In recent decades, we can observe a growing interest in philosophical applications of Twardowski’s distinction between actions and products which is applied, for example, in the theory of objects of attitudes (cf. Moltmann (2013)) or in the theory of the use of demonstratives (Ciecierski & Makowski (2022), Ciecierski (2023)). Twardowski’s distinction meets at the very same time with criticism: authors such as Brandl (1998) and Bronzo (2020) argue that one cannot treat actions and products as different kinds of entities, it is rather the case that there is one kind of object that can be presented in two different manners (actional and productional). In my talk I shall discuss Fregean interpretation of Twardowski’s distinction. I shall attempt to answer the question whether Brand and Bronzo might be correct.

References

Brandl, Johannes. L. 1998. “Twardowski’s Distinction Between Actions and Products.” In Kijania-Placek, Katarzyna; & Woleński, Jan, (eds.), The Lvov-Warsaw School and contemporary philosophy (pp. 23–34). Kluwer Academic Publishers. Bronzo, Silver. 2020. “Actions, Products, and Truth-Bearers: A Critique of Twardowskian Accounts.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 50(3), 297–312. Ciecierski, Tadeusz; Makowski, Piotr. 2022. “Demonstrations as Actions”, Synthese 200: 467. Ciecierski, T. (2023). Actions, Products, Demonstrations. Organon F, 30(1), 102–126. Moltmann, Frederike. 2013. “Propositions, Attitudinal Objects, and The Distinction Between Actions and Products.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy.