ABSTRACT. In this paper I consider the overlooked possibility that John Rawls’s Liberal Principle of Legitimacy should require justifiability to future citizens. I argue that the currently dominant interpretation of the principle cannot properly handle their inclusion, and that we therefore have reasons to adopt a different version of the view.

ABSTRACT. This paper develops a novel argument that so-called "legitimate-state" rationalizations for settler colonialism are incoherent by making a case that settler colonial social formations cannot satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy.

ABSTRACT. Against the claim that democracies are inherently short-termist, I argue for a new way to understand them as committed to future generations. If taking turns among rulers and ruled is a normative idea inherent to the concept of democracy, then turn-taking commits democrats to a fair turn with future generations.

ABSTRACT. In Summa I.78.4, Aquinas refers to a cognitive object that he calls the intention of pastness. However, he says nothing further about it. In this paper, I construct as detailed an account of this object as possible by appealing to Aquinas' De memoria commentary, and his much-neglected account of estimation/cogitation.

ABSTRACT. The submission says it should not exceed "50" words when I think it should read "500 words". In that case, I provide my abstract below, under "CGMA Applicants only: Abstract"!

ABSTRACT. An apophatic style of argumentation is characteristic of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy. Under the two truths distinction (the conventional and the ultimate truth), the ultimate truth is articulated only with non-affirming negation. This lack of positive conceptual reference implies a purely experiential form of (ultimate) truth.

ABSTRACT. Using women’s anger as a case study, I characterize emotional injustice as arising from emotion regulation; I outline ways that emotion regulation is governed by social norms, internalized in childhood, that constrain both the appropriateness conditions of standard emotions and the expected styles of their expression.

ABSTRACT. There seems to be no akrasia in games even though we perform actions in games. This calls for an explanation since it is widely held that genuine agency involves akrasia. Against this view, I argue that akrasia is explained by different kinds of reasons governing different domains of activities.

ABSTRACT. Contrary to many Strawsonians who deny shame as a reactive attitude because they understand reactive attitudes within the morality system, I argue shame is a reactive attitude by proposing a new definition of reactive attitude, i.e., reactive attitudes are emotional responses to the violation or fulfillment of social ethical expectations.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I argue:(1a) social media posts can extend emotions, (1b) the involvement of an audience is a somewhat unique component of such extension, and (2) since we are responsible for emotions, we ought to expand our understanding of that responsibility to include the tools of extended affectivity.

ABSTRACT. When grieving, we are often told that our dead loved ones "will always be with us”. This is comforting, but most naturalists will think it plainly false. I argue that Baruch Spinoza offers one example of, and thus shows the possibility of, naturalist ways of considering this platitude true.

ABSTRACT. Kant claims that we are conscious of ourselves as we are in ourselves: that is, as real objects? How should we characterize this state of consciousness? In this paper, I argue that it is a distinct kind of consciousness for Kant, with a specific non-representational character.

ABSTRACT. I argue that Ralph Cudworth, the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonist, anticipates Locke by defining the self in terms of consciousness, but that there are nonetheless at least three important differences between Cudworth's and Locke's respective accounts of the self.

ABSTRACT. According to critics, arguments purporting to show that consciousness isn’t reducible to physical facts would also establish the vitalist thesis that life isn’t reducible to physical facts. This paper offers a historical account of G. H. Lewes’s emergent vitalism that dampens the force of the supposed reductio.

ABSTRACT. Using the popular video, “Consent: it’s simple as tea,” as a case study, I argue that simplified sexual consent discourse constitutes an epistemology of ignorance. I highlight tensions between consent intelligibility and accuracy, which serve to position sexual consent as something easy to understand and practice, despite realities suggesting otherwise.

ABSTRACT. I argue that consent-based theories of sexual ethics mistakenly assume that one’s own sexual wants are definitive and knowable. But all too often, this is not the case. When someone’s desires are murky, consent-based theories fail to be action-guiding. My paper explores this problem and suggests an alternative model.

ABSTRACT. This paper extends María Lugones’s discussion of loving versus agonistic playfulness to our engagement with microbiomes, to uncover alternatives to the healthist and control-oriented orientation characteristic of most microbiome discourse. Loving playfulness in the microbiome context can foster an ability to resist the imposition of pre-determined and “arrogant” frameworks.

ABSTRACT. This paper examines the role that pornography plays in setting cultural norms regarding sexual consent. In response, it argues that pornography also has the unfortunate consequence of undermining the standard of the reasonable person in cases of sexual abuse and rape, thus compromising the criminal culpability of the accused.

ABSTRACT. Callard critiques internalism about reasons in her account of aspirational agency. I build on her work by considering the apparently paradoxical case of the reluctant aspirant. My argument draws on the example of the transformation of Derek Black, a former white nationalist.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I consider the lessons we can learn about solidarity from queer community responses to the recent mpox (monkeypox) outbreak. This solidarity has led to a relatively successful public health response to mpox in contrast to other public health crises, like the COVID-19 and HIV/AIDS pandemics.

ABSTRACT. I argue that healthcare resource allocation policy should prioritize nurses' well-being by using Vulnerability Theory because this promotes ethical patient care. The current Ontario Government Health System Funding Reform (HSFR) does not protect nurses or provide them with resources they need to perform care which increases their moral distress.

ABSTRACT. The distinction between perception and cognition frames countless debates in philosophy and cognitive science. But what does this distinction actually amount to? I critically examine three prominent approaches – in terms of modularity, format, and stimulus-dependence – raising difficulties for the first two and defending the third against recent attacks.

ABSTRACT. Debates concerning the cognitive penetrability of perception are concerned with the ways cognition impacts what we perceive. But are there ways in which cognition impacts what we do not perceive? One potential example of this is inattentional blindness. This paper will argue that IB is an instance of cognitive penetration.

ABSTRACT. Abstract submission

ABSTRACT. Clinical depression has been characterized as involving brain pathology, but this conception incorrectly rules out genuine instances of content-sensitive causation between adverse conditions in the world and the characteristic symptoms of depression. This failure points to an undertheorized and nosologically relevant category of mental causation: the non-rational but intelligible.

ABSTRACT. Could you be a brain in a vat? Hilary Putnam has shown that you can dismiss this alleged possibility. Skeptics about objectivity argue that even if Putnam is right, a skeptical possibility remains: You might be disturbingly analogous to a brain in a vat. I develop and defend this possibility.

ABSTRACT. Subjective indistinguishability has long played a role in explanations of the force of sceptical hypotheses. I argue that sceptical hypotheses do not need to be subjectively indistinguishable to be effective, and I provide an alternative diagnosis of the force of traditional Cartesian sceptical hypotheses.

ABSTRACT. Explaining imagination’s epistemic value typically involves showing that imagination can justify beliefs. This paper develops a more expansive view according to which imagination has a creative as well as justificatory role.

ABSTRACT. Zombies establish a lower limit on consciousness. But is there an upper limit to how many distinct types of conscious experiences physical/functional duplicates of us could conceivably have? I argue that recent accounts of the compositionality and the unity of consciousness may show that consciousness has an upper limit.

ABSTRACT. I recently argued that reductive physicalist versions of libertarian free will face a physical indeterminism luck objection. John Lemos claims that one potential advocate of reductive physicalist libertarianism, Robert Kane, avoids this physical indeterminism luck objection. I here show how the problem remains.

ABSTRACT. abstract-only submission

ABSTRACT. In the philosophical literature on forgiveness, it is contested whether the victim has an exclusive standing to forgive. In this paper, I argue that we have good moral reasons to reject victim-only accounts of forgiveness and recognize that third parties can have standing to forgive.

ABSTRACT. I defend a hybrid approach to collective action cases, that presents our reasons to contribute to collectively caused benefits, with reasons to help that are proportional in strength to our acts’ expected benefits. This account supports social science and history as foundational in attempts to create beneficial social change.

ABSTRACT. Please see the submitted abstract file.

ABSTRACT. This paper develops an understanding of the relation between Badiou’s formal theory of the subject and his ‘anti-humanist humanism’ founded on the generic human capacity for thought. It clarifies Badiou’s concept of ‘generic humanity’ through a distinction between the finite individual and the subject of an infinite and universal production.

ABSTRACT. The autonomy of children and youth should be reevaluated on the grounds that personal autonomy is possible via inquiry, rather than merely via the assertion of one’s informed will. Autonomy is possible when an agent is inquiring because people can genuinely pursue information that they would sincerely desire to possess.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I challenge current conceptions of the accessibility of religious reasons for political action by considering how, in various ways, accessibility requires emotion.

ABSTRACT. This paper offers four reasonable approaches (i.e., cost-benefit, sufficientarian, pluralistic, and democratic) for fairly adjudicating clashes of interests in ecologically tragic situations, (i.e., circumstances in which the only way to meet citizens’ vital interests is through acts of environmental destruction that undermine other vital interests).