One can interpret the “phenomena” in Husserl’s sense as the existences (“existentia”) of the “things themselves” or by themselves. Husserl rejected that approach as “naturalization” of his phenomenology. Heidegger himself, though revising or developing far further Husserl’s phenomenology, refuted to be an “existentialist”.

He tried to reinterpret Greek philosophy especially a few Presocratics in that manner, in which the phenomenon (as “meaning it in itself by itself”) might be identified as naïvely as wisely with the being (inseparable from the existence) of each certain thing.

The same approach of Heidegger penetrates his extended comment on a single fragment (B, 1) from Aristotle’s Physics. The part in question refers to the concept of “Φύσις” at all, and Heidegger’s reflection addresses the relation of that term in Greek philosophy and Aristotle’s particularly to the modern European understanding of nature as opposed to both human being and technics.

Heidegger’s way of interpretation merges the things and their Platonic “ideas” in the initial Φύσις thinkable as both χάος and ἀλήθεια. Heidegger means the latter as that truth relevant to both Greek and his philosophy: ἀλήθεια is ἀ-λήθεια, i.e. the appearance at all from hiddenness as un-hiddenness. That concept of truth is not underlain by any opposition to anything: it has not the form of the Latin adaequatio, the origin of which is often searched again in Aristotle.

Truth as ἀ-λήθεια is phenomenon as appearance where being and existence are both yet and initially inseparable from each other. Thus truth as ἀ-λήθεια is φύσις at the same. Nature is Truth before any opposition, particularly that of human being to nature.