TALK KEYWORD INDEX
This page contains an index consisting of author-provided keywords.
| ( | |
| (Tullock) contests | |
| A | |
| Abel mean | |
| Abrupt Information | |
| ACA method | |
| accelerating externalities | |
| Accountability | |
| action gaps | |
| Action Selection | |
| Ad Auctions | |
| adaptation | |
| adaptive learning | |
| Additive reward-additive transition stochastic game | |
| adjacent non manipulability | |
| Adjusted proportional rule | |
| adjusted winner | |
| adjustment cost | |
| adjustment to equilibrium | |
| Administrative Processes in Public Organizations and Corruption | |
| Admissibility | |
| adverse selection | |
| Advertising | |
| Advice | |
| advisory committees | |
| Affirmative Action | |
| agenda formation | |
| agent based simulation | |
| Aggregate Monotonicity | |
| Aggregation and voting rules | |
| aggregation rules | |
| aggregative game | |
| Agreeing to disagree | |
| Algorithm | |
| algorithms | |
| all-pay auction | |
| all-pay auctions | |
| All-pay Contest | |
| All-pay contests | |
| Alleles | |
| alliances | |
| allocation of power | |
| Allocation rules | |
| Allocation without transfers | |
| Almost common-value auction | |
| almost exchangeable | |
| Alternating moves | |
| Alternative for Matrices | |
| altruism | |
| Altruistic behavior | |
| ambiguity | |
| Ambiguity Averse Players | |
| analogy-based expectation equilibrium | |
| Anarchy | |
| announcement proofness | |
| anonymity | |
| Anonymous Reserves | |
| Anti-Imitation | |
| Apology | |
| Application of the Boston Mechanism | |
| approachability | |
| appropriation | |
| Approval Voting | |
| approximate equilibrium | |
| approximation | |
| arborescence problems | |
| Arrivals and Exits | |
| ascending price | |
| Assignment | |
| Assignment game | |
| assignment games | |
| assignment model | |
| assignment problems | |
| assortative matching | |
| assortativity | |
| Asymmetric Bidders | |
| Asymmetric contests | |
| asymmetric equilibrium | |
| Asymmetric information | |
| asymmetric type distributions | |
| Asymmetric Updating | |
| Asymptotic Efficiency | |
| Asymptotic Learning | |
| asymptotic stability | |
| asymptotics of the value | |
| Attacker-defender game | |
| attractive evolutionary equilibria | |
| Auction | |
| Auction Failures | |
| Auction Theory | |
| auctioneer competition | |
| Auctions | |
| Auctions and Procurement Auctions | |
| Auditing | |
| Authoritarian Politics | |
| axiomatic approach | |
| axiomatization | |
| B | |
| backward induction | |
| Balanced Collections | |
| balanced contribution | |
| balanced contributions | |
| Bandit Experimentation | |
| Bandits | |
| Bank runs | |
| Banking crisis | |
| Bankruptcy or rationing problem | |
| bankruptcy problem | |
| Bankruptcy Problems | |
| Banzhaf value | |
| Bargaining | |
| Bargaining Alternatives | |
| Bargaining environment | |
| Bargaining problem | |
| Bargaining solutions | |
| Bargaining Theory | |
| bargaining with private values | |
| barganining | |
| Bayes Correlated Equilibrium | |
| Bayesian equilibrium | |
| Bayesian game | |
| Bayesian games | |
| Bayesian games with infinite type and action spaces | |
| Bayesian Incentive Compatibility | |
| Bayesian Learning | |
| Bayesian Nash equilibria | |
| Bayesian Nash equilibrium | |
| Bayesian Observational Learning | |
| Bayesian Persuasion | |
| Bayesian Updating | |
| Bayesianism | |
| Beauty contest | |
| Behavioral game theory | |
| behavioral heterogeneity | |
| Behavioral Theory | |
| behavioural variation | |
| belief elicitation | |
| Belief free strategies | |
| belief hierarchies | |
| Belief hierarchy | |
| belief revision in games | |
| Beliefs | |
| Benchmarking | |
| Bertrand equilibrium | |
| best-response dynamics | |
| Better Reply Security | |
| Better Response Dynamics | |
| better-reply secure games | |
| betweenness criterion | |
| beyond worst-case synthesis | |
| Biased Belief | |
| Bid cap | |
| Bid Premium | |
| bidding | |
| bidding consortia | |
| bidding games | |
| Bidding ring | |
| Bilateral Incentive Compatibility | |
| Bilateral Trade | |
| bilinear programming | |
| bimatrix game | |
| Bimatrix games | |
| Blotto games | |
| bluffing | |
| Borda Rule | |
| Borel measurable payoffs | |
| Boston Mechanism | |
| bounded confidence | |
| Bounded Depths of Rationality | |
| Bounded Memory | |
| bounded rationality | |
| Bounded Reasoning | |
| Bribeproof | |
| Budget Balance | |
| Budget Constraint | |
| Budget Constraints | |
| budget-balance mechanisms | |
| budget-constrained | |
| Bunching | |
| buyout | |
| Böhm-Bawerk horse market games | |
| C | |
| Cadet-Branch Matching | |
| cake-cutting | |
| calibration | |
| Capacity Constraint | |
| Capacity Constraints | |
| Capacity-constrained competition | |
| Career Concerns | |
| Cartel | |
| cartel damages | |
| casting vote | |
| Catalog Games | |
| catch-up rule | |
| Categorization | |
| Causal effects | |
| CD games | |
| CEEI | |
| Censorship | |
| centipede game | |
| Centipede games | |
| Centralised union | |
| centrality measures | |
| centralization | |
| certifiable dominance | |
| Cesaro mean | |
| Chain-concave best reply | |
| Chairman’s paradox | |
| changing tastes | |
| Characteristic function | |
| characteristic function game | |
| characterization | |
| Characterization of Equilibria | |
| characterization of equilibrium outcomes | |
| characterization of Nash equilibria | |
| cheap talk | |
| cheap-talk messages | |
| choice theory | |
| choices and preferences | |
| circulation | |
| citation index | |
| Citation indices | |
| Citizen-Candidate Model | |
| claims problem | |
| claims problems | |
| Climate finance | |
| climate treaty | |
| cloning-consistency | |
| cluster formation | |
| Co-positive program | |
| coalition | |
| coalition configurations | |
| Coalition formation | |
| coalition structure | |
| coalition structures | |
| coalition-proof equilibrium | |
| Coalition-Proofness | |
| coalitional bargaining | |
| coalitional belief | |
| Coalitional merge convexity | |
| Coalitional strategy proofness | |
| Coalitional strategy-proofness | |
| Coase-conjecture | |
| Coauthorship network | |
| Cognition | |
| cognitive bounds | |
| Cognitive hierarchy | |
| collective choice | |
| Collective decision | |
| Collective decision making | |
| collusion | |
| Colonel Blotto game | |
| combinatorial auction | |
| combinatorial auctions | |
| Commitment | |
| Commitment types | |
| common belief in future rationality | |
| Common knowledge | |
| common knowledge of rationality | |
| common object ranking domain | |
| common prior assumption | |
| common project | |
| common tiered object domain | |
| Common Value Elections | |
| Common-Values | |
| communication | |
| Communication Equilibrium | |
| communication game | |
| Communication Networks | |
| community enforcement | |
| Comparative statics | |
| Competing Auctions | |
| Competing Mechanisms | |
| Competing Sellers | |
| Competition | |
| competitive equilibria | |
| Competitive Equilibrium | |
| competitive equilibrium with networks | |
| complementarities | |
| complements | |
| complements vs. substitutes | |
| Complete Information | |
| completely mixed strategies | |
| Completely positive program | |
| Complex networks | |
| complexity | |
| Compromise stability | |
| computation | |
| computational economics | |
| Computational game theory | |
| computational social choice | |
| Computer Poker | |
| concealment | |
| Conditional Contribution | |
| conditional cooperator | |
| Conditional probability | |
| Conditional Probability System | |
| Conditional probability systems | |
| Conditional Reasoning | |
| Condorcet Jury Theorem | |
| Condorcet winner | |
| configuration value | |
| conflict | |
| Conflict of interest | |
| Conflicts of Interest | |
| Conformism | |
| Conformity | |
| congestion | |
| Congestion externalities | |
| Conjectural variations | |
| connectedness | |
| conscious and unconscious | |
| consensus | |
| consistency | |
| Conspicuous consumption | |
| constellation | |
| constrained dynamics | |
| constrained efficiency | |
| constrained stability | |
| Constrained-efficiency | |
| consumer behavior | |
| Consumer Learning | |
| Contagion | |
| contamination | |
| Contest | |
| Contest Design | |
| contest success function | |
| contests | |
| Contingent Variables | |
| continuous opinions | |
| Continuous Space | |
| Continuous strategy space | |
| Continuous Time | |
| continuum of players | |
| contract design | |
| contract theory | |
| Contracting | |
| Contractive games | |
| Contracts | |
| convergence | |
| convergence dynamics | |
| convergence time | |
| converse Lyapunov theorem | |
| convex games | |
| Convex interval spaces | |
| Convex preferences | |
| convexity | |
| cooperation | |
| cooperative bargaining | |
| cooperative game | |
| cooperative game theory | |
| cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions | |
| cooperative games | |
| Coordination | |
| coordination failure | |
| Coordination games | |
| core | |
| Core cover | |
| core selection | |
| Core stability | |
| Core-periphery | |
| Core-selecting auction | |
| corporate culture | |
| Corporate Social Responsibility | |
| correct beliefs assumption | |
| correlated equilibrium | |
| Correlated Private Information | |
| Correlated signals | |
| correspondence principle | |
| Corruption | |
| cost allocation | |
| cost overruns | |
| Cost shares | |
| cost sharing | |
| cost sharing games | |
| cost-monotonicity | |
| Costly monitoring | |
| costly state verification | |
| Costly verification | |
| costs of change | |
| costs of reform | |
| Cottle and Dantzig algorithm | |
| Counter-terrorism | |
| counterfeiting products | |
| Couples | |
| Cournot | |
| Cournot duopoly | |
| Cournot Nash | |
| Cournot oligopoly | |
| Credence goods | |
| Credible deviation | |
| credit crunch | |
| credit rationing | |
| critical level policy | |
| Critical node sets | |
| Critical nodes | |
| Crowdfunding | |
| Cryptography | |
| cultural aversion | |
| Cultural capital | |
| Cumulative offer process | |
| Curiosity | |
| currency crisis | |
| current power distribution | |
| cursed equilibrium | |
| Cyclic preferences | |
| D | |
| D-rationalizability | |
| damage allocation | |
| damaged goods | |
| Dark Pools | |
| De Tocqueville | |
| Deadline | |
| Decentralised union | |
| decentralization | |
| Decentralized Clearing | |
| Decision support system | |
| decision theory | |
| decision under ambiguity | |
| decision-making | |
| Decision-Making Ability | |
| decomposability | |
| decomposition | |
| deep learning | |
| Default | |
| deferred acceptance | |
| DeGroot model | |
| delay | |
| delayed recovery | |
| Delays | |
| Delegated Agency Games | |
| delegation | |
| Delegation Games | |
| Delegation Principle | |
| demand schedule competition | |
| democracy | |
| Democratic Mechanisms | |
| Depositor Beliefs | |
| Diagonal Transfert Continuity | |
| Diamond equilibrium | |
| differentiable manifold | |
| differential evolution | |
| differential game | |
| Differentiated markets | |
| differentiated products | |
| diffusion | |
| Directed graph | |
| Directed networks | |
| directed search | |
| Disclosure | |
| discontinuity | |
| Discontinuous Games | |
| Discounted repeated games | |
| discounted Shapley value | |
| Discounted Stochastic Games | |
| Discrete choice | |
| discrete fixed points | |
| discrete-time dynamic programming | |
| Distance | |
| distributed control | |
| Diversity | |
| Diversity of talents | |
| divide-and-choose | |
| divided majority problem | |
| Divisible Goods | |
| Division problems | |
| differential games | |
| dollar auction | |
| Domain restriction | |
| dominance of strategies | |
| dominance solvability | |
| dominance structure | |
| dominant diagonal | |
| dominant punishment strategy | |
| double auction | |
| Drèze Equilibrium | |
| DS Puzzle | |
| dual agent | |
| dual processes | |
| Dually essential coalitions | |
| Duopoly | |
| durable goods | |
| Dynamic Agency | |
| Dynamic auction | |
| Dynamic Bayesian Persuasion | |
| dynamic competition | |
| Dynamic Consistency | |
| Dynamic Contests | |
| Dynamic contracting | |
| dynamic decision problem | |
| Dynamic duopoly | |
| dynamic elections | |
| dynamic game | |
| Dynamic Games | |
| Dynamic games with complete information | |
| dynamic global games | |
| dynamic inconsistency | |
| Dynamic matching | |
| dynamic mechanisms | |
| dynamic model of oligopoly | |
| Dynamic programming principle | |
| Dynamic Reserves | |
| Dynamic Signalling | |
| Dynamic Stability | |
| dynamic stability of equilibrium | |
| Dynamic stochastic oligopoly | |
| dynamic zero sum games | |
| dynamical system | |
| dynamics | |
| E | |
| e-auctions | |
| eBay | |
| economic crises | |
| Economic Governance | |
| Economies in distributional form | |
| ecosystem restoration | |
| efficiency | |
| efficient auction | |
| efficient fair assignment | |
| efficient information aggregation | |
| Efficient path | |
| efficient payoffs | |
| effort provision | |
| egalitarian and utilitarian solutions | |
| egalitarian Shapley value | |
| Election Design | |
| Elections | |
| Electoral College | |
| electricity auctions | |
| emotions | |
| endogenous claims | |
| endogenous commitment | |
| endogenous entry | |
| Endogenous fluctuations | |
| Endogenous frictions | |
| Endogenous Network Formation | |
| endogenous priority structure | |
| Endogenous prize contests | |
| endogenous screening | |
| Endowment Effect | |
| Endowment Lower Bound | |
| enforcement | |
| English auction | |
| ENSC method | |
| entrepreneurial finance | |
| Entry | |
| Entry deterrence | |
| Envy | |
| epistemic game theory | |
| Epistemic models | |
| epsilon-equilibrium | |
| equal representation | |
| equilibria | |
| equilibrium | |
| Equilibrium Characterization | |
| Equilibrium Computation | |
| Equilibrium distributions | |
| equilibrium finding | |
| equilibrium index | |
| equilibrium learning | |
| equilibrium payoff set | |
| equilibrium payoffs | |
| Equilibrium Refinements | |
| Equilibrium selection | |
| Equilibrium selection problem | |
| equilibrium stability | |
| equilibrium under ambiguity | |
| Equity auctions | |
| equivalence | |
| Equivalent transformations | |
| error term | |
| Espionage | |
| event-related potentials (ERPs) | |
| Evolution | |
| evolution of preferences | |
| evolutionary algorithms | |
| Evolutionary competition | |
| evolutionary dynamics | |
| evolutionary equilibrium | |
| Evolutionary game dynamics | |
| evolutionary game theory | |
| evolutionary games | |
| evolutionary implementation | |
| evolutionary oligopoly | |
| Evolutionary Population Dynamics | |
| Evolutionary stability | |
| ex post investment | |
| ex-ante efficiency | |
| ex-ante stability | |
| Ex-post Risk | |
| excess | |
| Exchange | |
| Exchange Economy | |
| exchange-stability | |
| exchangeability | |
| exclusion oracle | |
| executive control | |
| existence | |
| existence of an equilibrium | |
| existence of Nash equilibrium | |
| Exit Problems | |
| Exogenous News | |
| expectancy violation | |
| expected capability to manage emerging states | |
| expected cost | |
| Experience | |
| experiment | |
| experimental economics | |
| Experimental evidence | |
| Experimentation | |
| Experiments | |
| expert | |
| expertise | |
| Experts | |
| Experts Testing | |
| Extended Imputations | |
| extensive form rationalizability | |
| Extensive Form Refinements | |
| extensive game | |
| extensive games with perfect information | |
| Extensive-form game | |
| Extensive-Form Games | |
| extensive-form rationalizability | |
| externalities | |
| externality | |
| extremal optimization | |
| F | |
| fads | |
| fair division | |
| Fair Division Theory | |
| fairness | |
| Farsighted Stability | |
| farsighted stable set | |
| Farsightedness | |
| fashion | |
| favoring higher ranks | |
| Favoritism | |
| FCC spectrum auctions | |
| fear of mis-coordination | |
| Feasible elimination procedure | |
| feasible payoffs | |
| feedback | |
| Field experiment | |
| financial accelerator | |
| Financial Analysts | |
| Financial crises | |
| financial markets | |
| Finite Dynamic Game | |
| finite games | |
| Finite Mechanism | |
| finite memory | |
| finite recall | |
| finite-horizon paradox | |
| finitely additive strategies | |
| firm pricing strategies | |
| firms | |
| First Price Auction | |
| first-mover advantage | |
| fixed bribe | |
| Fixed or random deadlines | |
| fixed point index | |
| fixed points | |
| Fixed Prices | |
| Fixed Pricing | |
| Flexible information acquisition | |
| flourishing trap | |
| focal point | |
| focal points | |
| Folk rule | |
| folk theorem | |
| forced contribution | |
| forecasts | |
| foreign direct investment | |
| formal methods | |
| Formation | |
| Formation games | |
| forward induction | |
| Forward-induction | |
| free recall | |
| Free-rider problem | |
| Free-Riding | |
| frictions | |
| full agreement | |
| Full Bayesian Updating | |
| full effort equilibrium | |
| full implementation | |
| full revelation | |
| Functional monotone class theorem | |
| Fundamental Equilibrium | |
| Fuzzy game theory | |
| fuzzy set | |
| G | |
| gambling | |
| Game Abstraction | |
| Game Analysis | |
| game theory | |
| game with zero sum | |
| Games in Partition Function Form | |
| games with ambiguity | |
| Games with Ambiguity Averse Agents | |
| Games with Incomplete Information | |
| games with many players | |
| Games/group decisions: cooperative | |
| gamma-core | |
| gender difference | |
| gender equality | |
| General allocation problems | |
| General equilibrium | |
| general learning | |
| General Lotto game | |
| Generalized bimatrix game | |
| Generalized Nash equilibrium | |
| Generalized Stable Set | |
| generalized Vickrey rule | |
| generation map | |
| generic finiteness | |
| generic property | |
| Generous Tit-For-Tat | |
| Genotypes | |
| gift exchange | |
| Global game | |
| global games | |
| governance | |
| graph | |
| gratification | |
| Gravity model | |
| Green-Laffont mechanism | |
| Group contests | |
| group decision | |
| group formation | |
| group work | |
| groups | |
| GSP | |
| H | |
| Handicap | |
| Harsanyi dividends | |
| HBS Draft | |
| Head Start | |
| Hedonic Games | |
| Herding | |
| Hereditarity | |
| Hessian Riemannian metrics | |
| heterogeneity | |
| heterogeneous beliefs | |
| heterogeneous experts | |
| hidden Markov models | |
| hide and seek | |
| Hierarchical delegation | |
| Hierarchies of Beliefs | |
| Higher Education | |
| higher-order beliefs | |
| highway problem | |
| Hillman's political economy games | |
| Hirsch index | |
| Hobbes | |
| Hold-up | |
| homogeneous products | |
| honesty | |
| horizontal differentiation | |
| horizontal subcontracting | |
| Hotelling | |
| human capital | |
| hyper-preferences | |
| hypergraph | |
| I | |
| idempotent duality | |
| identification | |
| Ideology | |
| image scoring | |
| Imitation | |
| imitation game | |
| Imitative dynamics | |
| immediate acceptance mechanism | |
| Imperfect Information | |
| Imperfect Observation | |
| Imperfect Private Monitoring | |
| Imperfect Public Monitoring | |
| Imperfect-information game | |
| Implementation | |
| Implementation Core | |
| impluse response dynamics | |
| Impossibility result | |
| impulse balance theory | |
| Imputation distribution procedure | |
| In-Group/Universal Fairness | |
| Incentive compatibility | |
| Incentive Compatible Multilayered Networks Delegated Networking Principle | |
| Incentives | |
| Incentives in Engineering | |
| inclusive set | |
| inclusiveness | |
| income effect | |
| Income Inequality | |
| Incomparability of Marginal Gains | |
| Incomparability of Marginal Losses | |
| Incomplete Information | |
| Incomplete Information Games | |
| Inconsistent Beliefs | |
| Incumbent Competition | |
| independence of totally irrelevant alternatives | |
| independent blocking | |
| independent domain | |
| indirect reciprocity | |
| Individual Based Model | |
| Individual Decisions | |
| individual improvement chain | |
| individuals choosing among themselves | |
| Indivisibilities | |
| Indivisibility | |
| indivisible goods | |
| induced price of anarchy | |
| induced price of stability | |
| Industrial espionage | |
| inequality | |
| Infinite games | |
| infinitely many players | |
| Influence | |
| influence network | |
| Information | |
| Information acquisition | |
| Information Aggregation | |
| Information asymmetry | |
| Information Cascades | |
| Information Design | |
| information diffusion | |
| Information Disclosure | |
| information elicitation | |
| Information Externality | |
| Information orders | |
| Information perturbations | |
| information pooling game | |
| Information Processing | |
| information structure | |
| Information Structures | |
| Information Transmission | |
| information-processing | |
| Informational Cascades | |
| Informational herding | |
| informed principal | |
| inhibition | |
| Initiation of Negotiation | |
| Innovation | |
| insincere agents | |
| inspection game | |
| inspection games | |
| Institutional Design | |
| institutions | |
| Integer and modulo game | |
| interactions | |
| interactive learning | |
| interactive multi-portfolio optimization | |
| interchangeability | |
| Interdependency | |
| interdependent values | |
| Interim Efficiency | |
| interim-efficiency | |
| Interior-point methods | |
| Intermediaries | |
| intermediation | |
| Intermediation centrality | |
| international conflicts | |
| international law | |
| international relations | |
| Internet | |
| Internet trade | |
| Interval | |
| Interval computing | |
| Interval cooperative game | |
| interval ranking | |
| Introspection | |
| Intuitionistic fuzzy set | |
| inventory/production: applications | |
| inverse problem | |
| investment | |
| Investment Complementarity | |
| investment efficiency | |
| Investment firms | |
| investment funding | |
| Investment game | |
| investment opportunities | |
| irreversible investment | |
| Iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies | |
| iterated dominance | |
| Iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies | |
| Iterated elimination procedures | |
| Iterated Weak Dominance | |
| iterative deferred acceptance | |
| iterative models | |
| iterative revelation mechanism | |
| J | |
| Job Design | |
| Job matching | |
| Joint-Strategies | |
| judgment aggregation | |
| jump bidding | |
| jury | |
| jury selection | |
| Jury Theorem | |
| Justification | |
| K | |
| k+1-Price Auctions | |
| Kemeny property | |
| Kidney exchange | |
| Knaster procedure | |
| Knightian uncertainty | |
| Knowledge-belief space | |
| Ky Fan Inequality | |
| L | |
| labor market competition | |
| Laboratory Experiment | |
| Labour Market | |
| land monotonicity | |
| land reassignment | |
| land rental | |
| Language | |
| large deviations principle | |
| Large economies | |
| Large games | |
| Large Markets | |
| lattice | |
| Law of Effect | |
| Leadership | |
| Learning | |
| Learning Algorithms | |
| learning in games | |
| Learning of the game | |
| Least square prenucleolus | |
| Lebesgue unit interval | |
| leftover cost matrix | |
| Legal Institutions | |
| legal remedies | |
| Legislative bargaining | |
| Lemke's algorithm | |
| Lemke–Howson algorithm | |
| level-k | |
| level-k model | |
| leveling the playing field | |
| liberal peace | |
| Licensing | |
| licensing scheme | |
| limited attention | |
| limited commitment | |
| limited communication | |
| limited foresight | |
| Limited liability | |
| limited memory | |
| Lindahl prices | |
| linear complementarity problem | |
| Linear preferences | |
| linearization | |
| liquidity auctions | |
| liquidity crisis | |
| Listed Corporations | |
| lobbying | |
| Local Interactions | |
| Local public goods | |
| Local reasoning | |
| Local Sufficiency | |
| location games on networks | |
| lock-in | |
| Logit Choice Rules | |
| Logit Dynamics | |
| Logit response | |
| Long and Short-lived Players | |
| long cheap talk | |
| long-lived vs. short-lived agents | |
| long-time dynamics | |
| Loss aversion | |
| Lotteries | |
| Lottery | |
| Lottery Contests | |
| Lyapunov function | |
| M | |
| Macro Stress Tests | |
| Majority | |
| majority rule | |
| Make-Take Fees | |
| Managerial Bonuses | |
| manipulability | |
| many-to-many assignment markets | |
| Many-to-many matchings | |
| marginal surplus | |
| Market | |
| Market Concentration | |
| Market Design | |
| Market Fragmentation | |
| market impact cost split | |
| Market Microstructure | |
| market-testing | |
| Markov Chain | |
| Markov chains | |
| Markov decision processes | |
| Markov Equilibrium | |
| Markov games | |
| Markov perfect equilibrium | |
| marriage markets | |
| Maskin monotonicity | |
| Matches | |
| Matching | |
| matching markets | |
| Matching Theory | |
| Matching with Contracts | |
| mathematical programming | |
| mathematics: convexity | |
| matrix approach | |
| Maximal Element | |
| Maximal Lotteries | |
| Maximax strategies | |
| Maximin strategy | |
| Maxmin Expected Utility | |
| Mean Residual Lifetime | |
| mechanism | |
| Mechanism Design | |
| Mechanism Design with Ambiguity Averse Agents | |
| Mechanism design with limited transfers | |
| Mechanism Design without transfers | |
| Media | |
| medial frontal negativity (MFN) | |
| median | |
| Median Voter Theorem | |
| Mediated communication | |
| mediation | |
| Mediator | |
| Memory | |
| merge-proofness | |
| Merger and Acquisition | |
| mergers | |
| meta-stability | |
| Metastable Distribution | |
| Midpoint | |
| Milestones | |
| Mindsets | |
| minimal overlap rule | |
| minimal rights | |
| minimax | |
| Minimax strategies | |
| Minimum Coalition | |
| Minimum cost spanning tree problems | |
| Minimum costa spanning tree problems | |
| minimum incoming cost rules | |
| minimum price Walrasian rule | |
| minority games | |
| MINthenMAX decision model | |
| MINthenMAX equilibrium | |
| Mirage equilibrium | |
| mistakes | |
| Mixed Bundling Prices | |
| mixed duopoly | |
| mixed strategies | |
| mixed strategy Nash equilibrium | |
| mixture-of-types models | |
| Models | |
| modified dictator game | |
| monopoly | |
| Monopoly pricing | |
| monotone perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium | |
| Monotonic strategies | |
| Monotonicity | |
| Monte Carlo simulation | |
| Moral hazard | |
| Moreau-Yosida regularization | |
| most informative equilibrium | |
| multi-agent model | |
| multi-armed bandits | |
| Multi-battle contest | |
| multi-demand preferences | |
| Multi-dimensional capacity | |
| Multi-Dimensional Discrimination | |
| Multi-dimensional screening | |
| Multi-game | |
| Multi-layered Financial Network | |
| multi-object | |
| Multi-period Matching | |
| multi-player games | |
| Multi-Player Ultimatum Game | |
| multi-product auction | |
| multi-rationality | |
| multi-regional migration | |
| Multi-sender cheap talk | |
| multi-sided assignment games | |
| multi-stage game | |
| Multi-Unit Auctions | |
| Multi-winner Contest | |
| Multicriteria game | |
| multidimensional policies | |
| multidimensional screening | |
| Multilateral Bargaining | |
| Multilateral enforcement | |
| multilateral negotiations | |
| multilinear extension | |
| Multiobjective programming | |
| Multipartner matching | |
| Multiplayer Bargaining | |
| multiple agents | |
| Multiple Dimensions | |
| Multiple Receivers | |
| Multiple references | |
| Multiple Senders | |
| Multiple sources | |
| multiple-choice test | |
| Multiproduct Price Competition | |
| Multitask | |
| multi–leader–follower games | |
| Mutation | |
| Mutual Knowledge of Rationality | |
| Myerson value | |
| Myerson's optimal auction | |
| N | |
| n-player Cournot games | |
| naivete | |
| Nash and Coalitional Equilibria | |
| Nash bargaining problem | |
| Nash bargaining solution | |
| Nash Demand Game | |
| Nash dynamics | |
| Nash equilibria | |
| Nash equilibrium | |
| Nash equilibrium computation | |
| Nash equilibrium uniqueness | |
| Nash implementation | |
| Nash program | |
| Nash solution | |
| nearly pure Nash equilibrium | |
| Negotiations | |
| neologism proofness | |
| network | |
| Network centrality | |
| network community structure | |
| Network flexibility | |
| Network flow | |
| Network Formation | |
| Network Formation Game | |
| network game | |
| network games | |
| Network performance | |
| Network Routing | |
| Network-formation | |
| Networks | |
| Nice game | |
| no commitment | |
| No veto power | |
| no-envy | |
| no-regret learning | |
| Noisy Communication | |
| Non cooperative mechanisms | |
| Non-benevolence | |
| non-connected honesty standards | |
| Non-convexity | |
| Non-cooperative foundation | |
| non-cooperative games | |
| non-linear pricing | |
| non-manipulability | |
| non-monetary domain | |
| Non-Monotone Learning | |
| non-parametric test | |
| non-quasi-linear preferences | |
| non-wastefulness | |
| noncooperative coalitional bargaining | |
| Noncooperative game | |
| Noncooperative Games | |
| Nonlinear complementarity problem | |
| nonmonotone comparative statics | |
| Normal form games in Banach spaces | |
| Normal-form information set | |
| Normal-form invariance | |
| NTU-bankruptcy game | |
| NTU-bankruptcy problem | |
| Nucleolus | |
| Number of equilibria | |
| O | |
| Obfuscation | |
| Object Allocation | |
| Object Re-allocation | |
| Observability | |
| observable payoffs | |
| observable restrictions | |
| Observables | |
| Observational learning | |
| offers for incentive payments | |
| oil market | |
| Oligopoly | |
| Oligopoly equilibrium | |
| On-the-match search | |
| online behavioral experiment | |
| Online dating | |
| Online social network | |
| Opaque Goods | |
| open loop | |
| Open-loop equilibrium | |
| opinion formation | |
| optimal auction | |
| optimal budget ratio | |
| Optimal Contracts | |
| Optimal Control | |
| Optimal Demand | |
| Optimal information disclosure | |
| Optimal mechanism | |
| Optimal Reward Schemes | |
| Optimal Selling Strategies | |
| optimal stopping | |
| optimal taxation | |
| optimization | |
| Optimization heuristics | |
| optional verification | |
| order independence | |
| Order preservation | |
| Ordinal convexity | |
| ordinal potential | |
| Organizational Behavior | |
| Organizations | |
| Outcome mechanism | |
| outside option | |
| Overbidding | |
| overcharging | |
| overconfidence | |
| Overlapping generations | |
| Owen value | |
| Owen-Shapley spatial power index | |
| P | |
| Pairwise Stable | |
| pairwise unanimity | |
| panopticon | |
| paradox of choice | |
| Pareto efficiency | |
| Pareto equilibrium | |
| Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy | |
| Pareto optimal mechanism | |
| Pareto optimality | |
| Partial Commitment | |
| partial equilibrium analysis | |
| Partial honesty | |
| partial inspection | |
| Partial Strategyproofness | |
| partial-honesty | |
| partially informed consumers | |
| partially verifiable messages | |
| Participation constraints | |
| partition function | |
| partitions | |
| Partnership Dissolution | |
| Partnership Dissolving | |
| Partnerships | |
| passive beliefs | |
| passivity | |
| Patent | |
| Patents | |
| Path Selection | |
| Paul Samuelson | |
| Pay-as-bid auction | |
| payoff information | |
| Payoff monotonicity | |
| payoff-dominant | |
| payoff-irrelevant cue | |
| peer prediction | |
| Peer Referrals | |
| peer review | |
| perceived fairness | |
| percentile queries | |
| perception biases | |
| Perfect Competition | |
| Perfect Equilibrium | |
| Perfect information games | |
| perfect interim equilibria | |
| personality | |
| Personnel economics | |
| persuasion game | |
| persuasion games with binary actions | |
| phase transitions | |
| Piece-rates | |
| pillage game | |
| piracy | |
| platforms | |
| Plurality Rule | |
| plurality voting | |
| Poisson Bandits | |
| Poisson games | |
| poker | |
| Political campaigns | |
| Political Communication | |
| political economy | |
| Political institutions | |
| political polarization | |
| Polling | |
| polling systems | |
| pooling | |
| Pooling equilibria | |
| population game | |
| Population growth | |
| population processes | |
| population-monotonicity | |
| Portfolio management | |
| Position value | |
| Positive Feedback | |
| Post-auction investment | |
| Posted Price | |
| posted prices | |
| Posted Pricing | |
| potential | |
| Potential games | |
| power | |
| power contests | |
| power index | |
| power indices | |
| Power of incentives | |
| Power-sharing systems | |
| pre-election polls | |
| pre-play communication | |
| prediction markets | |
| predictive models | |
| preemption | |
| preference aggregation | |
| Preference evolution with incomplete information | |
| preference information | |
| Preference type space | |
| Preferences | |
| Presidential Elections | |
| Price caps | |
| Price competition | |
| Price Controls | |
| Price Discrimination | |
| Price Dispersion | |
| price equilibrium | |
| Price mechanism selection | |
| Price of anarchy | |
| Price of stability | |
| pricing | |
| Pride | |
| Principal-Agent | |
| principal-agent model | |
| Principal-Agent models | |
| Principle Agent | |
| Principle of Minimum Differentiation | |
| priority rules | |
| prisoner dilemma | |
| Prisoner's Dilemma | |
| Privacy | |
| Private Agenda | |
| Private Information | |
| Private monitoring | |
| probabilistic assignment | |
| Probabilistic Rule | |
| Probabilistic Serial | |
| probability weighting | |
| Procurement | |
| procurement auction | |
| procurement auctions | |
| Product Choice Game | |
| Product Differentiation | |
| Product innovation | |
| Product market competition | |
| production | |
| Productive and destructive effort | |
| Productivity | |
| productivity dispersion | |
| Profit-sharing | |
| promises | |
| Promotion | |
| property rights | |
| proportional bribe | |
| Proportional Representation | |
| Proportionality | |
| Proposal Power | |
| propositional calculus | |
| Prospect theory | |
| public and private information | |
| Public bads | |
| public economics | |
| Public good | |
| Public good externality | |
| Public Goods | |
| Public Information | |
| public procurement | |
| Public Resources | |
| punctuated equilibrium | |
| punishment and reward | |
| Pure and mixed Nash equilibrium | |
| pure equilibria | |
| pure Nash equilibrium | |
| pure strategy | |
| Purifiability | |
| Purification | |
| Purification Theorem | |
| Q | |
| q-mechanisms | |
| Quadratic programming | |
| quality competition | |
| quantal response | |
| quantal response equilibrium | |
| quantitative objectives | |
| quantity competition | |
| quantity externalities | |
| Quantum algorithms | |
| Quantum games | |
| quantum theory | |
| quasi-monotone functions | |
| Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium | |
| quasiconcave | |
| quasiconcavity | |
| Queues | |
| queues: applications | |
| R | |
| R&D | |
| R&D Networks | |
| Random Auditing | |
| Random Dictatorship | |
| random matching | |
| Random Network | |
| random paths | |
| random walks | |
| Randomized Social Choice | |
| Rank dependent utility | |
| rank-respecting unavailable-type- invariance | |
| Ranking methods | |
| Rating Systems | |
| rational attention | |
| Rational inattention | |
| Rational preferences | |
| rational voting | |
| rationality | |
| rationality threshold | |
| rationalizability | |
| rationalizing | |
| re-election hurdles | |
| real authority | |
| real options | |
| Reallocation | |
| Reasoning | |
| Reasoning in Dynamic Games | |
| reciprocity | |
| recommended retail prices | |
| recursive core | |
| recursive games | |
| Recursive methods | |
| Recursive Optimization | |
| recursive preferences | |
| recursive utility | |
| Redistribution | |
| Redistributive politics | |
| reference dependent preference | |
| reference dependent preferences | |
| reference points | |
| Referenda | |
| refinements of equilibrium | |
| Regime Change | |
| Regular equilibrium | |
| Regulated competition | |
| regulation | |
| regulatory approval | |
| regulatory commitment | |
| reinforcement | |
| Reinforcement learning | |
| rejection-proof core | |
| relational contracts | |
| relative and team performance pay | |
| relative contribution | |
| relative responsibility | |
| Renegotiation | |
| rent-extraction | |
| rent-seeking | |
| rent-seeking contest | |
| Repeated Game | |
| repeated games | |
| repeated games with incomplete information | |
| repeated multi-coalitional games | |
| Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma | |
| Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma | |
| Replicator Dynamic | |
| Representation of preferences | |
| Reputation | |
| reputation concerns | |
| Reputation Systems | |
| Research Tournament | |
| resource sharing | |
| resource-monotonicity | |
| Response times | |
| responsibility | |
| restless bandit | |
| Restless bandits | |
| Restricted cooperation | |
| Restricted Domain | |
| revealed preferences | |
| Revenue | |
| Revenue cap | |
| Revenue Equivalence | |
| revenue maximization | |
| Reward Schemes | |
| Ride Sharing | |
| Riemannian geometry | |
| Risk | |
| risk attitudes | |
| risk aversion | |
| risk aversion and robustness | |
| risk of breakdown | |
| risk preferences | |
| risk-dominant | |
| robust control | |
| robust implementation | |
| robust mechanism design | |
| Robust Social Influence | |
| robustness | |
| role-reversal | |
| Role-switching | |
| roommate problem | |
| Roommates Problem | |
| round-robin tournaments | |
| routing | |
| Rubinstein game | |
| ruling coalition | |
| rumours | |
| S | |
| saddle | |
| salience | |
| saliency | |
| same-sex marriage | |
| Sampling | |
| Savage | |
| scale-invariant | |
| school assignment | |
| School Choice | |
| school choice problem | |
| scoring rules | |
| Screening | |
| Search | |
| Search frictions | |
| search without priors | |
| Second-Chance Offers | |
| Second-degree price discrimination | |
| second-mover advantage | |
| Second-price auctions with interdependent values | |
| secret and public reserve prices | |
| secret handshake | |
| Secret Sharing | |
| Secure Communication | |
| Segmentation | |
| Segregation | |
| selection of equilibria | |
| self fulfilling expectations | |
| self-categorization | |
| self-control | |
| Self-evidence | |
| Self-selection | |
| semi algebraic sets | |
| Semilattice | |
| sender-receiver game | |
| sender-receiver games | |
| Separable Preferences | |
| separation | |
| sequencing games | |
| sequential | |
| Sequential Auctions | |
| sequential equilibria | |
| sequential equilibrium | |
| sequential rationality | |
| Sequential screening | |
| sequential search | |
| sequential voting | |
| Serial Dictatorship Mechanism | |
| set theory | |
| set–valued maps | |
| Sexual Reproduction | |
| Sexual vs. asexual reproduction | |
| Shadow Banking | |
| Shapley value | |
| Share equilibrium | |
| Shared effort games | |
| Sharing Rule | |
| Side information | |
| Signaling | |
| signalling | |
| Silent timing game | |
| simple game | |
| simplicial polytope | |
| Simulation | |
| Simulation software | |
| simultaneous ascending auctions | |
| Simultaneous moves | |
| Single-Crossing | |
| Single-dipped preferences | |
| Single-Peaked Domains | |
| Single-peaked preferences | |
| Skewness | |
| slowly varying function | |
| Small Bias | |
| Smooth Path-Following Method | |
| soccer (penalty shootout) | |
| Social capital | |
| Social Choice | |
| Social choice correspondence | |
| Social choice problems with reference points | |
| social choice rule | |
| Social comparison | |
| social dilemma | |
| social distance | |
| social identity | |
| Social interactions | |
| Social Learning | |
| Social mobility | |
| social network | |
| social network games | |
| Social Networks | |
| social norms | |
| Social optimum | |
| Social preferences | |
| Social Status | |
| Social Storage | |
| Social Welfare | |
| soft information | |
| software | |
| solutions of 2-player games | |
| Sophisticated Voting | |
| Sophistication | |
| Sorting | |
| sovereign crisis | |
| spare parts pooling | |
| spatial game | |
| Spatial Learning | |
| Spatial models | |
| Spatial Voting | |
| spectral analysis | |
| spillovers between skilled and low skilled labor | |
| Spite | |
| split-award auctions | |
| sponsored search | |
| sports rules | |
| spread | |
| square root rules | |
| stability | |
| Stability of Cournot-Nash equilibrium | |
| stable allocations | |
| Stable equilibria | |
| Stable marriage | |
| Stable marriage problem | |
| Stable matching | |
| Stable Outcomes | |
| Stable Set | |
| stable sets | |
| stable/contractive/negative definite games | |
| stag hunt | |
| standard for two-person | |
| state capacity | |
| stationary strategies | |
| statistical equilibrium | |
| Statistics | |
| Status | |
| status-quo bias | |
| sticky prices | |
| Stochastic and Dynamic Games | |
| stochastic approximation | |
| Stochastic contracts | |
| Stochastic Control | |
| Stochastic Dominance | |
| stochastic evolutionary games | |
| stochastic game | |
| Stochastic games | |
| stochastic shortest path problem | |
| Stochastic stability | |
| Stochastic timing games | |
| strategic alliance | |
| strategic ambiguity | |
| strategic bargaining | |
| Strategic Behavior | |
| strategic communication | |
| strategic complementarities | |
| Strategic complementarity | |
| Strategic Complements | |
| Strategic Complements and Substitutes | |
| Strategic Decision Making | |
| Strategic Dependence | |
| Strategic Equilibrium | |
| Strategic Equivalence | |
| Strategic Experimentation | |
| Strategic information transmission | |
| strategic learning | |
| strategic manipulation | |
| Strategic market games | |
| strategic player | |
| strategic reasoning | |
| strategic straightforwardness | |
| Strategic substitutes | |
| strategic teaching | |
| Strategic uncertainty | |
| strategic voting | |
| strategical advantage | |
| Strategy evolution | |
| strategy method | |
| strategy proofness | |
| strategy revision opportunities | |
| Strategy space reduction | |
| strategy-proofness | |
| Strategyproofness | |
| Strict strategy-proofness | |
| strong belief in rationality | |
| Strong Equilibrium | |
| Strong Nash equilibrium | |
| Strong substitutability | |
| Structured stochastic games | |
| stubborn agents | |
| subgame perfect | |
| Subgame perfect core | |
| subgame perfect equilibrium | |
| Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium | |
| subgame perfect nash equilibrum | |
| subgame prefect $\epsilon$-equilibria | |
| Subgame-perfect equilibrium | |
| subgame-perfection | |
| subgame–perfect equilibrium | |
| Subjective evaluation | |
| subjective expected utility | |
| subsolution | |
| substitutes | |
| succinct games | |
| Supermodularity | |
| Supervision | |
| surplus division | |
| surplus extraction | |
| Swing Voter's Curse | |
| switching control stochastic game | |
| switching controller stochastic game | |
| symmetric game | |
| Symmetric games | |
| synergies | |
| Systemic Risk | |
| T | |
| tacit bargaining | |
| take-it-or-leave-it offers | |
| Talmud rule | |
| target-based preferences | |
| targeting | |
| tau-value | |
| Tauberian theorem | |
| Teachers assignment | |
| team experimentation | |
| Teams | |
| teamwork | |
| technology transfer | |
| tennis (tiebreaker) | |
| terrorism studies | |
| Test Manipulation | |
| Testing | |
| The minimal p-norm solution | |
| the minimum price Walrasian rule | |
| the two-system decision-making | |
| Theory | |
| thick priorities | |
| threshold | |
| threshold bank-run analysis | |
| Tick Size Constraints | |
| tie-breaking rules | |
| Tiebout sorting | |
| time consistency | |
| time inconsistency | |
| Time-consistency | |
| time-inconsistent preferences | |
| time-variability aversion | |
| Timeability | |
| Tinder | |
| Top convexity | |
| Top Trading Cycles | |
| topological space | |
| tops-only | |
| Tournament | |
| tournament design | |
| Tournament game | |
| Tournament games | |
| tournament solutions | |
| Tournaments | |
| transferable utility | |
| Transferrable Utility Games | |
| Transformation | |
| transparency | |
| Treasury auctions | |
| Trembling hand perfect equilibrium | |
| trembling-hand mistakes | |
| Trial-and-error | |
| triangular intuitionistic fuzzy numbers | |
| trigger games | |
| Truncated Leximin solutions | |
| Trust | |
| trust game | |
| Truthful Implementability | |
| TU game | |
| Tullock Contests | |
| turnout paradox | |
| Twin crises | |
| Two-armed Bandit | |
| two-armed exponential bandit | |
| two-dimensional optimal stopping | |
| Two-Part tariff | |
| two-person zero-sum games | |
| two-player games on graphs | |
| Two-sided markets | |
| Two-sided matching | |
| Two-Sided Private Information | |
| Two-stage voting | |
| type-monomorphic | |
| Type-symmetric randomized equilibria | |
| U | |
| ultimatum game | |
| Unanimity | |
| unanimity rule | |
| Unawareness | |
| Uncertain monitoring | |
| uncertain needs | |
| Uncertainty | |
| Uncovered Set | |
| unequal discount rates | |
| Uniform Price Auction | |
| Union utility | |
| unipolarity | |
| unit vector game | |
| unit-demand preferences | |
| universal type space | |
| university | |
| upgrades | |
| upper semi-continuous functions | |
| US Stock Exchange Competition | |
| Utilitarian aggregation | |
| utilitarianism | |
| utility function | |
| utility games | |
| Utility Proportional Beliefs | |
| Utility representation | |
| Utility theory | |
| Utility Transfer Analysis | |
| V | |
| Valence | |
| value evolution | |
| value of a game | |
| Value of Public Information | |
| VCG | |
| VCG auction | |
| VCG mechanism | |
| vector field index | |
| vector-utility | |
| Venture Capital | |
| verifiable evidence | |
| Verifiable information | |
| verifiable messages | |
| verification and synthesis | |
| verification control | |
| verification-proofness | |
| vertical linear complementarity problem | |
| vertical product differentiation | |
| VFJS Model | |
| Vickrey auction | |
| Vickrey outcome | |
| Virtual utility | |
| voluntary partnerships | |
| vote buying | |
| Vote trading | |
| Voter turnout | |
| voter's behavior | |
| Voting | |
| Voting by Committees | |
| voting by veto | |
| voting equilibrium | |
| voting games | |
| Voting Power | |
| Voting systems | |
| voucher | |
| W | |
| wage dispersion | |
| Wald's MiniMax principle | |
| Walras | |
| War and Peace | |
| War of Attrition | |
| Wardrop equilibrium | |
| weak monotonicity | |
| weighted Shapley value | |
| Welfare | |
| welfare comparison | |
| welfare costs of competition | |
| well-being | |
| Winner's Curse | |
| Z | |
| Zero-Determinant Strategies | |
| zero-sum game | |
| zero-sum games | |
| Zerosum games | |