ABSTRACT. A study was undertaken in order to explore different possibilities to collect data on individual and organizational adaptivity in the maritime context. The scope was methods for capturing dynamic variations in individual and organizational adaptive capability. Adaptivity was in this case to be seen as interchangeable with the NATO STO SAS-085 definition of agility; “The capability to successfully effect, cope with ad/or exploit changes in circumstances”. The context was a Swedish naval exercise during 2015. It spanned 12 days and included some 40 vessels and 1300 soldiers and sailors. The study was an explorative case study using observations, document analysis and interviews in the operational setting. It focused on the general conditions for collecting dynamic data during a maritime exercise at sea by means of observers, questionnaires, interviews, physiological measures, video/photo and logging of digital files. In general, the conditions were found to be suitable for collecting dynamic data. The most important restriction was the limited possibility to deploy observers. The result points at some general principles for the further development of approaches to capture dynamic variations in adaptivity. Data on perceived organizational adaptivity is primarily possible to collect from a few key informants. Individual adaptivity can be assessed from a larger set. A realistic approach is to have participants provide data a few times a day. Typically there are high demands on some factors in the early phases with subsequent lower perceived ratings due to the inevitable initial exercise frictions.

ABSTRACT. This article presents the statistical analysis results of information arrival process during FIFA Confederations Cup 2013 and FIFA World Cup 2014. Data was gathered from the Brazilian Army Command and Control (C2) tool (Pacificador), that was the main software used for information sharing and decision making. The statistical analysis showed that the correlation between planned actions and feedback information can be considered as a metric of performance evaluation of each C2 center. The information inter­arrival process, for each C2 center, was found and the behavior can be best modeled by Weibull distribution. The analysis also demonstrated that the most part of the events happen in a short period of time and also that 50% of these observations are held in intervals lower than 5 minutes. The biggest contribution of this article is a closer analysis to application layer (decision making process).

ABSTRACT. Systems engineering is an established approach to develop systems, including complex sociotechnical systems such as Command and Control (C2) Systems. These systems often occur through introduction of a new technology into an existing system. In systems engineering modelling is applied to capture and represent the mental models of the systems’ stakeholders during the concept development stage. These models, consisting of various views on the system structure and behaviour, can be used to derive requirements for system development. The views of the models must represent the mental model of the originator as well as ensure that the interpreters develop the same mental picture. An architectural framework is required to achieve effective Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE), which is provided by MoDAF. The Unified Profile for DODAF and MoDAF (UPDM) supports development of the model to ensure transportability to other participants in the development process. This paper proposes a model development process within UPDM for a C2 system during concept development.

ABSTRACT. Operational level military headquarters (HQ) are the brain of a modern command and control (C2) system. It is envisaged that in the near future, artificial intelligence (AI) based autonomous agents will proliferate both within HQs and in a battlespace over which they exercise C2. To integrate such technology effectively may require a complete alteration of a HQ’s roles, functions, processes and organisational structures. In order to enable C2 to be conducted in innovative ways in these circumstances, the question “what are key desirable properties of an AI-enhanced HQ, conducive to operations in a complex connected battlespace”, needs to be examined. This paper articulates a concept for the future operational level military HQ, which we term a “5th generation” HQ. We apply three lenses to describe the concept. Military HQs have gone through major changes due mainly to technology revolutions since the Napoleonic era, thus the first lens is historical and technological. In air warfare, the latest capability hinges on 5th generation fighters, with similar capability evolutions happening in other warfighting domains, thus the second lens is by analogy with corresponding 5th generation platform characteristics such as stealth and high manoeuverability. Finally an effect lens is used to inspect the desired effects a 5th generation HQ should generate. After describing the ‘what’, we explore the ‘why’, i.e. the drivers that generate the requirement for a 5th generation HQ. We also attempt to determine underlying theoretical principles that support our assertions and a 5th generation HQ design should be based upon.

ABSTRACT. For C2 in a complex connected battlespace, agility is of importance. The hot topic “C2 agility” has mainly been discussed on organization level, while C2 in the age of AI (Artificial Intelligence) is no longer a concept that contains only human activities. The truth AlphaGo defeated human top level proves that machine can join C2 activities, and provide intelligent decision support to commanders. C2 agility can be improved on DSS (Decision Support System) level through improved decision making quality and adjusting efficiency. By this idea, agile C2 DSS concept is proposed, with key technologies discussed. Conclusion is that AI technologies and accumulated knowledge can help commander to better understand changes in battlespace and quickly adjust COAs, so as to improve C2 agility.

ABSTRACT. The key attributes of the “mission command” concept include shared awareness/understanding, along with clear-intent and trust, and overlooking these attributes has potential to cause operational difficulties and to give rise to the inherent uncertainty in operational environments for both peacetime and warfighting missions for NATO. To create a shared awareness/understanding, the information and knowledge is of paramount important for mission success. Despite the enhanced network connectivity, the state-of-the-art C2 systems have never totally mitigated the uncertainty (the fog and friction of war) in the operational environment. Commanders of NATO forces should integrate and synchronize military operations through creating and sustaining shared awareness/understanding to facilitate unity of effort. Mission command is based on shared awareness/understanding, and it requires each level of leader to be ready to assume responsibility, sustain unity of effort, and act practically within the commander’s intent. Therefore, mission command and related key attributes, especially shared awareness/understanding, will continue to be imperative in future NATO operations. In this paper, we demystify the concept of shared situational awareness/understanding. And to demonstrate the validity of the proposed framework, a case study-based evidence is provided.

ABSTRACT. Current military vehicles are equipped with a variety of sensors and effectors which are not yet connected or are only linked via proprietary, vendor-specific interfaces. Hence, changes and enhancements to IT-related vehicle equipment are often only possible by the original manufacturer and a seamless integration of new components is difficult and expensive. In order to unify the interfaces of subsystems and enhance interoperability, the NATO Generic Vehicle Architecture (NGVA) defines architecture concepts for future land vehicle electronics concerning data and power infrastructure. To verify that NGVA-based systems meet the defined requirements, as part of the NGVA, a generic framework for the verification and validation of NGVA systems based on an early version of the UK GVA Verification approach has been developed.

This paper describes the basic concepts of the proposed NGVA Verification and Validation (V&V) specification. It mainly focuses on how to outline a detailed verification plan tailored to the specific NGVA system to define a verification process. Therefore, it provides details on organizational verification responsibilities; verification, review and analysis methods; as well as methods for verification independence. To assess the conformity of NGVA systems, three sequentially-related compatibility levels have been developed to facilitate the evaluation of the specific system requirements in a structured manner by arranging an order of their verification. These levels form the basis for a verification process consisting of five steps ranging from verification planning to capturing of the results.

ABSTRACT. The NATO Generic Vehicle Architecture (NGVA) proposes an open architecture approach to land vehicle platform design and integration. It provides an interoperability solution to achieve a fully integrated vehicle data infrastructure consisting of all mission sub-systems while interfacing to the automotive subsystem of military land vehicle platforms. Based on published and freely available standards, the NGVA defines design constraints for electronic interfaces and protocols to harmonize the information exchange between the various vehicle sub-systems. The Ethernet-based information exchange is described in the related NGVA Data Model which is used to produce the message set for sub-system data exchange.

In current military land vehicles, automotive networks like Controller Area Networks (CAN) form the backbone for data exchange between existing vehicle components. These legacy components will remain an integral part of future vehicle architectures due to factors such as their reliability, durability, error handling capabilities and economical deployment. Thus, there is the challenge of integrating these legacy components into the newer vehicle architectures such as the NGVA.

This paper presents an approach towards integrating automotive bus based networks such as CAN into the NGVA. It involves understanding and associating the vendor specific CAN Bus messages with vehicle sub-system operations and using them to communicate according to the NGVA specification. We introduce a system prototype to realize this idea. The prototype uses a CAN adapter mounted on a micro-computer such as the Raspberry Pi communicating over traditional Ethernet networks with custom Java applications as well as commercial Command and Control Information Systems (C2IS).

ABSTRACT. Semantic interoperability in combined and joint operations requires a commonly agreed upon standard that clearly specifies the information elements exchanged between the participating partners. The Multilateral Interoperability Programme (MIP) is developing the MIP Information Model (MIM) as a semantic reference for C2 information exchange. The model defines detailed taxonomies for keys concepts such as objects and actions as well as the relationships between them. The model is continuously enhanced by the 24 MIP member nations and NATO. A new version, MIM 4.0, will be released in May 2016. It will build the foundation for the MIP 4 Information Exchange Specification (IES). The proposed paper consists of three major parts: • First, we will give a brief summary of the concepts of the MIP Information Model. This includes the modelling approach to capture semantic information and an overview of the tools and services complementing the model. • Thereafter, we will highlight recent enhancements of the MIM. Most noteworthy, the MIM 4.0 will feature a revised taxonomy of military units based on functional aspects. Further operational improvements are achieved by the use of so-called “managed” codes that are determined only at deployment time. The MIM 4.0 will also apply a generic, pattern-based approach to deal with unknown information. • Finally, we will discuss various technical solutions for how COIs may build their own interoperability solution based on the MIM and the tools available. We will describe how the elements of the MIM can be grouped logically to form larger, semantically complete messages.

ABSTRACT. Defense industry research and development is hindered by limited information sharing between operational stakeholders and researchers. Research and development activities are often defined by project managers who are well intentioned but have limited access to or understanding of actual operational challenges. Deliverables are evaluated in sterile settings with limited feedback from practitioners. The Cyber Immersion Lab (CIL), a US Cyber Command development and experimentation activity, is tightening the feedback loops between cyber practitioners and research communities. The research project described in this paper addresses a 2015 US Cyber Command effort to assess mature cyberspace network mapping capabilities for operational fit in the Cyber Mission Force. The research project comprised complementary investigative strategies including a field study of cyber mission teams to understand their work processes; market research to identify candidate network mapping tool capabilities; and an experiment involving 20 members of Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs). This paper describes how rich measures were developed and employed to assess the abilities of tools to support decision making in operational settings. These measures go beyond traditional measures of accuracy, speed, and failure rates. The methodology of this project illustrates how cognitive engineering can strengthen materiel solutions by orienting developers on tangible operationally relevant objectives.

ABSTRACT. As cyberspace is now commonly considered the fifth domain of warfare after land, sea, air, and space, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are adapting to meet the challenges that come with operating in such an environment. These challenges include an evolving set of threats, new capabilities, and a dynamic environment where the speed at which actions are taken is unlike any other.

The CAF have established an initiative to adjust the governance structure for cyber command and control (C2), and introduce a framework for defensive cyber operations (DCO) that considers the dynamic nature of this environment. This may require resource investment, re-alignment of current authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities, and the reorganisation and/or creation of new organisations within the CAF. A set of options was developed by the CAF to address the governance structure of cyber forces and the DCO framework. Criteria were developed to assess the options at a high level, and two complementary table-top wargames were conducted in order to compare the proposed options in greater detail. The first game focused on the DCO framework while the second game focused on the cyber C2 governance structure.

Both wargame designs combined aspects of the Matrix Game approach with the Concept Development Assessment Game model. The specific design of each game was uniquely tailored to meet the CAF’s objectives, and incorporate lessons learned from previous games. This paper discusses the high level assessment criteria, game designs, measures of game success, and presents the results and lessons learned related to game execution.

ABSTRACT. The future operating concept of the Canadian Army is grounded in an understanding of the future security environment characterized by complex, multidimensional conflicts and a dispersed operational framework. Future operations will span the full spectrum of engagements requiring military forces to be dispersed in time, space and purpose. Dispersion in time and space will in turn increase the need for Unit Commanders to be mobile, moving away from the main static headquarters (HQ).

When physically separated from the main HQ, Unit Commanders require information and communication capabilities to effectively maintain command and control of their forces and assets and to maintain situational awareness. To identify and validate the key information and communication requirements that will enable Unit Commanders to effectively command while being mobile, the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, in collaboration with the Army Experimentation Centre and Defence Research & Development Canada, conducted the Unit Commander on the Move Experiment.

This paper presents the methodology and the preliminary results of this experiment. The Unit Commander on the Move Experiment immersed participants within a simulated environment recreating situations where a Commander had to command while being away from the main HQ. Participants were Canadian Army officers with relevant experience and qualifications as Unit Commanders. A series of vignettes were created to provide the operational environment and a set of surrogate information technology tools was made available to the participants to plan and execute tactical tasks. The usefulness of each tool was then assessed through surveys and semi-structured interviews.

ABSTRACT. For addressing data-sharing and data-synchronization challenges associated with developing resilient network-centric operations, a cloud-based experimentation framework is under ongoing development [1-2]. The overarching objective is to develop reliable, robust, and resilient ISR communications/networking support capabilities that can be trusted to operate within contested anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) environments. Thus, experimentation support capabilities are being explored and established for addressing cloud-computing oriented model-based system-of-systems engineering (MBSE/SOSE) needs (e.g. C2, ISR).

Most recently, attention has focused towards addressing communications and networking specific cross-layer dependencies which include components within the physical and data-link layers. Within the context of such lower-layer dependencies, long-haul RF/microwave line-of-sight (LOS) ad-hoc networks of land-air-sea links, are of particular interest. As highlighted and discussed within the paper, adaptive ISR communications services are being prototyped and assessed.

Initial results from data-intensive use-cases, such as the streaming of Full Motion Video (FMV), illustrate how resilient cross-layer communications services can help to dynamically adapt to denied - disrupted/disconnected, intermittent, Low-bandwidth (D-DIL) operating conditions while also optimizing overall performance. Thus, such capabilities help to dynamically optimize cross-layer data-transport and data-mediation, ensuring timely information flows that may span a diversity of organizational components and a wide range of participating entities.

References [1] Durham, J., et al, “An Experimentation Framework for Developing Federated Data-Sharing Services Operating in Disrupted, Disconnected, Intermittent, and Limited-bandwidth (D-DIL) Environments,” 20th ICCRTS, 2015 [2] Durham, J., et al. Network-Centric Operations Support: Lessons Learned, Status, and Way-Ahead. 19th ICCRTS, 2014.

ABSTRACT. U.S. doctrines have introduced a third approach within Operational art, called the design approach, which have evoked military professional and academic debate as well as influenced NATO doctrines. Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning (AJP 5) states that a Force Commander should choose one out of three approaches when performing Operational art and conducting operational planning: a traditional (causalist), a systemic or a design approach. The difference between the causalist and the systemic approach concerns the clash between reductionism and holism, but difference between the design and the systemic approach is the methodologically vague. Hence the following question concerning methodology and Operational art arises:

What methodological implications could constitute an argument for choosing the design approach when performing Operational art within the battlespace?

Neither NATO doctrine, planning framework nor previous research offer any explicit methodological argument for choosing, or preferring, the design over the systemic approach. This article concludes that one possible argument for preferring a design approach is adherence to value-focused thinking, but this requires that the Force Commander can and is willing to focus on stakeholders’ values within the battlespace.  This conclusion is implied by two methodological implications identified and discussed in this article. If the design approach is to be a relevant option, then further conceptual development, experimentation and education is required. To conclude, NATO should review the description of their approaches within Operational art since the argument for preferring one approach over another is lacking and this could hamper the Force Commander’s management of the battlespace.

ABSTRACT. Agility is a desirable characteristic of command and control (C2) organizations. In this paper, we propose a new scheme to enable agile C2 ― Information System Defined C2 Organization (ISDC2O). A C2 organization model consisting of substantive organization and information system which are combined by a virtual layer is first proposed. The virtual layer, containing a series of templates, is the interface between substantive organization and information system. Entities in substantive organization are mapped to the virtual layer and interactive with each other via information systems. The C2 organization can be reconstructed dynamically by changing the mapping between entities and the virtual layer, and adjusting the information workflow in information systems. The proposed scheme emphasizes the importance of information system in the procedure of organization construction, which gives the C2 organization the ability to evolve with the change of combat missions and circumstances.

ABSTRACT. We will not achieve a high level of Command and Control (C2) connectivity or inter-dependence without alignment and unity of effort with our Mission Partners. Alignment is an absolute necessity and should be based on the following four principles: Common view with goals and objectives, Common understanding of capabilities, Alignment or Coordination of efforts to ensure coherency, and Common measures of progress and ability to change course or direction as needed.

Improved alignment will help address the challenges associated with operating in any complex environment. Applying the Unity of effort (UOE) Framework that was discussed in the 19th ICCRTS (003) demonstrates the importance of comprehending and respecting that each mission partner’s approaches, strategies, and development areas are important according to their individual requirements.

The UOE Framework used for alignment assists both the United States and our mission partners to better understand a problem or issue by identifying common goals, areas of interest, capabilities, and common categories of effort to be applied by each of the organizations for the focus areas. This methodology will directly impact the way C2 is conducted in the future.

ABSTRACT. In 2002, Pigeau and McCann noted that official definitions of Command, Control and C2 exhibited considerable conceptual confusion. In response, they re-conceptualized Command and Control, focusing on Competence, Authority and Responsibility (CAR). Fourteen years on, the definitional problems appear to have increased, and the nature and locus of authority is now far from clear. Authority is the principal focus for this paper: who holds it, and what form does it take? To this end, the paper re-visits the Pigeau and McCann CAR framework, and discusses other conceptual frameworks. The paper also considers whether traditional understandings of Command and Control (and C2) were always syntheses of elements held together by contingent factors; for example: • Have current drivers (e.g. the ‘level of the fight’ now being more deeply-tactical) disrupted these traditional alignments? • Have these drivers helped to move Command away from Control; leaving C2 to be treated as a process or as a system? • Is Command itself becoming obsolete, with authority now tending to reside within the Control or Management function rather than being vested in a Commander? The paper discusses the implications for future military operations of authority residing wholly within the Control function, and what that might mean for degrees of competence and responsibility given the current focus on accountability and risk. In re-examining the concepts and definitions, current drivers will be compiled into a cognitive map to inform the development of a conceptual framework that can be used to address the question posed by the title.

ABSTRACT. Under the topic of C2-Simulation Interoperability (C2SIM) NATO and SISO develop formalisms to allow military organizations to link their C2 and simulation systems, without special preparation, in order to support staff training, after action analysis, and decision support among others. One of these formalisms is Military Scenario Definition Language (MSDL) by which simulation systems easily can be initialized. Another one is Battle Management Language (BML), which allows exchange of orders and reports among the systems. BML needs to be grounded in an ontology. We discuss how the MIP Information Model (MIM) can be developed further so that it will become the ontology BML should be grounded upon.

ABSTRACT. Traditionally, cyber-incident response has been the preserve of communication and information system (CIS) managers or CIS security specialists who have done their best to protect CIS infrastructure and its information based on their own priorities. However, as part of PhD research the contribution of a wider community impacted by cyber-incidents has been used to produce a cross-functional model; this model provides broader situational awareness (SA) in order to inform cyber-incident response decision-making. To validate the concepts established by the model a practical instantiation in the form of a spreadsheet-based tool was developed for the military environment. This tool was rapidly prototyped using continuous feedback from the Cyber Defence Working Group of a military headquarters and is now being incorporated into a training programme to teach Cyber Operational Planners for that organisation. This paper looks at the model behind the tool, the development of the model and the cross-functional applicability of the tool in a practical environment. It also shares some of the lessons from the feedback relating to the use of the tool.

ABSTRACT. Command and Control to Simulation Interoperability (C2SIM) is an emerging family of standards to exchange Command and Control (C2) information between C2 systems and simulation systems in a coalition context. In order to achieve interoperability on the semantic level, C2SIM will need a formal ontological semantic model. A C2SIM ontology will formalize C2SIM semantics, capture domain axioms and provide a model a) for constraining the expressions that can be generated by the C2SIM standard according to the doctrine represented by the ontology and b) for semantic reasoning and hypothesis analysis using abductive reasoning.

In this paper we present the history and scope of the C2SIM standard and the need for semantic C2SIM. The current phase of C2SIM development is focused on using a model driven framework (MDF) for ease of use, extensibility and scalability in coalition simulation environments. Therefore, the benefits of using an OWL ontology as a model in C2SIM MDF are presented next. Thereafter, we will depict how aspects of “Foundation of Intelligent Physical Agents” (FIPA), in particular the “Agent Communication Language” (ACL) as well as the Coalition Battle Management Language and Military Scenario Description Language XML schemas can be exploited as the C2SIM semantic foundation, the concept hierarchy and the domain relationships for our C2SIM ontology.

ABSTRACT. Federated activity presents a challenge for enterprises with high-level security architectures. Federation involves information sharing among the services and with working partners, coalition partners, first responders, and other organizations. Federation may be unilateral or bilateral and with similar or dissimilar information sharing goals.  Strong internal security controls often do not extend cleanly across enterprise boundaries, potentially leading to insecure shortcuts and workarounds that can become the rule instead of the exception. This paper presents methods for an enterprise to extend its strong security policies to include federation partners. It applies to federation partners that support the same security policies with compatible standards and services, and also to partners that provide a similar but incompatible security framework, a subset of required security services, or no security services. The partner organization may be fully trusted, partially trusted, or untrusted. Even in trusted partners the services may not meet required security standards. The solution presented combines selected partner security services, internal services, derived credentials, delegated authorities, and supplemental services to form the federation security architecture. This paper uses the Enterprise Level Security (ELS) architecture as the starting point for a secure enterprise and addresses the challenge of extending this model to federate with different types of partners. We review the security approach, the security properties, and several options for an enterprise to maintain the ELS security properties while enabling federated sharing with other enterprises that have different capabilities and levels of trust.