ABSTRACT. My paper contributes to decision theory under uncertainty. It considers decision-makers with a rich agency, in the sense that they can not only contemplate, but also influence the state of the world. I am concerned with making this non-standard case the object of a standard exercise, namely, inferring from the choices of such agents their underlying preferences and beliefs. I am concerned with the mathematical task of proving the relevant representation theorem (which has not been done in the canonical Savage framework), but also with the philosophical task of discussing the nature of the preferences and beliefs thus identified.

ABSTRACT. This paper investigates two problems of (categorical) orthodox Bayesianism. Conditionalisation is undefined for probability-0 evidence. A natural default extension of conditionalisation recommends: conditionalise if possible and else equivocate. Since conditionalisation conserves certainty, it is also non-open-minded – previously neglected possibilities remain so, although the evidence might suggest otherwise. A slight generalisation of default conditionalisation recommends: first extend the prior to the newly suggested possibilities by mixing the prior with the uniform probability on these possibilities, then conditionalise. The paper justifies this revision family as minimal non-biased, open-minded modifications of conditionalization and discusses some consequences.

ABSTRACT. There is a debate in both philosophy and psychology, regarding whether and how one can rationally reconstruct partial/full belief of propositions by using probabilities. However, any direct application of standard (extensional) probability as rational formalization of belief in logical predicates seems ill-conceived from the outset. The most general proposition (the tautology) by definition is most probable. Correspondingly, probabilities of nested hypotheses seem empirically uninformative. As an alternative, Bayesian Logic (BL) is presented, providing a probabilistic measure of how ideal noisy-logical patterns have produced some data. BL can be understood as an extension of ‘Bayesian Occam’s razor’ to a noisy world.

ABSTRACT. Bayesianism is perhaps the most widely-accepted epistemological theory. It is embraced not only by epistemologists and philosophers of science, but also by statisticians and working scientists. I argue that, unfortunately, Bayesianism is inconsistent with analytic epistemology's most popular externalist theories of knowledge, justified belief, and evidence; such theories include anti-luck epistemologies employing safety or sensitivity principles, virtue-theoretic accounts, and "normal worlds" versions of reliabilism.

ABSTRACT. A qualitative model is presented which combines various types of ampliative inference. The model explicates how information can be attained non-deductively from given data. It works in three steps. Starting off with a set of singular data and, possibly, a number of background generalizations, predictive regularities are inferred via inductive generalization (step 1). Regularities that have a `lawlike' character can be strengthened into laws via the process of nomological generalization (step 2). Laws can then be used to infer explanations via abductive inference (step 3). The model is implemented in first-order modal logic within the adaptive logics framework.

ABSTRACT. Sometimes when proving a fact by induction, one gets "stuck" at the induction step. The solution is often to use a "stronger" induction hypothesis. We provide a precise characterization of this phenomenon and show that it applies to a number of natural examples. By reflecting on mathematical practice, we argue that our definition does capture the informal notion of "proof by strengthened induction hypothesis". The general problem of when one must, in order to prove a fact X, first prove another fact Y, seems very hard. Interestingly, the special case of proof by induction turns out to be more manageable.

ABSTRACT. There is hardly any doubt that concepts and doxastic states are related. You can only have an epistemic attitude towards propositions your conceptual system allows to assess. But beliefs also influence concepts. I will focus on the second part of the relation. The papers gives an account of predicate change as a form of conceptual change in a monadic predicate logic. Predicate change is introduced in a way that resembles the methodology of dynamic epistemic logic. After defining predicate changing operations, rational preconditions and restrictions are investigated.

ABSTRACT. How many logics do logical pluralists adopt (or could/ought to adopt) in arguing for their view? Answers to this metatheoretical question fall under three categories: i. no logic; ii. a single logic; iii. more than one logic. We assess possible replies, and in particular: a) we argue that the possibility of alogical reasonings for pluralism hasn’t been satisfactorily defended; b) we discuss whether the logic of the metatheory should be stronger or weaker than the object-logics; c) we explore the prospects for an abductive metatheory. In conclusion, we express skepticism that any of the available strategies is viable.

ABSTRACT. Possible world semantics is today still the default theory of linguistic meaning. However, there are a number of serious problems with possible worlds. These include the difficulty of individuating or counting worlds, the ‘total’ nature of worlds, and the coarse-grainedness of propositions qua sets of worlds. Recent work in computational semantics has further observed the intractability of representing worlds, which challenges the cognitive plausibility of any theory referencing worlds. This symposium aims to critically review the use of possible worlds in semantics and philosophy, to identify different problems with possible worlds, and to propose ways of solving these problems.

ABSTRACT. Attention is a central aspect of the mind, and empirically intensely studied. After a long neglect, analytic philosophy of mind has rediscovered attention also as a philosophical subject. This symposium focuses on the role of attention in action and agency. It brings together young philosophers who show – in close dialogue with empirical work – how the study of attention newly illuminates important topics in the philosophy of action: skill and rational control, expertise, the lower border of agency, and self-control. The symposium thus showcases an exciting topic that directly connects the philosophy of mind with the philosophy of action.

ABSTRACT. The Symposium addresses current trends in neurophilosophy with a focus on methodological problems in neuroscience with respect to representations, explanations, and causation.

ABSTRACT. Nozick (1981) argued that sensitivity is necessary for knowing, i.e. S knows that p only if S would not believe that p if p were false. Sensitivity accounts of knowledge suffer from well-known problems. One popular reaction to these problems is to replace sensitivity by the alternative modal principle of safety. In this paper, I will sketch a modal account of discrimination. I will argue that discrimination requires a sensitive method. Furthermore, I will show that safety is not sufficient for discrimination. I conclude that sensitivity marks a crucial distinction between knowing and discriminating.

ABSTRACT. In this talk I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa (1999) and Pritchard (2015), among others, and can be formulated as follows: (SC) If S knows that p, then S's true belief that p could not have easily been false. I will try to argue that condition (SC) is still necessary for knowledge and that, therefore, epistemic safety is not threatened by Frankfurt type cases.

ABSTRACT. My proposed talk relates to an ongoing debate about epistemic luck and the safety condition for knowledge. I will start by discussing a modal fallacy that Stephen Hetherington (2013) found behind the reasoning of the safe knowledge proponent. Then, I will try to show that under a particular description, epistemic safety plays its role in an analysis of knowledge without being vulnerable to the modal fallacy. In more general epistemological terms, my proposal favors robust virtue epistemology.

ABSTRACT. To be announced.

ABSTRACT. Principles are central to physical reasoning, particularly in quantum gravity (QG) where novel empirical data is lacking. One of the principles in QG is that of UV-completion—the idea that a theory should hold up to arbitrarily high energies. We argue—contra common practice—that UV-completion is poorly-motivated as a guiding principle in theory-construction, and cannot be used as a criterion of theory-justification. For this, we explore the reasons for expecting, or desiring, a UV-complete theory, as well as analyse how UV completion is used, and how it should be used, in different specific approaches to QG.

ABSTRACT. Analogue simulation is an increasingly important part of modern science. This paper addresses the question why. We will first introduce an important distinction between `emulation' and `simulation' as used in the context of contemporary quantum physics. By isolating and assessing the goals of analogue simulation and emulation we hope to establish a precise analytical framework that will serve as a prospectus to a philosophy of analogue quantum simulation. We expect that our framework will be useful both to working scientists and philosophers of science interested in cutting edge scientific practice.

ABSTRACT. We look first at the explanations some authors (Weisberg, Grune-Yanoff) claimed are provided through ABS and argue that they do not exclude non-explanatory forms of understanding. We address next Strevens’ view claiming the existence of an explanation behind any understanding and his strategy to accommodate non-explanatory forms; we argue that it fails to reach its goal & weakens his account. Last we discuss Khalifa’s critique on Lipton’s non-explanatory ways of understanding and argue that it is based on an unjustified construal. We argue that his ‘argumentative strategy’ fails to establish the superiority of actual understanding over one from possible explanations.

ABSTRACT. A traditionally accepted view is that scientific understanding comes in degrees. Until now however no-one has provided a fully articulated account of how to measure degrees of scientific understanding. Using the Inferential Theory of Scientific Understanding I show how degrees of understanding can be measured by attending to the kind of inferences being made by a subject, and hence answer the question of how much scientific understanding a subject has developed.

ABSTRACT. The central argument in this paper is that if one of the aims of explanation is to provide or increase understanding, and if we assess understanding on the basis of the inferences one can draw from the knowledge of the phenomenon which is understood, then the goodness of explanation, i.e. its capacity to provide or increase understanding of the explained phenomenon, should be assessed on the basis of the extra-inferences which this explanation allows for. It will be shown how this stance to explanation allows to tackle with a number of difficulties that have puzzled contemporary philosophers of explanation.

ABSTRACT. An unsolved problem for conceptual analysis is the paradox of analysis. Given the assumption that a correct analysis states an identity between analysans and analysandum, it can be deduced that every correct analysis is trivial. The inferences in the paradox can be blocked if one denies that analysans and analysandum have to be identical. But this solution creates a new problem: What connects the analysans and the analysandum? I argue that a solution to the paradox that makes use of the two notions of generic essence and metaphysical grounding can account for this problem.

ABSTRACT. It seems that there can be coincident physical objects which are numerically distinct in virtue of their different modal properties. The so-called grounding problem is the problem of giving, for any such case of coincidence, an explanation of the relevant difference in modal properties in terms of more fundamental physical properties like shape, weight or stuff. I will argue that there cannot be such an explanation, but that its absence is not a problem, but just what one should expect on the basis of a proper understanding of the phenomenon of coincidence.

ABSTRACT. The received view concerning the relation of grounding says that grounding is a strict partial ordering. Thus, grounding is irreflexive, transitiv and asymmetric. Some philosophers have questioned the received view. In this talk I will argue that grounding is not an asymmetric relation. For example, I will argue that the fact that A becomes romantically involved with B is at least partially grounded in the fact that B becomes romantically involved with A and vice versa. Concluding, I will discuss the question whether grounding is a strict partial ordering in connection with metaphysical fundamentalism.

ABSTRACT. This paper aims at shedding light on the current about Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) in metaethics. Most of such debate has focused only on the epistemological core of the question maintaining that, if moral realism is true and if selective pressures have heavily influenced the evolution of our moral psychology, we cannot have moral knowledge. My point is that the debate on EDAs in metaethics relies on a confusion. There are indeed various sorts of EDAs and giving up either moral realism or moral knowledge depends on which sort of EDA we are referring to.

ABSTRACT. In this paper I will reconsider M. White’s idea of ‘thickening’ (‘whitening’) Quine’s holistic pragmatism. The mentioned thickening pertains to extending holism into normative domains (like epistemology or ethics). This move has been positively assessed by such philosophers as P. Hare or H. Putnam. However, it brings certain difficulties. For instance, it is not clear how should we account for ‘feelings of moral obligation’ which are supposed to provide a sensory basis for ‘moral observation statements’ (by analogy, the same problem appears in context of normative epistemology). I will try to provide some preliminary solutions to most apparent difficulties.

ABSTRACT. This paper discusses the relevance of evolutionary theorizing to (normative) ethics. It aims to suggest a route from evolutionary theorizing to ethical conclusions that, on the one hand, does not commit a naturalistic fallacy while, on the other hand, makes substantive contact with the science. The route in question concerns the notion of stability. I explore different notions of stability that occur in evolutionary modeling, and point out ways in which they connect to, and can affect arguments for, ethical principles. I also discuss a potential circularity in such arguments, due to the structural assumptions necessary for evolutionary modeling.

ABSTRACT. Animalism is the view that human persons are biological entities, i.e., organisms or animals, and that therefore their diachronic identity has to be understood in purely biological terms. In my paper, I shall argue that animalism, in its current form, fails to match with what biological science tells us about biological identity insofar as it is committed to some sort of substance or thing ontological view of the organism. I shall argue that these difficulties can be overcome by switching to a process ontological framework, according to which organisms are organised biological processes.

ABSTRACT. Temporal ontology is the part of ontology involving the rival positions of presentism, eternalism, and the growing block theory. While this much is clear, it’s surprisingly difficult to elucidate the substance of the disagreement between presentists and eternalists (to focus on the most widespread positions). In spite of widespread suspicion concerning the status and methods of analytic metaphysics, skeptics’ doubts about this debate have not generally been heeded, neither by metaphysicians, nor by philosophers of physics. This paper revisits the question in the light of prominent elucidation attempts from both camps.

ABSTRACT. Diaz-Leon (2015) claims that if a property is constitutively socially constructed then it is not biological and vice versa. I will argue that given the notion of being biological as employed within debates about social constructivism (where being biological is understood in terms of being caused by genes), a property can be both biological and socially constitutively constructed. Recognizing this is important for the social constructionist project that Diaz-Leon focuses on: to argue against the inevitability of a property.

ABSTRACT. Acquiring citizenship signifies being legally recognized as a member of the society. Immigrants have to fulfill some formal requirements to be granted citizenship. In particular, they have to prove their residency in the country: only people who live in the state can be considered as members and can then claim for citizenship. However, membership “beyond residence” is commonplace in host societies. From this factual observation and using moral principles adopted by democratic states, I argue that physical presence repeated over time can give rise to membership to the state and should motivate rethinking our conception of citizenship independently of residence.

ABSTRACT. Is Ada’s knowledge that London is the capital of England radically different from her knowledge how to handwrite? This paper defends the unpopular intellectualist thesis that it is not. In particular, it defends Stanley’s (2011; 2013) account from Fridland’s (2013; 2014) attempts to revive Ryle’s (1946; 1949) regress argument. Of key importance is Fridland’s contention that automatic mechanisms applying propositional knowledge must be intelligent. This paper shows that Fridland sets the bar for ‘intelligence’ too low and that her other objections can be explained away within Stanley’s framework. Consequently, the historically strongest objection to intellectualism does not succeed.

ABSTRACT. The aim of the talk is to show that the alethic deflationists’ discussion of the thesis according to which truth is a normative concept does not register a real progress in the last sixty years. In fact, the well-known critical remark put forward in 1959 by Michael Dummett has not got a plausible answer from the various deflationisms on the scene. Moreover, in the final part of the talk I will try to explain why no plausible answer could ever come from a deflationary standpoint, and so why every deflationary explanation of the normativity of truth is doomed to failure.

ABSTRACT. Uncertainty and vagueness give rise to different kinds of degrees of belief. The paper rejects Smith’s (2010, 2014) combined account of these types of degrees of belief as expected truth value. It further argues that we can save Ramsey’s interpretation of degrees of belief as tendencies to act even without a unified account of degrees of belief: there may be more than one tendency to act, as there are different aspects of an action. I suggest that uncertainty based degrees of belief determine the performative part of the action while vagueness based degrees of belief determine its content.

ABSTRACT. Hintikka (1997, 1998) and Gabbay and Wood (2005) distinguish between abduction that delivers a hypothesis purporting to explain some data and the inductive process of testing that hypothesis. Gabbay and Wood also distinguish between abducting a hypothesis and the decision to use it for some inferential work. I argue that in scientific practise the distinction between an abductive discovery and an inductive phase of hypothesis testing, and the distinction between testing an hypothesis that has been abductively discovered and activating the same hypothesis for further inferential work are blurred because all these processes form an inextricable whole of theory elaboration.

ABSTRACT. What strategy guides researchers when planning studies involving multiple experiments? I argue that abductive search strategy may be employed to answer this question. It is a pattern of reasoning from known fact(s) to an abduced hypothesis through a series of intermediate steps of making and empirically testing hypothetical conjectures. I offer an example from the field of numerical cognition in cognitive science, showing how the plan of a systematically designed study involving nine experiments can be explicated using the proposed model of abductive search strategy. I also discuss its possible implementation as a normative model for optimizing research planning.

ABSTRACT. I develop a fully schematic, inferentialist account of higher-order logic, which allows for the definition of an indefinitely extensible series of partial truth-predicates. For practically any language, a truth-predicate is definable. Enough "truth" should thus be available to the inferentialist to do the theoretical work that opponents claim is wanting. Furthermore, deflationists claim that the truth-predicate does not express a substantive property, but is only required to express generalizations. On the account here, truth-predicates are purely logical, and indeed eliminable since they are logically definable. Deflationism appears to lead to a redundancy theory of truth.

ABSTRACT. Formal theories of truth are useful for seeking a minimally adequate theory of truth. It has been argued that if such a theory is conservative over its background, then it is a deflationary theory of truth. If no conservative minimally adequate theory can be found, then there is no suitable deflationary theory. In looking at a conservative theory of truth from a semantic perspective I find that it is not adequate and, by improving the theory, a non-conservative theory is produced. I offer some arguments as to why this should not be considered as a counter-argument against deflationism, however.

ABSTRACT. Kripke's theory of truth is arguably the most influential approach to self-referential truth and the semantic paradoxes. The use of a partial evaluation scheme is crucial to the theory and the most prominent schemes that are adopted are the strong Kleene and the supervaluation scheme. The strong Kleene scheme guarantees a compositional notion of truth whereas the supervaluation scheme guarantees that all logical truths will be declared true. In this paper we explore the middle ground between the two schemes and provide an evaluation scheme that adheres to classical reasoning but violates compositionality only to a certain, clearly determined extent.

ABSTRACT. Recently several experimental studies have reporting relevance effects on the cognitive assessments of conditionals, which pose an explanatory challenge to the suppositional theory of conditionals. Some of them concern the “Equation” (P(if A, then C) = P(C|A)), others the de Finetti truth table, and yet others the uncertain and-to-inference task. The purpose of this paper is to take a Birdseye view on the debate and investigate some of the open theoretical issues posed by these results such as whether to count these effects as belonging to pragmatics or semantics and how to decide this issue.

ABSTRACT. The subject of the paper is the problem of counterpossibles, i.e. counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. According to the standard analysis of counterfactuals, each counterpossible should be taken to be vacuously true. Contrary to this, some philosophers and logicians have been arguing in favor of an alternative approach, according to which only some counterpossibles are true, and others are false. This alternative approach has been recently criticized by (among others) T. Williamson, N. Emry, and C.S. Hill. The aim of this paper is to address this critique and to support the view that some counterpossibles are false.

ABSTRACT. It is a common intuition that the antecedent of an indicative conditional should have something to do with its consequent, that they should be somehow connected. However, only very few semantic theories of conditionals do justice to this intuition and the majority tends to relegate it to the realm of pragmatics. Yet no one has offered a full-fledged pragmatic account of the oddness of missing-link conditionals. The aim of this talk is to discuss pos- sible pragmatic explanations of the phenomenon and, consequently, to show how they fail.

ABSTRACT. Derived from the work of Ramsey [1927], Success Semantics (SS) has been said incompatible with the aetiological theory of biofunctions [Millikan 1984, Papineau 1987] by Whyte [1983] and Dokic & Engel [2005]. In this talk we argue that their critiques are surmountable by the interactivist theory of biofunctions (as proposed by Bickhard [2009], Hooker [2009], and Christensen [2002]). We proceed by: exposing Ramsey’s Principle (RP) (the founding principle of SS); considering the critiques; showing Interactivism’s compatibility with RP; and concluding that “Interactivist Biosemantics” answers worries expressed by Blackburn [2005], Nanay [2013], and Methven [2015] concerning the general viability of SS.

ABSTRACT. Traditional teleosemantics makes use of the selected effect theory of function in order to explain mental representations. I will argue that traditional teleosemantics cannot explain productivity, the capacity of representational systems to represent states of affairs that have not been represented before. The reason is that the selected effect theory is unable to explain how traits can have functions that have never been performed before. As a solution I will suggest that teleosemantics should be combined with a selected disposition theory.

ABSTRACT. Neander (2015) argues that pragmatism about mental content is unstable and needs to be abandoned. I claim that, to the contrary, the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism shows that pragmatism is needed to determine the ontological nature of perceptual and doxastic content. I defend an interpretivist version of content pragmatism by arguing that the nature of perceptual and doxastic content is determinate only with respect to conceptualists' and nonconceptualists' shared explanatory concerns. Other philosophers, involved in other debates, have other explanatory purposes. Relative to these, perceptual and doxastic content may be of a different ontological kind.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I explore the significance of memory for the persistence of group agents. I adapt the psychological criterion of agential identity according to which the cross-temporal identity of agents depends on there being overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness. I shall seek to apply this criterion to the persistence of corporate agents by first spelling out an organizational route. Then I take a closer at the structure of collective memory as a shared intentional state, before I turn to the question whether changes in membership or of the organizational structure of the group agent undermine its persistence.

ABSTRACT. In this paper I explain what I take to be the differences between three related notions: specific thoughts, singular thoughts, and de re thoughts. Philosophers often conflate two or more of them; I argue that this is gravely mistaken. Specific thoughts, singular thoughts, and de re thoughts have different properties and explain different aspects of our cognitive lives. I conclude that this distinction helps to accommodate our intuitions about some problematic cases much more nicely than any proposal currently on the market.

ABSTRACT. Snowdon argues that the mind-body problem is not a philosophical but empirical problem. But empirical investigations of consciousness presuppose conceptual decisions and theoretical interpretations. Dehaene requires cognitive access and report as criteria for consciousness, Block argues for conscious experience the subject cannot know about. When one denies consciously seeing X, representation of X may be unconscious or conscious but inaccessible. Block's neural criterion presupposes knowledge about neural correlates. Neuroscience discovers correlations, but correlating does not yield reduction or explanation. Causal and constitutive interpretations are empirically equivalent. The mind-body problem is a philosophical problem that will not be solved empirically.

ABSTRACT. In my talk I sketch a semantics for ground, essence and metaphysical modality. Its core feature is that essences are modelled as accessibility relations between worlds. I start by showing how the popular assumptions that grounding and essence are tightly connected and that modality can be understood in terms of essence stand in tension to the further widespread assumption that grounds don’t always necessitate what they ground. Afterwards I present a framework in which essences and their relation to grounding and modality can be modelled in a way that resolves the apparent conflict between the aforementioned assumptions.

ABSTRACT. I am going to present different approaches to metaphysical truthmaking considering the problem of negative existential truths. The main goal is to analyse what are the consequences of the problem considering two functions of metaphysical truthmaking, namely giving an explanation or determining truth value. The second aim is to present which truth-theory (correspondence or coherence) gives a better support for truthmaking considering two functions mentioned above.

ABSTRACT. If X is fundamental to Y, then X is said to ground Y. I propose a conception on which grounding is conceived of as a byproduct of nothing-over-and-above-ness, meaning: if X grounds Y, then this is the case because Y is “nothing over and above” X. For example, if the macroscopic is grounded by the microscopic, then this is because the macroscopic is nothing over and above the microscopic. I then explain how this conception is considerably advantageous, and yet, this conception is subject to problems which can be resolved only by accepting some unconventional claims about grounding.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I sustain that one of the main causes of people’s sub-optimal intertemporal choices (ICs) is a twofold failure in other perspective-taking applied to one’s own future self, which leads the individual to treat the latter as a stranger. As a consequence, ICs become social choices, and moral ICs become interpersonal and not intrapersonal conflicts of values. Starting from this characterization of moral ICs, I will demonstrate that our perception of the future self as a stranger is not morally justified once the moral relation in which the present self stands with her future self is analysed.

ABSTRACT. Several philosophers have recently argued that individuals can stop being morally responsible for their past actions. One objection to this view stems from moral responsibility for atrocities. Surely the perpetrators of atrocities, so the objection goes, cannot stop being morally responsible. In this paper, I defend the view that even such war criminals can stop being morally responsible. However, I argue that ceasing to be morally responsible for an action does not necessarily discharge all our obligations with respect to that action. I propose that an individual still has a duty to apologise for her past misdeeds.

ABSTRACT. In asking how goods should be distributed across time, many moral theories accept temporal neutrality. Temporal neutrality requires us to attach no normative significance per se to the temporal location of goods and harm – in short, we shouldn’t be time-biased. There are two time-biases, near-bias and future-bias. This paper argues that future-bias is more difficult to rule out than near-bias, because future-bias is more intuitive and less arbitrary than near-bias. Also, to rule out future-bias, temporal neutrality needs to be conceptualised as diachronic. Since this is controversial, I suggest making peace with future-bias, and to revise temporal neutrality accordingly.

ABSTRACT. For many refugees, the journey towards a safe place is almost as dangerous as staying home, especially because safe means of travel are being denied by the countries of the refugee’s destination. Refugees are thus trapped between the horror they wish to flee and the threats of fleeing. By stating an admission analogy I will argue that states are obliged to protect and admit refugees who are still far away, and are thus obliged to grant visa and thereby allow refugees to use safe means of travel, such as airplanes, ferries, and trains to arrive at their borders.

ABSTRACT. In this paper I will present a detailed analysis of the ideal – nonideal debate. I will present the Rawlsian distinction between ideal and nonideal theory as well as the classical dispute between ideal and nonideal theorists. I will also analyze whether and how ideal and nonideal theory can be interrelated. Here I will try to distinguish between five subtypes of nonideal theory and I will argue that only two of them manage to meet the basic criteria in order to be taken into account in a sound theory of distributive justice.

ABSTRACT. What explains the wrong of sovereignty violations—i.e., the wrong of usurping an agent’s right to be the final decision-maker within a particular domain? I address this question in relation to the sovereignty of both individuals and collective entities. I argue that the most common account of the wrong of sovereignty-violations, which points to the value of self-determination, is incomplete. Values other than self-determination may be set back by violations of sovereignty. The paper explains which values these are, thereby offering a more robust justification of the core liberal principle of sovereignty.

ABSTRACT. This talk aims to discuss the theory of expressiveness for works of art and objects put forward by Paul Noordhof (2008), by casting light on what I maintain to be its problematic aspects and providing an alternative explanation. After introducing his account based on sensuous imagination, I will elaborate on its implied notion of expression and suggest that a cluster notion of emotion might do a better job. Moreover, I will claim that appealing to imagination is not necessary. I will draw on aesthetic literature, philosophy of music, and on psychological contributions about the recognition of human expression of emotions.

ABSTRACT. Musical ontology faces a challenge with improvisations. Improvisations do not fit well with the classical interpretation of musical works and performances in terms of types and tokens. I shall defend the claim that we should let go this distinction in the case of improvisations. I propose, therefore, adopting a different approach: collapsing the distinction between performances and musical works in the case of improvisations. Improvisations are identical to both performances and musical works. In the context of improvisation, the distinction does not make much sense: musical works are nothing else than performances. And performances are nothing else than musical works.

ABSTRACT. The problem concerning the cognitive value of literary works has mostly received two kind of answers, respectively the cognitivist and anti-cognitivist one. Between these two opposite positions, this paper defends a two-level solution according to which at a first level literature does transmit us literary truths and knowing that and, at a second level, it has to do with imagining what it is like to be those characters involved in those events. At this level we learn from literature as we learn form thought experiments, examples or counterexamples.

ABSTRACT. The talk will focus onto transitive action verbs (TAVs) like “kiss”, “kick”, “kill”… These verbs are similar intensional transitive verbs (ITVs) like “love”, “seek”, “worship”… which raise well-known difficulties. TAVs and ITVs share a common feature, namely intensionality, that put them apart from verbs denoting physicalist behaviours. In order to analyse TAVs (as well à ITVs) I will follow a three-step strategy: (i) analyze TAV-sentences as modal sentences, (ii) extend modal logic with independent quantifiers, and (iii) use cross-world extensions of predicates.

ABSTRACT. The symposium entitled “Mathematical Platonism: Frege and Neo-Fregeanism” brings together four Frege scholars to debate the relevance of Frege’s thinking on current topics in the philosophy of mathematics. More specifically, the symposium investigates the importance of Platonism in Frege’s own philosophy, the role and problems of (neo-)Fregean Platonism in contemporary philosophy of mathematics, and the late-Fregean, Kantian alternative to Platonism. As such, the symposium is aimed not merely at Frege scholars but at philosophers of logic and mathematics in general.

ABSTRACT. Models represent. But how do they do that? I present an amended version of fictionalism about models, simple fictionalism, that overcomes what I take to be the false ontological dychotomy between Frigg's indirect fictionalism and Toon and Levy's direct fictionalism. And I draw an explanation of how models represent in terms of the notions of reference and theoretical hypotheses. The key to understanding how models represent resides in the idea that the representation relation between models and the world is a kind of indirect referential relation that is mediated by imagination.

ABSTRACT. Sociobiology is the branch of evolutionary biology that deals with the underlying mechanisms of animal social behavior, notably with the question of biological altruism. It relies on the concept of kin selection and on an adaptationist approach that entails the application of optimality and game theory models to the study of evolution. This paper aims to identify the place of sociobiology within the paradigm defined by the Modern evolutionary synthesis, as well as the relations between kin selection and other forms of natural selection, by analyzing the way in which such models define the conceptual and formal structure of sociobiology.

ABSTRACT. Despite the wealth of empirical work done over the past 40 years, the non-human animal mindreading research program has come up with two equally plausible and incompatible theories to account for the current data: MRT (mind reading theory) and BRT (behavior reading theory). Faced with this situation, philosophers and psychologists have made multiple appeals to parsimony as a means of overcoming this dilemma, however these claims are not necessarily in conflict. Given this, I introduce the notion of meta-parsimony as a means of evaluating parsimony claims within the larger context of theoretical underdetermination and argue that meta-parsimony favors BRT.

ABSTRACT. Even physicalism struggles with mental causation. Property dualism can share the traditional mind-body problem. It is timely to reconsider the logic of conservation laws. First, they are local: energy does not disappear and reappear elsewhere. Second, local conservation forms an infinite conjunction, so failure permits conservation outside minds. Third, conservation laws are rooted in symmetries (Noether’s theorem): energy (momentum) conservation is due to uniform laws over time (space). Fourth, Noether’s converse says conservation laws imply symmetries. One should expect conservation to fail, given mental causation, so this is no objection theoretically. A proper objection comes only from neuroscience.

ABSTRACT. Pharmacology is at the crossroad of heterogeneous aims and interests. The complex network of interests (financial, reputational etc.), as well as legal rights and duties which frame the scientific and social ecosystem in which pharmacology is embedded make it a unique blend of science and technology. In this symposium philosophers and health scientists offer a panorama of the complex interaction of such heterogeneous dimensions with a special focus on current debates on 1) standards for evidence evaluation, 2) methodological evolution, and 3) pragmatics as well as epistemic asymmetry of causal assessment of risk vs. benefits.

ABSTRACT. We discuss whether the notion of grounding can be successfully applied in understanding the kind of explanation of the dependance of arithmetical truths on non-arithmetical ones that Hume's Principle (HP) is supposed to provide in a neo-logicist framework. After identifying a number of explanatory roles for HP, we criticise recent proposals for explanatory version of HP based on the notion of grounding. We emphasize the main limitations in applying grounding to HP, and suggest what we take as the most promising solution. This will also throw light on how grounding can be fruitfully applied to the foundations of mathematics.

ABSTRACT. Zero, on the face of it, presents us with a philosophical problem. On the one hand it is a useful and mathematically well-understood entity that we would like to incorporate into our ontology, but at the same time seems to be somewhat paradoxical. Here, I present an account of zero which resolves these problems. Section 1 provides a critique of some extant characterisations, and identifies two criteria we would like an account to satisfy. My solution to the problem is provided in Section 2 by combining an account of numbers as properties with an explanation of absence perception.

ABSTRACT. How do we get out knowledge of the natural numbers? Various philosophical accounts exist, but without any connection to psychological data on how the learning process actually takes place. The psychological literature on number acquisition can be used to provide a empirically well-founded basis for an epistemology of arithmetic. On that basis I argue that we need a combination of neologicist accounts and Parsons's account. In particular, we learn the initial segment of the natural numbers on the basis of the Fregean definitions, but do not learn the natural number structure as a whole on the basis of Hume's principle.

ABSTRACT. A wide array of different meanings that are associated with the word “arithmetic”. In mathematics, often only formal axiomatic systems of natural numbers and their operations are called arithmetic. At the other extreme, some cognitive scientists and philosophers write about “infant arithmetic” to refer to innate ability with quantities. While this may seem like harmless terminological incongruence, in this paper we argue it can cause important problems in the study of arithmetical knowledge. We analyze the use of the term “arithmetic” in literature and suggest a definition that captures the essence of handling discrete numbers in a systematic manner.

ABSTRACT. One of the main problems of concept Empiricism is to explain the acquisition of the most basic constituents of concepts, without resorting to preexisting innate elements. I will show that the uppermost nativist arguments against the acquisition of primitive concepts rest on the assumption that the constituents of concepts must be available as an input of the acquisition process ‒precedence assumption. Then I will argue that there is no obligation to accept the precedence assumption, and will present a model where the constitutive elements of concepts result from the same learning process by virtue of which those concepts are acquired.

ABSTRACT. I will shed some light on the notions of neural representation and computation by elaborating on a fairly underinvestigated and yet crucial characteristic of cognitive states, namely their level of abstractness. My objective is to develop an appropriate understanding of the 'abstractness of cognitive states'; one informed both by representational and computational considerations. These considerations will be introduced in the context Hierarchical Bayesian Processing (HBP) and the Semantic Pointer Architecture (SPA). Both suggest hierarchical levels of processing and take a particularly systematic approach to abstractness of cognitive states, thus affording a new way of understanding neural representation and computation.

ABSTRACT. Current views of implicit bias fail to explain its diverse manifestations that are underwritten by its diverse contents. Most theorists of implicit bias posit associations as causes of implicit bias. I side with the propositional attitude proponents, in arguing that implicit biases are not associations because they can partake in inferential processes. However, I do not accept that these biases are undergirded by propositions. I call attention to the phenomenology of implicit bias and an unjustified assumption with regards to mental content to undermine this view. I propose a new view that avoids the shortcomings of these two prevalent views.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I argue against the truth of the following conditional: if implicit biases can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations, then their representational structure is propositional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit biases. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by structural social injustice, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view.

ABSTRACT. This paper proposes an analysis of the concept of indeterministic causation that helps clarify the debate about the metaphysical nature of causal relations. Assuming a difference between indeterministic causation and non-causation, we defend the idea that the former implies the externality of causal relations, contrary to conceptions that defend their internality based on causal dispositions. Being compatible with either Determinism or Indeterminism, Causal Dispositionalism can only posit the internality of causal relations, if it considers indeterminism as absence of causes, and not as presence of causes that can fail to bring about the effects, without alteration of their intrinsic properties.

ABSTRACT. In the light of a pragmatist propensity interpretation of probability, I present some of the consequences of dispositionalist views for the metaphysics of chance. Specifically, I show that certain monist accounts would bring propensities close to the classic possibilist picture, and would make it hard to defend the objectivity of probability without redefining the concept of chance. My proposal is to characterize propensities as a specific subset of dispositional properties, leaning on the work of Bird on dispositions. In doing so, I also intend to defend dispositionalism as the best ontology for an objective interpretation of probability.

ABSTRACT. Some philosophers of time assume as unproblematic that there can be no experience of passage without experience itself instantiating genuinely dynamic characteristics (e.g. Dainton). Others resolutely deny this (e.g. Savitt). In this paper we consider three plausible candidates as to the content of the illusory experience of passage that are compatible with the B-theory. Excluding each of them in turn we aim at proving that the B-theorists exhausts the whole of her conceptual repertoire. We conclude that we could not mistake an Eternalist world for one in which time passes.

ABSTRACT. I discuss the problem on causation by absence. Initially, I assert that our causal understanding stands up by focusing upon something unusual or some deviations from usual courses with raising questions, ‘Why was the usual course broken?’ and/or ‘Could it be prevented?’ As far as the possibility of prevention matters, we must face the problem on causation by absence in a counterfactual way. However, many absences could be a candidate for the cause of the deviation. I try to sort this problem out by introducing two kinds of degrees, namely, those of manipulability and normativity.

ABSTRACT. Changed to: The Immutability of the Past is not going to be Los(s)t (Joint work with Giuliano Torrengo - Milan)

Abstract: Loss (2015) argued against the received view according to which episodes of time travel can give rise to changes in the past only if time is multi-dimensional. The aim of his article is to show that past-changing time-travel is metaphysically possible also in one-dimensional time. To this goal, he devised a model made up of four
assumptions. In this paper we argue that although Loss’s model does imply this metaphysical possibility, it also generates critical problems. To avoid these problems, we argue that at least one of his four assumptions has to be abandoned, and we contend that his distinction between external and internal time(s) of a world is the one which generates difficulties. We eventually propose an alternative model which does not run into the problems we highlight and such that it keeps the past in one-dimensional time immutable.

ABSTRACT. In my paper, I will investigate the compatibility of different metaphysics of time with the powers view. It has recently been argued that a pow- ers ontology, which is supposed to be inherently dynamic and productive, is incompatible with eternalism, which does not allow for any sort of real productivity. While I agree that the powers view is incompatible with eter- nalism, I will argue that is also incompatible with either the growing block view and with presentism.

ABSTRACT. The debate between endurantists and perdurantists is often characterized as an ontological dispute about the existence of temporal parts. But one might argue that one undesirable upshot of this is that hylomorphic endurantism turns out compatible with perdurance theory, as it allows for a myriad of short-lived entities that suspiciously resemble the temporal parts introduced by perdurantists. I argue that once we accept Wasserman's distinction between ontological and explanatory persistence accounts (2016), hylomorphic endurantist accounts, like Fine's (1999) and Brower's (2010), qualify as explanatory enduring theories and therefore remain beyond the scope of the argument advanced by our objector.

ABSTRACT. Perdurantism is usually regarded as incompatible with presentism (Heller 1992): if there were no time except the present then nothing could be a sum of stages belonging to different times. The aim of this paper is to argue that fragmentalism, a non-standard form of tense realism proposed by Kit Fine (2005), can be fruitfully employed to combine a (non- standard) presentist metaphysics with a (non-standard) version of perdurantism.

ABSTRACT. Assume consequentialism and assume that moral properties are causally efficacious. Then, I’ll argue, a puzzle arises: these assumptions lead to denying plausible metaphysical principles. We therefore have to reject either consequentialism or the causal efficacy of moral properties or the plausible metaphysical principles. Which of these to reject is an argument for another occasion: my aim here is to present the puzzle. It is a puzzle worth thinking about: no matter how we solve it, we stand to learn something, be it in normative ethics, metaethics, or metaphysics.

ABSTRACT. In contrast to the problem of causal selection – explaining the priority given to causes over background conditions (Mill 1843/1947: 213-214) – little systematic attention has been offered to a similar distinction on the effect side. If reality is represented as a directed network of causal interactions, what explains the priority typically given to effects over further consequences (by-products, side-effects, after-effects)? I explore effect selection and assess its relevance to determining the appropriate extent of moral responsibility for consequences. I argue that difficulties in the way of a clear answer to effect selection motivate a novel epistemic objection to consequentialism.

ABSTRACT. Lenman (2000) presents a compelling argument that purports to show how deep the epistemic problem for consequentialism runs. The argument from cluelessness shows that, generally, agents are clueless about the consequences of their decisions and, as such, are unaware of relevant information to decide to act rightly. The upshot of the argument is that no consequentialist act-guiding principle is applicable in decision-making. In this paper I argue that consequentialism can successfully reply to the argument without disengaging the act-guiding principles from its moral theory by accepting what I call the Non-disaggregation Principle.

ABSTRACT. Frances Howard-Snyder has argued that objective act-consequentialism is incompatible with the (true) “ought implies can”-principle, and thereby false. In this paper, I discuss some replies to Howard-Snyder’s argument, and present my own defense of objective act-consequentialism. I argue that “can” and “ought” are ambiguous terms, and that objective act-consequentialism tells us only what we ought to do in a specific objective sense of “ought”. In the final section, I consider the objection that this objective ought is not the primary or most significant ought-concept.

ABSTRACT. Can religious arguments play a role in the public justification of state action? In this essay I will claim that so far neither political liberals nor their religious critics have presented a satisfying answer to this question due to their deficient third- or first-person accounts of public justification. I will therefore argue for a second-person account of public justification according to which religious arguments can serve a role in public justification but can never justify state action on their own in a plural and secular society.

ABSTRACT. Capability approach (CA) provides account of human well-being in plural communities. However, what seems to be puzzling within CA is the role of others and community for achieving our own well-being. Our proposal is to put forward particular account of “civic friendship” as realization of basic capability for affiliation at the level of liberal political community. Civic friendship as political relation among citizens provides stability to plural community that respects different functionings and their different evaluation. Consequently, such a position is able to explain how taking care of the other’s interests is part of any individual’s own well-being.

ABSTRACT. Although nudging was introduced as a form of liberal paternalism, most nudges can be justified without touching on the issue of paternalism at all. The paternalism accusation only arises if nudges are implemented for the benefit of the nudgee, not if nudges are justified by arguing for the greater good of the community. Those "social nudges" prevent harms or costs, which society otherwise had to bear. I offer a coercion-parallel argument in favor of social nudges. If my argument is sound, nudges can be justified because they are less interfering than prohibitions laws, which coerce citizens into good behavior.

ABSTRACT. I discuss Steven Wall’s thesis that reasons endorsed by leading political liberal, John Rawls, justify perfectionism: the Aristotelian Principle and the value of self-respect. I agree that there is space for perfectionist policies in Rawls’s view. Contrary to Wall’s view I try to show that: (i) the Aristotelian Principle and the value of self-respect properly interpreted put egalitarian constraints on perfectionist policies; (ii) an elitist interpretation of the Aristotelian Principle is justified, as well, but the protection of its egalitarian interpretation and the protection of the value of self-respect have priority over it.

ABSTRACT. What’s the evidential impact of learning that something is a mystery? To answer this question, we first explicate the notion of a mystery in terms of unexplainability. After distinguishing different ways in which something can be unexplainable, we develop a test to evaluate the evidential impact of two distinct types of unexplainables: symmetrical and a-symmetrical unexplainables. We argue that only a-symmetrical unexplainables have evidential impact. We finally clarify how our explication of mysteries as unexplainables complements existing accounts of abduction and contributes to the literature on the mystery of consciousness.

ABSTRACT. In this contribution abduction is analyzed both using a real and complex case of the history of science (the discovery of the megatherium) and through simple everyday abductions (the interpretation of intentional deviations from the ordinary use of language). The final goal is to criticize abductions in every context. If we are able to follow a certain methodology and to find strategies, we can become aware of our abductive paths. We could conclude that in any case of abduction where logica docens mediates, although it may seem quick and instinctive, abduction can always be evaluated.

ABSTRACT. Schupbach and Sprenger (2011) introduced a novel probabilistic approach to measuring the explanatory strength that a given explanans exerts over a corresponding explanandum. We show that the measure obtained by Schupbach and Sprenger gives incorrect results for distinctively causal explanations, and go on to define an alternative measure of explanatory strength that is better able to model the strength of causal explanations. This alternative approach relies crucially on Pearl's notion of an 'intervention' and suggests the existence of both an ontic and an epistemic component of explanatory power.

ABSTRACT. Adjectives like interesting, clever, and good are multi-dimensional; being (e.g.) good is a matter of having some combination of features. A thing can be good (overall), without being good in all respects. Moreover, being good in just one respect is often insufficient for being good (overall). Thus, these adjectives’ semantics involve more than simple quantification over individual respects. This paper draws on resources from linguistic as well as philosophical semantics, and proposes a combinatorial semantics. This analysis is motivated by disagreement data, as well as ‘all things considered’-judgements, which any plausible semantics for these adjectives will subsume.

ABSTRACT. In contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, it is generally assumed that model-theoretic semantics for natural language [MTS-NL] can also provide an explanatory account of meaning as a cognitive phenomenon (e.g., some body of semantic knowledge that speakers possess, or some set of psychological processes underlying human semantic abilities). Such a cognitivist view is the natural extension of the Chomskian approach to syntax, and has been explicitly endorsed in many introductory textbooks for both Montagovian and Davidsonian MTS-NL. In this talk, I will argue that the association of cognitivism and MTS-NL is controversial.

ABSTRACT. Recently, philosophers have suggested that paying attention to how generics work may provide new ways of approaching philosophical problems and concepts (e.g. sorites-paradox, rule-following, ceteris-paribus-laws, dispositions, implicit-bias). However, the semantics of generics is still highly controversial. I argue that a particular inference schema involving generics, negations, and disjunctions is valid, and that accounting for this validity forces us to accept generic non-contradiction, a principle about the interplay between generics and negation. I show that two of the most comprehensive truth-conditional accounts currently on the market are incapable of accounting for the relevant validity: Cohen’s probability-based account and Nickel’s normality-based account.

ABSTRACT. Dodd (2013) claims that prospects for descriptivism in art ontology (e.g. Davies 2004, Kania 2008) are grim and that also Thomasson’s global descriptivist approach to ontology (e.g. 2007) should be resisted (2012). If we agree with Dodd, should we conclude that there is no room for any form of descriptivism in the ontology of art? I argue that semantic descriptivism (SD), (modelled on Yablo e.g. 2009) is immune to Dodd’s criticisms and even compatible with Dodd’s own revisionist view, link SD to a fictionalist metaontology of art, and show the advantage of such metaontology over Dodd’s revisionism.

ABSTRACT. Many central questions of social ontology concern existence. For example, do groups have minds? Are there corporate actions over and above individual actions? In this paper I illustrate how, in answering these questions, there is room for talking past each other. The paper has three parts. First, I distinguish two conceptions of existence. Second, as an account of talking past each other, I introduce the idea of verbal disputes. Finally, I investigate the social ontology literature for verbal disputes concerning conceptions of existence. It will turn out that there is a correlation between implicit conceptions of existence and explicit conclusions.

ABSTRACT. There are two ways of representing rational belief: qualitatively as yes-or-no belief, and quantitatively as degrees of belief. Standard rationality conditions are: (i) consistency and logical closure for qualitative belief, (ii) satisfaction of the probability axioms for quantitative belief, and (iii) a relationship between qualitative and quantitative beliefs in accordance with Locke's thesis. In this talk it is shown that these conditions are inconsistent with each of two further rationality conditions: rich fallibilism and open-mindedness. Restrictions of Locke's thesis that have been suggested in the literature cannot remove the inconsistency.

ABSTRACT. It is commonly assumed that people need outright beliefs in addition to credences to simplify their reasoning. Outright beliefs do this by allowing agents to ignore small error possibilities. What is believed can change between contexts. It has been claimed that our beliefs change via an updating procedure resembling conditionalization. However, conditionalization is notoriously complicated. This claim is thus in tension with the explanation that the function of beliefs is to simplify our reasoning. I propose to resolve this puzzle by endorsing a different hypothesis about how beliefs change across contexts that better accounts for the simplifying role of beliefs.

ABSTRACT. Over the last few years, ethical and social issues related to life extension have gathered much attention among biologists, doctors and philosophers. However, despite the general agreement on the importance of life extension both for biogerontology and philosophy of medicine, a satisfactory definition of life extension has not been provided yet.

In order to mediate with all the knowledge, in this paper I will present a conceptual model of human life extension: (1) to offer a general definition and some biomedical aspects; (2) to offer three levels: moderate human life extension, radical human life extension and others forms of extension.

ABSTRACT. Psychopathy as a psychiatric condition has figured prominently in many recent philosophical debates, especially with regards to the issues concerning morality and responsibility of psychopaths, and the disorder status of psychopathy. Such debates, at least implicitly, presuppose that psychopathy is a unified psychiatric construct that picks out a real phenomenon, which makes it a candidate for a psychiatric natural kind according to some recent accounts of psychiatric classification. Our aim is to explore this underlying assumption and analyze whether psychopathy can be considered a psychiatric natural kind.

ABSTRACT. Coordination is the central notion of Fine’s (2007) semantic relationism. “This is the very strongest relation of synonymy or being semantically the same” (2007: 5) that holds between variables as well as between constants. In my (forthcoming) I have argued that Fine’s semantic and interpersonal relation of coordination between token names is fundamentally obscure. Fine has responded in his (forthcoming). It will be the goal of my talk to reconstruct the exchange between Fine and myself and reply to his (forthcoming) comments.

ABSTRACT. The paper is an assessment of compositionality from the vantage point of Kit Fine’s semantic relationist approach to meaning. This relationist view is deepening our conception about how the meanings of propositions depend not only on the semantic features and roles of each separate meaningful unit in a complex but also on the relations that those units hold to each other. The telling feature of the formal apparatus of this Finean relationist syntax and semantics, viz. the coordination scheme, has some unexpected consequences that will emerge against the background of an analogy with the counterpart theoretic semantics for modal languages.

ABSTRACT. Current consensus holds that counterfactuals do not presuppose the falsity of the antecedent; if the speaker of a counterfactual conveys the antecedent's falsity at all, she conversationally implicates it. Most people take this to be obvious for non-past subjunctive conditionals; but many people also think this is the case for past subjunctive conditionals. Anderson Conditionals such as 'If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same symptoms he actually shows' are taken as evidence for this. In this paper, I shall question this argument from Anderson Conditionals.

ABSTRACT. For Frege, judging that p was advancing from merely entertaining it to acknowledging its truth. Because we can judge false propositions, and because we have reason to distinguish truth values with respect to different indices, a revised version is better: where content is modeled as a set of indices (for instance, worlds), force is modeled as application to the actual index. A truth value results. Now a problem is how to accommodate assumptions. Assumptions are made without assertoric force, but seem nonetheless to be concerned with the actual world. In this talk I propose a solution to this problem.

ABSTRACT. Contemporary accounts of shared intention suggest that being engaged in joint actions involving shared intentions presupposes sophisticated social cognitive skills such as having a robust theory of mind – that is acquired not until age 4 in human ontogeny. However, developmental research has shown that also younger children are able to cooperate. Moreover, phenomenological considerations and findings from social psychology illustrate that empathy and agent-specificities play a central role in cooperative activities, which often has not been considered in the joint action debate. In my talk, I provide a novel approach to what joint action involving shared intentions comes to.

ABSTRACT. Some philosophers approach the phenomenon of dissonance within a person´s attitudes with theories of fragmented mind. Studies on implicit bias, interpretable as an occasion of dissonance, reveal that contradictory attitudes on different levels of the mind very often refuse individual training, so that, in morally salient cases, interventions in the social structure of the relevant field, such as quotas, are claimed for. I will explain this difficulty of the mind by combining the structural account of dissonance provided by fragmentation theories with a genealogically richer account based on a socio-relational and self-constitutional view on mental activities.

ABSTRACT. We sometimes judge or perceive others in a biased way, while bias results from the other’s (ascribed) social group membership. Such biased judgments and perceptions can occur without a person’s intention. Dispositions for them can persist against a person's will. I tackle biased judgments in considered decisions (as opposed to spontaneous actions) and argue that, once we account for the central role of imagination for decision-making, it is to be expected that people harbor persisting dispositions for intergroup biases. The model explains why these dispositions can persist against a person’s will. It offers a new explanation of so-called implicit biases.

ABSTRACT. In his paper `Essence and Modality', Kit Fine proposes that we should understand metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence. Call the view that the metaphysically necessary truths can be identified with the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatsoever Fine's Thesis.

My aim in this paper is twofold. I will first investigate what the formal and philosophical preconditions of Fine's Thesis are. I will then show that, if correct, the most plausible version of Fine's Thesis opens up an interesting conciliatory option in the dispute between necessitism and contingentism.

ABSTRACT. The naive conceivability-view according to which ‘plain’ conceivability alone is enough to establish metaphysical possibility is widely rejected, but sophisticated variants of the view still play an important role in the epistemology of modality. One such variant, which has so far been neglected in the literature on the epistemology of modality, is Rosen’s correct conceivability-view. According to it, we may infer metaphysical possibility from conceivability, given that we have knowledge of the relevant essences. In this talk, I introduce, critically discuss and assess the view regarding its prospects as a viable alternative to other sophisticated conceivability-views.

ABSTRACT. On the advice model, normative facts depend on the attitudes that some idealized agent would have for the actual agent. I argue that any such theory faces the entanglement problem. The argument exploits the possibility of entangling the attitudes of the idealized agent to the normative facts concerning the actual agent. This generates counter-examples where an action has its normatively relevant features, such as leading to more pleasure than pain, only insofar as the idealized agent would not want that action to be performed. As the problem generalizes, I conclude that the advice model should be rejected.

ABSTRACT. According to Street’s Humean Constructivism, (1) judgments of truth and falsity in the normative domain must always relativize to a point of view and (2) no distinctively moral judgment is true relative to every possible point of view. However, Street believes that Humean Constructivism has a Kantian basis, in the sense that constructivism itself is entailed from within every practical point of view. I show that Street’s thesis is inconsistent with her own views about epistemic reasons and assess the consequences of this inconsistency for Street’s overall project.

ABSTRACT. Guilt feeling is an important moral experiential state. When an individual realizes that she is held morally responsible for doing or failing to do something it is warranted that she feel guilt about it. But how do we make sense of this plain conceptual connection between guilt feeling and moral responsibility in the context of a collective? This paper argues for the possibility of non-metaphorical collective guilt feeling for the moral culpability of collectives. It defends a non-individualist account of collective guilt feeling by maintaining a distinction between singularity of agency and plurality of experiencing subjects.