpretation. This lecture explores the fiction of finality as law’s structural response to its own indeterminacy. Takayoshi Kawashima once observed that “our legal system is just like the Cinderella story. Interpretation is the magic wand with which everything needed can be accomplished through some kind of semantic manipulation.” (Dartmouth, 1992.) His metaphor captures the creative yet illusory power of legal interpretation. As Origen warned, “the letter kills, but the spirit gives life” – law must therefore remain faithful not to the rigidity of words, but to the living intention that sustains them. Drawing on Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Derrida’s deconstruction, and Luhmann’s systems theory, the lecture argues that legal meaning is never fixed but continually recreated through interpretation. Like Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in physics, the act of legal judgment alters what it observes – the application of a norm inevitably transforms the norm itself. Thus, uncertainty is not a defect but an operational condition of law. The lecture further examines the classical doctrine res iudicata pro veritate habetur as a performative fiction that converts epistemic doubt into institutional peace. Finality is not truth, but a decision to stop deciding – a necessary closure that transforms chaos into order. Finally, the study extends this paradox to international and transnational norms, where enforcement often depends more on reputation than on coercion. Here, legitimacy survives as a modern form of lex imperfecta – a command sustained by recognition rather than by force. Law, in this view, emerges as crystallised consciousness – an ever-moving balance between meaning and power, uncertainty and order, word and will.

ABSTRACT. Lon Fuller is famous for arguing that there are ‘internal moralities’ of law that constitute a necessary connection between law and morality. Specifically, he claims that a legal system is necessarily morally valuable due to its rule-like features of generality, stability, etc. The reason, Fuller argues, is that rule-governing constitutes a reciprocal relationship between the ruler and her subjects. In this paper, I examine this argument – the argument from reciprocity – and suggest that neither the original nor the revised version of it establishes Fuller’s ambitious claim of law’s necessary moral value. First of all, in its original version, Fuller does not make clear a crucial distinction between a ‘thin’ and a ‘thick’ understanding of reciprocity. While the former is indeed essential to law, it is nevertheless devoid of moral value. Interpreting along the latter line, however, does not save the argument. The reason supporting it, which appeals to the fact that governing through general rules recognizes the subjects as ‘rational and autonomous agents’, likewise oscillates between two understandings. Neither interpretation yields the required conclusion that law is necessarily morally valuable in virtue of its rule-like character: it fails either to be morally valuable or to be necessarily true of legal systems. The revised version of this argument, which emphasizes the generality of law, is also problematic. Fuller falsely believes that the bare generality of law implies the law’s observance of the moral ideal of limited government, whereas they are in fact logically independent. The generality of law, therefore, does not guarantee that law is necessarily of moral value. I conclude with a suggestion for a more promising way to argue for the law’s necessary moral value in virtue of its rule-like features, which appeals to the effects of stability and predictability that they offer to its subjects.

ABSTRACT. This paper seeks to address the gap in existing literature on the role of the Global South in the rules-based order. Most scholarship and commentary heavily centre the role of the West and their warnings that non-Western revisionist state actors, driven by naked self-interest, are explicitly undermining the rules-based order. Such scholarship is historically contextualised by the decline of the United States as the hegemonic guarantor of the rules-based order. Many critics of this narrative on the rules-based order have rightly pointed out the hypocrisy of the West which holds a long and chequered history of violent interventions and rule-breaking, especially when it comes to treatment of the Global South.

Conversely, this paper seeks to reclaim the Global South’s historical role in advocating and building a more authentic rules-based order, not as a by-product of US hegemonic decline but rather to uphold a universal standard for international law and international institutions with the explicit aim to foster greater equality and fairness. In particular, a focus will be placed on how the Global South has participated in the United Nations (UN) and the UN’s judicial organ – the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The paper presents two key arguments: (i) the rules-based order interpreted as a Western-led project is highly problematic. Reclaiming the Global South’s contribution to the rules-based order is a much-needed historical correction; and (ii) the Global South’s ongoing attempts at upholding and reforming the rules-based order is a stabilising force for future global relations in the aftermath of US hegemony.

ABSTRACT. Contemporary sovereign debt crises expose a deep disjunction between the promises of international financial law and ideals of fairness and justice. This paper examines the legal structure of sovereign lending and debt governance to ask whether current regimes respect sovereign equality and democratic legitimacy.

Contrary to claims that conditional lending fosters development, recent evidence reveals that such arrangements reproduce structural inequalities. An Oxfam analysis found that 76 of 91 IMF loans concluded since the start of the COVID‑19 crisis imposed fiscal consolidation measures. Cross‑country studies indicate that policy conditionality rarely improves governance; instead it can erode accountability, entrench rent‑seeking and undermine social welfare. Debt‑servicing obligations now eclipse core social expenditure in many highly indebted states; a survey of African countries showed that the majority spend more on external debt repayments than on healthcare or education. Long‑term austerity and underinvestment have contributed to the re‑emergence of diseases such as cholera, malaria and yellow fever. These outcomes call into question legal doctrines that prioritise creditor rights over human rights and sustainable development.

The governance of sovereign lending institutions further undermines fairness. Since their founding, the IMF and World Bank have been headed under an unwritten “gentleman’s agreement” which ensures that the IMF managing director is European and the World Bank president is American. Voting rules entrench this dominance: key decisions require an 85 % majority, allowing the United States, with about 16.5 % of the votes, to veto structural reforms. Efforts to adjust quotas have not substantially enhanced the voice of the Global South, leaving debtor nations with limited influence over legal norms that profoundly shape their policy space. Meanwhile, some commentators portray emerging lenders’ practices as debt‑trap diplomacy, yet research suggests that such narratives often obscure more complex realities and deflect attention from structural injustices.

Drawing on theories of global justice and third‑world approaches to international law, the paper argues that equitable debt governance requires procedural reforms and substantive reorientation. Democratising leadership selection and recalibrating voting shares would enhance the legitimacy of international financial institutions. Sovereign debt resolution mechanisms should incorporate human rights impact assessments, ecological considerations and meaningful participation of debtor states. By reconceptualising international financial law through the lens of fairness and democratic accountability, this study highlights the relational dimensions of debt and proposes pathways toward a more just global economic order.

ABSTRACT. While the Constitution of Japan stipulates the separation of government and religion, prohibiting religious organizations from exercising any political authority or from receiving privileges from the state, various religious bodies have maintained close political ties even after the Second World War. Aside from the close alliance between Komeito and the Soka Gakkai, the Liberal Democratic Party has sometimes been suspected to associate with religiously motivated conservative lobbyists. This presentation not only considers institutional and organizational religions but also cultural religion, i.e., ethical and spiritual values ingrained in the mentality and customs of the public, and examines how law and religious values have intricately intertwined with each other. For example, it deals with how religious values and doctrines are involved in the implementation as well as disregard of fundamental human rights in contemporary society, particularly in issues concerning family, reproduction, education, and international migration. More specifically, I will elucidate how various forms of cultural religion have affected law and politics by using an idea of ‘landscape’ which a modern historian John Breen produces in his book Rites and Power: The Emperor’s Meiji Restoration (2021). Landscape here means a combination of myths and symbols shared by members of the political community, which works as the nation’s distinctive normative order. The landscape in Japanese context comprises, for example, the Emperor and Imperial Family, the national flag and anthem, family life, ancestral rituals, and festivals. I argue that the landscape thus envisioned is a typical form of ‘civil religion’ of the community members and drives them to implement, maintain and protect norms and integrity set in the landscape. In other words, religious values and consciousness shared by the community members are necessarily related to national integration and their sense of ‘belonging’. The presentation is a spin-off from my article ‘Law, Discrimination, and Religion in Contemporary Japanese Society’ included in Ioanna Tourkochoriti and Mark A. Graber (eds.), The Oxford Handbook on Religion and Antidiscrimination Law, Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

ABSTRACT. The concept of global justice has been advocated for some time and has been subject to various criticisms over the years. The most prominent critique questions its feasibility and desirability. According to this critique, justice can only be realized within a single nation or community because justice cannot exist in the global sphere, which lacks coercive power. Alternatively, some argue that a desirable international society is one in which justice is realized within each nation. They claim that a world governed by a single conception of distributive justice would be undesirable. However, since around the 2010s, objections to the concept of global justice have emerged that are distinct from these critiques. This new objection claims that the global justice debate itself has committed “epistemic injustice”. Epistemic injustice is, simply put, a concept that concerns unfair treatment in knowledge, understanding, and communicative practices. Critiques of global justice from this epistemic perspective have primarily challenged its theoretical “parochialism”. Specifically, philosophers from non-Western regions, such as East Asia and Africa, have questioned the marginalization of non-Western philosophical traditions within the theoretical framework of global justice discourse. This paper critically examines this trend toward the de-parochialization of global justice theory and argues that it remains limited insofar as it perpetuates Western-centricism without questioning the power relations between Western and non-Western philosophy or the nature of philosophical practice. The paper further contends that the experiences and perspectives of the most marginalized people—particularly women and children in developing countries—deserve greater epistemic attention. First, the paper provides an overview of epistemic injustice, confirming that it addresses injustice in knowledge and understanding, which is distinct from the unfair distribution of goods. Next, it examines Western-centrism as a major epistemic critique of global justice theory, noting that dialogue between different philosophical traditions is proposed as a solution. The paper then acknowledges the limitations of such dialogue and asserts that a more fundamental reexamination of philosophical practice is necessary. Positioning women and children in developing countries as key epistemic agents in this practice, the paper argues, would lead to reimagining justice beyond Western liberal assumptions and bring about more "epistemically just global justice".

ABSTRACT. Environmental injustice means the state where environmental goods and bads are profoundly unequally distributed among specific groups. The concept of environmental justice historically developed alongside the movement against environmental racism in the United States. As this background suggests, while environmental injustice seems to be a problem of distribution on the surface, if we look closer, we can understand that it also entails deep-seated issues of relational inequality, such as systemic discrimination and disregard. This presentation asks: how can egalitarianism overcome this multifaceted injustice?

First, it is necessary to survey some theories of egalitarianism. In the history of egalitarianism, there is a controversy between distributive and relational egalitarianism. Distributive egalitarianism, exemplified by Rawls and Dworkin, is primarily concerned with achieving an equitable allocation of certain goods and resources. In contrast, relational egalitarianism, represented by Anderson, focuses on social relationships, positing that equality consists of people mutually regarding and treating one another as equals in their social and political interactions.

Given its complexity, environmental injustice cannot be reduced to a single element. It involves coexisting distributive and relational aspects, making it impossible for one framework to fully subsume the other. We must, therefore, develop a more robust, composite concept of justice to confront this issue. A significant preceding contribution in this area is the theory of David Schlosberg. Schlosberg argues that the lack of recognition is injustice not only because it constrains people and does them harm, but also because it is foundation for distributive injustice. He also suggests that the lack of respect and recognition causes a decline in a person’s membership and participation in the greater community. Schlosberg attempts to overcome environmental injustice through a theory combining three dimensions of justice—distribution, procedures, and recognition—after analyzing the distinct role of each.

In this presentation, by analyzing Schlosberg’s theory, I explore the possibility of overcoming the historical controversy in egalitarian theory and constructing a more robust theory to overcome the environmental injustice.

ABSTRACT. The paper considers the legal responses to loneliness. It argues that currently with the emphasis placed on concepts such as privacy and autonomy by the law, the model of an individual self who needs protection from others. Such rights are designed to protect us from unwanted interference from others. However, our relational selves require relationships in order to survive. We need laws that draw us together, allowing flourishing, caring relationships.

This is all the more so given the “loneliness epidemic” which is blighting many countries. We need to see social deprivation as a major human rights interference. This places a duty on the state to provide facilities to combat loneliness. While at one time we may have needed social structures such as family law to control sexual behaviour and regulate relationships, it is the creation of these relationships, rather than their sustenance, which is the key issue now.

This issue is particularly acute among older people and those with disabilities, who suffer isolation. This paper will call for a recognition of loneliness as a human rights issue, with duties on the state to protect people from loneliness, particular older people and those with disabilities. It will examine how recognising a legal right to protection from loneliness might be put into practice.

ABSTRACT. Family reunification is a right that most democratic states grant to its citizens to be able to invite non-citizen family members to live together in one country. Because the family is considered the foundation of the nation, families receive privileged status under immigration law. At the same time, states have a vested interest in prioritizing and validating which kin members will be granted entry. In this way, immigration law simultaneously preferences the family unit in comparison to other relations and discriminates which family are desirable and deserving of entry. The logics underlying family reunification deserve close examination. On the one hand, citizens and their families are understood to benefit from being able to live together and build their family within one country. The ability to pursue family formation freely is a natural right, and family reunification seeks to uphold it by granting citizens the ability to reunite with their family. It is understood that citizens and their family thrive when granted the right to live together. But if a citizen’s ability to form kin networks were the priority, states would allow citizens to determine who they would like to petition as current or future family members, including non-biolegal kin like families of choice. On the other hand, states benefit from admitting immigrants who uphold its (family) values. States have a vested interest in determining the composition of its citizenry and the demographics of future generations. Normative family formation is associated with outcomes like family stability and reproduction. Though immigration laws dictate which family relations are prioritized for family reunification, states nevertheless do not require its citizens to form and invite specific family members. Using what Sanne Taekema calls “interdisciplinary triangulation,” I articulate the limits and contradictions inherent in family reunification as a guiding principle of immigration law. I primarily draw on the case of U.S. immigration law as a case study given its explicit prioritization of family reunification since 1965. I focus on non-normative family formation practices like same-sex marriage and polyamory, adoption and communal childrearing, and families of choice to consider the limits of family reunification in immigration law. I consider how the interests of the state and its citizens remain unfulfilled by family reunification laws given the persistent exclusion of non-normative family formation at the borders. I explore alternative legal logics and arrangements with fewer restrictions on family formation and cross-border movement.

ABSTRACT. This article examines whether the principle that like cases should be treated alike can function as a legality requirement for death sentences and, if so, what theoretical foundations support that claim.

In Taiwan, since the terms of seven justices of the Constitutional Court expired in 2024, the Legislative Yuan has to date refused to confirm any nominees to fill the vacancies. One key reason is that a majority of legislators, citing public support for capital punishment, have rigorously pressed each nominee on whether they endorse Constitutional Court Judgment No. 8 of 2024. The controversy stems from that decision’s exceptionally stringent standard: the death penalty may be imposed only for “the most serious crimes.” Moreover, a court’s determination that a particular case qualifies as “one of the most serious crimes” must not be arbitrary; if this requirement is violated, the defendant is entitled to request that the Prosecutor General lodge an extraordinary appeal against the death sentence.

To fill this gap, this article (re)examines the concept of avoiding arbitrary (capital) sentencing as a legality requirement for the imposition of the death penalty, within the context of the Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC)'s ruling and punishment theory. The article begins by reviewing the TCC's judgment, noting that to prevent arbitrariness, the Court permits an extraordinary appeal of a death sentence where the underlying facts do not constitute “the most serious crimes.” This mechanism provides a doctrinal entry point for integrating the non-arbitrariness requirement with punishment theory. The article then focuses on punishment theory, arguing that the requirement to avoid arbitrariness essentially implies the principle of "treat like cases alike". To support this claim, we address potential challenges posed by competing punishment theories, particularly the argument that the "treat like cases alike" might allow individuals to pre-calculate the "cost" of their crimes. The article argues that, for this criticism to hold, it must rest entirely on deterrence theory—a highly controversial purpose of criminal law—that is misaligned with both Taiwan's sentencing criteria, grounded in the retributive principle of proportionality, and the requirement of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Furthermore, the article illustrates that adopting the "treat like cases alike" possesses instrumental value, even if it lacks intrinsic value. Therefore, the article concludes that the principle of "treat like cases alike" is appropriate.

ABSTRACT. Restorative justice is a legal mechanism that restores the victim's condition, holds the offender accountable, repairs the harm caused by a crime, and restores the affected parties. Generally, the criminal justice system neglects the interests of victims, the imposition of punishment on the offender is usually seen as representing the interests of victims, even though often victims do not feel represented by the punishment imposed by the state. This conventional criminal law settlement is deemed as not fully resolving the problem. Restorative justice addresses criminal issues comprehensively. Currently, restorative justice has become a new trend in many countries, fostering a more holistic understanding of justice. Many countries have adopted the restorative justice model in their criminal justice systems, including Indonesia. Indonesia has enacted a new Penal Code (KUHP), which will take effect on January 2nd, 2026. The previous Indonesian penal code was originated under the Dutch colonial government and has been prevailing since January 1918. One of the novel provisions in the new penal code is the restorative justice value that is implicitly spread in several of its provisions. The restorative justice values in the new penal code can be seen from Article 2 regarding the application of living law in society; Article 12 paragraph (2) regarding the determination of criminal acts based on living law in society; Article 54 paragraph (1) point f, h, i j, k, regarding consideration of sentencing; Article 54 paragraph (2) regarding the judge's forgiveness (rechterlijkpardon); Article 66 paragraph (1) point f, Article 116 point b; and Article 120 paragraph (1) point d regarding additional punishment for the fulfillment of customary criminal law in general, for children, and corporations respectively; Article 132 paragraph (1) point g regarding the cessation of prosecution authority due to settlement outside the judicial process; Article 597 regarding criminal act based on living law in society. All of these articles embody restorative justice values, which will be explained in this article. These provisions demonstrate a paradigm shift in justice within criminal law, from a retributive to a restorative approach. Therefore, the new penal code implements the principle of ultimum remedium, where the use of criminal law and imprisonment is the last resort when other means of resolving a criminal case are ineffective.

ABSTRACT. Immigration policies are daily discussed in developed countries, including Japan, and attentions are also focusing on the treatment of irregular migrants. While calls to deport irregular immigrants have become prominent, the effectiveness of immigration policy has inherent limits, making the existence of a certain number of irregular migrants unavoidable. To discuss the effectiveness of immigration policy, it is necessary to distinguish between three gaps: the discourse gap, the implementation gap, and the effectiveness gap. The discourse gap refers to the discrepancy between the goals presented in the discourse of politicians and others regarding immigration policies and the immigration policies actually written on paper, as represented by enacted laws and guidelines. Some note that while politicians' rhetorics often tend to be harsh, written immigration policies tend to be more moderate. This is because written policies are established through coordination among politicians, government agencies, and interest groups, and are also constrained by international and domestic laws. The implement gap is that between written immigration policies and those actually implemented. For example, this gap arises when the application of enacted laws is subject to administrative discretion in areas like refugee recognition or work permit issuance. The effectiveness gap is that between the intents behind implementing immigration policies and its actual outcomes. The outcomes of implementing immigration policies can differ from the authorities' intentions due to factors like the balance of labor supply and demand between receiving and sending countries, or the existence of networks supporting immigrant reception. Recognizing this, it is essential to carefully debate whether regularizing irregular immigrants is morally desirable, considering the fundamental purpose of border control. On the one hand, there is an argument that emphasizes how social rights guarantees through pensions and social insurance are strongly tied to the membership of political communities. It focuses on the question of who should be guaranteed these benefits should be left to the political self-determination of the regular members—citizens and permanent residents—who bear the burden of the social security system. On the other hand, there is also an argument that assumes freedom of movement is a human right that should be guaranteed to all humanity, and that treating foreigners' freedom of entry differently from that of nationals should not be permitted. I will examine the normative arguments of purposes of border control to vindicate an argument for permitting restraining migrations.

ABSTRACT. This paper addresses the conceptual disarray surrounding militant democracy by introducing a novel two-axes analytical framework based on Procedurality and Regularity. Moving beyond traditional rigid dichotomies and state-centric definitions, the study proposes a comprehensive 3x3 matrix that descriptively typologizes a broad spectrum of state and non-state defensive measures, explicitly setting aside evaluations of their normative appropriateness or practical success. By mapping these mechanisms, the paper examines how defensive measures are triggered, institutionally situated, and embedded within democratic systems. Comparative analyses of Germany, Turkey, and Taiwan illustrate the framework's analytical utility: Germany demonstrates a self-reinforcing institutional architecture; Turkey reveals how militant measures can be co-opted to suppress the very democratic values they purport to protect; and Taiwan's case highlights the conceptual dangers of conflating militant democracy with national security, as well as how historical trauma shapes a polity's structural capacity for democratic defense. Ultimately, this institutionally sensitive approach offers a heuristic tool for evaluating the constitutional paradox of militant democracy—ensuring that the accurate assessment of defensive mechanisms' procedural safeguards and operational frequency can help prevent the defense of the democratic order from inadvertently becoming the instrument of its undoing.

ABSTRACT. Over the last several decades around the globe, in the wake of the decline of American style secular political liberalisms, there have been several attempts made to align ethnic nationalist and theocratic agendas with democratic political traditions. This has resulted in in the promotion of various forms of “ethnodemocracy” and “theodemocracy” in contested political geographies. Going beyond the most cynical rhetorical re-brandings, I will contrast two alternative assessments of such moves. In the first case, ethno- and religious nationalism is understood to be a common component of several thriving democracies. Shared ethnic and religious identities hold participatory democracies together allowing them to function more efficiently. On the other hand, ethnodemocracy and theodemocracy are described as inherently problematic from liberal democratic perspectives as they undermine equality for all citizens and a unified political demos in territories where there is substantial ethnic diversity.

In this paper, via reference to the theorizations of “pragmatic democracy” in the work of John Dewey and more recently Jeffrey Stout, I will discuss the conditions under which ethnodemocracy and theodemocracy might be possible or even optimal. In addition to reflecting on recent developments in the United States, I will draw on examples related to my own work on ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the Middle East.

ABSTRACT. Extremism is currently threatening democracies across the globe. Not only in Europe and the United States, but also in South Korea, extremist actors and extremist parties are coming to power through elections and gradually dismantling democratic systems. In response to this rising threat, the concept of “militant democracy” has again come to the forefront of discussion. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt also refer to the potential of militant democracy as a defense against extremism in Tyranny of the Minority. The idea of “militant democracy” was first articulated by Karl Löwenstein, a political scientist who fled Nazi persecution and emigrated to the United States in the 1930s. His argument was that democratic systems require constitutional mechanisms to protect themselves from forces like fascism, which seek to abolish democracy from within. West Germany actively adopted this doctrine in 1949. The Basic Law of 1949 incorporated instruments throughout the constitutional framework to counter fascism and prevent a repetition of the Nazi experience. The West German Constitution, which defines its identity as founded upon a “free democratic basic order,” introduced mechanisms such as the banning of unconstitutional political parties, disqualification from public office, a duty of Patriot to the Constitution, and the possibility of forfeiture of fundamental rights. This constitutional order has often been described as embodying a commitment to “defensive democracy.” Today, Germany is again debating party prohibition measures, as the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) gains significant influence. South Korea also has a party dissolution mechanism modeled after the German system. However, unlike Germany, Korea did not adopt this mechanism as part of a conscious embrace of militant democracy. Yet, following the attempted coup by the sitting president in 2024 and allegations that the party which produced that president assisted in insurrection, renewed discussions have emerged over the possible dissolution of the main opposition party. As the rise of far-right movements becomes a global phenomenon and democratic constitutionalism faces increasing peril, militant democracy is re-emerging as a proposed countermeasure. In this paper, the author examines the potential of militant democracy as a response to the rise of far-right extremism.

ABSTRACT. The aim of this presentation is to re-evaluate the ability of liberalism as an “ism” to support modern law in modern society. This examination arises from a critique of liberalism (e.g., care theory), which is premised on respect of the individual.

The state, based on modern law, aspires to a free society, and it is the role of the state to construct and operate a legal system that promotes respect of the individual. The realization of a free society depends on society respecting individuals who are “no one other than themselves”. While it is a necessary condition that individuals are treated as free agents, it is the responsibility of the state to create the institutional framework.

This presentation is part of a liberal project that aims to present a theoretical conception of normative relationships based on the idea of “respect of individuals for others”. This project is in line with modern legal thought in that it starts with the respect of the individual, and it may not be particularly new in that it is based on the idea of a free society. However, previous research has not fully examined the unnamed concept that has been incorporated into modern legal systems but has never been verbalized. This unnamed concept is related to the normative obligations that arise in the relationship between “those who have faced each other”.

In examining this issue, this presentation will focus on the “edges of life,” birth and death. Everyone begins and ends at these stages. At these stagers, no one can exist solely through their own will and actions. The core issue of recognizing others as legal persons equal to oneself and respecting others as equal beings is most clearly revealed at these stages. For example, consider the issue of regulating the use of assisted reproductive technology or the issue of regulating end-of-life care. We need to carefully consider how to view the relationship between the fetus and the pregnant woman, or the relationship between the patient at the end of life and their family and other concerned parties, and how to justify legal regulations in these stages. These issues must be evaluated from the perspective of normative relational theory.

Individual specific questions have their own particularities and there are no universally applicable answers, but theory has the responsibility to provide a path for consideration, a perspective to be adopted, and questions to be formed. At the same time, it also provides an opportunity to explore whether it is possible to comprehensively elucidate practical issues from a theoretical perspective that is detached from specific problems. This is the essence of the mutual penetration (interaction) of theory and practice.

Issues related to the human experience from birth to death are aspects that require support for life maintenance and the maintenance of bodily functions. This phenomenon is an unavoidable part of our human destiny, so we need to create an environment that allows us to be aware of it. In a just society, individuals have a special, unilateral, positive duty towards specific others who are facing such situations. In normative relational theory, when examining issues in this area, we do not consider them to be exceptional or peripheral problems within the legal framework. Rather, we recognize the fundamental importance of these issues in forming the foundations of a free society.