Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 and the Signal protocol are very important and widely used security protocols. We show that the key update function in TLS 1.3 and the symmetric key ratchet in Signal can be modelled as non-additive synchronous stream ciphers. This means that the efficient Time Memory Tradeoff Attacks for stream ci- phers can be applied. The implication is that TLS 1.3, QUIC, DTLS 1.3, and Signal offers a lower security level against TMTO attacks than expected from the key sizes. We provide detailed analyses of the key update mechanisms in TLS 1.3 and Signal, illustrate the importance of ephemeral key exchange, and show that the process that DTLS 1.3 and QUIC use to calculate AEAD limits is flawed. We provide many concrete recommendations for the analyzed protocols.