ABSTRACT. Goldman (1967) proposed that a subject s knows p if and only if p is appropriately causally connected to s’s believing p. He later on abandoned this theory (Goldman, 1976). The main objection to the theory is that the causal connection required by Goldman is compatible with certain problematic forms of luck. In this paper we argue that Goldman’s causal theory of knowledge can overcome the luck problem if causation is understood along interventionist lines.

ABSTRACT. Debates on the nature of understanding-why are focused on whether it is reducible or not to knowledge-that. In one of those debates, Hills (2015) and Sullivan (2018) are focusing on the kind of abilities that constitute understanding-why. We draw on the distinction between upstream and downstream indicators (Hawley 2011) in order to elucidate this debate and to sketch a defence of non-reductionism that avoids the objection that physical-practical abilities are typically required for knowledge-how, but not for understanding-why.

ABSTRACT. This study is about epistemology through manipulated moving image in all of its expanded forms. We aim to focus on the epistemic values of time-lapse animation in the context of these cinematographic constraints, and we want to assess its viability as a cognitive tool for obtaining knowledge about the “invisible” world. The study has been divided into three parts: History and origins of manipulating capturing and projecting time in moving image, the relation between Spatio-temporal properties in representing the agency of the scene’s components and representing a social scene in manipulated time perspective. We investigate the boundaries of intelligibility.

ABSTRACT. This paper argues against the existence of so-called normative defeaters, i.e. defeaters consisting of doubts or beliefs that a subject ought to have, but may actually not have, indicating that her belief that p is either false or unjustified. Despite not necessarily being in the possession of the subject, such defeaters still remove her status as justified in that belief. It will be argued that alleged cases of such defeat either are not genuine cases of defeat – the subject remains justified or was not justified to begin with – or can be subsumed under other categories of defeat.

ABSTRACT. This paper proposes a functional approach to ‘perspectival realism’ (R. Giere, M. Massimi, P. Teller, i.a.) by delineating a functional role of scientific perspectives in the ‘representational success’ of models. First, in the DEKI account of how models represent (C. Elgin, R. Frigg&J. Ngyuen), we accommodate a scientific perspective within the mapping (K): the relation between interpreted attributes of a model and those of the target system. Perspectives alter the probability of the accuracy of a model, defined here through the first-order similarity relation between the model and the target (M. Weisberg). We point to two advantages of this approach: a diachronic convergence of models based on different perspectives and the stability of models to the change of perspectives. We offer two case studies: the debate about the Yang-Mills “surplus structure” and a case of super-symmetry in the “extended models” in particle physics. We show that the probabilistic approach to perspectives sheds new light on the concept of ‘exploratory’ models (both on ‘targetless’ and on ‘hypothetical’ models, see Massimi).

ABSTRACT. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

Externalism (the position that our contents depend on the external world, that they can be individuated by our causal interaction with the natural and social world) is not written in stone, however it seems that the majority of philosophers share externalistic intuitions (Philpapers survey, 2009). If one accepts social externalism as presented by Burge, then certain implications for the theory of linguistic meaning seem to follow. One of them is that correct theory of meaning should distinguish between linguistic and empirical correctness. In my presentation I show that normative inferentialism (Brandom 1994, 2000; Peregrin 2014) is able to draw the distinction between semantic and empirical correctness.

ABSTRACT. Force Cancellation and Force Liberation I present and develop Peter Hanks’ (2007/2015) notion of force cancellation in his account of force integral propositions with respect to the unity problem. Force cancellation is examined under Reiland’s (2013) dilemma. Recanati’s (2016/2019) attempt to partially defend Hanks’ account is criticized, as it leaves unanswered the act a speaker is performing in a cancellation context. Instead, I would suggest that the problem lies in the very restrictive variety of forces that are acknowledged, the ones we inherited from Austin and Searle. However, one could construe utterances of a conditional sentence as carrying conditional force integrated to the components of the conditional proposition. A similar line could be taken for disjunctive and pretending propositions.

ABSTRACT. Conceptual engineering faces the challenge of topic continuity. Attempts to meet the challenge have mainly been made within the framework of externalist semantics. In contrast, I claim that topic continuity can be preserved from a broadly Fregean view that sees revision of meaning as replacement (vs. change or stability) of concepts. First, I discuss externalist proposals from Haslanger (2020) and Sawyer (2018, 2019). Second, I contrast their views with mine, focusing on the example MARRIAGE. Finally, I propose ways to enable topic continuity in spite of conceptual replacement (functionalism, chains of meaning).

Section: Philosophy of Language

ABSTRACT. Topic: Logic and philosophy of mathematics It is shown that the general form of the sorites paradox is second-order, relying on the notion of transitive closure. It can be expressed in classical FOL with a finite upper bound. This leads to defining vagueness as dispersion, using the interplay of total preorders and monadic predicates. Results include the failure of weak NC (‘Some men are broadly tall and broadly short’), the failure of weak LEM (‘Some men are neither strictly tall nor strictly short`), and a weak tolerance holding (‘If a man of n cm is strictly tall, a man of n-1 cm is broadly tall’).

ABSTRACT. The paper deals with natural-language processing and question-answering with respect to formalised natural-language texts. Our background theory is the system of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). We apply Gentzen-style natural deduction to answer Wh-questions by deriving answers entailed by the input sentences. There are two novelties. First, we integrate special semantic rules rooted in the rich natural-language semantics into the standard proof system. Second, while a standard proof calculus deals only with sentences denoting truth-values, Wh-questions are transformed into lambda- terms denoting entities of different types. The solution is based on applying the rules of lambda abstraction and reduction.

ABSTRACT. Conceptual engineering is an exciting new movement in analytic philosophy that promotes a renewed take on philosophical methodology as the study of concepts. In a nutshell, it is now quite consensually characterized as the method to assess and improve our conceptual devices. The MICE Symposium (4x30min. talks) is about the metaphilosophical issues in conceptual engineering — dealing with its theoretical foundations, methodological framework, and practical implementation. The main goal of the symposium is to thereby contribute to a better understanding of what conceptual engineering is all about and ultimately improve the prospect for conceptual engineering being an actionable method.

ABSTRACT. Ethics, Philosophy of action.

Collective attitudes, joint actions and shared intentions have been deployed in ethical and political philosophy to understand the functioning of society and the relationship between authority and its subjects. This paper aims to show how individuals do things together and how they share intentions when the state has authority over them. A reductionist account of hierarchical joint activities applicable to both small and large-scale groups (with an emphasis on political societies) will be developed. The paper will show that members of large-scale groups share intentions in acting together even in the face of authority.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I will propose that non-cognitivist theories of ethics do not imply motivational internalism. To show this, I will propose an objection to the motivation-based theories of desire. I will show motivation is neither necessary nor sufficient for desiring. Therefore, even if we accept the thesis that moral judgements are expressions of desires (as non-cognitivists claim), it does not immediately follow that moral judgements are motivational. Therefore, the highly held connection between internalism and non-cognitivism is faced with a challenge. My argument is based on discussions of motivation and desire in philosophy and psychology.

ABSTRACT. What is it for a system to be intelligent? The so-called Blockhead thought experiment (Block 1981) is widely regarded as providing a decisive refutation of any dispositionalist answer to this question. The thought experiment turns on an imaginary machine whose outward behavior equals that of an intelligent person, but which is said to be clearly unintelligent due to the overly simple nature of its internal mechanisms. This paper reconsiders the thought experiment and provides an extensive argument for the conclusion that the central claim about the case—viz., that the Blockhead lacks intelligence—lacks adequate justification and should therefore not be assigned any weight in deciding on the nature of intelligence.

ABSTRACT. The ability to engage in joint attention, in which two individuals attend to the same object or event together, is considered fundamental for language learning, for understanding others and for joint actions. Joint attention is often defined as a mutually open, or transparent relation between co-attenders. But how should this openness be characterised? I argue that tensions in current approaches to tackle this question arise from the attempt to address both normative and cognitive explanada. Drawing from evidence in developmental psychology, I outline the case for an account of joint attention based on a weaker notion of mutual awareness. This paper's topic is Philosophy of Mind and Action.

ABSTRACT. Do we have to presuppose a self to account for human self-consciousness? If so, how should we characterize the self? These questions are discussed in the context of two alternatives, i.e., the no-self position (Metzinger 2003, 2009) and the claim that the only self we have to presuppose is a narrative self (Dennett, 1992; Schechtman, 2007; Hardcastle, 2008) which is primarily an abstract entity. In contrast, I argue that we have to presuppose an embodied self. Self-consciousness results from an integration of an embodied, basic affective flow with an intentional object where this integration remains anchored in an embodied self. This embodied self will be characterized in detail using the pattern theory of self.

ABSTRACT. (Topic: Metaphysics)

Mereology studies the part–whole relation and is nowadays mostly discussed within the metaphysics of material objects—for example, whether two composite objects can be made of the same parts? But besides being the subject of philosophical investigation, mereology may also be the method of philosophical investigation. This talk identifies two ways in which mereology can be used as a method: to restrict the space of admissible theories and to explicate a position. I argue that both ways depend on a version of mereological monism according to which all composite objects satisfy the principles of a single (core) mereological theory.

ABSTRACT. [Metaphysics]

Instantaneous velocity (IV) must be part of the instantaneous state of an object, it is widely argued, but this is in tension with IV being derived from the pattern of positions of that object over time. This tension may be understood as the modern formulation of Zeno’s arrow paradox. I present a solution derived from Aristotle’s solution to Zeno: the (flight of the) arrow is a ‘lasting’ entity, i.e. it is ontologically prior to its point-in-time (composing) states. We may still follow contemporary mathematics in accepting actual infinities, supposing that the (flight of the) arrow has an actual infinity of potential point-in-time parts - potential in a mereological sense.

ABSTRACT. According to actualism there are no merely possible individuals. Instead there are only actually existing ersatz individuals. In addition, some actualists claim that there are no de re possibilities for merely possible individuals, but all such possibilities are de dicto (general). In order to motivate this view some actualists appeal to counterpart theory. In my talk I present how this can be done. However, counterpart actualist theory suffers from some issues. A most popular one is that counterpart actualist cannot explain possibility of indiscernibles. I argue that actualist can avoid this problem once she introduces a variant of metaphysical anti-haecceitism.

ABSTRACT. I argue for the metametaphysical view that the general question in metaphysics is what it is to be or exist. Metaphysics divides into ontology and formal ontology. Ontology studies questions what there is and on what ground. These include specific metaphysical problems like the existence of space-time, the consideration of which arguably involves the ontological categories of substance and relation. Ontological problems are studied from the point of view of ontological categories. In the formal ontological tradition (e.g. Husserl, Smith, Simons and Lowe), metaphysics focusing on ontological categories and forms is formal ontology, whose questions are logically primary to the ontological problems. Topic: metaphysics

ABSTRACT. Kit Fine’s infamous monster objection is usually seen by hylomorphism’s friends as a fatal threat to the so-called standard mereology. On the other hand, the supporters of standard mereology take it as blatant nonsense. Despite its influence, the argument has received little attention in the literature. No thorough analysis is available. This work aims to fill this void, providing the reader with an exhaustive reconstruction of the objection, offering a clear rephrasing and unveiling the metaphysical background from which it rises. This exercise will disclose different paths that a standard mereologist might be willing to go to avoid the problem.