One can introduce the concept of “attension” as to any unit enumerated above, e.g. as to a notion. It means both all individuals of the extension as existing and their wholeness as existing, too. Thus “attension” is relative to “intension” and “extension”, on the one hand, and to the Platonic “idea” and “eidos”, on the other hand. Furthermore, “attension” can be defined as the application of the “philosophical attention” to any explicit or implicit (e.g. contextual) intension.

Attension complements intension to the pair of both biggest and least element of the mathematical structure of lattice extended from the intention of consciousness to the idea therefore giving both logical and ontological structure of the notion or whatever else unit. That structure orders
the extension in question in a potential taxonomy (i.e. classification of genera and species), the biggest element of which, i.e. the idea of the thing defined by the extension or even that thing itself or by itself, is generated just by the philosophical attention as the corresponding attension.

On the contrary, if the notion or unit is supplied as usual by any logical or ontological structure, thus its attension is implicitly certain, too.