Traditional risk decision-making method cannot simulate the strategic interaction between the pipeline company (PLM) and the intentional third party (iTP). In order to overcome this, the evolutionary game theory is adopted firstly to analyze the long-term dynamic complex imitation and learning behavior between the PLM and the iTP, under the hypothesis of bounded rationality and incomplete knowledge. Firstly, the mental model is used to simplify the complex analysis process of the traditional Wright manifold theory, following cognitive rules. A threshold value which means a group proportion of the iTP adopting the damage strategy is obtained. It can guide the PLM to adjust the defense strategy flexibly. And then, the prospect theory is adopted to improve the traditional expected return matrix into the income perception matrix. Four equilibrium conditions that both parties need to actively protect the pipeline are obtained. From the view of cognitive ability, fluke mind and psychological of adventure, the two parties of the game are often unable to fully satisfy the conditions and cause frequent accidents. The results of evolutionary game analysis show that increasing the awareness of management/learning costs, probability of occurrence, severity of consequences and punishment of the PLM and the iTP can reduce third-party damage (TPD) accidents and enhance pipeline risk management.