In his analysis of our contemporary moral condition in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams famously deplored the gradual loss of moral certainty, which he attributed, on the one hand, to our ever growing reflectiveness, and on the other, to the erosion of social ties in which a shared normative understanding of reality could be grounded. Among conspicuous symptoms of this malady, according to Williams, are the changes in our moral language, from which richly descriptive (“thick”) terms disappear in favour of purely normative (“thin”) ones. One example which he did not give, but which I want to argue is particularly interesting, is the history of the term “evil”, until the middle of the 20th century all but pushed out of use by the terms “bad” and “wrong”. Although pessimistic about our chances of reversing this process, Williams claimed that we should try to countervail the “thinning” of our moral language by cherishing the “thick” concepts still available to us and perhaps by engaging in social practices which would allow us to acquire new ones. It is in the light of this idea that I want to examine the controversial “comeback” of the concept of evil we have witnessed since the Second World War. While many have suggested that given its absolutist overtones, its contemporary usage is at best glib, and at worst nefarious, I want to argue that in “evil” we may be dealing with an authentic “thick” moral concept. To that effect, I will try to show that, as it is used today, the term is first and foremost descriptive, and that its specific function is to help prevent severe harm.