This paper explores the question of whether a law can be considered just or unjust, a fundamental concern in jurisprudence. It begins by defining law as a norm that obliges, prohibits or permits certain actions by individuals. These norms are categorised as individual norms (imposing obligations on specific individuals) and general norms.The concept of justice is examined, drawing primarily on Aristotle's definition of justice as equality. This equality is further divided into corrective justice (restoring equality between parties) and distributive justice (treating equals equally).The paper argues that corrective justice is a subset of distributive justice, focusing on cases where two actions are already considered equal. However, Aristotle's concept of distributive justice as equality doesn't specify 'which perspective to focus on' and 'how to treat equal acts', leaving these considerations to external factors.The question of whether an individual norm (e.g. a judgement or a contract) can be regarded as just is addressed. It suggests that an individual legal norm is just if it confers the same benefits or burdens as those with which it is compared.General norms, such as statutory provisions, are divided into rules and principles. Rules are seen as concrete examples of distributive justice and are not subject to judgments of justice. Principles serve as criteria for evaluating the correctness of rules, based on the principle of proportionality. Finally, the paper divides the question 'Is a law just or unjust?' into two parts: the justice of individual norms and the justice of general norms. Individual norms can be judged on the basis of compliance with the principle of equal treatment. General norms, as rules, are not subject to judgments of justice, but can be assessed for compliance with the principle of proportionality. This nuanced perspective highlights the complexity of assessing the justice of laws in different contexts.