ABSTRACT. Stereotypes about Muslims rely on two public discourses: There is a strong association of Muslims and Islam with violence and terrorism, and simultaneously, there is a discourse, most notably related to the wearing of headscarves, of submissiveness and oppression. Still, Muslims are typically presented as a homogenous group and research on gender specific stereotypes of Muslims is missing. In this study we compared stereotypes of Muslims, Muslim men and Muslim women with perceived cultural stereotypes of Germans, German men and women, Christians, Christian men and women, and men and women (no ethno-religious specification). Using a free-response procedure, we asked 259 German participants to generate 5 cultural stereotypes for one of the 11 groups. Following the Social Dominance Theory, we found that stereotypes of Muslims were more similar to stereotypes of Muslim men than to stereotypes of Muslim women. This pattern was not found for Germans or Christians. Furthermore, stereotypes of women were more similar to stereotypes of German women, compared to Muslim or Christian women. This hypothesis was not confirmed for men. Finally, in line with the Intersectionality Theory, we found that Muslim women elicited unique stereotypes that did not result from merely adding stereotypes of religiosity (Muslim) to stereotypes of gender (women). These results show that ethno-religious and gender stereotypes are diverse. Theory, research and practice should take the intersectionality of these social categories into account. Muslim women do not fit stereotypes of women, nor of Muslims, and run the risk of being invisible in the debate on Muslims.

ABSTRACT. This paper investigates the intergenerational transmission of political ideology in families in multi-party systems, using household data from Germany (G-SOEP) and Switzerland (SHP). Uniting classic political socialization theory and family dynamics and political gender gap literature, it studies to what extent children take over the political left-right positions from their parents and what role gender plays in this process. Not only are parent-child sex dyads taken into account, but also the siblings’ sexes mix compositions. It is firstly hypothesized that a higher level of ideological transmission is found for same-sex parent-child dyads. Secondly, sisters are expected to affect this transmission process and the ideology of their siblings directly, because of the gender gap in political ideology and the reinforcement of gender roles in the family. In order to control for the shared family environment, sibling models are estimated separately for males and females, in which ideological positions of siblings are compared to those of their parents and of each other.

ABSTRACT. Prescriptive gender norms dictate what behaviors are appropriate for men and women: Men should be masculine and women feminine and men should be attracted to women and women to men. Gay couples deviate from these norms in several respects. Given the strong negative reactions that gender norm deviations tend to elicit, we hypothesized that people who are uncomfortable with homosexuality tend to perceive, and prefer, that same-sex couples fit a model of gender role complementarity, where one partner is seen as the feminine half (the “woman”) and the other is seen as the masculine half (the “man”). Supporting this hypothesis, we found in Study 1 that straight people who are relatively high (vs. low) on discomfort and aversion toward homosexuality (“homonegativity”) (1) perceive same-sex couples as exhibiting gender complementarity (Study 1); and (2) prefer (in terms of liking and predicted relationship success) same-sex couples that fit a gender complementarity (vs. non complementary) model (Study 2). Further, we find that gay men with relatively high (vs. low) levels of internalized homonegativity believe that the ideal partner is one that serves as a gender-complement to their own disposition in both a control condition and when they were reminded of discrimination, but this effect was eliminated when they were reminded of increased public acceptance of homosexuality (Study 3). Taken together, these findings suggest that to the extent that they endorse homonegative attitudes, both heterosexuals and homosexuals fit gay relationships and partner preferences to heteronormative conceptions of masculinity and femininity.

ABSTRACT. Experimental studies have shown that emotional displays of politicians can influence general political judgments and the assessments of political leaders’ traits. These studies often disregard that the candidate’s gender is an important factor mediating the effects of emotions on political attitudes. According to the double bind dilemma, women in male dominated fields such as politics suffer from strong stereotypical expectations, particularly regarding their emotional behavior. For example, when female leaders show anger, an emotion particularly associated with masculinity, they must be prepared to meet negative evaluations of their effectiveness or competence just like it leads to negative assessments when they express a rather gender-appropriate emotion such as sadness. However, stereotypes are cognitive schemata, which associate social groups with negative as well as positive traits. Therefore, in contrast to previous assumptions we suppose that female politicians can also improve their impression as credible or likeable by showing specific gender-appropriate emotions. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a large-scale online experiment whereby about 3,300 participants watched different video stimuli with emotional expressions of female and male politicians and assessed these politicians thereafter. The results so far indicate that the evaluation of trustworthiness is particularly affected by politicians’ emotional displays. Classic gender stereotypical beliefs of the recipients lead to a negative effect of female politicians’ active emotions, whereas male politicians’ respective emotions have a positive effect.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, we evaluate the psychological basis of civic engagement. To date, our knowledge about the relationship between personality and volunteering as an important facet of the social fabric is limited. Applying the Five Factor Model of personality (Big Five) we scrutinize this relationship in a comprehensive manner. We consider different opportunity structures in which voluntary work can be carried out, including the internet as new arena for volunteering. Empirically analyzing a representative population sample of Switzerland, we find that extraversion is a driving force for volunteering and decreases the propensity to abstain from voluntary work. Openness to experience especially enhances the likelihood of volunteering in the new opportunity structure of the Internet. Conscientiousness especially hampers voluntary work in a comprehensive manner, while agreeableness increases the probability to volunteer offline and emotional stability promotes comprehensive volunteering.

ABSTRACT. The present and past observations of political behaviors suggest that people often choose politicians who are not necessarily an example of honor, honesty, morality, and modesty. However, the voters themselves might be not of a “good character”. The so-called “Dark triad” was a concept introduced by personality psychology and was coined to describe three personality “disorders”: narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Scientific data suggest that those with Dark Triad traits are inclined to use manipulation to achieve personal goals. We have decided to check whether such personality traits are correlated with the tendency to use certain manipulation techniques (a novelty questionnaire was designed, consisting of 69 manipulation techniques), and how these might affect the political choices during the presidential campaign of 2015 in Poland. The study was designed and conducted over the internet on a sample of 305 people. The results suggest that Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism correlate to a preference for different manipulation techniques. It can also serve as an indicator or a basis for speculation on a different array of techniques used by narcissistic, Machiavellian, and psychopathic political leaders. The traits typical of the Dark Triad were also related to certain political choices. More support for manipulation was related to more “colorful” or extreme political choices.

ABSTRACT. In four studies, we examined the link between narcissism and outgroup prejudice, and tested on the mediational role of two dimensions of ideological attitudes: right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. We hypothesized that narcissism would be positively associated with social dominance orientation but negatively with right wing authoritarianism. These two dimensions of ideology should differentially mediate between narcissism and prejudice, explaining why the links between narcissism and prejudice might sometimes be difficult to observe. Our hypotheses were confirmed in four survey studies conducted in three different socio-political contexts: the UK (Study 1), the US (Studies 2 and 3) and Poland (Study 4), revealing a consistent pattern of results. Narcissism was indirectly and positively associated with prejudice through increased social dominance orientation, yet indirectly and negatively associated with prejudice through decreased right-wing authoritarianism. The mediation model held even after accounting for the effects of self-esteem (Studies 1-4), national collective narcissism (Study 4), Big Five personality characteristics (Study 4), as well as psychopathy and Machiavellianism – two personality characteristics that together with narcissism constitute the so called Dark Triad (Study 3). We discuss implications for understanding the role of self-evaluation and right-wing ideological attitudes in explaining prejudice.

ABSTRACT. Most of the research on personality and vote choice has been conducted in two-party systems, such as the United Stated. The first aim of this paper is to analyse if the multi-party system’s higher level of complexity leads to different (more nuanced) effects of personality on vote choice and how personality traits affect support for different political parties, in particular those from the main party families in western democracies. The second aim of the paper is to further increase our understanding of these effects by focusing on the mechanisms that establish the linkage. More specifically, we wondered to what extent the personality effects on vote choice are mediated by political ideology and partisanship. We examine this with survey data from Netherlands from the Longitudinal Internet Survey for the Social Sciences (LISS).

ABSTRACT. The renewed focus on the personalization of politics has stressed the importance of leader evaluations in voting behavior (Garzia 2012). While some party families, such as right-wing populist parties, have always been characterized by “the prevalence of charismatic leadership” (Kischelt, 1995), others have historically relied on collective responsibility over centralized leadership. Despite these historic and ideological differences, candidates and political leaders across the ideological spectrum seem to have become the ‘face’ of their party and have increased in saliency in the voting calculation.

By using unique data collected across eleven electoral democracies (France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela) through online Voting Advice Applications, the aim of this paper is to provide an overview of leaders’ and presidential candidates evaluations, during election campaigns. In particular, we differentiate between populist and non-populist leaders and test whether political families and the degree of radicalism account for differences in leaders’ evaluations expressed on likeability, reliability and capability scales.

ABSTRACT. What motivates citizens to run for office? Recent work has shown that early life parental socialization is strongly associated with a desire to run for office. However, parents not only shape their children's political environment, but also pass along their genes to those same children. A growing area of research has shown that individual differences in a wide range of political behaviors and attitudes are linked to genetic differences. As a result, genetic factors may confound the observed political similarities among parents and children.

This study analyzes Swedish register data containing information on all nominated and elected candidates in the ten parliamentary, county council, and municipal elections from 1982 to 2014 for a large sample of adoptees and their adoptive and biological parents. By studying the similarity in political ambition within both adoptive and biological families, our research design allows us to disentangle so-called "pre-birth" factors, such as genes and pre-natal environment, and "post-birth" factors like parental socialization. We find that the likelihood of becoming a political candidate increased by more than 200% if one's parent has been a candidate. We also find that the effects of pre-birth and post-birth factors are approximately equal in size. In addition, we test and find support for two potential post-birth transmission mechanisms. First, in line with the "impressionable years" hypothesis we show that the post-birth effects are strongest during late adolescence and early adulthood. Second, we find evidence of the influence of parental role modeling on a child's decision to run for office.

ABSTRACT. Do political actors like governments, political parties and individual politicians apply heuristics – rules of thumb or cognitive shortcuts – in making judgments, that is, in assessing the likelihood of events with uncertain outcomes such as elections? And to what extent does this lead to biases in their decision mak-ing? While there is ample literature that focuses on the heuristics that voters apply, the literature on the heuristics that political actors apply is much scantier. My contribution here is to this last line of research by taking stock and reviewing the existing literature on heuristics and biases in political judgment and in political decision making. In a nutshell, I show that this literature demonstrates that also political actors use well-known heuristics like the representativeness heuristic and the availability heuristic in their judgment and decision making, and that also they fall prey to biases like the endowment effect. My stock taking exercise also reveals many areas for future research, which is why I end by outlining a re-search agenda for studying heuristics and biases in political judgment and political decision making that uses quantitative, qualitative and experimental techniques.

ABSTRACT. Do democratic leaders differ from dictatorial leaders in terms of their ideology or belief system? And if so, on which particular beliefs can most variance between democratic and anti-democratic leaders be found? This paper presents the analysis of a data-set resulting from processing spontaneous interview responses of 15 Heads of State through the Verbs in Context System. The VICS was designed to analyse a leader’s belief pattern from public statements and drawing inferences about public behaviour that are compatible with these beliefs. The leaders compared stem from similar backgrounds: Barack Obama, George W. Bush, Nelson Mandela, Robert Mugabe, Margareth Thatcher, Tony Blair, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Paul Kagame, John Kufuor, Meles Zenawi, Yuweri Museveni, Ilham Aliyev, Benazir Bhutto and Bahar el-Asad. The Operational Code model of analyses, which preceded the development of VICS, was designed by Walker, Schafer and Young, based on earlier work of George and Leites, and studies the beliefs of a leader, i.e.: the way a leader views the world versus the way he or she views him-, or herself. E.g.: When a leader views the political universe as a very hostile place, he or she will most likely be inclined to behave in an oppressive, conflict-oriented and non-cooperative manner to defend him/her-self from the perceived hostility. In this paper, the belief systems of both democratic and undemocratic leaders will be analysed aiming to shed light on the most determinant idea(s) in a belief system to deepen the understanding of the ideological divides underpinning democratic and anti-democratic behaviour.

ABSTRACT. Empirically-oriented students of national identity have in general concerned themselves with its dimensionality and its attitudinal correlates. We develop an account of patriotism that contextualizes it in the context of national politics. The intuition behind our Politics-Pride-Public Opinion (PPP) model is simply that patriotism is not some sui generis latent attitude that leads people to think in certain ways about politics. Rather, it represents a kind of buy-in to a nation’s political culture, and its consequences depend on how elites have shaped that culture using policy and rhetoric. We test these dynamics empirically in two policy areas: the extent of a nation’s political “multiculturalism”, and its welfare generosity. The PPP model finds substantial support in the former case, but not in the latter.

ABSTRACT. It is well known that liberals and conservatives differ in their justice concerns and preferences. Compared to conservatives, liberals (a) emphasize justice as a moral principle more strongly, (b) judge public policies as more fair when they are based on the principle of equality than if they are based on merit, and (c) attribute the neediness of claimants rather to factors external than internal to the person. Extending this work, we gathered correlational evidence in German and US samples showing that a left-wing political orientation is related to higher sensitivity to injustice from an observer perspective (observer sensitivity) compared to a right-wing political orientation. Moreover, we tested the causality of this relation using experimental and longitudinal data. In an experimental study with a representative German sample, we asked participants to either recall a situation in which they experienced injustice towards someone else (experimental condition) or to themselves (control condition A) or they were not asked to remember anything (control condition B). In the experimental condition, participants were less inclined to adhere to rightist political attitudes (SDO, RWA, left-right orientation) compared to the control conditions. Using longitudinal data, we could also show that observer sensitivity predicted a more left-wing political orientation over a time period of four years. Concluding, our research provides evidence that being sensitive to injustice towards others can foster left-wing political orientations. We discuss ways in which the relationship between political ideology and observer sensitivity can illuminate the motivational underpinnings of left-wing (vs. right-wing) orientation.

ABSTRACT. As many as 37% of Americans agree that global warming is a “hoax”. Research suggests that conspiracy beliefs even about unrelated matters (e.g., 9/11) are associated with climate denial (Lewandowsky et al., 2013). However, on the other side of the debate, conspiracy theories accuse link “big oil” of colluding with think tanks, politicians, and other stooges to subvert climate science and policy. Across four studies (N > 900), we find that these warmist conspiracy theories are as familiar as, and more believed than, denialist conspiracy theories (e.g., accusing scientists of fraud). Like denialist conspiracy beliefs, they are related to general conspiracy beliefs (e.g., about 9/11). However, mediation analyses show there is no direct or zero-order relationship between warmist and denialist conspiracy beliefs, since they have opposing relationships with conservative ideology and climate change denial. Further, there is no direct relationship between general conspiracy belief and climate change denial, but instead two opposing mediated paths through warmist (-) and denialist (+) conspiracies. Finally, denialist and general – but not warmist - conspiracy beliefs are related to various indices of irrationality (e.g., paranormal belief). The present results call for a rethink of the structure and rationality of conspiracy beliefs, which are shown not to be straightforwardly related to each other, irrationality, or rejection of science.

ABSTRACT. In the last decade, the far right’s increasing political clout and eroding political participation in modern societies have become subject of international concern. In order to gain insight into this phenomenon, the thesis investigated the role of a voter’s perception of context, conservatism and attitudes towards political participation. A pretest-post-test control group experiment was devised to assess each of these variables’ contribution to the stability of political choices for 202 participants. Results show that while a perceived positive context nearly guarantees stable political choices, negative contexts make them vulnerable to change. Furthermore, conservatism was found to moderate the effect of perceived contexts across conditions, the more conservative one is, the more stable one’s choices are. In terms of political participation, results indicate that while perceived positive contexts sponsor participative attitudes towards political participation, negative and uncertain contexts tend to provoke the reverse effect. Findings complement the literature by providing psychological explanations as to why the far-right rises while political participation erodes during an economic crisis period.

ABSTRACT. Collective memories about atrocities such as the Armenian Genocide or Sri Lankan civil war can be different depending on who is doing the remembering. In conversations, groups tend to emphasize justifications for in-group perpetrated atrocities, and neglect to mention atrocities and potential apologies for these atrocities. The current research investigated whether this selective recollection during group remembering could facilitate mnemonic convergence on information consistent with this bias. Study one was conducted online via Amazon Mechanical Turk and the Software Platform for Social Interaction Experiments. Study two was a field experiment carried out in post-war Sri Lanka. In Study one we investigated how American participants remembered atrocities, justifications, and apologies for transgressions committed by either an American (ingroup condition) or Iraqi (outgroup condition) soldier. In Study two, Sri Lankan participants were asked to remember the same information, but this time for transgressions committed by either a Sinhalese (ingroup condition) or Tamil (outgroup condition). Remembering took place in either group interactions (4-members) in the American study, or dyadic interactions, in the Sri Lankan study. Both studies revealed a similar pattern: groups/dyads converged significantly more on justifications in the ingroup than in the outgroup condition. In Study 1, liberals recalled more ingroup atrocities while conservatives recalled more justifications for ingroup transgressions. Ingroup members who recalled more justifications also recalled fewer apologies for atrocities committed. These findings are important in understanding how social remembering facilitates the formation of collective memory, and how counter-narratives of acknowledgment can be formed to foster reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

ABSTRACT. This article seeks to explore the role that leadership plays in both the perpetration and avoidance of mass atrocities. Many scholars have argued that leadership is pivotal to the outbreak of such violence but there is almost no scholarship which explores the role that political leaders play in mitigating or aggravating the risk of atrocities over time. Why is it that mass atrocities occur in some places but not in others, despite the existence of similar risk factors? By conducting a comparative analysis of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, this paper investigates the impact that the strategies of each leader had on the risk of mass atrocities. Both countries share similar colonial backgrounds, and display comparable structural risk factors commonly associated with genocide and other mass atrocities. Both Kaunda and Mugabe were key leaders in their countries’ liberation struggles, and both leaders played pivotal roles during the crucial formative years of independence. Yet the two countries have taken dramatically different paths – while Zambia has remained relatively stable and peaceful, Zimbabwe has experience mass violence and repression.

ABSTRACT. Despite the aversive nature of perpetrating violence, history and modern society are replete with instances of individuals engaging in violent behavior on behalf of groups. We test the idea that perpetrating violence on behalf of one’s group, a behavior that is likely to induce cognitive dissonance, increases identification with the violent group. Survey data from ex-combatants who were members of violent groups in Liberia confirm that there is a positive association between perpetrating violence and identifying with one’s violent group (Study 1). Study 2 replicates and extends this finding with survey data from ex-combatants in Northern Uganda, using a natural experiment in which some members of the violent group were quasi-randomly assigned to perpetrate violence while other group members were not. Only violent behaviors that involve a sense of personal responsibility for the outcome (i.e. behaviors that are expected to induce more dissonance) are positively associated with group identification. Finally, perpetrating violence is not significantly related to enduring attitudes about the use of violence to resolve conflict. These findings suggest that increasing group identification may be another means of resolving cognitive dissonance, even in the extreme context of perpetrating violence.

ABSTRACT. In the polling station, voters have to cast a valid vote in accordance with the voting rule. In line with Baujard and Igersheim (2007) who postulated that voters are first strongly motivated by expressing themselves, we hypothesis that electoral satisfaction depends on the expressiveness of the rule. With an online polling survey experiment (N=300), simulating the French Presidential Elections of 2017 with a realistic design, we propose to explore the subjective perception of the voting process by voters, under four voting rules (plurality, approval voting and two variations of evaluative voting). We address the question of what kind of constraints –affective and cognitive- weights on voters when they turn their preferences into a ballot, with different voting rules. Consistent with our expectations, we found that the qualitative dimension of voter's experience is strongly affected by voting rules. Our results suggest that plurality voting, the most widely used voting rule, is also the one leading to the more negative experiences comparing with alternative rules.

ABSTRACT. This paper investigates the impact of negative affective reactions to the January 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris on political participation. Drawing on theories of risk assessment and cognitive appraisal we hypothesize that anger, but not anxiety, boosts participation in a demonstration. In order to test our hypotheses we use a survey that was conducted on a nation-wide representative sample before and after the attacks. In specific, we build a composite model that controls for classic variables in political participation research, such as resources and motivation, but at the same time explores the impact of anxiety and anger on a) general willingness to participate to a demonstration and b) actual participation to the Charlie Hebdo demonstrations. Our results indicate that anger boosts participation both measured as willingness to participate and actual participation. Anxiety, on the other hand, decreases general willingness to participate to a demonstration but not participation per se.

ABSTRACT. Voter turnout has experienced a dramatic decline in most Western Democracies over the last 60 years and New Zealand is no exception. Though over 91% of the electorate voted in New Zealand‘s General Election in 1954, nearly a third of the population abstained from voting in 2011. Notably, studies examining the demographic correlates of the rising rates of voter abstention have identified increasing income inequality as a significant factor in this trend. However, the psychological mechanisms underlying this relationship have only received limited attention. We address this oversight by examining the indirect effect of income on voter turnout through perceptions of relative deprivation. Participants (N = 4942) completed a survey assessing their beliefs about the extent to which they felt (a) personally deprived relative to others and (b) that their group was deprived relative to other groups, as well as reporting their income and other demographic variables. Voting behaviour was self-reported. As expected, income was positively associated with voter turnout. Follow up analyses, however, indicated that the relationship between income and voter turnout was partially mediated by perceptions of relative deprivation. These results demonstrate the significance of subjective experiences of inequality with respect to voting behaviour, as well as the importance of integrating psychological perspectives into models of voter turnout.

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ABSTRACT. Recent experimental research in political psychology and leadership research shows that voters and followers prefer more dominant looking candidates and leaders in contexts of inter-group conflict compared to contexts of inter-group cooperation. However, due to the lack of a neutral control condition in prior studies it remains unclear whether this context effect is driven by the conflict context, the cooperation context, or both. Based on evolutionary psychological theory, we argue that preferences for facial dominance in leaders are primarily driven by perceptions of social conflict. Moreover, we predict that such perceptions are colored by 1) contextual differences in social conflict, as well as by 2) individual predispositions for perceiving society as a place of conflict as measured by Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). We find support for this prediction in two leader choice experiments embedded in large-scale nationally representative surveys in Poland and Ukraine (N=1,000). Both Polish and Ukrainian subjects assigned to a Conflict condition are significantly more likely to choose a dominant leader face than are subjects assigned to a No-Conflict Cooperation context or a Neutral Control context. Simultaneously, SDO positively predicts preferences for a dominant leader face in both studies independently of the assigned experimental condition. These findings extend previous research in two important ways. First, key findings from established democracies replicate in new or only partly democratic countries, and second, it clarifies that perceived social conflict is the primary driver of preferences for facial dominance in leaders.

ABSTRACT. Research in social psychology has identified several cues that influence trust evaluations in social interactions involving uncertainty about the future actions of potential partners. It remains a puzzle, however, how these cues influence political trust. Political interactions are peculiar, both due to the inherent challenges of power asymmetries between potential partners, and because interactions in mass politics are indirect, infrequent, influenced by a complex institutional framework and concern abstract problems. Thus, in politics, two specific types of informational inputs emerges; salient cues, which may provide non-reliable information, and relevant information appearing in non-salient forms. The interaction between these two types of inputs is essential to understand how political trust is formed. Focusing on the competence component of trust, I investigate how facial appearance and institutional signals interact in forming trust evaluations about a hypothetical male political actor. Informed by evolutionary political psychology, I expect that despite their unnatural appearance institutional signals may be processed by domain-specific cognitive mechanisms of competence evaluation. I therefore hypothesise that the presence of relevant institutional signals of competence will diminish the impact of the facial cues. I test my hypothesis with a framing experiment conducted among university students.

ABSTRACT. In political elections voters prefer candidates who are currently in office (incumbents) over new candidates (challengers), not because of their politics but because they perceive that the way things are at present, are the way they should be. Using query theory (Johnson, Häubl, & Keinan, 2007) as a premise, we hypothesize that the effect of incumbency on candidate preference is mediated by the order in which individuals query information from memory. Individuals ‘typically’ first query information about the incumbent, which creates richer representations and suppresses later queries about the challenger. By reversing this typical query order the incumbency advantage can be reduced, and by emphasizing this typical query order it can also be exacerbated. These three hypotheses were tested in two studies using a hypothetical election scenario. In both Studies 1 and 2, candidate preferences were mediated by the hypothesized typical query order. Study 2 also revealed a significant interaction between incumbency and query order in the predicted direction, such that reversed query order reduced the incumbency effect compared to the emphasized typical query order (although neither condition differed from the control condition). In sum, preferences are related to the order in which people query information from memory. This research provides initial evidence for a cognitive, memory-retrieval process underling the incumbency advantage and potentially other status quo biases. Possible explanations for the difficulty of eliminating the bias are discussed.