ABSTRACT. Sixty years ago philosophy of language was the Queen Bee of Analytic Philosophy. Nowadays analytic metaphysics enjoys a degree of importance unimaginable sixty years ago. But then, as now, logic and the philosophy of logic were at the centre of analytic philosophy. This symposium looks critically at aspects of the developments in logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of language over the last sixty years.

ABSTRACT. The mentioning of error-possibilities can make us withdraw knowledge claims. A once common strategy to deal with this observation appeals to the so-called “availability heuristic.” We withdraw because error becomes more available so that we mistakenly judge it as more likely. Nagel, 2010 is generally taken to have offered a devastating criticism of this account. The present paper seeks to rehabilitate it. I will argue that there are two ways to spell out the availability account—one in terms of the phenomenon of “subadditivity,” another in terms of the so-called “explanation effect”—neither of which is subject to Nagel’s worries.

ABSTRACT. We argue that that an intuitionistic view of truth and knowledge yields a better notion of fallibilistic knowledge than does one based on classical truth. Fallibilism holds that knowledge-adequate justification need not guarantee truth, while the classical truth condition holds that knowledge guarantees truth. An intuitionistic conception of truth and knowledge, one based on the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov understanding of truth, resolves this tension in a natural manner. As a case study we consider the intuitionistic response to the lottery paradox, a key problem for fallibilist views of knowledge.

ABSTRACT. Our thinking is compartmentalized. We are able to walk and talk, in one compartment we know where we are while another is focused on conversation. Lewis (1996) used this fact in an attempt to avoid an inflation of knowledge in his epistemology. A compartmentalized subject could know the truth of two propositions and yet fail to know their logical consequence. I show that Lewis’s epistemology is pulled in two conflicting directions here, but also, that compartmentalized knowledge has interesting features of its own. A subject will find it harder to know that she doesn't know than to know she does.

ABSTRACT. What are the norms of assertion? Do we request of a person to believe with justification what she claims, or is it rather crucial that the claim she makes is true, or both? In this paper, we present empirical evidence showing that having a justified belief that p is sufficient for asserting p. Truth and knowledge do not seem to matter. Our results challenge recent studies conducted by Turri (2013, 2014) which are supposed to support a knowledge norm of assertion. We will demonstrate empirically that his conclusion is not warranted but that the justified belief account prevails.

ABSTRACT. Analogical arguments are ubiquitous vehicles of knowledge transfer in science and medicine. This talk builds on a Bayesian evidence-amalgamation framework for the purpose of formally exploring different analogy-based inference patterns with respect to their justification in pharmacological risk assessment. By relating formal explications of similarity, analogy, and analog simulation, three sources of confirmatory support for a causal hypothesis are distinguished in reconstruction: relevant studies, established causal knowledge, and computational models.

ABSTRACT. This paper explores the epistemic landscape of nutrition research. The trustworthiness of evidence that forms the basis for official, population-based dietary guidelines is contested. According to the critics, a major part of the problem is the lack of randomized controlled trials and the dependence on observational studies. I shall argue that, first, the criticism is based on certain ideals of evidence that originate from the so-called drug trial paradigm. Second, I argue that accusing nutrition science of not satisfying these ideals is problematic. The used standards of evidence need to be adjusted by considering the intended practical applications of research.

ABSTRACT. Disagreement between scientist may concern a number of epistemic, socio-political or psychological factors. In this paper, we offer an account of the `loci and reasons' for disagreement at different stages of the scientific process. We then present a controversial episode of the health sciences: hypercholesterolemia. The causes and effects of high levels of cholesterol in blood have been long debated, and some are still under debate. In this contribution, we focus on some selected loci and reasons for disagreement that occurred between 1920 and 1994 in the studies on hypercholesterolemia.

ABSTRACT. Biased research occurs frequently in the sciences. It is a major challenge for philosophy of science to improve our understanding of such biases. I address the following question: what precisely is epistemically defective (that is, unjustified or irrational) about biased research? In light of a specific example of a preference bias, I defend the claim that biased research is epistemically defective because biased research fails to provide evidence for the hypothesis to be tested, contrary to the assertions of the scientists carrying out biased research projects. I support this claim by drawing on major accounts of evidence and confirmation.

ABSTRACT. The well known position of the platonism in mathematics is that which implies the existence of mathematical objects. One of the recent tools for advancing this standpoint is the so-called Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA). This argument has been explicitly formulated by Alan Baker. There are several reasons for which the EIA does not appear to be solidly set. The aim is to show that the formulation of the EIA is verbally and hence logically imprecise, generating, therefore, new imprecision and vagueness of interpretation in the recent publications that deal with the Argument.

ABSTRACT. Schroeder-Heister pointed out a dogma of proof-theoretic semantics: the primacy of the categorical over the hypothetical, or, as it was latter called, the placeholder view of assumptions. I will contrast the more traditional approach to proof-theoretic validity with an alternative approach where assumptions are incorporated in an essential way instead of acting as placeholders for closed proofs. To this end, I will advocate a proof-theoretic notion of validity which is essentially a modified version of Dummett's pragmatist justification procedure.

ABSTRACT. This work represents a preliminary study of the proof theory of modal logic with propositional quantifiers; the framework adopted is that of labelled calculi of natural deduction. We provide rules for the universal propositional quantifier and show that the resulting labelled calculus is sound and complete with respect to the class of all general frames. Furthermore, since traditional detour-elimination techniques do not work for the calculus at issue (due to some feature of the rule of quantifier-elimination), we adapt techniques used by Girard for second-order logic in order to prove a strong normalization result for a fragment of our calculus.

ABSTRACT. One debated problem in philosophical applications of many-valued logics is classical recapture: How can we secure inference of classical conclusions, under the assumption that our premises involve no ‘abnormal phenomenon’ such as logical paradoxes or vagueness? Two established approaches to this problem are the so-called `classical collapse' by Beall and `minimal inconsistency' by Priest. This paper considers a third approach, extending many-valued systems with a normality operator. This enables us to express that a formula A has a classical value. We establish a classical recapture result and compare our approach to the methods of classical collapse and minimal inconsistency.

ABSTRACT. In analytical philosophy of mind, there has recently been a strong and rising interest focusing on a new mathematical model of brain function termed “predictive processing”. The symposium will explore the relevance of this formal framework for conceptual and metatheoretical issues. A first, non-technical introduction to the topic of “predictive processing” specifically aimed at philosophers (plus an edited collection of original, peer-reviewed papers) can be found online at http://predictive-mind.net.

ABSTRACT. Shaffer argues that there is one and only fundamental substance, the cosmos; L.A. Paul argues that what is fundamental is a mosaic of properties, with no need for substances. Aristotle’s position is in between; biological organisms are primary substances. I argue for a novel account of ‘oneness’, and thus for different criteria for fundamentality. I show the difference of oneness from simplicity, particularity and structure. I argue that ontological dependence, and even substantial holism do not deliver the oneness of an entity. Oneness ensues from the emergence of a subject (not from the emergence of properties or states).

ABSTRACT. A great challenge in metaphysics is to render an answer to the question What Are We? I contend that, although the thesis that we are identical with our bodies or to some parts of them is thought to be the only coherent option in the scientific conception of the world, there is a sort of ontological dependence between mental states and their thinkers that is at odds with materialist approaches. I also contend, against dualists, that the refusal of materialism is compatible with the claim that we, as genuine bearers of mental states, are subjects of experience, instead of persons.

ABSTRACT. It has recently been argued that realist interpretations of quantum mechanics favor a monistic worldview. According to such interpretations all there is fundamentally is the wavefunction, a high-dimensional field in configuration space, which grounds the existence of derivative three-dimensional objects. The most influential account in the literature maintains that the relation between the wavefunction and three-dimensional objects is parthood. We provide new arguments against this account, and put forward a better alternative, Substance Monism. Substance Monism has it that material objects are modes of the one fundamental substance, i.e. the wavefunction, but not proper parts of it.

ABSTRACT. My paper draws on the intuition that in the concept of a person both her ontological and practical identity are deeply interwoven. In the current debate on personal identity, this constitutive unity has often been ignored by dealing with each kind of identity separately. Against this tendency, I shall try to explain both the ontological and practical identity of persons by considering their special relationship. The main question of the paper is: Can the relationship between ontological and practical identity be further explained by referring to a special kind of form that concerns the specific life that persons normally lead?

ABSTRACT. We have a similar experience occasionally: standing at crossroads in life wondering how you should live. In this paper, I outline the basic idea of a compass that represents who you are and what you want to be, and discuss arguments about the nature of such a compass. First, I examine some candidates for such a compass: Christine Korsgaard’s idea of practical identity and David Velleman’s account of narrative. I argue that their proposals are dissatisfactory. Then, I develop my own proposal: values and commitments serve better. I end by examining an objection to my proposal.

ABSTRACT. Biomedical sciences cannot answer the question who should be saved from death if not everyone can be. This is an ethical issue. However we face exactly this question when deliberating on criteria for organ allocation. The main goal of this presentation is to formulate a pluralistic theory of just distribution of organs, which incorporates the assumptions of utilitarianism and egalitarianism. Both constituent theories adopt different worth as a criterion for organ allocation. For utilitarianism it is a health benefit for a patient whereas for egalitarianism it is a ratio of deserts and health related wellbeing.

ABSTRACT. Many moral vegetarians accommodate the buying and eating of meat in various ways. Harman (2015) thinks that this behaviour is puzzling and to explain it she argues that those actions belong to a new category: permissible moral mistakes. My main goal here is to show that Harman’s explanation is unsupported. I argue that in the examples she provides she implicitly uses distinct criteria to point out *what one should do* and *what one is morally required to do*. But this is precisely the distinction Harman has to argue for if her explanation implies introducing permissible moral mistakes.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, the moral argument, that neurotechnological behavioural treatment to offenders, as e.g. a condition of parole, should only be offered if it is in the best interest of the offender, will be criticed. Primarily this view will be criticized for being inconsistent. If proponents of the argument believe that some form of imprisonment is morally acceptable and that imprisonment do harm to the offenders, then why not accept offering treatment to offenders even though the offenders might be harmed by the treatment?

ABSTRACT. Justice in childrearing is an expanding field of philosophical research. Some of the most intensively debated issues within theories of justice in childrearing are about intergenerational justice. They cover questions concerning the ways in which the family disrupts justice by introducing unfair patterns in the distribution of social and economic goods, as well as questions concerning population ethics. The papers in this symposium discuss the fair distribution of the costs of childrearing and ageing populations and normative concerns raised by the fact that childrearing in the family makes it impossible to implement fair equality of opprtunity.

ABSTRACT. The fake barns is standardly denied knowledge. Many theories of knowledge follow this reading of the scenario. The safety and sensitivity conditions are designed against the case. Other theories are also refined to deny knowledge in like situations. This paper rejects the standard reading with an inference of “discovery”. It establishes discovery as a sufficient condition for knowledge, and argues that fake barns is as a relevant case of discovery. A contextualist explanation shall be offered to account for our intuitive conflict over the case.

ABSTRACT. This paper will propound an epistemic approach to creativity by expounding on two epistemic features of creativity. First, this approach highlights an epistemic context in which certain knowledge seen as products achieved by persons can be granted creative, by offering the perspective to assess the quality of knowledge and considering the interpersonal qualities of those persons, such as their credibility. Second, by focusing more on the property of creative products, this epistemic approach endorses that both epistemic anomaly and exemplarity, which will be explained, constitute the social-epistemic standards for entitling a product to be considered creative.

ABSTRACT. Philosophical thought experiments elicit intuitive judgments which can serve as premises in philosophical arguments (e.g. Gettier-like intuitions against the JTB analysis of knowledge). The so-called ``content problem'' is to specify the logical form of these intuitive judgments so that the corresponding arguments are valid and sound. In this paper, I put forward a new solution to this problem, drawing on the logic of implicit conceiving developed recently by Francesco Berto (2014) and argue that it avoids the problems of deviant realization that are fatal to other proposals.

ABSTRACT. According to the sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness, perceptual experience is not representational, but is instead the skillful exercise of sensorimotor contingencies. Yet, defenders of this theory do accept the existence of representations. This raises the problem of understanding their role within the cognitive system. I will argue that the canonical explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory is that of a nomothetic dynamical explanation, and that this constitutes the theory’s motivation for rejecting representationalism. I will then show the theory’s compatibility with a mechanistic framework, calling for a reconsideration of the role of representations within the sensorimotor theory.

ABSTRACT. I challenge the widespread conviction that unification in physics relies on external constraints (metaphysical or formal principles). I argue that paradigmatic examples of unification rather prove to be a by-product of genuine physical research itself. Accordingly, unification can be explained internally. To support this claim, I will investigate different instances of unification in physics. Arguing for internal unification fits neatly into metaphysical approaches in the context of the research program of Inductive Metaphysics. In particular, such a view opens up the possibility to employ unification as a positive constraint for inferences in metaphysics of science.

ABSTRACT. Chakravartty (2010) examines the arguments for perspectivism arising from the widely recognised fact that scientific theories are often associated with strictly inconsistent models. Chakravartty appeals to the plausibility of scientific knowledge concerning non-perspectival, dispositional facts about modelled systems and argues that perspectivism’s strong form is defeasible in principle.

In my talk I will look into cases of probabilistic modelling in physics and check whether they strengthened Chakravartty’s conclusion against scientific perspectivism or not. To this end, I will examine two models of Brownian motion –following Beisbart (2011)– a discrete random-walk model and a second model constructed using the Langevin-equation approach.

ABSTRACT. Hume’s theory of concepts is generally taken to be subjectivistic and atomistic and thus presented as standing in stark opposition to the pragmatistic and holistic doctrines that gained much attention during the 20th century. I shall argue, however, that Hume’s conceptual theory is much more akin to the proposals of pragmatist thinkers (like Peirce, James, Dewey, and, with certain qualifications, Wittgenstein) than many, including pragmatists themselves, probably might have suspected. As I try to show, Hume anticipates many themes central to pragmatist views on language and meaning, and actually takes initial steps towards both an anti-subjectivistic and anti-atomistic cognitive science.

ABSTRACT. Combining philosophy of language and epistemology, this talk displays a new intentionalist model for semiotic referential meaning that lays the methodological foundations for conceptual engineering — namely, as a systematic method for the designing of conceptual systems.

ABSTRACT. Fodor is a famous advocate of the idea that the semantics of thought is prior to the semantics of language. He also holds that the components of thought are concepts, that words express primitive concepts, and that concepts are individuated by their extensions and their vehicles. Given that, for example, linguistic categories for color are not universal, and that color names have variable extensions from language to language, I discuss how Fodor can, if he can, accept these last three ideas without being committed to a weak linguistic relativism, according to which the language we speak influences our thinking.

ABSTRACT. What is the difference between the two occurrences of ‘Vegas’ in the following sentence: “But now Vegas is no longer Vegas, it's Disneyland gone horribly wrong”? The second token of ‘Vegas’ is an evaluative category expressing especially important properties of the item in question rather than simple toponym. In this paper, I suggest that such uses of proper names as the second ‘Vegas’ should be considered a species of antonomasia. I characterize this species of antonomasia and discuss how such antonomastic uses of proper names can shed some light on current philosophical and psychological debates on individual identity judgments.

ABSTRACT. According to a purely causal theory of reference borrowing or transmission, the reference of terms – proper names and natural kind terms ‒ as used by borrowers is exclusively determined by the membership of such uses into causal chains regardless of the descriptions or properties that borrowers could associate with the terms. In this paper I allege that a causal theory of reference borrowing should include, in addition to causal chains, some associated descriptive element, at least a categorial term that indicates the type of entity referred to. Thus, the causal theory of reference borrowing should be descriptive-causal.

ABSTRACT. Kripke’s arguments in Naming and Necessity, though decisive as objections to various forms of descriptivism, fail as objections to Russell's brand of descriptivism, which is compatible with the data Kripke presents. In particular, Russell's descriptivism does not deny that proper names refer to objects independently of the descriptions we associate with them. Russell's claim is rather that we can think about these objects only under the guise of a definite description. A significant upshot of the discussion is the recognition that Russell was engaged in a semantic project that has largely disappeared from philosophy and linguistics today.

ABSTRACT. In this paper I want to show that the traditional characterization of the notion of paradox —an apparently valid argument with apparently true premises and an apparently false conclusion— is too narrow; there are paradoxes that do not satisfy it. After discussing and discarding some alternatives, a paradox is found to be an argument that seems valid but such that the commitment to the conclusion that stems from the acceptance of the premises and the validity of the argument should not be there. In the last sections, two consequences and two objections are discussed.

ABSTRACT. In this talk, I criticise nontransitive approaches to truth-theoretic paradoxes based on their inadequacy with respect to virtues common in the literature and argue against the nontransitivsts claim that their nontransitive logic is, in fact, classical logic. In the first part I will argue that since the Liar and its negation remain provable, nontransitive logics deem e.g. compositional principles about truth paradoxical whereas, intuitively, they are not. The second half argues that the nontransitive logic is not classical logic as has been argued by Ripley. This is because several meta-theorems of classical logic fail for the nontransitive one.

ABSTRACT. In my paper I argue against the representationalist reading of Spinoza’s theory of ideas, according to which the only property individuating the particular idea is its representational content. My argument in short is this: an idea has two elements: a representational content and a belief concerning this content (E2p49); Spinoza allows for change of belief concerning the same representational content (E4p1s); therefore, according to Spinoza, belief cannot be constituted by the representational content alone. This allows for a more liberal understanding of Spinoza’s notion of knowledge and freedom, which allows for finite human beings to be free knowers.

ABSTRACT. Recent necessitarian readings of Leibniz give significance to reconsidering Leibniz's accounts of contingency, especially its singular version. Analytic commentators have also suggested their interpretations for contingency. In this talk I identify the types of these various accounts and consider them from the perspective how they cohere with Leibniz's complete-concept notion of individuals and his predicate-in-the-subject truth principle. I shall argue that the existence-based explanation of singular contingency coheres well with the Leibnizian system and it is not vulnerable to serious possible objections. The explanatory value and limit of this preferred account will also be covered.

ABSTRACT. In this paper I will argue that Kant gives a rich and comprehensive account of friendship, which has many features in common with Aristotelian conception of friendship but is also unique. For Kant, friendship requires a balance between love and respect and the amount of love and respect friends have for each other should be equal. Kant argues that we have a duty for friendship since it makes us worthy of happiness. By reconstructing Kant’s argument, I will show the importance of friendship in Kant’s ethics.

ABSTRACT. It is generally argued that if the wave-function in the de Broglie–Bohm theory is a field, it has to be a physical field on configuration space. We show that it can be regarded as a physical field on three-dimensional space. Indeed, we propose a novel interpretation of the wave function as a new type of physical field: a multi-field. The multi-field interpretation allows to accommodate a realistic understanding of the wave-function, while retaining the basic ontology of the theory in ordinary three-dimensional space.

ABSTRACT. The view of scientific perspectivism, presented prominently in Ronald Giere’s work, is re-evaluated and extended to a comprehensive perspectivist methodology and 'mediated' realistic epistemology, especially, with reference to contemporary physics. This is accomplished by representing categorically the quantum-mechanical structure of events in terms of structured multitudes of interrelated local Boolean frames, realized as suitable perspectives or contexts for measurement of physical quantities. The philosophical meaning of the proposed approach implies that the quantum world can be comprehended through a multi-level structure of locally variable perspectives, which interlock, in a category-theoretical environment, to form a coherent picture of the whole.

ABSTRACT. The existence of ontologically different but empirically indistinguishable versions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is one of the most serious and widely discussed cases of metaphysical underdetermination. I argue that this problem is unlikely to disappear when we turn to the next more fundamental theory, namely relativistic quantum field theory. The problem is merely overshadowed by yet another interpretational controversy, but it persists regardless of the outcome of this latter debate. I further argue that one should not be too optimistic about transferring ontological lessons learned in the context of one physical theory to the context of a more fundamental theory.

ABSTRACT. In van Fraassen’s view, solving the “coordination problem” implies restricting a variety of logical possibilities to particular structures providing scientific representations of target systems. Seen from within the historical process of coordination of theoretical parameters with their correlate, the theory appears to evolve together with measurement procedures in an entangled way. However, there are cases where such evolution reveals a deeper level of entanglement in the very formation of theoretical terms also when it comes to mathematical objects. The aim of this paper is to discuss those cases and highlight the peculiarity of the coordination entailed by some mathematical procedures.

ABSTRACT. Philosophers of science nowadays widely accept that science is not, and could not, be value free. Yet in practice many scientists still appeal to traditional conceptions of value-freedom. How should philosophers of science react? I analyze the motivations of economists who refuse to openly discuss the values that influence their research. This refusal is based on a strong commitment to policy relevance. The argument from inductive risk, a popular philosophical argument against the value-free ideal, depends on a similar normative commitment. What at first looks like a rejection of the philosophical consensus, could therefore actually help to improve it.

ABSTRACT. In this talk I will discuss the question of what—if anything—is wrong with conspiracy theories. I will argue that conspiracy theories aren’t problematic because they evoke a certain type of explanation (viz. an explanation that cites the existence of a conspiracy as a salient cause), but because of the reasoning often employed by conspiracy theorists when providing abductive support for this explanation. For example, the cui bono-heuristics that often leads to the theory in the first place, seems defective. I will analyse the nature of the most typical defects, and explain how conspiracy theories can be rationally and effectively criticized.

ABSTRACT. A ramified theory of intensional types is regarded by many as the most reasonable approach to the paradoxes of intensionality: paradoxes about what can be expressed or entertained. I compare two different approaches to the problem of ramifying the theory of types for semantic theory. On one view (going back to Kaplan) levels in the hierarchy of intensional types correspond to iterations of attitude operators. On an alternative proposal, levels correspond to indices on quantifiers over domains of propositions. I will conclude by defending the latter view.

ABSTRACT. In the first part of my talk, I argue that McGee’s famous counterexample to modus ponens (McGee, 1985) has the very same structure as Lewis’s triviality result for conditionals (Lewis, 1976). I then extend the analogy to Carroll’s barbershop paradox (Carroll, 1894), which can be regarded as a counterexample to modus tollens (Yalcin, 2012). In the second part of the talk, I draw some consequences about counterexamples to modus ponens and modus tollens in general, and conclude that these two principles are valid only in the context of trivial probability distributions, i.e., distributions that are not concerned by Lewis’s result.

ABSTRACT. My aim in this talk is twofold: (i) to outline my favourite framework for understanding questions concerning the norms governing judgments—what I call Normative Alethic Pluralism (NAP)—(ii) to investigate which pluralist framework for understanding the metaphysics of truth fits better NAP. I argue that if we have independent reasons to adopt a pluralistic metaphysics of truth, in the light of NAP there is considerable pressure to go for what in the literature is known as strong pluralism—i.e. a form of pluralism that denies that there is a generic truth property over and above the various domain-specific properties.

ABSTRACT. According to moderate alethic pluralism propositions from different domains of discourse may be true by possessing different properties (correspondence, superassertibility, etc.). Determination pluralists, a specific type of moderate pluralist, adopt so-called determination conditionals of the form “If proposition p pertains to D, then p is true if and only if F” where D is some specific domain of discourse (ethics, mathematics, etc.) and F is the truth-relevant property for D. Determination pluralists say that F determines truth within D (Edwards, Wright). I subject determination pluralism to critical discussion. However, I likewise offer some constructive remarks to complement the critical considerations.

ABSTRACT. I begin by sketching the role the Retraction Rule [RR] plays in MacFarlane’s argument for Assessment-Sensitive Relativism. Next, I discuss some of the most convincing objections against it and introduce new considerations to conclude that RR is untenable as it stands. Then I suggest the restriction of the RR’s domain to contexts of high stakes, the occupants of which I dub the experts on truth. This modification smoothly dodges most of the worries concerning MacFarlane’s view, while preserving its spirit. Moreover, it provides a natural account of why certain groups of people, like scientists and judges, enjoy high social esteem.

ABSTRACT. I show that rigidity of reference cannot be correct in any way that can ground a semantics that respects the best science of the day. The content and character of scientific knowledge not only cannot support what it requires, but actually shows the notion to be incoherent. The scientific meaning of natural-kind terms can be determined only within the context of a fixed scientific framework and not sub specie aeternitatis. Along the way, I provide grounds for the rejection of essentialist views of natural kinds, and discuss the dangers of the casual deployment of thought experiments in philosophy.

ABSTRACT. In numerous specific places in his works, Frege repeatedly refers to fiction in order to set up the boundaries of his semantic distinctions. Could we use these remarks to draw a Fregean definition of fictional discourse, which not just negatively distinguishes it form any other way of speaking (telling us what it is not), but also positively indicates what its nature is (telling us what it is)? Would this definition include only semantic features, or only pragmatic ones, or both semantic and pragmatic ones? And what could Frege tell us through it about the ontological status of fictional objects?

ABSTRACT. Are ordinary proper names rigid when they occur in fictional discourse? In this paper I’ll argue that there are no good reasons to support the claim that either ‘Bloom’ or ‘Dublin’ behaves like a rigid designator with respect to the content of the utterances constituting Joyce’s Ulysses. Associated descriptive content (person named ‘Bloom’/city named ‘Dublin’) is not irrelevant with respect to that content. And it is not the case that, when we consider counterfactual circumstances to establish whether or not they realize the contents the fiction ask us to imagine, we just consider how things are with a single Bloom/Dublin.

ABSTRACT. In this paper I argue that it cannot be shown a priori that physicalism is false, at least via David Chalmers’ (1996, 2010) well known zombie argument. I challenge the argument’s conceivability premise, the claim that zombies are conceivable. I argue that full concepts of physical and phenomenal properties, of the sort needed to successfully conceive of zombies, are not available on a priori grounds, not even for ideal reasoners. The upshot is that either zombies are not conceivable, or their conceivability is in an important sense a posteriori. Either way, physicalism is not refuted a priori.

ABSTRACT. The relationship between attention and perceptual justification has scarcely been studied in philosophy. I will rely on recent empirical findings to evaluate how attention contributes to a subject's epistemic situation. While uncommital as to the relationship between attention and consciousness, I will dwell on the relationship between attention and cognitive access to draw a contrast between the epistemic situation of attentive and inattentive subjects and defend the view that attention is necessary for doxastic justification and for the metacognitive evaluation of the subject's epistemic situation. I will also examine the impact of attention on the resolution of conscious sensory content.

ABSTRACT. According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a belief-like propositional attitude. For the intentionalist, it would seem natural to expect the justificatory role of experience to be at least in part a function of its content, and to use Bayesianism to model it. Standard Bayesianism does not cover updating on perceptual content, however, and regardless of whether we use classical or Jeffrey conditionalization, it is surprisingly difficult to make it do so. I'll run through some of the problems, and show a way of being a Bayesian about the epistemology of perception: adopting "phenomenal intentionalism" instead of standard intentionalism.

ABSTRACT. In order to thwart the demand for contrastive explanations, Robert Kane appeals to an agent’s dual efforts of will during an undetermined choice in order to secure her responsibility for the outcome. Neil Levy has argued that this strategy leads to a problematic doubling of the agent’s responsibility. I argue (1) that the example that Levy employs to support the above conclusion is problematic, and (2) that his conclusion is not the counterintuitive one he claims. It would only appear to be problematic if one were confused about the variety of responsibility that is doubled.

ABSTRACT. Ever since David Lewis’s famous reply to the Consequence Argument, it has often been claimed, that compatibilists are committed to a controversial thesis: the thesis that we are sometimes able to break the laws (in a weak sense). The aim of this talk is to show that this claim rests on a misunderstanding: defenders of this claim fail to see that Lewis suggested a revised definition of compatibilism.

ABSTRACT. A central question in the free will debate is whether determinism is compatible with the ability to do otherwise. If my current action logically follows from the laws of nature and the distant past, could I still have acted otherwise? In this paper, I develop a new argument in support of the compatibility of determinism with the ability to do otherwise. I will argue that the apparent incompatibility rests on a fallacious identification of possibilities with possible worlds.

ABSTRACT. The view that disagreement about what there is can be nonsubstantive is a brand of ontological deflationism which has drawn a great deal of attention. Ted Sider has argued that a metaphysics of structure is our best chance to stave off the deflationary threat. I articulate and motivate a novel deflationary views, dubbed 'pluralistic quantifier variance', and show that it cannot be ruled out by appealing to a metaphysics of structure. The moral is that ontological deflationism remains a live option, threatening the substantivity of a number of current philosophical debates.

ABSTRACT. Recently, a number of metaphysicians and philosophers of science have raised the issue of the dispositionality vs categoricality of the fundamental structures of the world. In this talk, I’ll examine the possibility of a dispositionalist construal of the fundamental symmetry structures. After putting forward the necessary metaphysical presuppositions for the debate to make sense, I’ll explore the various ontological options available to the dispositional structuralist. My main aim for doing so is to unearth some difficulties related to their possible adoption. Finally, I’ll provide a reason which undermines the plausibility of a dispositionalist account of symmetry structures.

ABSTRACT. Structural universals pose certain difficulties when attempts are made to fit them into a theory of universals in general. David Lewis argued that there is no solution to these difficulties, in particular because of the repetition problem: the repeated occurrence of the same universal within the complex whole that the structural universal constitutes. Several attempts have been made to undermine this claim. I present a new argument to the effect that, under moderate assumptions, the observed phenomenon of repetition blocks the analysis of structural universals in terms of simpler ones.

ABSTRACT. The development of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) has recently sparked a debate on the moral permissibility of the use of these systems. The aim of this paper is to articulate a consequentialist argument for the deployment of AWS. First, I contend that the deontological argument against the permissibility of the use of AWS is unsound, or else has highly implausible implications. Second, I analyze the different types of autonomy and agency manifested by AWS and soldiers, and use this analysis to argue that considerations of harm suggest a prima facie moral obligation to deploy AWS.

ABSTRACT. This essay examines the moral status of grey markets. A grey market features exchanges of a good which are not illegal but in some way unofficial, unauthorized, or unintended by the original manufacturer or the relevant authority. I argue that the morally salient issue for evaluating grey markets is that of rule-bypassing. When I buy something on a grey market, I bypass rules which do not officially allow such purchase. Although grey markets frequently evolve around normatively problematic goods, relying on both a formal economic model and normative analysis I find that grey markets themselves often are not objectionable.

ABSTRACT. The ethical concerns regarding the development of an Artificial Intelligence have received a lot of attention lately. Even if we have good reason to believe that it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of an AI causing extreme human suffering is problematic enough to warrant serious consideration. In this paper I argue that a similar concern arises when we look at this problem from the perspective of the AI. Even if we have good reason to believe that it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of humanity causing extreme suffering to an AI is problematic enough to warrant serious consideration.

ABSTRACT. Cases of provoked wrongdoing have a peculiar feature. While it is generally accepted that a provocateur does not forfeit her right not to be harmed, some scholars argue that the provocateur forfeits her right to self-defence even though she may not be harmed. This is because the provocateur unjustifiably brought about the conditions in which self-defence is necessary. I argue that uncoupling the right not to be harmed from the right to self-defence faces several problems. Therefore, even those who unjustifiably provoke should retain their right to self-defend against wrongful harm.

ABSTRACT. This paper argues that the concept of ‘the criminal’ operates in contemporary liberal thought and real politics to perpetuate injustice. With its connotations of both immorality and the ‘mindless’ absence of political motivation, it functions to depoliticise deep dissent. That dominant constructions of criminality are highly racialized, and the least privileged in society most likely to be criminalised, are familiar points. Yet apart from the work of Tommie Shelby and Shatema Threadcraft, the concept itself remains under-investigated by political philosophers. I show how its use as a slur term constitutes a barrier to progressive social transformation.

ABSTRACT. This essay defends the claim that duress should be a complete defence in specific cases of murder, like the case of Erdemovic. Erdemovic was convicted by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) after having killed several innocent people during the Bosnian War in order to save his own life. Part One of this presentation presents two objections against the judgment of the ICTY, which no other form of conviction/punishment can possibly overcome. In Part Two, I will reply to what I consider the strongest objection against acquitting Erdemovic.

ABSTRACT. The main objective of the paper is to show that Plotinus rejects the notion of truth as correspondence in favour of some version of the identity theory of truth, according to which truth consists in some form of identity between what is thought (or said) and what is the case. Secondly, it will be argued that Plotinus’s endorsement of an identity theory of truth is a reaction to a series of sceptical arguments along the lines of those presented by Sextus Empiricus in Adversus Mathematicos VII.

ABSTRACT. In the dialogue Gorgias Socrates claims that whenever we do an action, we don't want what this action, but that for the sake of which we do the action. This claim leads to a number of problems. For instance, does that imply that we never want any of the things we do? In my paper I argue that the claim does not have this implication, but that it's in line with this claim that there are actions that we want, namely actions through which the agent, in the process of his performing the action, realizes the good life.

ABSTRACT. In Sophistici Elenchi 13 and Metaph. Z.5, Aristotle presents an argument to refute putative scientific definitions of per-se compounds on the grounds that they imply ‘babbling’, i.e., the repetition of a term. Aristotle’s own, official solution to this problem in Sophistici Elenchi 31 fails. My paper argues for a novel solution based on Aristotle’s distinction between absurd and non-absurd babbling in the Topics. Although defining per-se compounds inevitably implies babbling, this kind of babbling turns out to be non-absurd and insufficient for refutation. While commentators have only debated how to avoid babbling, babbling is not problematic for defining per-se compounds.

ABSTRACT. It has recently argued that Donald Davidson and Elizabeth Anscombe were in basic agreement about the notion of practical knowledge, and that their views in the philosophy of action thus were close. The main contention here is that this claim is wrong. To throw light on why, an examination of the role of practical knowledge in Anscombe’s approach to intentional action is undertaken. The result indicates that the claim concerning the closeness of Anscombe to Davidson only has plausibility for knowledge of what one is doing, and not for their conceptions of intentional action.

ABSTRACT. There are several factive concepts of knowability, in particular the notion of having the possiblity to know that something is actually the case (Edgington) and having the potential to know (Fuhrmann). Both notions have been used to circumvent the Church-Fitch paradox of knowability. But even if one can block the possibility to derive omniscience, it does not mean one can block the derivation of possible omniscience. Edgington's and Furhmann's knowability theses have this unwanted consequence. This will be shown on the basis of the formal models for both notions.

ABSTRACT. It has been argued that Williamson’s theory of evidence, which equates one’s evidence to all and only one’s knowledge (henceforth, E=K) (Williamson, 2000), is committed to infallibilism. Crucially, infallibilism is traditionally taken to be the source of sceptical problems. It follows that (E=K) should be rejected for it leads to scepticism (Dodd 2005, Brown, 2013). I believe that epistemologists have overlooked varieties of infallibilism. In this paper, I put forward a taxonomy distinguishing seven varieties of infallibilism. I then argue that Williamson’s E=K is an infallibilist thesis, but it is one which does not have any sceptical implications.

ABSTRACT. Epistemic contextualism is one of the more popular anti-sceptical theories in contemporary epistemology. The advantages of contextualism over some rival theories are rather clear, yet it has been maintained that since contextualism faces some serious problems an anti-sceptical theory as neo-Mooreanism should be preferred. Here we will analyse three objections moved by the proponents of neo-Mooreanism to contextualism and we will conclude that contextualism can overtake these challenges. Furthermore, we will maintain that the contextualist’s objection to the thesis according to which are the assertability-conditions of “know(s)” that change from context to context represents a serious issue for neo-Mooreanism.

ABSTRACT. Different thought experiments have been offered to argue for the skeptical thesis that empirical knowledge is impossible. One of these experiments assumes that we cannot exclude a priori that we are eternal brains in a vat (BIV) whose sensory impressions are generated by a computer. Therefore, the skeptic continues, my sensory impressions don't justify my empirical beliefs. Putnam objects to this that this kind of skeptical challenge presupposes that content externalism is false. In this talk I argue by means of so called de se beliefs that even if content externalism is true, there is hope for the skeptic.

ABSTRACT. Cartwright (1999) attacked the causal Markov condition (CMC) by providing a counterexample in which a common cause does not screen off its effects: the chemical factory. We suggest a new way to handle counterexamples to CMC such as Cartwright’s. We argue that these scenarios feature non-causal dependencies of a certain kind. We then develop a representation of this specific kind of non-causal dependence that allows for modeling the problematic scenarios in such a way that CMC is not violated anymore and compare our solution to a recent proposal how to handle the problematic scenarios put forward by Schurz (forthcoming).

ABSTRACT. The Russo-Williamson thesis maintains that establishing a causal claim in medicine requires establishing that the putative cause and effect are correlated and linked by a mechanism. The thesis has proved quite controversial. But it is likely that some of the controversy is the result of misinterpreting the thesis, since formulations of the thesis have been ambiguous. Phyllis Illari argues for a disambiguated version of the thesis. However, Jeremy Howick has proposed a number of potential counterexamples to this disambiguated Russo-Williamson thesis. In this paper, I provide a response to these proposed counterexamples, one that requires further disambiguating the Russo-Williamson thesis.

ABSTRACT. philosophers debated and confused thirteen types of “common causes” and twelve types of associated “inferences,” six inferences of “common causes” and six inferences of likelihoods of effects given common causes. I present a grid of twelve “cells” along two dimensions: Types or tokens of common causes and effects, and whether the common cause is uniquely identifiable, a range of possibilities, or the assertion that some common cause was present without defining it. Thirteenth inference is analytical, of an event aspect from its other aspects. I clarify, analyze, and criticize Reichenbach, Sober, Salmon, Hitchcock &etc. analyses of “inference of common cause.”

ABSTRACT. In this paper, we develop a logical analysis of deterministic causation understood as production. The analysis is inspired by Ned Hall's famous observation that there are two concepts of causation: first, causation as counterfactual dependence, and, second, causation as production (Hall: 2004). We aim to analyse the latter concept of causation in a manner that is both intuitive and precise. Moreover, our analysis is driven by two further objectives. First, it should be reductive. Second, the infamous problems of overdetermination, preemption, and double prevention are to be solved in a formal fashion.

ABSTRACT. Well-known difficulties, like the Lottery and Preface paradoxes, trouble the attempt to combine a quantitative, probabilistic account of uncertain belief with our pre-systematic intuitions about plain belief. In this paper, I offer a novel account of fallible belief based on the idea that rational belief aims at truth approximation (what I call Carneades’ thesis on belief). I discuss the pros and cons of this proposal, as well as its connections with the Lockean thesis, so-called accuracy-first epistemology and epistemic utility theory, and Leitgeb’s stability theory as based on the Humean thesis on belief.

ABSTRACT. The Principal Principle suggests an appealing chance-credence norm for an agent's credences in propositions about chances. When it is assumed that deterministic theories describe the world, there are difficulties in understanding the norm when we rely on our analysis of probabilities in terms of chances and credences. To overcome these challenges, I introduce a new concept of probability called "auxiliary" probability. I argue this concept is neither chance, nor credence. Instead, it has an epistemic foundation and it plays an auxiliary role for describing uncertainty in deterministic theories.

ABSTRACT. Putnam (1963) construed the aim of Carnap's program of inductive logic as the specification of a universal learning machine, and presented a diagonal proof against the very possibility of such a thing. Yet the ideas of Solomonoff (1964) and Levin (1970) lead to a mathematical foundation of precisely those aspects of Carnap's program that Putnam took issue with, resurrecting the notion of a universal learning machine.

In this paper, I investigate whether the Solomonoff-Levin proposal is successful in this respect. I will show that the general strategy to evade Putnam's argument ultimately still succumbs to diagonalization, reinforcing Putnam's impossibility claim.

ABSTRACT. The Variety of Evidence Thesis is taken to state that varied evidence speaking in favor of a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence, ceteris paribus. This epistemological thesis enjoys widespread intuitive support. Its evidential character makes it highly amenable to a Bayesian analysis. I here give such an analysis. I thus put forward Bayesian models of inquiry in which I explicate the notion of varied evidence. Subsequently, I show that this explication of the notion of varied evidence entails that a Variety of Evidence Thesis holds in all these models. The Variety of Evidence Thesis emerges strengthened.

ABSTRACT. The Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc) is a recently developed powerful formal system, closer in syntax and semantics to Natural Language than is the Predicate Calculus. Investigations into its formal properties and its application to the study of Natural Language and various metaphysical and other philosophical questions have been published or are being conducted. The symposium presents these investigations. It will contain a concise introduction of Quarc and its basic applications; application to modal logic and invalidity of Barcan formulas; development of a Quarc sequent calculus; development of a three-valued version with defining clauses; soundness and completeness results; further directions.

ABSTRACT. In recent years, the relation between empathy and morality has been intensely discussed. However, this debate has often been impeded by keeping insufficiently apart factual questions about moral psychology and metaethical questions about the objectivity and normative authority of moral judgements. Here, we will squarely focus on the latter question. Specifically, we will investigate whether a construal of empathy taking its cue from Adam Smith allows us to articulate a plausible ‘middle way’ between Kantian constructivism and Humean sentimentalism, which are often seen as the most promising alternatives to a robust moral realism, but face well-known problems of their own.

ABSTRACT. Peter Morriss has famously analysed power as an ability. However, his account relies on the conditional analysis of abilities and inherits some its problems, such as the failure to account for masks and gradability. Therefore, his analysis is unsuitable for power -- for power, too, is often masked and comes in degrees. Moreover, Morriss fails to adequately distinguish between abilities in general and powers in particular. We amend these shortcomings by (1) offering an account of abilities in terms of proportions of worlds and (2) arguing that power is an extrinsic ability agents possess in view of certain social facts.

ABSTRACT. Roughly speaking, secret law is law that the government keeps from us. However, more attention is needed to treat it as a distinctive kind of law in order to evaluate its moral dimensions. Contrasting with work by Christopher Kutz (2013), I want to understand secret law as a distinctive legal kind of law which is promulgated in a manner and to a degree which does not meet the needs of legal subjects in context.

ABSTRACT. The diversity of acting together is reflected by current conceptions of joint agency. Apart from shared norms mutual trust is an essential common dominator. Nonetheless, in the last years a novel variant of acting together came into being: It is characterized by trustless interactions using blockchain–based platforms. If such collaborative environments were to prevail, trustless societies would be the result. However, even if in these collaborative networks (collective and shared) responsibility is completely delegated to the technology, focusing on norms as transparency, accountability and incorruptibility, this need not be the case in more mature approaches.

ABSTRACT. In public debates about political matters it is very common to refer implicitly or explicitly to trust between members of the political community. At least at first glance, trust is a helpful notion when it comes to describing and interpreting not only intimate interpersonal phenomena but also political structures and processes. From the perspective of philosophy and political science it is often pointed out that trust is of central value for democracy. The paper critically examines this claim and argues that we should not overestimate the role of trust for democracy.

ABSTRACT. Wright's (2004) has introduced a novel solution to the sceptical problem: epistemic entitlement. There are propositions for which we do not need any evidential warrant to believe in, we are entitled to accept them. Meanwhile, we risk to be entitled to absurd propositions such as the existence of real possible worlds - from this entitlement ensues evidential justification for beliefs about possible worlds. This problem of demarcation has only seen treatment in Pedersen's (2006); however his solution fails on several counts. I suggest that the way to save epistemic entitlement is to insist on the epistemic agent's virtues.

ABSTRACT. The topic of this paper is the problem of forgotten evidence and its solution proposed by John Pollock. Pollock illuminates a justificatory role of the feeling of ‘pastness’ and ‘familiarity’ which typically accompanies memory knowledge. However, as I will argue, his approach appears to make memory knowledge Sosa’s animal knowledge. If this is the case, the approach faces the challenge raised by John Greco against Sosa. I search for a solution to the challenge by investigating how our memory knowledge is retained, and whether its original epistemic status changes, or even deteriorates, after losing its original grounds.

ABSTRACT. My paper has two objectives. Firstly, I argue that both Hilary Putnam’s model theoretic indeterminacy argument against the external realism and Kripkensteinian argument against the semantic realism impose the following dilemma on the realist: either adopt meaning minimalism or postulate unobservable semantic facts.

Secondly, I argue that the coherent option available for the meaning minimalist is to adopt structured truth-predicate – minimal (or deflationary) and substantial (or robust) truth. This leads to position close to Huw Price’s global expressivism. Thus, the ultimate choice that Putnam’s and Kripkensteinian arguments impose, is: either Rorty-like Pricean global pragmatism or robust realism.

ABSTRACT. More than three decades ago, Saul Kripke has put forward a sceptical challenge about meaning. In this paper, I argue that Hannah Ginsborg’s recent attempt to offer a solution to Kripke’s challenge cannot succeed, given that it faces a difficulty in the form of a dilemma: as it stands, her account cannot meet one fundamental constraint on satisfactory answers, but if the account is revised in a way that makes it possible for the constraint to be met, it turns out to be simply a more elaborate version of Kripke’s own sceptical solution.

ABSTRACT. Conditional judgments about empirical matters fare differently from those about logical matters. One of the two purposes of this paper is to show that truth-conditions of material conditionals cannot be the truth-conditions of indicative conditionals. I bring up an objection for the truth-functionality of indicative conditionals based on the paradoxes of material implication. I show how Grice’s attempt to defend the truth-functionality of indicative conditionals is questioned by Jackson’s counter-examples. The second purpose of this paper is to show that, in the process of overcoming the counter examples, Grice would have to compromise on some of his own principles.

ABSTRACT. I argue that the best explanation for the phenomenon that philosophers of emotions use different terms to discuss the intentionality of emotions is they mean different things. The word “representation” focuses on the object-subject relation while “directedness” focuses on the subject-object relation. I propose to enrich the notion of intentionality to encompass both directions. Thus, emotion is a state interacting with its intentional object, and thus the intentionality is constituted by two aspects of the interaction. In an emotion, the object presents to me in a certain way, which is how I hold a corresponding attitude towards it.

ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is argue that affect plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. To defend this thesis, I argue that phenomenally conscious affective experience provides the subject with the epistemic access to the semantic value of the concept of the relevant evaluative property of the object of experience and therefore with the source of justification and rational intelligibility in her deployment of such concept. I conclude by distinguishing the conditions under which subjects with the inability to have affective experience are unable to generate evaluative concepts.

ABSTRACT. Traditionally, hope has been conceived as involving a desiderative and an estimative component: hope is a desire about what one believes is probable in the sense of uncertain. Nowadays, scholars agree that this conception is insufficient. This paper aims at defending the classical conception by proposing a new variant based on conjecture. In conjecture, probability features in the intentional mode (vs. content) of the attitude, unlike probabilistic belief; to conjecture a state is to take it as probable (as having a probability to obtain between 0 and 1). The claim is that hope is a desire about what one conjectures.

ABSTRACT. There are at least two challenges for the “Content View” of visual perceptual experience: the particularity of perception, and the ontological status of visual properties in light of a recent trend according to which visual properties are to be understood as constitutive mechanistic phenomena. In light of these two challenges, I will put forward two related claims. Firstly, I will show that both challenges can be met if we maintain that visual properties are tropes. Secondly, I will propose a solution to the trope-similarity problem, arguing that visual trope similarity can be explained by means of the underlying mechanisms.

ABSTRACT. We defend a notion of representation against non-representationalist theories. We begin by the thesis of van Gelder and counterarguments of Bechtel and others. This line of thought requires Millikan’s notion of a consumer device, but its deployment is highly problematic. Therefore, we follow Shapiro by claiming that the non-representational side seems victorious. Yet by extending his strategy of differentiating cases of devices that carry information from those that have a function of carrying it we make a novel step, in which counterfactual reasoning about utilization of carried information provides a guidance to systems that are properly understood as representational.

ABSTRACT. (Kaplan, 2012) suggests to use the mutual manipulability account (MM) of constitutive relevance to determine whether extracranial processes are cognitive processes. Kaplan’s considerations are problematic. First, MM is inconsistent, thus fails to provide an account of constitution in general. Second, Kaplan’s account falls prey of the “loopy version of the coupling-constitution fallacy” (Aizawa, 2010). Third, Kaplan drops the parthood condition of the mutual manipulability account, where this is crucial to draw the conclusion that constitution and causation are mutually exclusive relations. I will show how the notion of mechanistic constitution can be made fruitful for the situated cognition debate.

ABSTRACT. In my paper I will argue, first, that eliminative materialism concerning propositional attitudes faces a serious theoretical obstacle, called the problem of representation. The general idea of this problem is that the eliminativist cannot really maintain that her position represents reality. I will argue that adopting a broadly Carnapian position in the debate about the status of existence claims helps us find a solution to said problem. On this Carnapian reading, the disagreement between eliminative materialist and psychological realist concerns the normative question whether we should discontinue to use folk-psychological vocabulary.

ABSTRACT. Revisionary ontologists appear to make surprising claims about what there is. But how should they explain what they are really doing? I will argue for a non-standard answer, building on Theodore Sider’s suggestion that good beliefs are not just true, but also cast in joint-carving concepts. I will argue that Sider’s ethics of belief only applies to a sub-class of belief-like attitudes, which I will call celiefs. According to my account, revisionary ontology can improve our celiefs, by making them more joint-carving, but not our (other) beliefs.

ABSTRACT. I shall propose a new account of the concept of ontological form, substituting operational and topic/domain-neutrality accounts. Ontological form is characterized by the concept of manner of existence. Of manner of existence, I have a relational account: each manner of existence either is or can be construed as a certain type of internal relation: those internal relations whose predications as such, without further assumptions, do not tell anything about the non-relational character of their relata (e.g. numerical distinctness, ontological dependence). This type of internally relational predications express manners of existence of entities, which determine the ontological form of the world.

ABSTRACT. Thomasson defends deflationary approach to metaphysics, one on which such questions though factual admit of ‘easy’ answers – can be resolved through conceptual and/or ordinary empirical means. Most recently she has tried to show how this picture can do justice to the perceived depth and difficulty of some metaphysical questions by seeing the latter as veiled ‘metalingusitic negotiations’, concerning how we should use our terms. I will critique this conception of metaphysical enquiry, though also argue that the idea that metaphysical questions have a practical dimension can be preserved through the idea that certain metaphysical concepts are linked to action.

ABSTRACT. Robert Brandom’s analytic pragmatism attempts to fuse elements of the analytic and the pragmatist tradition. My talk focuses on the metaphilosophical aspect of this fusion. I argue that the metaphilosophy of analytic pragmatism as it is presented by Brandom is dominantly analytic in crucial aspects and that it is in tension with common pragmatist metaphilosophical commitments. On a metaphilosophical level, no “wedding” of analytic philosophy and pragmatism takes place. This fuels doubts about the usefulness of the label “analytic pragmatism”. It also shows that Brandom fails to address McDowell’s and Rorty’s metaphilosophical criticism to his project in its full range.

ABSTRACT. Did later Wittgenstein want to help us do philosophy better? My talk will take seriously this view. I intend to apply this view to a recent debate over the boundaries of the mind (internalism versus externalism). I will argue that this debate exemplifies the sort of ‘traditional’ philosophizing later Wittgenstein warned against and so calls for a Wittgensteinian remedy, that is, a method centered on careful description of our linguistic practices. Applying Wittgenstein’s method in this way can help clarify what it might mean to use Wittgenstein to do philosophy better.

ABSTRACT. If we take a look at the history of Ukrainian philosophy, we could note some analytical or proto-analytical fragments, which took place within it in different historical periods. However, these fragments were in the Ukrainian philosophy rather rare, and non-analytical elements always prevailed in it. That’s why the shift of modern Ukrainian philosophy toward the analytical direction is a necessary condition for its modernization, its complete cutting off from all forms of ideology and involvement in the construction of any political project.

ABSTRACT. I propose a somewhat novel approach how to evaluate analogical inferences. Essentially, such inferences are taken to be valid if the negative analogy, i.e. those circumstances in which source and target differ, is causally irrelevant in a given context. The notions of causal relevance and irrelevance are borrowed from a difference-making approach to causation, which combines a counterfactual perspective on causation with inductive rules in the tradition of Mill's methods, relying in particular on a refined version of the method of difference. Several complications are discussed and a distinction between predictive and structural analogies is introduced.

ABSTRACT. Current versions of epistemic consequentialism are accuracy-centred: they treat distance from the truth as the fundamental good. We set out a version of epistemic consequentialism that is knowledge-centred: it treats distance from knowledge as the fundamental good. The result for categorical belief is a threshold view in terms of expected knowledge: believe p iff your expectation of knowing p is high enough. The threshold yields an attractive package of answers to the lottery, preface and gate-crasher paradoxes.

ABSTRACT. As Russell (1913) thought, if temporal asymmetry of causal relations is a platitude to be accepted then causation in physics depends on Time Reversal Invariance (TRI). Many understand this to be related to the time reversal symmetry of Lagrangians.

TRI should be understood as a property of the descriptions. In a model based on the classical mechanical harmonic oscillator recently established by János Polonyi (2011, 2012, 2014, 2015). the origin of the causal structure is an effective theory, therefore the arrow of time and causality are connected to the scale or the position of our system in space-time.

ABSTRACT. Firstly, I want to clarify the relation between causal laws and statements of actual causation in an interventionist framework. If some causal model is given, subjective norms determine the causal factors that count as actual causes. I will argue that in the context of causal model building the order is reversed: we can build causal models only by evaluating hypotheses of actual causation. Secondly, I will argue that statements of actual causation in this way play a central role in the context of experimental physics. This will be illustrated on the example of the discovery of the Cosmic Microwave Background.

ABSTRACT. Our presentation will be devoted to a discussion of Russell’s and Grelling’s paradoxes from the perspective of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. We will show that the standard approach to sentences generating paradoxes is mistaken and will try to identify the wrong presuppositions of this approach, namely: 1) the conviction that the feeling of understanding of a sentence guarantees that there is a certain content which is understood; 2) the conviction that the understanding of parts of a sentence must be antecedent to the understanding of the whole sentence. We will propose an alternative approach, according to which sentences generating paradoxes are nonsensical.

ABSTRACT. I will challenge David Kaplan’s criticism of what he calls “sloppy thinker”. A sloppy thinker, according to Kaplan, is whoever thinks that “I”, “here” and “now” (Kaplan’s “pure indexicals”) means or are equivalent to “this person”, “this place”, “this moment”. Kaplan has two arguments against the sloppy thinker, one linked to modality and the other linked to acquaintance. I will insist on the latter. Challenging Kaplan’s second argument, I will present etymological evidence for a view of indexicals as complex demonstratives, following suggestions given by Karl Bühler, recently brought to the attention of philosophers by Kevin Mulligan.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, we argue that there is room within the framework of decision theory for a conception of credence which accounts for its representational role. We rely on second-order decisions that agents make on a rational basis concerning the way to frame the first-order decision-problems they face to understand this role. We argue that the best way to describe what agents do when they make second-order decisions is in terms of acceptance and that credence can be understood, in the context of second-order decisions, as an agent's propensity to accept its content.

ABSTRACT. Weakness of will is a prime example of irrationality. If irrationality violates a norm of rationality, then weakness of will violates rationality in some specific way, or violates some specific norm of rationality. I specify the rational norms that weakness of will violates, and show that they have implications which are, in parts, already widely discussed in the current literature. However, I also demonstrate that these rational norms may conflict. This is puzzling: if rationality is normative and action-guiding, then it should not place conflicting demands on agents.

ABSTRACT. When we think of commitments different things come to mind. Commitments can take various forms, e.g. that of marriage, relationship, contract, promise or intention. Even though the concept finds use in fields as diverse as economic theory, legal theory, ethical theory, moral theory, and action theory, commitments did not get too much philosophical attention. I want to argue that commitments should not be understood in terms of any of the above. Rather, I want to put forward the idea that commitments express “who we are as agents” and, therefore, should be understood as personal commitments in terms of qualified desires.

ABSTRACT. One of our fundamental presuppositions in everyday life as well as in science and philosophy is that we are persons — rational speakers and agents, capable of discourse and inquiry governed by intersubjectively accessible and comprehensible norms. This paper argues that a consistent account can be given in a pragmatic theory of personhood — a theory aiming to clarify which of our practices can be called rational and qualify the agent as a person. It views personhood as a concrete, embodied status within social space and focuses on speech acts as the linguistic dimension of rational practices.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I discuss a certain non-reductivist defense strategy against the charge of epiphenomenalism. In accordance with Ned Hall’s (2004) distinction between two concepts of causation, I distinguish two kinds of epiphenomenalism: Productive epiphenomenalism and dependence epiphenomenalism. I take it that non-reductivism does not lead to dependence epiphenomenalism, but still leads to productive epiphenomenalism. I argue that productive epiphenomenalism can be defended against the charge that it implies that there are no actions and that, all in all, the discussed non-reductivist defense strategy looks promising.

ABSTRACT. In this talk I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward’s (2003) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.

ABSTRACT. I call “Orthodoxy” the view that existence is a universal property (Frege, Russell, Quine) and “Meinongianism” the view that this is not the case. Under standard assumptions, those views are understood as expressing contradictory propositions. If so, exactly one of them has to be true and no other theories can be found “in between”. I present a way to avoid any commitment to such a strong conclusion, based on a specific, new interpretation of quantifiers in modal contexts. The resulting picture is one where orthodoxy and Meinongianism express contrary propositions and the centrality of modal metaphysics is established.

ABSTRACT. Meinongians have dealt with round squares, vague objects and existent golden mountains. Modal Meinongians welcome these nonexistent objects within a plurality of worlds. Yet a new object is ready to cause trouble: the actually existent golden mountain. In this talk, I argue, first, that there's indeed no place for this Troublemaker within the Modal Meinongian's plurality of worlds; but, second, that she can just expand the logical (and illogical) space into a plurality of pluralities of worlds, which it can happily inhabit; and, third, that this proposal is ontologically cheap and can be independently motivated---at least given the Meinongian mindset.