Tags:Climate Change, Decarbonization, Game Theory, Modeling and Potential game
Abstract:
The ongoing concerns surrounding climate change and its irreversible impacts necessitate a deeper understanding of the commitment levels and behavioral nuances of governments toward decarbonization. In our previous work, we established the dynamics of government players’ actions regarding carbon emission levels, emphasizing the interplay between GDP benefits and the repercussions of climate change.
In this year’s presentation, we further enrich our study by introducing two decision-making methodologies: a planning method and a receding horizon method. This allows us to delve deeper into the strategic decisions made by governments and ascertain the critical trade-off between global temperature rise and GDP. Such a rigorous examination provides valuable insights into certain behavioral tendencies that appear invariant to the choice of the damage function.
Furthermore, we augment our study with the introduction of new damage functions, offering a broader and more comprehensive perspective on the potential consequences of emissions. By examining the utilities, we aim to understand better the optimal agreeing time for both the planning and receding horizon methods for in favor of government and climate.
In the culmination of our analysis, we establish conditions on the benefits and damage functions that guarantee the uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium. This is instrumental in not only characterizing the strategic interactions among governments but also in identifying scenarios where cooperative outcomes are more likely.
A Planning Game for Global Decarbonization Strategies