Timothy Williamson (1998; 2013) is known for defending that the simplest and strongest modal logic is second-order S5 system. Moreover, he claims that axiomatizing second order S5 with Barcan Formulae gives us the most sensible doctrine for metaphysical modality. However, it is commonplace that Barcan Formulae defy commonsense since they commit us with metaphysically sui generis objects. Among the most controversial claims supported by necessitism, therefore, we find the claim that affirms that there exist bare possibilia (Williamson, 1998; 2013), i.e., objects which exist in a logical sense of the verb ‘exist’ but not substantively. To put it another way: contingently non-concrete objects. To understand the nature of these objects, Williamson urges us to take into consideration what he calls the attributive reading of the verb ‘exist’ instead of the predicative one. But what are exactly contingently non-concrete objects? How can we individuate them? In pursuing the answer to this question, we come directly across the Quinean slogan ‘no entity without identity’ (Quine, 1948) or what Yagisawa (2022) calls ‘the specificity problem”. On another note, according to the doctrine called haecceitism there exist alternative worlds which only differ from the actual world in their non-qualitative properties, whereas their qualitative properties are the same. There is also a stronger version of haecceitism often called ‘extreme haecceitism’ that holds that the only essential properties of an individual are general properties instantiated by all individuals. Williamson (1998) affirms that the necessity of distinctness and the necessity of identity are enough to individuate bare possibilia, so I will argue that, if that is the case, Williamson is adopting a position very similar to extreme haecceistism.