ABSTRACT. The panel addresses the question: Does realism imply representationalism, as has been claimed by some? The panel presents three varieties of antirepresentational realism by drawing on discussions from the analytic pragmatist tradition. The contributions spell out which norms in each case are to be followed, what the criteria of adequacy are, what exact tradition and question-sets the particular approaches follow and intend to answer, and what function the term “realism” performs in this picture.

ABSTRACT. Whether philosophy is a set of doctrines or practices has implications for how learning philosophy is conceived. Does learning philosophy affect one’s identity and practical outlook? In the early modern period, learning philosophy was understood following the analogy of conversion through spiritual exercise as a process of mental self-formation. In German Idealism, the learning of philosophy is understood as the self-formation of the specifically human person through the actualization of the divine absolute. The talks of this panel explore the question of whether learning philosophy can be conceived as an initiation to transformative social practices, according to Spinoza and Hegel.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I present the “Modal Truthmaker Paradox” (MTP), that avoids weaknesses of Brendel's (2020) Truthmaker Paradox: the MTP does not rest on Montague’s theorem and it does not assume that provability implies having a truthmaker. Moreover, MTP gives rise to a new problem for truthmaker maximalists (e.g. Jago 2020) as it assumes a weak variant of Truthmaker Maximalism (<If p is true, it is possible that p has a truthmaker>). A truthmaker maximalist who would like to block the MTP has to give up this weak form of truthmaker maximalism, even Jago’s fixed Fitch (Jago 2021; Trueman 2021).

ABSTRACT. I’ll introduce some of the main paradoxes in philosophy of logic. I’ll present substructural approaches to those paradoxes and explain their advantages over structural nonclassical approaches. It’s common to assume that such advantages accrue because the structural level is more fundamental than the operational one. I’ll explore the opposite hypothesis on which the operational rules of a logic ground its structural rules. I’ll argue that such a hypothesis leads to a reconceptualisation of a large class of substructural logics and substructural approaches to paradox as unusually centring on logical operations (conjunction and disjunction) whose arguments are all upwards monotonic.

ABSTRACT. Restall’s interpretation of Routley-Meyer semantics in terms of Barwise’s channel theory suggests a dynamic view of substructural implication. I will compare two approaches to implication, one motivated by van Benthem’s semantics for Lambek calculus and the other by Kozen and Tiuryn’s version of propositional dynamic logic. It will be observed that these approaches lead to two different implications that are however residuated by the same composition operation. I will argue that this connection provides a tool that allows us to compare directly the two areas: substructural logic and propositional dynamic logic.

ABSTRACT. This paper concerns a recent defense of Lewis's (1979) account of de se attitudes from the primitiveness objection, which charges that Lewis's theory hinges crucially on the notion of self-ascription, yet fails to provide an explanation of it. Openshaw (2020) argues that self-ascription is analyzable in terms of the role initialization plays in Lewis's two-dimensional semantics. Though I find the analysis laudable, the objector should remain unsatisfied by the putative explanation, because the worry animating the primitiveness objection can now be re-stated in terms of initialization. It's then not clear that Lewis's theory provides a satisfying response.

ABSTRACT. There has been much discussion during the last decade concerning issues introduced by Perry and Lewis. Broadly, the main positions have been divided between “de se exceptionalists” and “de se skeptics”. In my talk, I distinguish between three different questions that have been conflated in the literature, and re-focus some of the discussions and theoretical positions by appealing to some theses on the transparency of content that have been widely overlooked. I will argue that, even though Perry's and Lewis's examples do present the problems they were intended to, the appeal to indexical expressions is not necessary.

ABSTRACT. One famous objection to meta-representationalist views of consciousness is that they fail to capture the ‘intimate’ relation that obtains between inner awareness and conscious qualities. Kriegel (2009) argues that self-representationalism (SR) has the resources to capture the required intimacy by construing inner awareness as a constituting representation. In my talk, I argue that this is not a good solution for the naturalistically minded self-representationalist, as it gives rise to the following dilemma: Either the self-representationalist accommodates intimacy by appealing to constituting representation; or they provide a naturalistic explanation of consciousness in terms of mental representation. But they cannot do both.

ABSTRACT. The implicit commitment thesis (ICT) claims that rational agents accepting a theory S ought to accept – among other things – the statement expressing the consistency of S. (ICT) is prima facie at odds with general meta-mathematical results. Gödel’s Incompleteness shows that for any consistent theory S, the ‘consistency-statement’ for S is independent of S. How is it so that acceptance of S epistemically requires acceptance of a statement unprovable from S? This article argues that acceptance of consistency is necessary for justification for (i) rational beliefs in S-theorems and (ii) rational claims about our justified beliefs.

ABSTRACT. In sequential decision problems, an act of learning cost-free evidence might be symptomatic, in the sense that performing this act itself provides evidence about states of the world it does nothing to causally promote. It is well known that orthodox causal decision theory, like its main rival evidential decision theory, may sanction such acts as rationally impermissible. I show that, under plausible assumptions, a minimal version of ratificationist causal decision theory, known as principled ratificationism, fares better in this respect, for it never labels symptomatic acts of learning cost-free evidence as rationally impermissible.

ABSTRACT. The principle of total evidence says that one should conditionalize one's degrees of belief on one's total evidence. In the first part of the talk I propose a justification of this principle in terms of its epistemic optimality. The justification is embedded into a new account of internalist epistemology based on optimality-justifications. In the second part I discuss a possible conflict of the principle of total evidence with political requirements of anti-discrimination. Should information about gender be included in the relevant evidence for a job qualification? I try to show that the conflict is only apparent.

ABSTRACT. Modal conventionalists of old used to hold the view that modal truth is fully grounded in linguistic conventions (Ayer, 1936). Recently, a neoconventionalist view has emerged that aims to revive the spirit, if not the letter of the logical positivists’ stance. The view has been articulated and defended by Sidelle, Sider, and Cameron among others. The aim of the talk is to offer a reductio of the neoconventionalist picture of modality. The overarching strategy consists in showing that an intensional logic satisfying the neoconventionalist desiderata, as well as a number of plausible conditions, is incoherent.

ABSTRACT. I present a theory of modality according to which a proposition such as ‘it is possible that Gemma is in Vienna’ is analysed as: the propositional function x is in Vienna is true for at least one value of x that is relevantly similar to Gemma. I briefly indicate the Russellian roots of this proposal before arguing that it has intuitive appeal. I show it can be developed to deal with some of the obvious immediate problems it faces. Finally, I very briefly compare the theory to the more traditional possible world analyses of modality by highlighting some interesting differences.

ABSTRACT. A reductive explanation of necessity informs us in virtue of what necessary truths are necessarily true. Simon Blackburn raises a dilemma to show that any reductive explanation of necessity is doomed to fail. Although Blackburn’s dilemma faces problems, Peter Hanks has argued that a revised version of Blackburn’s dilemma circumvents these problems. Central to Hanks’s dilemma are two assumptions. The first assumption suggests that explanations of necessity have the general form ‘necessarily p because (p because q);’ the second assumption denies the possibility of multiple potential grounds of the same truth. I argue against both assumptions in this paper.

ABSTRACT. The ethics of blame lays down a series of conditions to ponder when deciding whether an instance of blame is all-in morally permissible. One such condition is that the blame is proportional. If it is not proportional, that speak against its all-in moral permissibility. All the same, it is undertheorized what constitutes proportional blame. This paper aims to amend this. In short, I distinguish between overt and private blame, and highlight their different features. Given their different natures, I argue they are proportional in different ways. Finally, I discuss some practical and theoretical implications of my account.

ABSTRACT. While some items are good and some bad, most are neither good nor bad. What should we say of these items? Two possibilities invite themselves, one being that the items lack value and the other being that they have neutral value. How are these to be kept apart exactly? I will present two general strategies for keeping them apart that rely on the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. The approach that I favor connects final value to fitting indifference and so I am tasked to say more about what makes this attitude unique in relation to other types of responses.

ABSTRACT. According to the buck-passing account of value in terms of reasons, an object being good is to be understood in terms of it being fitting to favor it, where fittingness is understood in terms of reasons. “Favor” is commonly used as a place-holder for pro-responses that include both attitudes and acts (Rowland, 2017; Scanlon, 1998). I argue that this is incorrect. I diffuse arguments for the view and provide positive arguments for the claim that while reasons for attitudes are explanatorily prior to value, value is explanatorily prior to reason for actions.

ABSTRACT. The aim of the paper is to introduce, develop and defend a middle ground between eternalism (the view that propositions do not change their truth values through time) and temporalism (the view that some propositions change their truth values through time). My theory consists of two fundamental claims: (1) that simple sentences are temporally neutral, i.e., they express temporal propositions, and (2) that tensed sentences express eternal propositions. I will provide a formalization based on the Neighborhood Semantics for Modal Logic (Pacuit 2017).

ABSTRACT. In this talk I’ll argue that metalinguistic negotiations (MN) are not as common as Plunkett and Sundell assume. In particular, I claim that typical disagreements involving relative gradable adjectives are not MN. I argue that MN view should meet two challenges. (i) It should clarify why the speakers are oblivious to what they are saying and communicating and (ii) it should explain the mechanism that transforms what seems like a usual object-language disagreement into a MN. In my view, the way in which Plunkett and Sundell handle these challenges is unsatisfactory.

ABSTRACT. It has been authoritatively argued that existence cannot be vague for semantic reasons. I will claim instead that even if vagueness is semantic, existence is vague. According to my analysis, natural language admits different and incompatible semantic rules for sentences expressing ontological commitments, and this allows for semantically vague existence.

ABSTRACT. The term robustness is ubiquitous in ML. However, its meaning varies depending on context and community. Researchers either focus on narrow technical definitions or they leave unspecified what they mean by robustness. This paper provides a conceptual analysis of the term robustness in ML. We define robustness as the relative stability of a robustness target w.r.t. specific interventions on a modifier. Our account captures the various sub-types of robustness that are discussed in the research literature. Finally, we delineate robustness from adjacent concepts in ML, such as extrapolation, generalization, and uncertainty, and establish it as an independent epistemic concept.

ABSTRACT. The notion of Trustworthy AI (TAI) has recently become pivotal in debates on artificial intelligence, and yet it is problematic. Advocates of cognitive accounts of trust have trouble distinguishing TAI from merely reliable AI, while grounding trustworthiness in the trustee’s motivations and moral obligations makes the notion of TAI a categorical error. We shed light on the implicit methodological assumptions of this debate, and we argue for an alternative approach that takes talk of TAI to be an instance of useful loose talk. We conclude by insisting on the importance of the contextual factors involved in building trust in AI.

ABSTRACT. I present an alternative tripartite formulation of the problem of physical computation reflecting computer engineering/design concerns: "Given an abstract computation C, what conditions must a physical system S satisfy so that a given user U can use S to perform C?" I argue that on this formulation, the relative importance of corollary issues such as pancomputationalism, simultaneous implementation, and the problem of computational explanation decreases. Conversely, further considerations surface regarding the relation between the computing system and its intended user. I conclude that different questions of physical computation arise across different scientific disciplines like computer engineering or cognitive science.

ABSTRACT. In the talk, I will propose an interpretation of the method of cases by which this method can serve as a tool for conceptual engineering enterprise. According to this interpretation, within the method of cases an argument for a concept revision is presented and justified by intuitions that express ones’ expectations towards the target concept. In the talk, I will show how the proposed interpretation can help in refuting the critique of the method of cases formulated by the so-called negative program of experimental philosophy. Finally, I will determine how widely the discussed interpretation can be applied in philosophy.

ABSTRACT. In conceptual engineering, and especially in what is often treated as its paradigm method, Carnapian explication, the concept needing revision (explicandum), is given a prominent role. Similarity to it is taken as a distinct criterion for the evaluation of the new concept, separate from and in competition with other criteria such as exactness and fruitfulness. This introduces an undue conservatism into projects in conceptual engineering. I argue that the commitment to preserving only what is worthy of being preserved by some independent qualitative standard allows one to view explicanda as unproblematically arbitrary, elusive starting points for philosophical inquiry.

ABSTRACT. Conceptual engineering is the practice of revising our concepts to improve how people think. Conceptual engineering is fundamentally purpose-driven and so it only succeeds if it manages to revise people’s concepts – if such is even possible. This paper presents first-of-its kind experimental research directly testing the possibility of conceptual revision using DINOSAUR and PLANET by exploiting the disconnect between scientists’ and folk’s concepts. Using a masked longitudinal design, we successfully revised PLANET in participants, but not DINOSAUR. Thus, we found that conceptual revision is possible – but difficult – proving conceptual engineering is both possible and possible to measure.

ABSTRACT. We can differentiate veridical perceptual experiences from imagination and hallucination, because veridical perception comes together with a feeling that we are perceiving the real world: a sense of reality. But what are the normative preconditions for experiencing the sense of reality in perception? Most philosophical accounts of the sense of reality take an individualistic approach, but many perceptual experiences are actually socially shared. Here, I argue that the ability to coordinate my perception of an object together with another individual, is a normative requirement for the ability to experience objects as real, and differentiate them from hallucinations and imagery.

ABSTRACT. My paper defends the controversial thesis that we can genuinely see high-level, abstract properties such as an object’s specific kind. For instance, I defend that we can see some objects as dogs, and not just see their specific shape, color and motion. To do so, I put aside introspective methods, focusing instead on recent empirical findings in perceptual psychology. I argue that recent experimental studies demonstrate subjects can perceptually represent objects as pertaining to classes of similarity, and that these classes have a rich, kind-like content in that they are selectively built to fulfil specific organism-dependent goals.

ABSTRACT. While it is often assumed that perceptual objects are units of perception, it’s not clear what these units are. When sitting at the campfire, are the objects the crackling sound, the smokey smell, and the flickering flame? Or is it a higher-level entity with some number of ‘parts’ or aspects? The term ‘object’ is ambiguous and used differently depending on the discipline, theoretical perspective, and underlying ontological assumptions. Various possibilities for perceptual objects have been explored, including material bodies, events, and mereological complexes. This paper discusses the role perceptual objects play as loci of unification in unimodal and multimodal perception.

ABSTRACT. This symposium is dedicated to two innovative research areas in logic: the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc) and Diagrammatic Reasoning. Quarc is an alternative to classical logic, offering a treatment of quantification closer to natural languages. Diagrammatic Reasoning is the use of diagrams to represent logical reasoning, and the formal analysis of diagrams themselves. Much work around Quarc and Diagrammatic Reasoning is motivated by the same fundamental idea of placing formal logic closer to ordinary reasoning. The symposium will present recent research on proof theory and decidability for various Quarc systems, as well as interactions between Quarc and Diagrammatic Reasoning. Moreover, we will discuss how methods employed in the two areas can be combined to develop original applications, such as tools for assisted reasoning accessible to users without a strong background in formal logic. 

ABSTRACT. The aim of this panel is to discuss new work in underdeveloped areas of the philosophy of perception through the prism of our experience of food. In particular, we wish to discuss issues related to cognitive and emotional penetration of perceptual content, olfaction, gustation, and multimodal perception. We hope both to shed light on these aspects of the philosophy of perception and to demonstrate the relevance of a better understanding of our sensory relation to food for the nascent field of the philosophy of food, for instance in its task to understand the value structure of our experience of food.

ABSTRACT. Jessica Wilson (2021) offers three characterizations of strong emergence: (1) heuristically, when higher-level features cannot in-principle be deduced from lower-level features, (2) the rejection of Physical Causal Closure in the emergence hexalemma, and (3) when a higher-level feature depends on lower-level features but has a novel power. I explicate Bernard Lonergan (1957)’s Aristotelian account of emergence to argue that these three characterizations come apart. Lonergan’s account is only weak emergence according to (1), and affirms Physical Causal Closure by denying adjunct premises rather than any of the assumptions of the emergence hexalemma, yet counts as strong emergence according to (3).

ABSTRACT. This paper denies the existential import of predicating (monadic propositional) truth in modal discourse: for some possible world w and some proposition p, at w, p is true but, at w, p does not exist. This thought undermines several arguments for the conclusion that there must be something rather than nothing. A famous argument by Williamson for the conclusion that he exists necessarily is concomitantly undermined. To divest truth of its seeming existential import, I distinguish between world-relative propositions (that are existence-entailing) and absolute propositions (that are not). I propose that predicating truth in modal discourse results in absolute propositions.

ABSTRACT. Why is there something rather than nothing? Many philosophers reformulate the question according to their own accepted perspectives. In this talk, I'll focus on some of the ways Leibniz’s question is being responded to in current debates and will show what makes those formulations of the question metaphysically trivial. I’ll show that in fact different questions are asked, many of which are indeed meaningless or trivial questions. Employing that insight then I’ll show that some other formulations may still be metaphysically significant.

ABSTRACT. Sometimes, when we commit a wrongdoing, a sense of guilt arises within us. However, what happens when that guilt persists for years, even as time passes, people evolve, and circumstances change? Should we continue to bear the weight of guilt for actions from our distant past? In this talk, I first explore a few existing accounts found in literature regarding the experience of guilt for past actions. I then argue that if we have genuinely felt an ample amount of guilt, accompanied by a sincere recognition of our past fault, a genuine apology, and, when applicable, appropriate compensation, then we no longer deserve to carry the burden of guilt for those past actions. My argument presents a more comprehensive framework for understanding how the evolving dynamics of one's agency over time can influence the appropriateness of experiencing guilt.

ABSTRACT. I develop an account of metaphysical relativism based, not in special considerations of time or minds, but rather in a particular account of relations on which relations apply to their relata through qualifications of each relata relative to the others. One advantage of my account is that it claims relative facts depend on arrangements of entities in the world. Thus, it allows that relative facts generally are objective, not subjective. Another advantage is that it provides a unified account of different kinds of relative facts. Temporary facts, facts of personal taste, facts about velocities are all aspects of relational facts.

ABSTRACT. Davidson's theory of action is a widely used starting point among many scholars. However, this theory excludes children, non-human animals, and artificial systems from agency. In research areas dealing with children or animals, it is self-evident that Davidson’s notion of rationalized action cannot capture the activity of these agents. Assuming that the abilities of artificial systems cannot be adequately captured by this theory either, I will suggest an account of action that can consider artificial systems as acting participants in joint actions.

ABSTRACT. Assuming that moral ignorance impacts our obligations, we argue that philosophical moral education has a transformative effect on our moral obligations by increasing our awareness of i) moral theories or principles and ii) of moral obligations in particular cases when applying these theories or principles. We proceed to ask to what extent agents then have an obligation to close their moral belief systems. It draws a parallel between epistemic and moral closure reviews arguments for and against. It concludes that in the moral case, agents are obligated to close their beliefs to a greater extent than in the epistemic case.

ABSTRACT. It is by now widely acknowledged in epistemology that we can wrong others with our beliefs. Many think that this calls for a revision of the traditional conception of the norms of belief: that we should allow for practical reasons for belief, or for morality to encroach on epistemic normativity. This paper critically reviews common attempts of making sense of doxastic morality, and then develops a more promising alternative. The alternative is to properly acknowledge the significance of traditional epistemic notions, such as truth, reliability, or knowledge, for our interpersonal epistemic relationships.

ABSTRACT. Doxastic norms, i.e. those that are, directly or indirectly, concerned with the formation, retention, and revision of beliefs, are usually described in terms of epistemic normativity. However, they also come with a significant moral dimension, which can be detected by analyzing the potential harm that is caused by asserting ill-justified beliefs and thereby putting other people at risk of being misinformed. Being far more than a mere addendum to the familiar epistemic dimension, this moral dimension helps us to understand our motivation for adopting evidentially justified beliefs as well as the relation between belief formation and inquiry.

ABSTRACT. The aim of this work is to discuss a particular version of contemporary hylomorphism: Amorphic Hylomorphism. Among its controversial claims, there is a special commitment that I will focus on, it is the claim that says there are objects whit hylomorphic structure, but they do not have any form. I will try to argue that at the end of the day, Amorphic Hylomorphism is committed to the robust existence of forms due to the typical roles ascribed to forms.

ABSTRACT. According to the Aristotelian view of universals, properties are immanent in their instantiations. This plausibly implies that universals exist in virtue of being instantiated by some entity or other – instantiations are, in other words, the metaphysical grounds for the existence of universals. In this talk, I argue against Aristotelianism. I shall show that the view leads to a cycle of ground. But cycles of ground are impossible, so the view ought to be rejected. If sound, the argument will have several noteworthy implications beyond neo-Aristotelian metaphysics. For, as we shall see, the argument is an instance of the puzzles of ground – which suggests that analogous arguments will hold for any generational theory of properties. Moreover, the argument also has historical interest. For it problematizes the possibility of selfinstantiating universals, which has been recently endorsed by David Armstrong.

ABSTRACT. Mind-body property dualism postulates two distinct kinds of properties: mental properties and physical properties. Other than (mere) predicate dualism which recognises only a difference in language, the contrast property dualism postulates is of an ontological nature. An issue rarely discussed is that this ontological contrast has to be accommodated by the general metaphysics of properties the property dualist holds — e.g., by nominalism, universals, tropes theory, or variants thereof. In this paper, I suggest how, separately for each of these theories, the required ontological difference maker can be implemented.

ABSTRACT. This paper explores an often-overlooked distinction in distributive theory and its importance. The paper illustrates that there are at least three ways to interpret substantive proposals of how to distribute goods based on the claims (or complaints) of different individuals, and shows that the interpretation affects what the proposals recommend. It then argues that each of the interpretations is associated with significant problems since they all seem to violate plausible requirements of rationality. A fourth interpretation of how to understand claims is introduced, but some questions regarding whether this is compatible with distributive theories that appeal to claims are raised.

ABSTRACT. It has been argued recently that the problem with philosophical accounts of well-being is that they are not useful for any other concerns besides strictly philosophical competition over the correctness of one of high well-being theories. In this paper I focus on one of the most promising contextualist well-being accounts developed by Robeyns within capabilitarian framework. In spite of its attractiveness, I discuss certain problems with Robeyns’ account, namely that as a philosophical theory it lacks normative and descriptive adequacy. Therefore, I propose a different, more substantive capabilitarian account of well-being, based on Nussbaum’s list of capabilities.

ABSTRACT. I argue that performing wrongdoing damages our agential capacities and that forgiveness offers a unique chance for agential repair after performing wrongdoing. I offer an action theoretical account of moral injury, a term used by psychologists to describe the experience of witnessing or performing actions that are radically antithetical to one’s moral commitments. Analyzing first-personal accounts of moral injury in light of Anscombe’s theory of human action demonstrates how performing wrong or harmful actions damages our agency. Borrowing Lucy Allais’s account of forgiveness, I show how forgiveness can achieve what I call agential repair for wrongdoers.

ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to give support to the view that the obligation to justify one’s assertion, in the form of a rule of justification and whenever this justification is required by the discussants, is a necessary condition for the felicitous performance of the speech act. If this is correct, then the connection between speech and argumentation is stronger than what traditional accounts of speech act theory have considered, but not as overarching as some outstanding theoretical views (notably, those by Brandom and Habermas) have contended.

ABSTRACT. In this talk I argue that we should use ‘assert’ to theorize a notion that is subject to three constraints. First, that assertion is necessary for lying. Second, that it is compatible with bald-faced lying. Finally, that it can be retracted or taken back. As such, assertion occupies the space between the linguistic act of saying that p and the addressed, testimonial act of telling someone that p. In contrast to saying, assertion is lie-prone and can be retracted. In contrast to telling-that, assertion is a matter of going on the public record and as such compatible with bald-faced lying.

ABSTRACT. According to the constitutive rule account of assertion (CRAA), asserting is constituted by one constitutive rule of assertion. A recent objection against this view is "the engagement condition objection". Philosophers have proposed necessary conditions on engaging in rule-constituted activities and argued that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion, asserting doesn’t satisfy these conditions. I present a counterexample that shows that the proposed engagement conditions lead to counterintuitive results, propose an alternative that better captures our intuitions, and argue that this alternative is compatible with the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion.

ABSTRACT. The mathematical and ontological foundations of the propensity interpretation of fitness (PIF) have repeatedly come under heavy criticism. In this talk, I will argue for a synthetic revision of PIF, which I call the normic-dispositional interpretation of fitness (NIF). According to NIF, fitness is a functional property realized under evolutionary ‘normal’ conditions in the sense of Schurz (2001). I will show that NIF succeeds where previous readings of PIF have fallen short. Finally, I will generalize these results to the theoretical framework of Cultural Evolution by claiming its validity for biological and cultural evolutionary systems and dynamics.

ABSTRACT. This paper investigates whether a pluralistic account of evolutionary causation by natural selection can be developed to bridge the propensionist and causal views on this very difficult issue in the philosophy of biology. The main thrust of the paper will try to underline the need for philosophical views on biological causation to account also for the epistemic context of biological research, not just the metaphysical conception of probabilistic causation the seems to reside in the background. This approach could explain why some biological research is better interpreted on propensionist grounds, while others on causalist grounds, and dissolve some statisticalist concerns.

ABSTRACT. Network analysis explains complex systems without decomposing them into their component parts. This methodological procedure is intensively applied to the study of many biological systems such as the microbiome and other ecological phenomena. Despite its importance, dominant accounts of scientific explanation, new-mechanistic models included, do not account well for how network explanations gain their explanatory power. We cover that gap by offering a neo-Hempelian approach of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding (ASE). We claim that network explanations explain in virtue of their capacity to embed biological phenomena in a non-accidental generalization which is simultaneously ampliative and specialized.

ABSTRACT. In this talk, I provide elements of definition for “Naturalized Epistemology” and evaluate if they apply to Helmholtz and Poincaré’s thoughts on geometry and space. Contemporary commentators have frequently credited Helmholtz for putting together a naturalized epistemology Avant l’heure (Hatfield (1990), De Kock (2012), Patton (2018)); the same has not been attempted for Poincaré. I demonstrate in a two-part argument that Poincaré’s thoughts on geometry and space are compatible with arguments found in Helmholtz’s “Naturalized Epistemology”.

ABSTRACT. I will discuss M. G. White's holistic pragmatism and compare it with other prominent XXth century evidential holisms: P. Duhem’s, logical positivists’, and W.V. Quine's. Holistic pragmatism, the view that beliefs or hypotheses are tested only as corporate bodies, is often associated with Quine's ‘Two Dogmas’ and P. Duhem's account of scientific tests. Regrettably, the popularity of Quine's philosophy had a detrimental effect on the common recognition of alternative holistic positions like logical positivists’ or inclusive holistic pragmatism of White, developed since mid-1950s. I argue the latter balanced pragmatist position has been unfairly neglected by the mainstream analytic scholarship.

ABSTRACT. For some commentators Quine's indeterminacy of meaning thesis supports semantic solipsism (Blackburn 1984, Hookway 1988). The key motivation for solipsism lies in understanding Quine’s radical translation thought experiment along the lines of an indefinite regress of interpretations. I argue that Quine’s approach to language can accommodate, instead, the idea that interpretation is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding (Quine, 1970) and hence overcome solipsism. In particular, as a theory of meaning solipsism goes beyond the threshold of Quine’s naturalism. From a Quinean perspective, the philosophical underpinnings of solipsism are a form of “first philosophy" prior to natural science” (67, 1981).

ABSTRACT. This paper argues that Dominic Lopes’s ‘network theory’ fails to provide a satisfactory answer to the question of aesthetic normativity: what makes aesthetic value value? The theory proposes to answer this question in terms of achievement. However, the only informative thing it tells us about what makes an aesthetic act an achievement is that it is performed competently in alignment upon an aesthetic profile. This only secures the descriptive aspect of an aesthetic property; it does not determine whether any such property is an aesthetic value or disvalue. At best, the theory provides a partial answer to the normative question.

ABSTRACT. I propose a construal of aesthetic value that gives us reason to emphasize some aesthetic practices over others. This construal rests on the existence of a central aesthetic value, namely apprehension-testing intricacy within an appropriate domain. I address three main objections: the objection that asks how an aesthetic value based on intricacy can account for the value of minimalism; the objection that asks about the difference between intricacy within a medium and intricacy between media; and the objection that asks about the danger of a regress of intricacy.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I argue that the content of literature is, in part, determined by its literary form and, further, that literary works, by virtue of their form, are a source of understanding. Whilst it may seem that a notion of literary cognitive value that is dependent on literary form falls prey to the problem of paraphrase (Livingston, 2009), by defending a notion of understanding as something holistic and distinct from propositional knowledge, I escape the problem.

ABSTRACT. A pluralist ontology states that works of art can belong to distinct ontological categories whereas a monist ontology states that all works of art belong to one ontological category. A monist ontology would be preferable since it paves the way for a unified account of art. Yet, monist conceptions find it hard to deal with cultural practices of art appreciation. In the first part of the paper, I will discuss the main monist strategies in the current ontology of art, and I will argue that all these strategies fail to deal with the relevant cultural practices. In the second part of the paper, I will propose a new monist ontology of art according to which all works of art are norm-constituted objects. I will argue that this account can succeed in dealing with the relevant cultural practices, and I will highlight its explanatory virtues.

ABSTRACT. Recent work on the phenomenology of free will suggests that experiences of freedom are partly constitutive of free will. I argue for the plausibility of this claim in the context of akratic and weak-willed agency. I focus on a paradigmatic class of self-reinforcing akratic and weak-willed action and first introduce the mechanism of self-signaling as a useful provisional model for explaining these. I then go on to argue that a properly phenomenological analysis significantly enhances our understanding of these kinds of actions, and of how they shape the broader sense of agency; this is demonstrated on two examples.

ABSTRACT. I argue that weakness of will involves a lack of self-confidence as one of its main psychological components. Specifically, I submit that one main issue with weak agents is their reduced feeling of self-efficacy: they do not trust themselves with the ability to deal with the aversive task in a way which is effective and, actually, not so painful. Seeing weakness as primarily stemming from a lack of self-trust helps us account for a phenomenon which is sometimes called ‘rigidity’ (or ‘stubbornness’) and which, prima facie, seems to reveal the opposite tendency.

ABSTRACT. This paper defends Evidence Internalism for Relevant Alternatives (RA) theories of knowledge. According to Evidence Internalism, if two subjects are "internal twins", they have the same evidence. According to pure RA theories of knowledge, a subject knows that $p$ iff the subject's evidence rules out all relevant alternatives to p. Since alternatives to one's evidence are always ruled out by the evidence itself, RA theories imply that one knows one's own evidence. Only on an internalist conception of evidence this is not problematic. Extant arguments against Evidence Internalism are forceless, since there is externalism elsewhere in the theoretical framework.

ABSTRACT. Non-evidentialist anti-sceptics maintain that acceptance of anti-sceptical hypotheses can be epistemically warranted without evidence. Critics find it unclear how this can be so. The underlying issue, I argue, is axiological: it is unclear how acceptance of anti-sceptical hypotheses can be epistemically warranted without evidence because it is unclear how such acceptance can be epistemically good. I introduce a pluralist axiology to address this issue. There are several fundamental epistemic goods——some externalist in nature, others internalist. Combined with epistemic consequentialism this pluralist axiology can be used to provide a non-evidentialist account of value and warrant for acceptance of anti-sceptical hypotheses.

ABSTRACT. Powers come in degrees. These have usually been characterised in terms of the robustness of the modal connection between power, stimulus, and manifestation. I argue that there is another sort of degrees of powers –– intensity. In this paper I offer a model of intensity degrees as the relative distance of stimuli and manifestation in quality spaces with the appropriate metric. I argue that they can do important theoretical work in grounding comparative judgements about dispositions, explaining functional laws of nature and physical constants, and even partially explain the composition of powers.

ABSTRACT. Representatives of the capability approach say that Rawls' theory excludes people who lack the capacities of reasonableness and rationality from justice. We, firstly, show weaknesses of the alternative proposed by them. Secondly, we remark that, contrary to the critique of the authors that we discuss, the Rawlsian legislators need to consider not only their immediate needs with intact capacities, but also those in possible conditions of disabilities. As reasonable, they do this universally and impartially. Therefore, they include persons who do not have the capacities of reasonableness and rationality in justice, as well.

ABSTRACT. Governments sometimes have to make trade-offs between civil liberties and the protection of public health. These trade-offs involve comparing risks to health and life to loss of economic activity. According to critics, this approach is problematic because of its aggregative nature: it fails to consider risks and benefits from each person's perspective and it takes into account morally irrelevant harms and benefits. These two arguments, however, are in conflict: it can be shown that if some harms and benefits are ignored, then the trade-offs cannot be justified to each person. This provides an argument for aggregative approaches.

ABSTRACT. Saul Kripke’s has formulated a highly influential “acquaintance model” of Fregean indirect senses (2008). My first aim is to argue that, for a reason which has gone unnoticed, Kripke's argument for his model is flawed. The criticism is that Kripke attempts to travel along a “backward road” from reference to sense - a backward road which is in fact unavailable. My second aim is to replace Kripke’s argument with a new one, in support of Kripke’s own model: I defend two stringent requirements on a theory of indirect senses, and show that Kripke’s model satisfies them.

ABSTRACT. I will propose a fictionalist analysis of social discourse based on the debate between fictional and metafictional propositions. While fictional propositions are identified with the ‘in fiction ’operator, metafictional propositions are identified with the commitment to the existence or non-existence of ‘fictional entities.’ Just as the fictional proposition that Sherlock Holmes exists in fiction is distinct from the metasocial proposition that Sherlock Holmes exists, I will argue that a social proposition that an entity exists in sociality is distinct from the metasocial proposition that a social entity exists. I will define ‘in sociality’ as an operator that converts the truth conditions into whether there is a group of people with appropriate doxastic attitudes, and thus argue that only the truth of existentially loaded metasocial propositions requires the existence of social entities. I then discuss the possible consequences of this distinction.

ABSTRACT. Arguments regarding theoretical irreducibility of mental predicates are often used for ontological conclusions. Whether these are justified depends on how one understands the notion of "reduction". Reduction in philosophy of mind is usually understood very strictly. However, the strong understanding of reduction does not reflect recent developments in the philosophy of science. In this talk, we will outline a framework for interrelating the discussions of reductionism in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. We show that ontological ir-/reducibility of mental properties to physical properties is explained in different ways by different reductionist and non-reductionist theories in philosophy of mind.

ABSTRACT. The divide between reductive and nonreductive physicalism boils down to a largely semantic difference once the two views are extricated from commitments associated with but not entailed by the positions. For nonreductivists, the commitment is that multiple realizability implies realizer irrelevance; for reductivists, that reduction is reduction to microphysical properties. Absent these commitments, the positions are analogous to two ways of categorizing the set of lattice-forming elements. This set includes multiple elements, but only those whose outer shell has four ‘empty spots’ for electrons. Whether only the elements or the whole set are a single kind is largely semantic.

ABSTRACT. Brentano’s late reism is often interpreted as a kind of nominalism, according to which all categories of entities boil down to the category of real things: the only things that exist are real things. In this paper, I reject this understanding of Brentano’s reism. I suggest that Brentano’s reism is only a nominalism about abstract objects belonging to the category of irreal and non-existent, such as concepts, propositions, states of affairs, objectives, and the like. Such entities should be eliminated because their postulation leads to absurdities, and not so much as a matter of ontological parsimony.

ABSTRACT. A recent interpretation of Brentano holds that Brentano may have held a purely non-relational conception of intentionality from the beginning. (Ierna 2015, forthcoming; Gow 2021). Although I disagree with this view, I think it draws attention to an important question: was there a critical engagement with the subject-object model in Brentano before the explicit critique of the relational core of the model? I will seek the answer to this question in Brentano's theory of inner perception.

ABSTRACT. Hohfeld (1913) has convincingly argued that liberty-rights (e.g. freedom of speech, property rights) should be distinguished from claim-rights (e.g. the claim that arise when one is promised something). Hohfeld argues, correctly as well, that the logical correlatives of claim-rights are duties: if Paul is entitled to have Julie buy him a beer, the corollary of Paul's right is Julie's obligation to buy him a beer.

What then are the logical correlatives of liberty-rights? Bob's freedom to F does not have as correlative everyone's duty not to prevent Bob from F-ing, Hohfled maintains. Thomson (1990, 53) disagrees. Genuine liberties (which she distinguishes for mere privileges), she argues, must have duties of non-interference as correlatives. I argue in defense of Hohfeld that insofar as we are interested ni logical correlatives, as he is, duties of non-interference, which may be valid on other grounds, are not logical correlatives of liberties. A first reason for this is that such duties have in their content the notion of interference, which is absent from the contents of the original liberty-rights. A second reason for this is that the relation between Bob's freedom to F and Martha's duty not to prevent Bob from F-ing is explanatory, contrary to the relation between logical correlatives which is symmetrical.

While accepting Hohfeld’s negative thesis that duty of non-interference are not correlatives of liberty-rights, I reject his positive thesis. According to Hohfeld, the logical correlative of Bob's liberty-right to F is the "no-right" of third parties that Bob does not F. I argue that this answer is unsatisfactory. First, because no-rights are not strictly speaking legal correlatives, but rather lacks thereof; second, because if nobody has the claim-right that Bob does not F, it is still not enough for Bob to have the liberty-right to F.

My positive thesis builds on a neglected proposal by Reinach (1913). According to Reinach, liberty-rights have no logical correlatives, because they are absolute rights. Absolute right are rights that have no opposite party. Hohfeld's error lies in his assuming from the outset that all rights are relations. I then argue that only claim-rights are relations, and that liberty-rights, while having normative implications for other persons, are essentially non-relative.

ABSTRACT. What does interpreting a work of classical music amount to? The aim of this article is to show that there are ethical issues that interpreters face in their practice. Every work lends itself to multiple interpretations. How is it possible that, while following the basic indications provided by the score, one can still violate the spirit of a work of music? This is a relevant question also from an ethical point of view. When is that the interpreter’s expressive freedom becomes violation? I argue what interpretation consists of and the I conclude with presenting a way of adjudicating interpretative disputes.

ABSTRACT. Headlines on the crisis of trust are legion. The crisis of trust is said to distort our attitudes towards public institutions, the media, and even science. Most seriously, the trust crisis can undermine democracy itself. The empirical evidence regarding a crisis of trust is mixed, and it is far from clear how the available data should be interpreted. Philosophers, however, by and large, have been willing to accept the narrative of a trust crisis unquestioningly, and there is indeed no shortage of insightful philosophical analyses on the topic.

In this talk, I would like to encourage social and political epistemologists to consider the topic of the crisis of trust from a somewhat different angle.

In this talk, I argue that the important task ahead of us is not just to investigate the perils of a crisis of trust, but to try and capture the conditions for trust and trustworthiness in a world that faces a multitude of simultaneous crises.

I claim that there are some unique features to trust in times of crisis when compared to everyday public trust:

1. A demand for both deeper and more widespread networks of trust.
2. A call for trust as what Nguyen (2022), in a different context, has called an “unquestioning attitude”.
3. Facing epistemically (and emotionally) unfavourable environments for trust, which provide grounds for mistrust.

1 to 3 create the dilemma of how to achieve robust public trust in an epistemic environment that is unfavourable, and even hostile, to trust.

The paper falls into three sections:

Section 1 provides a brief background to the discussion of various current crises, including the alleged crisis of trust.

Section 2 deals with what I call the demandingness of trust in times of crisis.

Section 3 focuses on the problem of unfavourable environments for trust.

I conclude with some tentative suggestions for how to address the dilemma of trust in times of crisis.