ABSTRACT. Over the last decades, there have been many examples of society losing trust in science. One does not have to look back very far to see glimpses, or actually major fissures, in the transparency with which science has been done and how subsequently society reacted to proposals coming from the scientific community (e.g. Pandemic or Climate Change).

But even before these current issues, in the beginning of the 2010s reports began to surface about failures to reproduce the results of high-profile studies in the field of Psychology (so called ‘Replication Crisis’). This crisis further stoked the fire and reignited debates in society and academia about the value and reliability of (past and seemingly established) scientific findings, as well as all connected instructions for actions, tools and policies.

Thankfully the arising of these ‘trust-issues’ led to the rise of a movement based on an Openness framework (i.e. accessibility, knowledge creation, collaboration and participation (see UNESCO, 2021). In theory, this framework should help to facilitate and recreate ‘trust’ in science within society, and science itself. Since this describes a fundamental trend in society as a whole, it is worthwhile to conduct a sociological analysis that focuses on both the functional areas and the purpose of trust in modern societies and the overall approach to disruptive technologies. In this regard, Niklas Luhmann's sociological systems theory not only serves this perspective but, due to its high degree of abstraction, also brings far-reaching new problem-solving approaches to the surface. Luhmann emphasizes the close relation between trust and sustainability, moreover that trust is considered to be the most reliable mechanism for reducing complexity in all areas of modern societies. In addition, the inherent and important distinction between trust and familiarity provides a new perspective on the actual functioning and importance of trust with regard to the implementation of new technologies, hereby revealing interfaces and links that meet the demands of open science.

Following the framework conceptualized by the open science movement, innovative scientists discovered the affordances of blockchain technology (e.g. inherent transparency, immutability, data security). It now offers researchers and scientists a unique approach to important parts of their scientific work processes, i.e. the pre-registration of their entire research projects/plans including proposed methods, study cohorts as well as their research data.

Not only does blockchain signal a glimmer of hope for science and society at large, but more unique approaches to solving the ‘trust-issue’ keep emerging, e.g. blockchains built specifically by universities, DeSci projects re-conceptualizing scientific publishing. In our theoretical-conceptual paper we elaborate on how misguided the use of the term ‘trust’ in the discourse around blockchain technology has become, and we aim to shine a light on current use-cases from within the scientific community on how the technology will eventually shape how science is done. Our overall objective is to provide an in-depth discussion on how the Open Science and DeSci communities can leverage and directly counteract critique levied by the public through the use of blockchain technology.

ABSTRACT. Blockchain technology emerged after the 2008 global financial crisis, disrupting various industries and offering applications beyond cryptocurrencies. It introduced an innovative trust infrastructure, transforming trust establishment and maintenance in digital environments.

Blockchain governance models play a pivotal role in facilitating trust among stakeholders. In this respect, this study analyzes governance models in selected permissioned and permissionless blockchains, investigating their key features, strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities for enhancement, and delving into their interplay with trust governance. We classify different governance models implemented in selected blockchain systems (Ethereum, Hyperledger, Tezos, R3 Corda) including on-chain, off-chain, and hybrid governance mechanisms. Comparisons of selected consensus algorithms and voting mechanisms are examined in this context. We explore how these models influence trust among stakeholders, focusing on trust generation, trust relations establishment and disruption, and overall trustworthiness by highlighting real-life examples.

Employing a theoretical approach, we use case studies and literature examination to investigate trust governance complexities in various blockchain governance models. Our main arguments emphasize that governance models, algorithms, and voting mechanisms impact blockchain's functional properties and shape trust dynamics among stakeholders.

Our contributions are threefold. First, we provide a taxonomy of governance models in blockchains and highlight their implications for building and maintaining trust. Second, we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each governance model, identifying potential areas for improvement and offering insights into challenges and opportunities. We also examine positive and negative real-life examples. Third, we propose future directions for blockchain governance models development, emphasizing the need for more adaptable, secure, and democratic governance mechanisms catering to different industries and applications while maintaining trustworthiness. A specific consideration is given to potential applications in the public governance domain.

By examining the complex relationship between trust governance and blockchain governance models, we underscore the importance of a balanced and holistic approach to the development and integration of these transformative technologies. We stress the significance of the conversation about blockchain governance models and trust, as its conclusions may impact traditional democratic institutions.

Our results stress the significance of cross-disciplinary research and cooperation among various parties to effectively address the multifaceted interaction between trust and governance in blockchain. We advocate for the establishment of a global entity, codification of unified regulations, and standardization to promote and solidify collaborative efforts. We suggest carrying out impact evaluations and incorporating quality control mechanisms for software code as essential steps towards successful blockchain implementation.

In conclusion, our study contributes to the growing knowledge on blockchain governance and trust in the digital age, offering valuable insights for policymakers, industry practitioners, and researchers. By shedding light on the crucial role of governance models in shaping trust dynamics within blockchain ecosystems, we can help achieve more adaptable, secure, and trustworthy blockchain systems across various applications, fostering innovation, growth, and trust in the digital society.

ABSTRACT. This paper brings forth an empirical analysis of blockchain implementation within public governance, based on a case study of an initiative of this sort issued by the Dutch government. The initiative in question is named “The red button”, and was intended to provide a mechanism for citizens with multiple sources of debt to temporarily pause debt collection – by pressing “the red button”. The "button" itself was technologically envisioned to rely on blockchain technology, and was carried out as a cooperation between the municipality and a private company focused on developing blockchain applications. This, supposedly, would provide more privacy for the citizens who have to report arguably sensitive personal information in order to pause debt collection and prevent accumulation of negative interest. Thus, “The red button” initiative was framed as a solution to the problem of privacy, assumed to trigger feelings of shame among citizens who would, without the red button, have to disclose their financial hardships to a municipality employee. This research advances the citizens' perspective by questioning the framing of privacy/shame as the main issue in this case, and analyzing to what extent “The red button” initiative addresses it. Moreover, the research identifies two additional issues that impose from the citizens perspective, namely the issue of political trust (or, in terms of emotional responses, the issue of fear), and the issue of taking informed action (which depends on the information at the citizens' disposal, as well as the citizens' responsiveness to such information). These issues are addressed using political science and social psychology theories. Empirically, the analysis relies on interviews conducted with the stakeholders relevant for “The red button” initiative. Finally, policy recommendations are given considering “The red button” initiative itself, but also more generally with regards to the use of novel technologies, such as blockchain, in public policy. Based on the conducted research, the use of novel technologies for such purposes should be carefully considered, in particular relative to the socio-economic and other relevant characteristics of the citizens who are target users. It is crucial that the government that wishes to implement policies relying on novel technologies remains responsible for ensuring that its citizens are properly informed – which, in case of notoriously complex blockchain technology, may be easier said than done. Introducing technological complexities to already sensitive issues, particularly in cases when effectively providing relevant technical information is absent or difficult, is likely to erode political trust and increase the uncertainty around privacy concerns.

ABSTRACT. The history of blockchains originates to large degrees from a loose group of hackers who called themselves cypherpunks (Brunton 2019) and who were actively involved in the development of a multitude of cryptographic tools. Blockchains consists to large degrees of cryptographic tools and operations. All blockchain transactions are cryptographic messages. The chains can be verified to be consistent with the help of cryptographic proofs. Cryptographic hashing functions provide what could be called the core building blocks of blockchains. Cryptography makes blockchains „trustless“ in technical terms. Because of applied cryptography, blockchains generally are considered secure. One of its core ideological goals, censorship resistance, shall be achieved by cryptographic means. Cryptography to large degrees controls all activities on a blockchain, and all models and ideas of blockchain governance start with the assumption that cryptography is necessary and available for computation. This paper argues that cryptography has acquired a fundamentally new role and status with blockchain technologies. Whereas prior to blockchains, cryptography was used mainly to ensure integrity and authenticity of data (by hashing), or classic encryption and decryption out of privacy considerations, with blockchains, for the first time, we see how cryptography is used to implement inherently political concepts. And this goes beyond the well known right-wing libertarian ideologies portrayed by David Golumbia (2016): by operationalising artificial scarcity in the digital realm, and by reducing identity to a cryptographic proof, cryptographic media first and foremost initiate a continuation and to some degree amplification of current systems of domination as tokenization and assetization have proliferated in the blockchain universe as exclusive socio-economic principles. One goal hereby is to eliminate - once and for all - all means to contest a status quo and get rid of all external arbitration. In the end, blockchains are political machines. Governance by such cryptographic media thus implies the devaluation of social processes per se. Cryptographic verification substitutes social agreement. The password has become the passport. And the means of governance are dictated by the cryptographic capabilities and affordances. Zero-knowledge proofs are thus the latest addition to the cryptographic primitives available for many blockchains. This paper synthesizes a long observation of blockchain projects and their attempts to implement governance by cryptographic means. In a sense, this is just another instance where technology is supposed to solve non-technical problems. But by tracing symptoms of such collective desires to be governed by cryptography, the paper sketches out further elements of a radical rationality of individualism that apparently easily accepts government by machines and less so by humans.

ABSTRACT. The authors address the problem of labour valuation in a world shaped by new technologies. Specifically, the paper explores the question of whether NFT gig tokens constitute such a tool for valuing one's own work that will take into account both financial and network dimensions of that valuation. The thesis is formulated that NFT gig tokens has the potential to become a new mean of labour valuation for and by gig workers. The article is based on empirical data concerning the owners of tokens, which are issued on an intentionally created personal token platform (https://personaltokens.io/). The study covers 170 personal token issuers, 45 of which were analysed in detail. In the research, the following methods were used: quantitative analysis (mainly t-test of significance of correlation coefficients between the included indicators and descriptive statistics of the created indicators) and content analysis in a framework of the cultural approach. The results of our research are: (1) a newly developed classification of work offered by digital token issuers that are considered as a part of a gig workers group, (2) an axiological reasoning of network factor of valuation (3) identification of factors influencing the valuation of work using personal tokens. It is worth underlining here that the financial benefits seem to be of lower relevance here. The main criteria of work valuation are the appearance in the virtual world and the development of a network of contacts (customers), which will enable them to achieve a network effect in the long term. The latter can, subsequently, translate into the increased financial benefits of personal token issues offering their work using the analysed platform.

ABSTRACT. Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) have gained unprecedented popularity, changing how digital art is perceived. Despite the mid-2022 NFTs crises, there seems to be a light at the end of the tunnel called Metaverse. In the virtual environment known as the Metaverse, NFTs are digital assets that indicate ownership. Through purchasing, selling, and trading, NFTs can completely transform the metaverse economy. Users can transport digital assets and identities between virtual worlds using them as identification or payment between metaverses. These digital assets can include visual art, music, and other types of virtual objects that may attract Intellectual Property (IP) claims. The relation between NFTs and IP Law in the Metaverse is complex and continues to evolve at the same speed as the Metaverse itself, therefore issues regarding copyright, trademark, and licensing are not only expected but have already risen. This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature surrounding the IP regulatory landscape of NFTs in the metaverse, especially considering the recent and pioneer decision on this matter in the Hermès vs. Rothschild “METABIRKIN Case”. To do this, it makes use of the principles of transparency, provenance, and validity to analyze the balancing of different components of IP Law, such as the right to an artistic expression, public interest, and consumer protection. Following this analysis, this paper provides a different solution to the METABIRKIN Case, from an ethical point of view, bringing attention to the danger of creating a “chilling effect” on creative expressions, legal abuse, and potential censorship. The key discussion focuses on the ethical concerns related to the abuse of the legal system, misuse of intellectual property rights, and potential harm to individuals.

ABSTRACT. This paper calls for thinking about digital data governance through a lens of ‘polycentrism’. This concept refers to actor constellations operating with multiple, overlapping rationalities, normative orientations, ethical concerns, technologies and institutional arrangements. Polycentrism, we argue, provides a set of lenses that are useful for understanding the growing variety of actors, issue areas and processes at the subnational, national, and regional levels all making up global digital data governance. Polycentric insights, we show, help to navigate the plurality of frameworks attempting to understand actors, technologies and controversies data and governance in two related ways.

First, polycentrism reveals the multiple power centers and connections binding together both formal and informal attempts to address concerns surrounding data at different levels of activity and across sectors. Polycentrism enables the identifying and assessing of highly fluid arrangements emerging in global digital data governance. Tensions, contradictions, and normative expectations are brought into conversation. Bridging insights into how data governance is both diffuse and fluid as well as retains centers of decision-making helps overcome the tendency to stress either the dispersion or persistent centralization of power and authority. Providing bridges between extremes, polycentric perspectives also allow for different understanding to be advanced of what should and could constitute appropriate forms of global digital data governance. Different manners in which democratic and social justice norms can for example be advanced and resisted can come into conversation through a focus on the plurality of overlapping centers that characterize polycentric data governance.

Second, by revealing the multiple power centers and connections between them, polycentric perspectives bridge divides in interdisciplinary analyses of global digital data governance. Existing analysis of artificial intelligence, (cyber)security, smart cities, health immunity passes, fake news “farms” all mobilize varying assumptions and understandings of what data and governance involve. These assumptions typically are implicit. They lead to varying understandings of what global digital data governance entails. Overcoming the tendency of discussions of data governance to remain siloed inside individual scholarly disciplines, polycentric perspectives provide bridge across disciplinary boundaries.

In short, polycentric perspectives help draw together a growing range of insights from different disciplines about digital data governance: how it occurs, how it might occur differently, and how it should occur. Adopting polycentric perspectives help identify and connect together key actors and location of authority across different levels – national, regional, international- in making sense of the complexities of global digital data governance. This paper grounds these arguments in a topology of controversial efforts to distribute the production, storage and use of digital data in blockchain and cryptocurrency governance. Such data governance architectures challenge the notions of centralized centres of power by ostensibly dispersing power amongst the plurality of nodes making up these peer-to-peer networks. Drawing on an ‘ordered chaos’ polycentric perspective we outline the key norms, practices and underlying orders governing distributed governance, before mapping the increasing complexity and fragility of distributed data ordering.

The main contributions of this paper to the conference will be to provide theoretically grounded interdisciplinary linkages between its core themes of data governance, (institutional) governance and real-existing blockchain applications.

ABSTRACT. The reliance of public institutions on technology companies that manage and control data related to institutional and people’s activities and interactions generates certain vulnerabilities. Companies collecting large amounts of data appear reluctant to share relevant data, and, as a result, public institutions may lack information necessary to fulfil their public tasks as mandated by law. In response, the EU has placed digital sovereignty high on its policy agenda with the Data Act and the Data Governance Act. In this paper I investigate the legal and technical dimensions of business-to-government data sharing (‘B2G’) through a data intermediary. A data intermediary, a trusted third party with a bespoke data governance regime, can potentially help overcome disincentives and strengthen confidence in B2G data sharing.

ABSTRACT. Terms such as distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) and blockchain which emerged in parallel with the rapid developments in technology, have not been fully understood despite their widespread popularity. It is unsurprising that many scholars and leads in business have claimed that blockchain technology will revolutionize the way data will be used in business and change the usual way of doing business. Additionally, the idea of blockchain will be changing and improving the financial sector is widely supported. Thus blockchain became a significant trend and a lead in the financial sector's digital transformation. Specifically in finance, there is a broad trend towards greater use of data and data sharing, and it is possible to see blockchain as the safest option for sharing data while ensuring that there wouldn’t be any change, deformation and/or erasion of information. This might be specifically important for open finance, because in open financial services, which offer a completely different concept from the established acceptance of the traditional financial system, customer information is made available to third-party institutions in line with the customers' approval. Together with the open finance concept based on data sharing, the concepts of "interoperability" and "data portability" have become the basic principles observed in the business models of financial institutions. Open finance is an umbrella concept covering various financial services such as banking, insurance, financing or investment services, and one of the leading applications of open finance is “open banking”. In this context, the specific feature that distinguishes open banking is changing the relationship between the financial sector actors with the free circulation of customers’ financial information. However, although open banking is integrated into financial services to facilitate more efficient data recording processes, most of the actors of the financial sector need to be ensured with a standard and open-access Information Technology (“IT”) infrastructure. Therefore, evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of enabling blockchain technology into the open banking system and ensuring data sharing while maintaining a standard of transparency, security and privacy is essential. In this context, this paper weighs the risks of sharing data such as financial exclusion, data protection, misuse of data, data leak, ID theft, fraud, insufficient security measures, and cybersecurity breaches and it proposes that blockchain and DLT infrastructure could answer these concerns. The main argument is that blockchain technology, specifically DLT infrastructure allows a greater degree of transparency and utilizes DLTs in the realm of an open banking system by creating an information system that holds data in a secure and self-verifying way. In addition, DLTs and smart contracts could improve the transparency and security of sharing financial data of the customers, which supports global efforts to improve the sustainability of the financial sector. Therefore this paper makes a careful risk assessment to estimate whether the benefits are greater than the risks for the various actors in the financial sector and tries to position blockchain technology, which has a complex technical dimension and a legally ambiguous image, in the context of financial technologies, particularly in EU legislation and Turkish Law.

ABSTRACT. If I had to sincerely answer to the question “Is there anything to be salvaged from the overhyped blockchain revolution?”, focusing on financial models, I would probably answer “No”. However, I would also point that the blockchain revolution is now part of our lives and a wise regulator should find a way to take advantage of it. What is relevant or not is determined by the facts. And the data reveal that crypto assets are widely diffused and with a significant impact in the performance of market. So, in this presentation I’ll focus on two topics: 1) Why people are so attracted to cryptocurrency; 2) Which is the best approach for authorities to guide investors’ behavior, without interfering with their freedom of choice. The key to this essay will be the economic behavioral theories developed from the second half of the Twentieth Century to the present day. In fact, finding the process that let people investing on cryptos will provide us with the element to consider for an efficient regulation. As the economists D. Kahneman, O. Sibony and C.R. Sunstein wrote, our decisions are influenced by noise. Noise represents the element that causes the variation in judgment of every human being and leads him to make a decision rather than another. It is responsible for the different choices of the individuals and represents the inner reason of any human being choice. The hype for the Blockchain phenomenon has certainly influenced investors' market choices, fostering the growth of this market and the appetite for investors in this new type of currency. However, without noise a whole range of people probably would not have made crypto investments, running great risks. The magnitude of this phenomenon is increasing, and there are two ways to deal with it: prohibition or regulation. We all know that outlawing something that people enjoy does not usually work. Regulating, on the other hand, is always the best choice. But what is the approach the legislature should take to ensure that the law is respected and the public support it? To answer, one must consider the specific legislative goals of the system. Taking the European Union as a reference, the main objectives in financial markets are: 1) ensuring the free market; 2) protecting and informing consumers; 3) preventing unfair conduct and criminal activities. Prohibiting would go against the free market, while making it barrier-free would harm consumers. For these reasons, it is necessary to think of a legislation that gently nudges the consumer to make the best choice. In this lecture, I will theorize the application of R. Thaler and C. Sunstein’s Nudge theory to this type of market, in order to determine if it’s the best approach to ensure the respect and pursuit of EU goals1. I will provide practical examples of the concrete application of these theories, showing how they could improve the perception of the decentralised financial models. The implementation of regulations inspired by this form of government could in fact ensure the conscious involvement of citizens in financial processes, as well as a safer market.

ABSTRACT. Regulation of blockchain-supported products is currently being implemented in multiple jurisdictions. Most commentators are understandably focused on the U.S. and the EU as international hubs of activity, but these are far from the only players in the field. Nation-states, professional organizations, and financial intermediaries are active as well, some forming their own rules and others implementing regulatory frameworks that will severely affect which DLT products will thrive, and which will be limited in application. Academic and popular discussion of DLT regulation is multi-faceted and future-oriented, as potential blockchain applications are almost endless and encompass a wide variety of types and subject-matters. Still, most regulatory interventions currently considered and implemented, are focused on financial products. This is not surprising given that control of monetary instruments, payment systems, credit and financing, are among the most heavily regulated spheres of human activity. Currently, most regulation considered and applied has to do with cryptocurrencies, their status as monetary instruments or securities, their effect on financial stability, money laundering, taxation, and the like.

What should be taken into account, though, is how much of financial regulation takes the form of rules, rather than standards, and how much this affects the development of blockchain-supported products more generally. Rules are norms specified to the point where application is clear, allowing for predictability and delineation of responsibility. Standards are norms left purposefully vague, allowing for flexibility of application and adaptability to changing circumstances. Their downside is less predictability and more potential for misuse of authority. Financial regulation, more than other types of regulation, is developed over time, as regulators implement “best practices” learnt from industry experience and routinely allow for participation and influence by major financial intermediaries. Indeed, industry participation exists in other forms of regulation as well, sometimes to an excess. Still, the financial realm is rife with long-standing economies of scale and scope, extreme levels of learning by doing incumbency advantages, together with regulatory respect for traditional methods and actors, which act together to increase industry concentration and influence. To have these be the deciding factors for regulation of innovative technologies which could thoroughly affect broad swaths of human activity, is obviously problematic.

One might focus on the competition-limiting effects of traditional financial intermediaries being central players in the formative regulation of DLT. One might be even more worried that their ability to thwart competition goes well beyond regulatory involvement, to include their ability to limit financing and even access to traditional banking and payment systems. The problem, though, is larger than that. Blockchain-supported products go well beyond financial instruments, and have the potential to dramatically change how we interact socially and professionally. The dominance of financial regulation in affecting the development of DLT has the potential to thwart growth and innovation in multiple sectors, not only when incumbents have a clear incentive limit competitive pressures, but when the structure of regulation is borrowed from finance while the effect of regulation is much broader in application. In my discussion I hope to shed light on path-dependence in regulatory intervention which deals with urgent matters first, while determining regulation that will outlive these and influence multiple spheres of activity.

ABSTRACT. The relationship between private and public money has shaped the economic and legal debate over money for centuries. Private money can either compete with or complement public money and this depends on the applicable law and the relative powers of the State and private parties, The rise of disruptive digital and cryptographic technologies applied to money creation has the potential to innovate this century-long debate. This article proposes an analytical framework to analyse the role of law and regulation in the relation to risks and benefits of having circulating private money competing with public money, hence threatening monetary sovereignty. Accordingly, it highlights the unprecedented risks to systemic stability and, ultimately, democratic decision-making that digital private money can prompt.To counter these risks while seizing potential efficiency gains generated by these novel forms of private money, the article proposes to regulate convertibility and fragment by regulation of this potentially global market.