ABSTRACT. The basic opposition between centralisation and decentralisation is prevalent in contemporary blockchain discourse. The twentieth century’s Coaseans termed the opposition managerial authority versus anarchic markets. The twenty-first century’s blockchain proponents repeatedly vary the centralisation versus decentralisation theme: natural-language laws versus encoded rules, legal interpretation versus machine-automated execution, trusted asset custodians versus “trustlessness”, and so on. Contra Coaseans, they claim that decentralised Web (DWeb) technologies offer an alternative to both managerial authority and anarchic markets. Instead of the former, DWeb technologies offer community voting rights; and instead of the latter, DWeb technologies offer protocols with machine-executed rules. According to upbeat predictions, DWeb technologies enable unaffiliated individuals to collaborate and trade resources in a non-chaotic, peer-to-peer manner. “Centralisation” – a disparaged array of administrative authorities, bureaucratic middlemen, and supervisory caricatures like Big Tech and Big Government – is no longer required, according to this Vision.

Although DWeb technologies appear complex (and the proponents’ rhetoric is both enthusiastic and mystifying), the basic proposition is simple: virtual private property is registered to an address that can be “unlocked” by the holder of a private key. The DWeb’s “key” concepts are the private and the encrypted; hence holders of private keys can access anything from encrypted messages to crypto-assets. Private keys can also sign off on transactions and append cryptographic signatures to electronic documents (for the sake of authentication).

Heads in the Cloud sublimate the DWeb’s basic proposition and somehow raise private key-holders to the level of “Sovereign Individuals”, “decentralised autonomous organisations” (DAOs), “blockchain institutions”, “digital sovereign states”, and the “Decentralised Society” (DeSoc). Putatively serious proponents within academia attempt to legitimise DWeb technologies with recourse to New Institutional Economics and Sveriges Riksbank Prize winners. The DWeb, according to them, is the “Cause” of organisations, institutions, and moral Missions that are worthy of the names Coase, Williamson, and Ostrom. These “serious” claims are not properly scrutinised. With respect to the DWeb’s enthusiasm and mystification, we offer a magic quadrant. The quadrant reveals organisations that owe their Cause to the DWeb. Examples include conventional organisations like central banks’ consortia and crypto companies, as well as novel online communities that are expected to govern anything from crypto-asset treasuries and shadow markets to metaverse projects.

ABSTRACT. In my paper I try to build a useful frame of reference for how the possibility of a soft or a hard fork of a cryptographic blockchain can affect its governance. The very threat of a controversial fork of the blockchain (as opposed to a consensual upgrade) is often a dramatic event: it triggers a number of political processes among stakeholders (developers, token-holders, users) that look rather unique and hard to analyse and predict. To better understand those, as well as the principal-agent concerns arising, in this paper I propose to do the following.

After an introduction and defining my terms, I first present a three case studies of soft and hard forks: (1) the hard fork of Ethereum and Ethereum Classic in 2016, a fascinating story of expediency pitched against putative core values of the blockchain (2) the hard fork of Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash in 2017 a high drama perhaps better understood in terms of a conflict of powerful mining interests, (3) the relatively low-conflict Taproot soft fork of Bitcoin in 2021.

In the next section I suggest a number of dimensions in terms of the choices available to members of different groups of stakeholders with respect to a potential fork, hard or soft. After that, I identify four potentially useful older, offline frameworks of reference where the effects of institutional splits upon governance and different stakeholder groups has already been amply studied: (1) religious schisms, (2) state separations, (3) political parties splitting up and (4) corporate spin-offs and splits. Using the dimensions I introduced above, review which of these are closest in terms of salient points to blockchain forks, and therefore, which one is the most likely to best predict the nature of the governance events surrounding blockchain forks.

In the last section I discuss to what extent the case studies indeed reflect the governance processes in the frame of reference found to be closest to the blockchain hard- and soft fork, respectively. I conclude by identifying directions for further research.

ABSTRACT. The Blockchain technology has promised to deliver a trustless system for transactions eliminating the need for a third party, with the potential to revolutionize many industries. However, as the excitement about it faded, it became apparent that not all aspects of this revolution lived up to the expectations. This paper explores some areas in which the blockchain has fallen short of its revolutionary promises, as well as some aspects that have managed to live up to the hype. The ability to complete transactions without the need to involve a trusted third party was one of the key promises of blockchain technology. Thus, the misleading term ‘trustless’ refers to the capacity of blockchain systems to function without the need for a central authority or trusted third party. However, while blockchain technology is ‘trustless’ in the sense that no central authority is necessary, trust in the underlying technology and the network of nodes being able to reach an unbiased consensus is still required. Accordingly, the paper focuses on how many Blockchain implementations could not keep the ‘trustless’ promise due to the real possibility of 51% attacks; privacy concerns related to confidential or encrypted transactions; their scalability; and regulatory challenges. Furthermore, this paper identifies use cases often mentioned in the same context as Blockchain that should be preserved, such as supply chain management and document certification. This paper analyzes how these use cases can be addressed by just using some of the well-known technical building blocks of the Blockchain, such as the Merkle Tree data structure, or digital signatures. For example, Merkle trees alone allow for a verifiable chain of transactions, where it is not possible to change one transaction undetected, i.e., without rewriting following transactions. Note that an approach building on this suffices to handle many use cases that have traditionally been mentioned in the context of Blockchain - but without the need for its complex and energy-intensive consensus mechanism.

ABSTRACT. TBD

ABSTRACT. Already in the e-justice Action Plan for 2019-2023, the European Union states its vision to incorporate innovative technologies in criminal justice cross-border judicial cooperation processes. Along with Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, Blockchain appears among the proposed projects. Although the integration of AI and robotic systems into the judiciary seems to be clearer, the use of blockchain technologies for its procedures remains a slightly unexplored field in the EU sphere. This is not the case in other countries, where the discussion has converted into action and where blockchain has gradually became a part of the judicial system. The most probable use of blockchain is associated with the exchange of evidence. For the time being, the exchange of evidence in cross-border cases, namely between different Member States and authorities takes place using hard copies. The latter demands physical storage of the evidence and its sending to the other involved Member State or agency via a private or public carrier. The Proposal for a Regulation of the Digitalisation of cross-border judicial cooperation aims to alter this narrative, establishing a safe and secure environment for the digital exchange of evidence, whether it is digital or not. Thus, this demands the prior digitalization of evidence in order to be feasible to send it electronically. When it comes to electronic evidence, another path exists and has been taken into account by the EU policymakers and this is the blockchain one. Undoubtedly, it is seen as an easy, quick and interoperable solution for the secure exchange of information and evidence, ensuring its authenticity and traceability, making it admissible in front of courts and enabling the desired decentralized and guaranteeing safe communication at Member State level without the necessity of involvement of any third party. Apart from it, other use cases appear that should be considered. In criminal cases with cross-border elements efforts in the disposition of criminal charges many parties get involved, often stemming from diverse Member States and agencies and who are responsible of maintaing accurate and up-to-date criminal records. In order to achieve it they rely on manual data entry, alternations and constant quality control. The same concerns can be expressed as far as the European arrest warrant goes, which needs to accessed by numerous authorities simultaneously. The shift towards the unhindered use of Blockchain is, nevertheless, not unhindered. Some conditions should be taken into place both at European and national level for blockchain technologies to realise their full potential. First and foremost, an assessment of the relevance of using blockchain instead of any other type of secure and encrypted communication channel should proceed, followed by an impact assessment of the use of these technologies on human rights, with a focus on the access to justice, the right to fair trial, the presumption of innocence and the fundamental principles of criminal justice. The ramifications of a variety of architectural decisions, such as the openness of networks, public access to them or the readability of the stored data must be highlighted. It should also be ensured that electronic evidence is recognized and is admissible by the legal and judicial systems of the Member States. Otherwise, blockchain technologies will remain an impractical and utopian tool, even menacing for the EU acquis.

ABSTRACT. As cryptocurrency continues to grow, the regulations that govern its use also increase. Alekseenko and Gidigbi (2021) assert that the use of the currency continues to grow as many vendors accept it as a medium of exchange. Governments also have to develop rules and regulations to cap its use with the worry that it may dilute the regular currency or lead to inflation. Several central banks have warned about the negative side of cryptocurrency and deny their use as a medium of exchange, with fewer financial institutions rejecting it as a financial asset. According to the Global Legal Research Center (2018), the lack of liquidity, leverage uses, market volatility, and the operational hazards of cryptocurrencies are all causing worry for policymakers. According to several central bankers, Bitcoin is not legal cash, and users stand the danger of transactions becoming unenforceable (Mkrtchian, 2021). It has led to controversy concerning the legal nature of cryptocurrency and its distinction from electronic money. In the article, "The Governance of Blockchain Financial Networks," Paech (2017) mentions that disruptors and incumbents alike might reimagine financial sector business models thanks to the widespread use of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). Consequently, how financial assets are traded and administered might alter significantly if blockchain technology is widely used. Consequently, various features that now connect regulatory law to practices in the market will be affected (Arner et al., 2020; Mkrtchian, 2021). These concepts are firmly ingrained in understanding financial markets and how they are regulated. Strategies for governance will need to be adjusted if they are lost or modified. When it comes to comprehending how markets operate, blockchain technology can reshape our knowledge of the present governance structure, as will be illustrated in subsequent sections. According to the Global Research Center (2018) research, cryptocurrency may be lawfully exchanged in nations that allow it, provided it complies with current rules or laws relating to financial assets. Despite the regulatory position, policymakers are concerned that cryptocurrencies might be used for criminal purposes, including money laundering, unlawful drug trafficking, or terrorist financing. Policymakers are also mindful of the risks to consumers and investors. Deposit protection for bitcoin holders is restricted and not provided by domestic financial regulators. Policy aversion or openness to cryptocurrency may be influenced by a combination of potential advantages and macroeconomic dangers (Jabotinsky & Sarel, 2022). Research on cryptocurrency spans various disciplines, including finance, economics, applied mathematics, and computer science.

ABSTRACT. Researchers argue that a fundamental aspect of the ongoing Fourth Industrial Revolution is the digital transformation that is taking place. In this process Data plays big role, nowadays every decision from private companies are based on data they have and also on the other hand Government have access on more and more data. More important becomes data, more complex becomes the question how data should be governed? Data governance requires multi-disciplinary approach, Data protection laws give effect to the government’s obligation to respect the privacy rights of individuals, ensuring that there are proper restrictions on how personal data is used and secured. Maybe it seems simple, to respect personal data, but on the other hand transparency is very important to avoid corruption and abuse of power. This paper aims to analyze one case of data governance, how beneficial ownership transparency can be balanced with the principles of data protection? Which country found this balance? Beneficial owners regulation seeks to combat money laundering and terrorist financing ("AML"), a global problem that necessitates global solutions. This area is specifically regulated within the EU by the 4th and 5th AML Directives. The fourth AML Directive requires all EU Member States to include provisions in their national laws requiring legal persons to obtain and maintain adequate, accurate, and up-to-date information on their beneficial owners, including share size details. Civil society organizations and governments around the world are increasingly recognizing the need for greater transparency into the ultimate ownership of companies. Countries’ efforts to fight criminal activity- including money laundering and terrorists financing- are often obstructed because of the challenges of finding out who truly owns and controls, and benefits from, the legal entities used in the context of these illicit activities. More must be done to investigate and hold to account those responsible for illicit financial activity, The key question is whether, in order to achieve these aims, the company ownership register must be made public? This is not a theoretical question, ECJ had already to answer the question and on 22 November 2022, the ECJ ruled that, the law that allows the public to access information about beneficial ownership of In-Scope Entities is invalid. According to the ECJ, the provision violated certain fundamental rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. These rights include the right to respect private life and the right to protect personal data. As a result of the ECJ's decision, unrestricted public access to the Ownership Registers constitutes an inadequacy of individuals’ rights. This is incompatible with the objectives of the Ownership Registers to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. There is a possibility that a change in the law may be required in response to the ECJ ruling, which will require that the law regarding open public access to beneficial ownership information of In-Scope Entities be reassessed. The paper will analyze how data privacy rules are in compliance with combating money laundering, corruption or terrorist financing

ABSTRACT. Following the advent of blockchain in 2008, a wave of decentralization has created enormous hype in many circles, including the digital identity management fronts, also known as blockchain-based Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) (Allen, 2016) (Ferdous et al. 2019). Among others, the excitement had to do with the potential of blockchain to eliminate the need for intermediaries and distribute the decision-making power in digital identity management. However, recent studies argued that this promise of blockchain might not be realized (Finck 2018). Furthermore, blockchain poses many legal questions, e.g., the clash with the GDPR (Finck 2018) (Berberich and Steiner 2016). The objective of this study is twofold. First, It aims to explain the data protection issues of blockchain-based SSI, taking into account the recent policy developments. Second, to demonstrate with a single case study that contrary to what the SSI community claims, identity management cannot exist entirely independently from third parties. First, this study briefly explains these legal conflicts, including the ongoing discussion in the context of Eidas 2.0. Blockchain's problematic relationship with the GDPR, e.g., immutability and accountability, remain relevant when it comes to SSI frameworks built on blockchain technology (Giannapoluo 2020). Furthermore, the possibility to modify or erase the data is redounded on other issues such as accuracy and storage limitation. Meanwhile, the eIDAS 2.0 proposal embraces the main components of SSI and decentralization in identity management, such as wallets, verifiable credentials, and tamper-proof electronic ledgers. Currently, the status of tamper-proof electronic ledgers is undecided. What is clear now is that the current version of the proposal adds to the legal risks and uncertainty regarding blockchain-based SSI systems. Secondly, the study takes a critical realist approach and explores the issues of the SSI regulatory domain based on technical possibilities and realities (Bygstad, 2008). In doing so, it, first of all, analyzes the common technical characteristics of SSI. This is not an easy task, as over hundreds of SSI projects use various techniques being developed (Github, 2019). While the essential components, e.g., wallets, remain more or less the same, the SOVRIN network has been chosen as the main focus since it is one of the most mature examples of the SSI to analyze the blockchain layer (ENISA 2022). Other prominent examples will be consulted, too, where necessary. Based on a critical analysis, the paper argues that the SSI paradigm will likely fail to eliminate the need for central authorities and might not necessarily eliminate the central databases from IdM. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that SSI is not a concept that is only associated with blockchain technology. In fact, the sophistication of smartphones and advances in cryptography are the main factors enabling this new decentralized identity framework (IRMA, 2020). Nevertheless, SSI has attractive features that might reduce bulk data disclosures and eliminate certification authorities and the security risks stemming from their mediation. Notably, locally-stored wallets, as a way to store and present credentials, can be considered to achieve a long-standing ideal of decentralization. However, these properties need to be further advanced regarding interoperability and security. Finally, one question remains: to what extent can blockchain-based SSI schemes decentralize the central control points in identity management processes?

ABSTRACT. As a newly emerging dispute resolution mechanism, smart contract arbitration has the potential to be fully transparent because of its technological features. Earning the trust and reputation by guaranteeing a just process is essential. Notwithstanding its potential, there is a prejudice against blockchain and smart contracts, which are still deemed vague and decentralized. Therefore, smart contract arbitration needs transparency standards as well. Are the current transparency standards for traditional arbitration applicable to smart contract arbitration, or should new standards be adopted?

This question should be answered according to the nature and technological background of smart contracts and blockchain technology. Nick Szabo called these contracts "smart." He claimed that they are far more functional than paper-based contracts because of the quicker transmission of larger and more sophisticated messages and a wide variety of new protocols thanks to new algorithms. He further argued that they minimize enforcement costs, transaction costs, fraud possibilities, and the need for intermediaries while enforcement and payment. Therefore, smart contracts promote a transparent transaction platform.

One of the main features of smart contracts is their self-enforcing nature. Therefore, they promote an automated environment and transactions, however, disputes are not avoidable. Smart contracts have "smart" disputes with distinct characters. Schmitz argues that traditional litigation is “largely nonsensical” because of the issues regarding jurisdiction, party identity, and developing technologies, and accordingly, offline litigation undermines the efficiency and scalability of smart contracts. Therefore, arbitration incorporating blockchain is the most effective method for dispute resolution arising from blockchain. In this respect, there are recent innovative ideas and initiatives on blockchain arbitration such as Kleros , Aragon and Jur.

Blockchain arbitration, as an automated arbitration mechanism with integrated smart contracts, aims to minimize third-party involvement, cost, paperwork, and evidence manipulation or tampering. Since the source of dispute and parameters are not identical, the perception and approach should differ from traditional arbitration. Nevertheless, fundamental rules of traditional arbitration to conduct a consistent procedure and a fair judgment should primarily be embraced. Yet, adopting such fundamental rules should not be perceived as assimilating smart contract arbitration into traditional arbitration. At this point, as one of the fundamental standards, transparency emerges as a delicate issue for both arbitration procedures because it spreads over an entire procedure.

Therefore, first, my study will introduce the definition of transparency in smart contract arbitration. Then transparency issues, rules, and approaches of the existing smart contract arbitration technologies will be analyzed. The main goal of this individual paper is to achieve and offer a low-cost, just, reputable, high-speed, and fully transparent smart contract arbitration mechanism. After determining the standards of transparency accurately, these will gradually prevalent. Through appropriate technological and legal infrastructure, disputes arising from traditional contracts could be resolved by blockchain arbitration as off-chain smart contracts as well. By this means, traditional arbitration could be overthrown and replaced in near future. However, blockchain arbitration still frankly needs a certain time, collective experience, and sample cases to yield and develop.

This individual paper is planned to be doctrinal and theoretical. Even if the blockchain-based dispute resolution methods are highlighted topics recently, transparency issues specifically in blockchain arbitration procedure are still ambiguous. Contributing this perspective would be significant to enhance the orientation and trust to blockchain-based arbitration and the blockchain itself ultimately.

ABSTRACT. The role of trust (or lack thereof) in blockchains has been a topic of discussion for as long as the technology has existed. While some have heralded blockchains as trust machines with the power to eliminate any trusted intermediaries, enabling trustless transactions, businesses, networks and even states (Atzori, 2015; Casey & Vigna, 2018; “The Trust Machine,” 2015), over the years such claims have largely been debunked (Hawlitschek et al., 2018; De Filippi et al., 2020; Werbach, 2018). However, as the debate continues, all sides seem to agree that a central goal of blockchain networks and the communities they serve is to reduce the need for trust and trusted intermediaries in their overall functioning. The effects of this implicit normative aspiration can be observed across the ecosystem. In Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), i.e. organizations that (partially) rely on blockchain technology for their governance and operations (Hassan & Filippi, 2021) it manifests itself in practices such as decision making via token voting, cast by pseudonymous actors, autonomously enforced via smart contracts. Yet, many DAOs today are experiencing severe problems, including voter apathy, a lack of accountability, security risks as well as legal uncertainty (Gogel et al., 2022).

In this paper I ask how DAO governance and the role of blockchain networks changes when the explicit goal is maximizing trust, not minimizing it. To begin answering this question, I draw on an ethnography of Dada, a historic blockchain art community, which I followed in their transition towards a DAO for over a year. While Dada shares many values such as decentralization, permissionless participation and transparency with the wider blockchain and DAO community, their governance is structured around high trust and alignment to support their vision of separating art making from the art market through a concept called the Invisible Economy.

Within the Dada community, blockchain and automation are strategically leveraged to access the wider blockchain economy and for core market facing activities within the community, while at the same time shielding it’s internal structures from the dynamics and logic this market and technology perpetuate. I describe the journey and outcome of Dada’s endeavor to build trust across its community, governance and operations as an example illustrating blockchain’s ability to supplement relatively general social trust, yet being correspondingly less effective at substituting particularized, context based trust (Schilke et al., 2021). The paper concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of Dada’s model of DAO governance in relation to other implicit goals in the blockchain community, namely decentralization, permissionless access, transparency, security and scalability. Overall, this paper contributes a nuanced discussion of how the narratives of trustless transactions and trusted governance intersect in the blockchain ecosystem.

ABSTRACT. The latest research on decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) revolved around the legal issues and the ‘picture-imperfect’ reality of DAOs. This article aims to address and go beyond those established problems by empirically reviewing the concept of DAOs and the necessity of a legal framework thereto. The first element of the article contains a critical review of the terms decentralized, autonomous, and organizations, which are not as absolute as they are presented to be. These discrepancies lead to the conclusion that there is no universally accepted definition for DAOs. The results lead to three recommendations for further definition development: (1) a definition that is based on the concepts of decentralization, autonomy, and organization, though be it in a way that corrects for the established discrepancies; (2) a negatively formulated definition that excludes organizations that do not meet a selection of criteria related to DAOs, or (3) a category-wise definition. The second element of the article builds upon those findings by displaying the needs and expectations of the DAO community for a legal framework. The findings suggest that there is a need for DAO-specific legislation to provide legal certainty and protection for DAOs, particularly for smaller DAOs. It identifies four rationales for legislation: operating in the traditional corporate world, legal protection, protection for smaller DAOs, and guidance for DAOs. It also highlights the different opinions on the extent of the legislation, ranging from no binding new legislation to new legislation with benefits for DAOs. Additionally, the article provides recommendations for the nature of (new) legislation, such as loose and future-proof legislation, and a solid and inclusive definition. Lastly, the article dives into the topics that the DAO community desires legislation on, which include tax, treasury and tokens, employment relations, dispute resolution, securities qualification, limited liability/legal personality, forking, voting, use of smart contracts, dissolution, disclaimer, and fiduciary status. It offers recommendations for these topics based on provisions from the COALA Model Law for DAOs and the DAO-specific legislation in Vermont, Wyoming, Tennessee, Utah, and the New Hampshire draft bill. These recommendations can inform the development of DAO-specific legislation, and provide guidance for DAOs on how they should shape themselves in accordance with legal requirements.

ABSTRACT. The theoretical framework of the commons (Ostrom, 1990) offers a powerful vision of how citizens can take collective action to redefine aspects of our socioeconomic system towards greater social or ecological justice. Recently, some authors have highlighted the potential of blockchain-based tools to support the governance of the commons (Rozas et al. 2021). Until now, these possibilities although very relevant were only theoretical. Today, we are in a position to update these possibilities, as some commons projects that have mobilized blockchain-based tools already have feedback that can be very informative. This paper focus on the limits of commons governance trough decentralized, distributed, blockchain-based systems. Our contributions come from real-existing situations. We conducted qualitative case studies of two commons experimentations based on blockchains. The first is the case of the free currency Ğ1, which is an experiment of common-based cryptocurrency that enables the distribution of a daily Universal Dividend to its members (Malafosse and al. 2022). The second is a pioneer European project called DECODE, which was initiated by the municipality of Barcelona to experiment data commons (Malafosse & Pascal, 2022). Our results show that blockchain, as a disruptive technology, offers new solutions to deal with enclosures situations, situations where the appropriation of a resource benefits only a few instead of maximizing the collective interest. For example, it offers perspectives for democratizing and complexifying monetary forms to experiment money creation as a common (Malafosse, 2021) or allows citizens to regain control over their personal data. Furthermore, our case studies allow us to analyze the use of blockchain to support the governance of the commons. By exploring the relationship between the blockchain and the bundles of rights present in the CBPP communities we were able to test the affordances proposed by Rozas et al. (2021) between blockchain functionalities and Ostrom's (1990) principles. We observe, for example, that the association of a web of trust with a blockchain proves to be effective in supporting the decentralized management of members' identities and drawing the boundaries of the commons in a convivial tool philosophy (Illich, 1973). Our work also highlights the interest in combining the commons method and blockchain to preserve the digital rights of citizens at the scale of a territorial community. This combination makes it possible to find local balances between technology, social, and sustainability principles. Even if blockchain is often only a subset of a large socio-technical device, its emerging characteristic can help to federate the heterogeneous actors of a territory, to strengthen social links, and to increase their skills. Finally, its mobilization in commons projects allows for the distribution of certain forms of power, which restores common sense and is opposed to techno-determinist visions. However, these case studies also highlight some of the limitations, challenges, and risks that may be associated with use of blockchain in the CBPP or cooperative context. Further analysis of our results through the lens of limitations highlights questions about digital identity, design dilemmas (Cila et al. 2020), asymmetric power of IT developers, the fork dilemma, hypertransparency, low decentralization, the difficulty of having a minimum level of participants and stakeholders, the relevance of blockchain, legal recognition, etc. This paper is an attempt to reveal and categorize these limitations and risks.