ABSTRACT. Abstract supplied below.

ABSTRACT. A leading theory of social norms is that they depend on community members having two types of expectations, namely, what we expect others to do and what we expect others should do (Bichierri, 1993; 2006; 2017). I argue this account of social norms faces two shortcomings.

ABSTRACT. An objection to cost-benefit analysis is that it ignores values such as justice and equality. One response involves extending "benefits" to include not only individual welfare-based preferences but also "moral preferences" such as a "taste" for fairness. Using examples from health economics, we show problems for extended CBA.

ABSTRACT. Neorepublican civic virtues consist of stable traits of character that exhibit excellences associated with republican citizenship. But, this paper argues, the primary role of such virtues is not to contribute to political stability. Rather, they function to correct laws and social norms that support arbitrary power.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I connect Justus Lipsius’s 16th-century account of the Stoic doctrine of providence with the way it was understood by the Greek Stoic Cleanthes. In so doing, I establish how Lipsius’s Neo-Stoic theodicy constitutes a genuine form of Stoicism that opens up the tradition in new ways.

ABSTRACT. I show how the raw data from many empirical studies of the benefits of mystical experiences could be fruitfully used to establish correlations between specific features of mystical experiences and specific beneficial features, thereby assisting with explanations of these benefits, most importantly when the experience doesn’t involve nonphysicalist beliefs.

ABSTRACT. I will argue that while Nietzsche cannot be said to be simply mimicking the Vedantic idea of human greatness, his notion of the Übermensch is both inspired and influenced by the Vedantic parallel. I will draw on Nietzsche’s acknowledgement of Vedantic self-overcoming and legislation of values to establish my claim.

ABSTRACT. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze conceptualizes dramatization suggesting that intensities must dramatize the Ideas to condition their actualization. Despite its significance, it is not clear why Deleuze evokes this artistic category to explain actualization. This article attempts to elucidate this ambiguity and establish a connection between dramatization and poetry.

ABSTRACT. Kant limits and defines the totality of our possible cognitions through the form given by the unity of transcendental apperception. Heidegger limits and defines the totality of Dasein’s possibilities-to-be through its ‘ownmost’ possibility, which makes it a whole: its death

ABSTRACT. I advance a phenomenological theory of the collective-intentional structure of joint remembering. I then expose a complication in phenomenological approaches to collective intentionality. Drawing a lesson from a story by James Joyce, I investigate dynamics of familiarity and alienation in the self-other relations that develop over collective intentional acts.

ABSTRACT. Challenging tradition, Aikin and Talisse (2017), in response to the James-Clifford debate, claim that Clifford's side features the stronger argument. Although I'm sympathetic, I argue that Aikin and Talisse's case overlooks what is crucial to Clifford's position: Clifford's fundamental notion of social trust and its connection to inquiry.

ABSTRACT. In this project, I explore ways in which Wittgenstein’s thinking was influenced by his interchanges with Russell during the formative period of 1911-13, with specific reference to ideas articulated in Russell’s 1913 Theory of Knowledge manuscript, and then later developed by Wittgenstein either by way of confluence or critical reaction.

ABSTRACT. I examine Nāgārjuna’s arguments against the Nyāya theory of inference. I reconstruct the arguments to uncover problematic aspects of Nyāya inference when it is understood as relying on a critical metaphysical posit: intrinsic nature. Using the dialogical conception of logic, I defend the Nyāya theory of inference.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I examine Luce Irigaray’s This Sex Which is Not One (1985), and Hélène Cixous’ The Newly Born Woman (1986) to argue that while their post-Hegelian and post-Lacanian theorizations of desire challenge the heteropatriarchal logics of psychoanalysis, they (re)produce racist, colonial logics and orders.

ABSTRACT. I reinterpret philosophical debates surrounding feminist solidarity through the lens of the recent renewal of global political activism against gender-based violence. I argue that this surge of activism presents a valuable opportunity for feminist theorists to normatively reimagine this incipient, and newly situated, form of feminist solidarity: responsive solidarity.

ABSTRACT. Through an examination of human composting, Emmett Till, and unmarked graves at Royal Victoria Hospital, I argue that contemporary analytic philosophy of death and dying ought to expand to consider the significance of funerary practices and the corpse and that feminist philosophy is the subdiscipline best suited to this task.

ABSTRACT. Cases involving medical interpretation require navigating barriers —epistemic, linguistic, and cultural— between patients and practitioners. Can we accept the consent of a patient speaking through an interpreter as unbiased informed consent if the interpreter is a family member? I employ the literature on interpretation theory to explore this ethical question.

ABSTRACT. This paper argues that the threshold for consent for elective sterilization in young women is often unreasonably high. I incorporate L. A. Paul’s work on transformative experience to establish that these thresholds ask women to know the unknowable, by requiring women to understand the phenomenological experience of their future selves.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I argue that some depressed patients have decision-making capacity even where there is a coinciding wish to die. These patients are said to have deficits in appreciative capacity insofar as they lack insight into their condition. I respond to this objection by reformulating appreciative capacity phenomenologically.

ABSTRACT. What role should the expertise of autistic people play in shaping the category of autism compared to the role played by science? This debate lies on a false dichotomy between science and activism. I show that first-person perspectives of autism have improved the validity and the scientificity of its concept.

ABSTRACT. Submission is abstract only (487 words excluding citations/references).

ABSTRACT. The problem of explanatory asymmetry has bedevilled non-causal approaches to scientific explanation. This paper argues that any solution to this problem—and indeed any adequate account of scientific explanation—requires a much stronger role for contextual factors in explanation than most philosophers are currently willing to countenance.

ABSTRACT. I argue that, contrary to the standard view in the literature on scientific explanation, understanding is not factive: our grasping of subject matters can contain central but false beliefs about those matters. Equilibrium explanations best make my case. Their use of Idealization in explanation renders the standard view false.

ABSTRACT. This is an abstract-only submission.

ABSTRACT. A widespread view among philosophers is that images or pictures, like formulas or sentences, lack a grammar or syntax. Yet there are decades of research, in cognitive science, dedicated to ``image grammars.’’ I argue that image grammars provide genuine empirical hypotheses about the syntactic structures of images.

ABSTRACT. Please see attached.

ABSTRACT. Many new research fields, such as cognitive sociology, are arising at the intersection of the social sciences and cognitive sciences. Cognitive social scientists are attempting to integrate the social and cognitive sciences, but face a number of issues. This paper seeks to address an epistemological issue in cognitive social science.

ABSTRACT. This paper considers how an integrated cognitive-emotional neural network perspective may provide novel insights for the way we understand autonomous decision-making. In particular, I look at Korsgaard’s (2009) theory of personal autonomy, and the role of ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’ in this account, arguing that they do not compete in decision-making.

ABSTRACT. Some assume sinfulness is deontic. Scriptural evidence favors evaluative categorization. However, if φ is sinful, φ is impermissible and wrong. If φ is righteous, φ is permissible and right. I argue this impermissibility and permissibility are genuinely deontic, but the rightness of righteousness and wrongness of sinfulness are evaluative.

ABSTRACT. Many value-laden English words end in the suffix ‘-ible and ‘-able’: ‘desirable’, ‘admirable’, ‘deplorable’, ‘inadmissible’ and ‘unacceptable’ are instances. Their prescriptive force, and certain blocked inferences described as moving “from fact to value”, can be explained by broad semantic and pragmatic features of the language used to talk about capacities.

ABSTRACT. Social consciousness is a cognitive sensitivity to social injustices in one’s local environment and broader culture. Recently, it’s been suggested that we can understand social consciousness through the lens of moral encroachment. I develop and defend an alternative account of social consciousness as a morally virtuous cognitive disposition.

ABSTRACT. In this proposal, I argue that Michael Huemer’s ethical intuitionism and phenomenal conservatism leave non-formal moral intuitions vulnerable to psychological and evolutionary debunking arguments. However, I also grant that these skeptical arguments do not undermine the prima facie justification held by formal and meta-discursive moral intuitions on the author’s account.

ABSTRACT. It’s good for us to be bad at some of our pursuits. Permanent mediocrity allows us to develop virtuous contentment, live well-rounded lives, and appreciate the value and rarity of genuine excellence. Recognizing the prudential value of being bad at things poses a particular threat to perfectionism about well-being.

ABSTRACT. Critics have alleged that neoAristotelian ethics is egoistic. I present a trilemma for neoAristotelian responses to the egoism objection and explain why some prominent responses to this objection fall to this trilemma. I then present my own neoAristotelian response to the egoism objection—one which avoid the trilemma.

ABSTRACT. This essay responds to Matthew Bennett’s recent essay “Demoralizing Trust” (2021). While I largely agree with Bennett’s critique of the extant trust literature, I disagree with his conclusion that trust should be demoralized. Furthermore, I argue that his primary example misapprehends the nature of both trust and friendship.

ABSTRACT. In this article, I contrast the Confucian virtue xin with other Classical Chinese schools' solutions to the ethical and political problems caused by untrustworthiness. I argue that understanding the Confucian position as a middle ground between these competing views can provide a new perspective in the comparative philosophy of trust.