Some interpretation of Davidson’s idea that there is “the obvious connection between a definition of truth of the kind Tarski has shown how to construct, and the concept of meaning” is proposed. A hint for it is provided by the third Gorgias’ thesis that, even if something exists and can be known, it cannot be communicated. To communicate is to convey true sentence(s). Then, according to Kotarbiński’s formulation of the classical definition of truth, a sentence is true iff it states that so-and-so, and it is actually so-and-so. What is to be explained is how a sentence can state anything. On the other hand, meaning of a sentence is just being able to state something. A reflection on the construction of the truth of a sentence in a model of its language enables to observe that it answers just the above question. A sentence ascribes to a fragment of the domain it is assumed to apply some structure. Thus, the so-called “Tarski’s theory of truth” turns out to be not so much a theory of truth, but rather just a ready theory of meaning.