ABSTRACT. My paper aims to fill a gap in the literature of special promisees, that of promises made to a person with dementia. Specifically, it looks at the common case of promises to care for a person with dementia at home (instead of them having to move to a residential care unit). I analyse such promises by drawing on two as of now unrelated fields, promissory theory and decision-making capacities. Promises to persons with dementia differ from standard cases because the receiver of the promise can become unable to make decisions regarding the promise. This leads to the question of whether such promises continue to obligate. In response, dementia care guidelines give recommendations that are lacking a philosophical justification. Instead, I will suggest that promissory decisions fall under the scope of substituted decision-making. Only then can the values and interests of the person with dementia continue to weigh on the promise.

ABSTRACT. This paper defends the claim that propositional gratitude (A is grateful that p) and targeted gratitude (A is grateful to B for x) are variations of the same fundamental concept. Both forms involve the recipient's positive evaluation of a benefit, a sense of humility regarding one's dependence, and a desire to express or reciprocate the gratitude experienced. I discuss two key components of gratitude - humility and the desire to make a return. Regarding humility, I argue that while gratitude does not necessarily require a sense of personal unworthiness (as per the "merit condition"), it does involve acknowledging one's dependence on external factors beyond one's control (the "dependence condition"). The desire to make a return, or the "return desire," is what motivates the expression of gratitude, transforming passive reception into active appreciation. Finally, I distinguish gratitude from the related concept of gladness.

ABSTRACT. According to the Advaita Vedānta, or non-dualist, tradition of Hindu philosophy, only unqualified Brahman (i.e. God) exists. Srinivasa Rao (1996) argues that ascribing reality to the empirical world is consistent with this core tenet if Brahman is conceived as the material and efficient cause of the world. I argue that conceiving of Brahman in this way is inconsistent with Advaita Vedānta, since such a conception would align more closely with Viśiṣṭādvaita, or qualified non-dualism, which is a competing tradition.

ABSTRACT. Hermeneutical death is a severe distinctly epistemic harm brought about due to a third-order epistemic exclusion from the dominant interpretive resource. This paper is a further development of José Medina’s introduction of the concept, which I argue helps provide clarity to hermeneutical injustice, marginalization, and what it means to participate in epistemic life. I analyze hermeneutical death in light of Medina’s pluralistic epistemology, propose a tension between the two, and provide a reparative account using Kristie Dotson’s third-order epistemic exclusion. Finally, I propose that hermeneutical death is an actual threat, as observed by master-slave relationships in Orlando Patterson’s work.

ABSTRACT. On Lewis's view of personal identity and of object persistence more generally, he seems to have trouble counting in cases of fission and fusion. I argue that he has no trouble counting by appealing to the context sensitivity of the domain over which we are quantifying. By restricting the spatio-temporal domain of quantification, we can accomodate our counting intuitions across a range of cases.

ABSTRACT. In this talk, I aim to do two things. First, I explain what I take to be the three most interesting questions surrounding the concept of punishment: (1) Why Do We Punish? (2) Who Should We Punish? And, (3) How Should We Punish? I then analyze three non-retributive theories of punishment, with a focus on Gregg Caruso’s Public Health Quarantine Model of Punishment (2021; 2023; 2025) and show how they fail to adequately answer all of these questions. Next, I argue that to adequately answer all three questions we must reject purely forward looking accounts of punishment, including Caruso’s. As a result, I argue that we should endorse what I refer to as a reasonable retributive account of punishment, an account that free will skeptics like Caruso cannot endorse due to their metaphysical commitments. I’ll conclude by emphasizing why any successful theory of punishment must include a retributivist element to be taken seriously.