ABSTRACT. There are many logics containing a conditional connective >, including classical logic, modal logic with strict implication, normal and classical conditional logics, the logic of dynamic semantics, intuitionistic logic, relevance logic, and Hype. Whereas some relations between these are known, others remain unexplained. This paper builts such a bridge, by defining a semantics where each logical operator is defined based on a different revision operator, plus an additional relation. The above logics are shown to arise as special cases, by tuning the semantic parameters. In particular, the paper will explore the different facets of the Ramsey test, arising from these different logics.

ABSTRACT. Logical pluralism is a family of positions united by the 'plurality thesis'—the claim that there is more than one correct logic. Different types of pluralism emerge with different readings of the terms 'logic' and 'correctness'. I defend a view called ‘modest pluralism’: there is a number of different correct logics but only one unique notion of logical consequence. I establish this position by linking it to different conceptions of what it means for a logic to be correct. I argue that modest pluralism avoids some pertinent problems of more substantial versions of logical pluralism.

ABSTRACT. I will first introduce two interpretations of quantifiers: as higher-order predicates and as choice functions. While the former has been adopted by the model-theoretic semantics of First-Order Logic, the latter has been formalized by the ε-operator of the Epsilon Calculus. I will then argue that the representation of dependence relations among quantified variables – as realized by Skolem functions – is a condition for the correct interpretation of quantifiers. Finally, I will compare and evaluate the two interpretations according to the condition of dependence relations. I will argue that the Epsilon Calculus, unlike First-Order Logic, can account for dependence relations – thus advocating for the interpretation of quantifiers as choice functions.

ABSTRACT. Kit Fine’s procedural postulationism is a novel approach to the metaphysics and epistemology of mathematical objects, according to which they are introduced in a stepwise fashion by executing imperatival postulates (Kit Fine 2005: “Our Knowledge of Mathematical Objects”, in: Gendler, T. Z. / Hawthorne J. (eds.) 2005: Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 89-109). In my presentation I will develop its logic and semantics, which Fine is largely silent about in published work. For the logic, I will take inspiration from Fitch-style natural deduction, and for the semantics from current work in graph transformation grammar.

Topic: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics

ABSTRACT. LC is a modal logic of change expressed in gradually expanding language with the primitive operator C (it changes that). Because of its direct references to the Aristotelian philosophy of substantial change, LC is a philosophical logic. The point of interest is to test its intended utility in application to classical concepts of change (Aristotle, Heraclitus, Parmenides). We propose their metatheoretical characterizations in terms of semantics of LC, founded on the histories of changes. We examine different concepts of definability applied to certain histories coding classical theories of change. We point general limitations of the considered concepts of LC definability. They give light on the strength of LC as a tool for analysis of the concept of change in general.

ABSTRACT. D. Fallis and P. Lewis argue that the Brier Score is not a good tool for measuring the value of an agent's belief function, since conditionalization is supposedly always of epistemic benefit to the agent, yet there are cases in which, according to the Brier Score, the inaccuracy of a belief function increases. However, in all examples there is a different world $w_m$ such that, were \textit{that} world the actual one, the inaccuracy would decrease. I prove a conjecture of L. Wronski that there are no probabilistic mass vectors $p$ and $q$ such that $q$ is obtained from $p$ via conditionalization and $B(p) < B(q)$, regardless of the choice of the actual world.

ABSTRACT. Proportional fairness of a voting rule can be characterized as the ability to reflect all shades of political opinion of a society within the winning committee. Recently certain a proportionality property of justified representation(JR) has been defined - intuitively it requires that if there is a group of at least n/k voters whose approval have at least one candidate in common, then it cannot be the case that neither of these voters is represented in the committee. During the talk I will try to demonstrate how we can use the machinery from the field of multiwinner election theory to investigate proportionality properties in the general situation of voting for logical propositions (thus, related logically) in place of candidates only.

ABSTRACT. Philosophy of Language Discursive pluralism, by stating that not all assertions conform to a descrictive model of language, poses an interesting challenge to representationalism. Although in recent years alethic pluralism is becoming more and more popular as an interesting way out for this issue, the discussion hosts also other interesting minority approaches. In particular, the late stage of contemporary expressivism offers a number of relevant insights. In this presentation, I try to show how these expressivist ideas combine well together, composing a unitary and metaphysically sober framework.

ABSTRACT. David Lewis' theory of meaning seems to be both internalist and externalist. In places, he defends a Fregean, descriptivist, and so internalist account of meaning. But his use of naturalness constraints on eligible meaning assignments, in 'Putnam's Paradox' (1984), and 'New Work for a Theory of Universals' (1983), seems externalist. How can this be resolved? In this paper, I argue that, 1) Lewis’ version of reference magnetism requires the truth of quidditism (a view on the metaphysics of properties), and that 2) this combination of views is incompatible with a Fregean approach to meaning. At the end of the paper, I suggest that the cause of these problems is Lewis’ unwillingness to take experience seriously in the determination of content.

ABSTRACT. Most people agree that the expression ‘conspiracy theory’ is ordinarily employed in a pejorative way. Rather surprisingly, however, most philosophers working on this topic have been reluctant to acknowledge the pejorative aspect when either defining or engineering the concept ‘conspiracy theory' and instead have advocated a descriptive definition. In this talk, we present empirical data on the nature of the concept ‘conspiracy theory’. The results from this study put severe pressure on those philosophers who argue that the concept ‘conspiracy theory' can or should be defined in a minimal and neutral way.

Philosophy of Language

ABSTRACT. In philosophy of language the constitutive account of the thesis that meaning is normative is the claim that rules that govern the use of the expressions constitute meaning. Against this account Glüer, Pagin and Wikforss claim that meaning determining rules cannot be action-guiding since they do not require anything from the speaker and action guiding rules fail to determine meaning. This argument has been a subject of controversy the debate. I will argue that regardless of the success of the no-guidance argument the constitutive account fails since the rules that allegedly constitute meaning should be understood as constituting speech acts.

ABSTRACT. In the philosophical discussion of communication there is a widely accepted approach: the Transmission model of communication (TM). According to this model, communication consists in the transmission of propositions. The strongest version of TM is the Naïve conception of communication. There is a well-known problem presented by the naïve conception: indexical communication. All the contemporary versions of TM aim to offer a solution to the problem that indexical utterances pose for the Naïve theory. What I will provide is an alternative to TM, the Classificatory model of communication. This model is grounded on the act-based view of propositions. I shall argue that in this new conception cases of indexical communication are not a problem and fit smoothly into the model.

ABSTRACT. We will consider some contrasting cases in which there is (or there isn’t) successful communication among conversation participants. These contrasts seem puzzling and in need of an explanation. I will argue that we can account for them by acknowledging some important facts regarding the nature of communication. I will focus on two:

- The existence of what I call the coordination requirement (that, very roughly put, requires that there be the right kind of connection between the use of the word by the speaker and the hearer).

- The fact that when speakers make an assertion they typically communicate several propositions in addition to the one that is the literal meaning (in context) of the sentence that they uttered.

ABSTRACT. Arthur Danto’s main contribution to the philosophy of art can be seen in his claim that the contemporary artworks do not differ from ordinary objects in terms of perception and that to see something as art requires an artistic theory (Danto 1998). I will demonstrate that although perception cannot often discriminate between contemporary artworks and ordinary objects, the difference between the two may be articulated not only by means of a theory but also by means of an experience. I will speak of non-perceptual aesthetic experience and I will demonstrate that it is based on frustrated action-awareness. To support my thesis, I will make use of the adverbialist model of aesthetic experience recently introduced by J. Dokic (2016).

ABSTRACT. Art theorists used to consider site-specific art a current which emerged in the 1960s to challenge the traditional distinction between artworks and their sites. Currently, however, also works not stemming from that concern are called ‘site-specific’ – both past ones (e.g. Michelangelo’s Last Judgement fresco) and contemporary ones (e.g. certain dance performances). I offer a general characterization of site-specific artworks: they respond to their sites of installation by articulating content about them and incorporate their sites into their artistic media; in works like 1960s ones the sites belong to the artistic media because they have been physically manipulated by the artists.

Area: aesthetics

ABSTRACT. This paper deploys Stacie Friend’s (2012) notion of genre in order to improve Darko Suvin’s (1979) characterization of science fiction, according to which a work of science fiction must concern “a fictional ‘novum’ (novelty, innovation) validated by cognitive logic”. While Suvin conceives of his characterization as a necessary and sufficient condition, I cast the “fictional novum” and its “cognitive validation” as standard features of the genre, which works of science fiction should have but might lack. This amended version of Suvin’s characterization can better account for two basic properties of science fiction as a genre, namely its historicity and its relevance to appreciation.

ABSTRACT. What are pictures ? To answer this question in aesthetics, it seems that we have to choose between two competing approaches : a perceptual or a conventional account. Although these accounts are often presented as incompatible, it is not obvious in what sense they are so. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to precisely identify the differences between the perceptual and the conventional accounts of pictures. Secondly, to suggest that they may not have the same explananda, leaving open the possibility that a theory of depiction associating both might be built.

ABSTRACT. A version of methodological triangulation (DMT) has recently been vindicated because if no method is known to be the most reliable, DMT is more likely to endorse a true result than randomly choosing a single method and sticking with it (Heesen et al., 2019). The success of DMT, however, depends on randomly selecting one of the results when evidence is discordant. We instead propose epistemically modest triangulation (EMT), according to which one should withhold judgment if evidence is unclear. We then show that, given some plausible assumptions, the expected utility of EMT is greater than that of DMT and that of randomly settling upon a single method.

ABSTRACT. Category: Epistemology

In his 2016 paper, Neil Levy offers an epistemological explanation of anxious rumination in paradigmatic cases such as agents worrying if they left their stove on. I show that Levy’s account does not succeed because it rests on three false premises. I offer my own solution that anxious rumination is an instantiation of what I call “saltatoric belief” - a rapid flickering between two mutually exclusive beliefs which is necessarily elicited by a specific set of situational parameters and a rational response to them. Lastly, I show that the concept of saltatoric belief also solves the epistemological problem of explaining (mild) superstition.

ABSTRACT. Quassim Cassam (2018) offers a comprehensive account of epistemic vices that is independent of any particular view of knowledge and virtue. I criticize Cassam’s account, as well as his separation of vice epistemology from the study of virtue in general. The account fails because its definition of epistemic vice wrongly includes some non-vicious character traits while excluding certain actual vices. The reason for this failure, I suggest, is that the different epistemic vices cannot be studied in isolation. Instead, we can only arrive at a satisfactory account of epistemic vice once we take into account the unity of virtue.

ABSTRACT. Social epistemology and intellectual autonomy-qua-virtue are in tension. For traditional accounts of intellectual autonomy tell us that it depends only on facts about whether one is epistemically self-reliant or self-governing, whereas social epistemology tells us that we are epistemically dependent on others. At best, its development comes at the expense of much of what we know, which simply trades one epistemic good—intellectual autonomy—for another—knowledge. I argue that intellectual autonomy is in fact not at odds with social epistemology. This is because intellectual autonomy depends on structural facts about one’s social-epistemic environment, as well as facts about whether agents have the arbitrary ability to interfere with one’s thoughts or inquiries, whether directly or by way of institutional structure.

ABSTRACT. In her Lessons Learned Report, Wendy Williams (2020) describes the UK Home Office as illustrating 'institutional ignorance' and 'thoughtlessness' towards the Windrush Generation. These are candidate collective/institutional epistemic vices. In this talk, I draw on Miranda Fricker's (forthcoming) notion of 'institutional ethos' and Ian James Kidd's (2019, 2020) idea of 'epistemic corruption' to diagnose the Home Office's failings. I argue that the Home Office's epistemic ethos was corrupted in two ways: actively when employees encouraged and promoted the exercise of epistemically vicious behaviour, which led to the cultivation of a bad epistemic ethos; and passively when Home Office employees tolerated the loss of epistemic virtues in its prescribed ethos. The net result of this was the development and exercise of institutionally ignorant and thoughtless conduct towards Britain's Caribbean population.

ABSTRACT. The paper develops a novel account of the justification of judgements on philosophical thought experiments. It argues that justified judgements on thought experiments are cases where an agent manifests the recognitional ability to apply concepts in a real or a hypothetical scenario. Unlike Deutsch’s proposal, the account does not rule out bona fide cases of justified judgements, and unlike Williamson’s proposal, it is not too weak as to be unsuitable as a basis for theory building in philosophy. One great advantage of explaining the justification of judgements on thought experiments without adverting to any faculty of rational intuition is that skeptical worries about the use of thought experiments in philosophy that are intuition-driven also lose their bases.

ABSTRACT. We put forth an analysis of actual causation. The analysis centers on the notion of a causal model that provides only partial information as to which events occur, but complete information about the dependences between the events. The basic idea is this: c causes e just in case there is a causal model that is uninformative on e and in which e will occur if c does. Notably, our analysis has no need to consider what would happen if c were absent. We show that our analysis captures more causal scenarios than any counterfactual account to date.

ABSTRACT. Most contemporary powers metaphysicians can be considered metaphysical realists. They take powers to be among the ontologically basic entities that populate the mind-independent world. However, the idea of a power has recently also been put to use within the radically different context of articulating an idealist philosophy – an 'analytic German Idealism', if you will. The difference between realist and idealist powers comes out most clearly in the case of the power of thought: for realists, thought is a power that certain objects in the world have, while for idealists it coincides with reality – ‘thinking is being’. I will argue that idealism, and not realism, best captures what made the invocation of powers look attractive in the first place.

ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between kinds and essences. The first section will present kinds in Aristotelian ontology and a possible problem of this framework. I will argue that a serious view on Aristotelian kinds may face a dilemma: either they become Platonic universals or they become particularised universals, but this seems problematic. To escape it, I will propose a theory of essences and kinds in section two. This conception of essence has been inspired by by Aquinas' De ente et essentia. To conclude, I will collocate this position in the realism-nominalism debate.

ABSTRACT. In many explanations, essences/forms/kinds play a key role. E.g. electrons have unit negative charge because they are electrons; triangles have internal angles equal to 180° because they are triangles. First, we argue that essence-based explanations are metaphysical explanations. We also apply the usual criteria for distinguishing causal from non-causal/metaphysical explanations to essence-based explanations. Second, we look into the prima facie close relation between essence-based explanation and grounding. Third, we argue that explanations should use generic, not individual, essences. Fourth, we argue that essences play an important role in biological and social sciences.

ABSTRACT. This talk is about how events which we commonly take to be inevitable, such as death, can have causes. Contemporary dependence approaches to actual causation are committed to the idea that only contingent events can have causes. In this talk we make two contributions to recent analyses of actual causation (such as Lewis 1973, Lewis 2000, Yablo 2002, Halpern & Pearl 2005, Halpern 2016, Beckers & Vennekens 2018). Firstly, we raise a general problem for the most popular solution to the problem of inevitable effects. Secondly, we adapt a recent account Beckers & Vennekens (2018) explain under what conditions inevitable events have causes.

ABSTRACT. Philosophy of science

In this paper, I build on Okasha’s (2018) discussion of endogenization as a widespread theoretical strategy in evolutionary biology, in order to provide a clearer conceptualization of its dynamics and to spell out some of its epistemic consequences. I first identify three successive stages of endogenization: formalization, functional extension, and semantic extension. Then, I show that semantic extension involves the problem of how to provide justification for the broader referential scope of some core concepts of the theory. To illustrate the relevance of this issue for successful endogenization, I analyse recent controversies concerning the extension of the concept of inheritance.

ABSTRACT. In the 1957 famous Wu's experiment evidenced parity violation in the spacetime of our world. Although some philosophers referred to its results, it seems that they did not see in them the opportunity to solve one of the most heated debates in the history of philosophy of spacetime: between relationalists and substantivalists. In my talk I would like to show some possible metaphysical consequences of parity violation. In particular, beginning with finding the relation between P symmetry and being oriented or orientable, I would try to suggest possible connections between having these features and being absolute or relational.

ABSTRACT. (PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE)

The present paper aims to provide an insight into the epistemological and metaphysical implications of a structuralist interpretation of Relational Quantum Mechanics. I will try to show that a particular formulation of Structural Realism represents the best framework in which to understand RQM, and, in turn, that such interpretation provides some support for the adoption of a structuralist viewpoint in Quantum Mechanics (QM) thus understood. The choice is motivated by the same revisionary metaphysics they both seem to offer, with respect to the notion of quantum entity and relation.

ABSTRACT. Emily Sullivan (2019) has recently made an important contribution to our philosophical understanding of Machine Learning (ML) in science, by pointing out that it is not their ‘black box’-ness that limits scientific understanding but rather their ‘link uncertainty’: a lack of empirical support and connection to target phenomena. I will significantly refine and extend this assessment in three steps: First, I distinguish explanatory from instrumental models, and show that ML models are instrumental. Second, I establish two independent dimensions of black box-ness, and how link uncertainty is intimately connected to one of them. Third, I show how this gives rise to a fundamental philosophical problem that I call “the problem of the best explanatory model”.

ABSTRACT. Behavioural welfare economics has lately been challenged on account of invoking ‘latent’ or ‘true’ preferences as normative criterion for welfare assessments. The charge is that this presupposes an ‘inner rational agent’ that can generate stable and context-independent preferences—an assumption without psychological foundation. I argue that behavioural welfare economics need only assume that people have long-term goals. Policy intervention, in the form of preference purification, is justified when people act on—but fail to efficiently advance—such goals. While preference purification on this account suffers from significant epistemological challenges, I argue they can be overcome in a number of instances.

Topic: Philosophy of Science

ABSTRACT. Many philosophers have been tempted by the view that metaphysical grounding generates a “fundamentality ordering” of facts—an ordering of facts consisting in (or determined by) a relation of being more fundamental than, a relation of being as fundamental as, and a property of being fundamental. I believe that the view is correct. I indeed believe that metaphysical grounding generates many such orderings. In this presentation, I will offer a characterisation of a particular, homogenous family of orderings of the sort in question. This characterisation does justice to the idea that where in the ordering a given fact is located is a matter, not of the particular fact that it is, but rather of the kind of fact that it is.

ABSTRACT. This is a book symposium on Button & Walsh's book, Philosophy and Model Theory (OUP, 2018). Three critics will explore different aspects of the book, with a short reply by B&W.

Critic 1 will consider B&W's criticisms of the Tarski-Sher thesis. This is the thesis that logical notions are exactly the bijection-invariant notions.

Critic 2 will consider the relationship between model theory and mathematical structuralism, drawing attention to logics which sit between first- and second-order, and to theories which are neither algebraic nor univocal, but rather `Lego-like'.

Critic 3 will criticise B&W's suggestion that internal categoricity results might help us to secure the determinacy of certain mathematical theories (e.g. PA or ZF).