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11:00 | Reading Newton's "De Analysi" by hyperfinite sums ABSTRACT. In the 1669 manuscript De Analysi, Newton derives three theorems, now cornerstones of modern calculus: the power series for arcsine, the power series for sine, and the area under the curve y(x)=xm/n=n/m+n∙xm+n/n (Rule I). He also sets the rule stating the area under finitely or infinitely many curves equals the sum of areas under each curve (Rule II) and shows how to expand into a power series then-standard functions such as a2/b+x or √(a2+x2) based on some algebraic laws (Rule III). Generally, Newton's approach in Rule I hinges on an odd procedure of summing up infinitesimal area moments; for the series of arcsine, he combines Rule II applied to infinitesimal arc moments with the same peculiar sum operation, dealing with area and arc moments, he employs the concept of the infinitely small unit segment (indivisible); deriving the sine series, he adopts an approach other than Rules I to III. Specifically, proving Rule I, Newton shows that if z(x)= n/m+n∙xm+n/n is a function of an area under a curve, then the curve is y(x)=xm/n. At the end, he writes ``Conversely therefore if a∙xm/n=y, then will be (n/m+n)∙a∙xm+n/n=z." We interpret Newton's Rule I with techniques of nonstandard analysis and represent his arguments on a hyperfinite grid, essentially a discrete domain instead of a continuous one. Bridging the gap between finite and infinite, we mimic Newton's approach, define the area under a curve as a hyperfinite sum, and prove the unproved part of Rule I using 17th-century techniques. References [1] Błaszczyk, P., Petiurenko, A.: Euler's Series for Sine and Cosine. An Interpretation in Nonstandard Analysis. In: Waszek, D., Zack, M. (eds.), Annals of the CSHPM, Birkhauser 2023, 73--102. [2] Newton, I.: The `De Analysis per Aequationes Infinitas'. On analysis by infinite equations. In: Whiteside, D. T. (ed): The Mathematical Papers of Isaac Newton. Vol II. 1667--1670. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge 1968, 206--247. |
11:15 | Bridging Classical and Modern Approaches to Thales' Theorem: From Euclidean Proportion to Automated Theorem Proving ABSTRACT. This paper bridges the classical and modern approaches to Thales' theorem. We start with commensurable lines and then introduce the general version. While the commensurable version relies on elementary techniques, the general one requires the arithmetic of line segments or real numbers. We reference Euclid's proof of Thales' theorem (Elements, VI.2) and consider its implications for automatic theorem proving. Thales' theorem, also known as the intercept or fundamental theorem of proportionality, is a crucial topic that distinguishes Euclid's methodology from modern axiomatic systems. In the Elements, it is a part of Book VI and builds on proportion developed in Book V - a technique replaced in the 20th century by the arithmetic of real numbers (Błaszczyk 2021). Its proof relies on proposition VI.1 and refers to the definition of proportion (V.def.5). Euclidean proportion relates pairs of figures of the same kind, such as line segments, triangles, and angles. At the same time, modern systems define proportion only for line segments. We review the proofs of Thales' theorem throughout the 20th-century geometric systems, significantly those developed by Hilbert (1899), Hartshorne (2000), Birkhoff (1932), Millman & Parker (1991), Borsuk & Szmielew (1960), and Schwabhäuser, Szmielew & Tarski (1983). These systems highlight the challenge of proving Thales' theorem, with two main strategies identified: segment arithmetic (Hilbert, Hartshorne, Schwabhäuser, Szmielew, Tarski) and the implementation of real numbers into geometric systems (Borsuk & Szmielew, Millman & Parker). The latter includes either axioms guaranteeing the existence of a bijection between real numbers and a straight line (Birkhoff) or deriving this bijection from Hilbert-style axioms (Borsuk & Szmielew). We examine proofs using segment arithmetic and discuss Borsuk and Szmielew's measure theorem and Millman and Parker's proof. Additionally, we consider Birkhoff's axiom on the relationship between real numbers and a straight line. Modern systems that bypass Euclid's proof of Thales' theorem introduce real numbers or segment arithmetic, resulting in complex proofs. Euclid's proof is straightforward but uses techniques abandoned by modern mathematics. We propose an intermediary solution: an axiomatic theory, making proposition VI.1 an axiom, enabling the recovery of the original proof. We present an approach to Thales' theorem based on the axioms of the area method and automatic theorem proving in the GCLC system developed by Chou, Gao, Zhang (1994) and Janicic, Narboux, Quaresma (2012). References [1] Birkhoff, G. D.: A Set of Postulates for Plane Geometry (Based on Scale and Protractors), Annals of Mathematics, 33(2), 329–345, 1932. [2] Błaszczyk, P.: Descartes' Transformation of Greek Notion of Proportionality. In B. Sriraman (ed.) Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Springer, Cham, 2021; https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/ 978-3-030-19071-2_16-1 [3] Borsuk, K., Szmielew, W.: Foundations of Geometry, North-Holland, Amsterdam 1960. [4] Hartshorne, R.: Geometry: Euclid and Beyond. Springer, New York 2000. [5] Chou, S., Gao, X., Zhang, J.: Machine Proofs in Geometry, World Scientific, Singapore 1994. [6] Hilbert, D.: Grundlagen der Geometrie. Festschrift zur Feier der Enthüllung des Gauss-Weber-Denkmals in Göttingen. Teubner, Leipzig 1899, 1–92. In: K. Volkert (Hrsg.), David Hilbert, Grundlagen der Geometrie (Festschrift 1899), Springer, Berlin 2015. [7] Janičić, P., Narboux, J., Quaresma, P.: The area method: a recapitulation, Journal of Automated Reasoning, Springer Verlag 48(4), 489–532, 2012. [8] Millman, R., Parker, G.: Geometry A Metric Approach with Models, Springer, Berlin 1991. [9] Schwabhäuser, W., Szmielew, W., Tarski, A.: Metamathematische Methoden in der Geometrie, Springer, Berlin 1983. |
11:30 | Intuitionistic Logic of Paradox: Introducing a Paraconsistent Intuitionistic Logic ABSTRACT. In the philosophical literature on the foundations of logic, various principles of classical logic have been questioned and weaker systems have been proposed. In paraconsistent logics, the law of explosion fails: a theory may contain a sentence together with its negation without exploding into triviality. In intuitionistic logic, the law of excluded middle fails: it may be that a sentence does not hold, but neither does its negation. As noted by Tedder and Shapiro, these two non-classical systems correspond to largely disjoint areas of research. We aim to contribute to bridging this gap by introducing a paraconsistent intuitionistic logic, in which both laws fail. Building on the bachelor's thesis under supervision of Robert Passmann, we take as a starting point Priest's paraconsistent logic propositional logic of paradox (LP) and combine it with the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic. The result is a natural extension of both logics, which we call intuitionistic logic of paradox (ILP). We introduce two versions of this logic; one that obeys modus ponens, and one that does not (remaining faithful to LP). Whenever a logic is weakened, this raises the question of recapture: can the original logic be recovered from its weakening by adding certain assumptions? We raise this question for ILP with respect to LP and intuitionistic logic. By its very definition, ILP allows for a primitive kind of recapture of both these logics: restricting the consequence relation to a certain class of models allows us to recover the consequence relation of LP or intuitionistic logic. However, such recapture is not necessarily expressible within the logic. We might hope for something stronger -- in particular, we ask the question: does ILP stand to LP as intuitionistic logic stands to classical logic? Classical logic can be recovered from intuitionistic logic by adding the law of excluded middle; do we obtain LP when we strengthen ILP by adding this law? The question turns out not to be straightforward, and its answer depends on the formulation of the law of excluded middle -- intuitionistically equivalent formulations are no longer equivalent in ILP -- and on the version of ILP that is used. |
11:45 | Intuitionistic natural deduction with a general collapse rule and its propositions-as-types interpretation ABSTRACT. We introduce a natural deduction system with a general collapse rule for intuitionistic propositional logic. The general collapse rule is a generalization of the collapse rule that replaces the falsity rule also known as the ex falso quodlibet rule. We provide a computational variant of the system in the style of the Curry-Howard correspondence and show that it is strongly normalizing. |
12:00 | Intuitionistic K: Proofs, Countermodels and Simulation PRESENTER: Han Gao ABSTRACT. The logic IK is the intuitionistic variant of normal modal logic K, introduced by Fischer Servi , Plotkin and Stirling , and studied by Simpson . This logic is considered a fundamental intuitionstic modal system as it corresponds, modulo the standard translation, to a fragment of intuitionstic first-order logic. The language of is generated from constants ⊤, ⊥ and a set At of propositional variables and by means of the operators ∧, ∨, ⊃, □ and ◇. The semantics of IK is defined in terms of bi-relational models, consisting of a pre-order relation ≤ from intuitionistic models and a binary relation R corresponding to the accessibility relation of modal Kripke frames. Bi-relational models additionally satisfy the frame conditions of forward and backward confluence, governing the interaction between the two relations. Various proof systems for IK have been proposed in the literature, among which nested and labelledsequent calculi [2,3,6]. We introduce an innovative labelled-free bi-nested sequent calculus for IK, whichis called CIK. This proof system comprises two kinds of nesting structures: ⟨·⟩, corresponding to thepre-order relation of bi-relational models for IK, and [·], corresponding to the accessibility relation. Theframe conditions of bi-relational models are modularly captured in the proof system by the ‘interactionrules’, (interfc) and (interbc), operating on the two nestings. Theorem 1 (Soundness). If a sequent is provable in CIK, then it is valid. Then we introduce a decision algorithm for IK, that is, an algorithm that for any formula decideswhether it is valid or not. The algorithm implements a terminating proof search strategy in a cumulativeand set-based version of CIK which is called CCIK. Proposition 2. Let S be a sequent. S is provable in CIK if and only if it is provable in CCIK. Theorem 3 (Termination). Let A be a formula. Proof-search for the sequent ⇒ A terminates and ityields either a proof of A or a finite derivation where all the non-axiomatic leaves are global-saturated. Next, we show that CIK allows for direct counter-model extraction: from a single failed derivation,it is possible to construct a finite countermodel for the formula at the root. This can be seen as themain advantage of our calculus over other labelled-free calculi. In order to extract a model from aglobal-saturated sequent, however, we need to additionally keep track of specific components occurringin set-based sequents. To this aim, we shall define an annotated version of CCIK, called CCIKn, whichoperates on sequents whose components are decorated by natural numbers, the annotations, and areequipped with an additional structure to keep in memory a binary relation on such annotations.The finite countermodel extraction from failed proof search entails completeness. Theorem 4 (Completeness). If A is valid in IK, it is provable in CCIKn, and thus in CCIK.Lastly, we compare CIK with a fully labelled sequent calculus labIK≤ (cf. [2]). We simulate anyderivation (rooted by a formula) in labIK≤ into one in CIK. The whole procedure is divided into threesteps, (i) llabIK≤ to CCIKn; (ii) CCIKn to CCIK; and lastly (iii) CCIK to CIK. Steps (ii) and (iii) aretrivial; for (i) we prove the following result: Proposition 5. For each formula, a derivation in labIK≤ can be simulated by one in CCIK. References [1] Gisèle Fischer Servi. Axiomatizations for some intuitionistic modal logics. Rendiconti del SeminarioMatematico Università e Politecnico di Torino, 42, 1984. [2] Sonia Marin, Marianela Morales, and Lutz Straßburger. A fully labelled proof system for intuitionisticmodal logics. J. Log. Comput., 31(3):998–1022, 2021. [3] Sonia Marin and Lutz Straßburger. Label-free modular systems for classical and intuitionistic modallogics. In Advances in Modal Logic 10, 2014. [4] Gordon Plotkin and Colin Stirling. A framework for intuitionistic modal logics. In Proceedings of the1st Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge (TARK), pages 399–406, 1986. [5] Alex K. Simpson. The proof theory and semantics of intuitionistic modal logic. 1994. [6] Lutz Straßburger. Cut elimination in nested sequents for intuitionistic modal logics. In Foundationsof Software Science and Computation Structures, pages 209–224. Springer, 2013. |
12:15 | Continua of logcs for negation below in intuitionistic logic ABSTRACT. In this paper, we analyse the effects of the principle of explosion (PE) and inference rules related to PE within the context of subminimal logics which were introduced by Dimiter Vakarelov [1]. Since we have two backgrounds, we will first describe the backgrounds, and then clarify the aims of the paper. References [1] Dimiter Vakarelov (2005): Nelson’s negation on the base of weaker versions of intuitionistic negation. Studia Logica 80, pp. 393–430, doi:10.1007/s11225-005-8476-5. |