ABSTRACT. Prawitz's notions of valid argument and ground account for a concept of provability not reducible to that of derivability in some specific system. From Gödel's incompleteness we know that no axiomatizable set of rules is suitable for a proof-based determination of meaning. But Gödel's theorems play a pivotal role also in Kreisel's idea of informal rigour, as well as in Gödel's own notion of absolute provability. We aim to investigate whether Prawitz's semantics can be read in terms of Kreisel's and Gödel's proposals, and argue that Prawitz's approach might cope with Kreisel's one. Gödel seems to undertake a different point of view, reminding of Girard's proof-nets and Ludics. This negative outcome may nonetheless suggest a bridging from Prawitz to Girard.

ABSTRACT. Topic: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics

Grounding is receiving increasing attention in philosophy. It is usually introduced as an objective and explanatory relation that is non-causal in nature, and much effort is being spent to logically characterise it and to provide formal systems that capture the relation between a formula and its logical grounds: the formulae in virtue of which it holds. Nevertheless, the existing grounding rules for quantified formulae have been shown to bring about paradoxes. By exploiting Bolzano’s ideas on grounding, we define a first-order formal system that captures the notion of grounding and avoids these paradoxes.

ABSTRACT. Section 66 of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I is located in Part II, “Proofs of the basic laws of cardinal number”. Uncharacteristically for a section in this part, §66 contains a meaty philosophical discussion, regarding the nature of correlations and the logicist method. Frege does not tell his reader why this discussion is inserted, nor does he name an opponent. I argue that §66 is a direct reaction to Dedekind’s Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?, adding evidence to the suggestion by Sundholm, Reck, Ebert & Rossberg, and others, that Dedekind’s work had some relevance to Frege.

(Topic: History of Philosophy)

ABSTRACT. This paper addresses a question about Frege's account of definition: viz., what justifies definitions qua analytic definitions of mathematical concepts? Roy Cook and Philip Ebert have recently argued that Frege's method for formulating and justifying definitions crucially relied on the use of abstraction principles. Their interpretation is well-aligned with Abstractionist approaches to mathematics. It is also an interesting attempt at clarifying, via a reconstruction of Frege's view, the more general issue of the justification of definitions. However, I shall argue that Cook and Ebert's interpretation is not well-supported by Frege's texts, and that it leads to a mistaken view of the role of abstraction principles in Frege's account of definition.

ABSTRACT. This paper defends the possibility of admitting perdurants in a presentist ontology. Two ways of doing so are proposed. The first proposal makes use of non-existents in order to allow perdurants within a presentist ontology. The second proposal involves non-concrete objects, i.e. objects that are contingently not concrete. I argue that, just by admitting non-concrete objects, it is possible to have perdurants even for the presentist. Of course, in order to do so we must modify our definitions of perdurant and endurant. Nevertheless, I argue that my theory is metaphysically sound, at least for the presentist persuaded by the intuitive claim that there are perdurants, which otherwise she must reject.

ABSTRACT. Sub-disciplinary area: Metaphysics

Equivocal Identity for Fictional Objects

Abstract Fictional realists claim that fictional objects exist. Are they paradoxically committed to fictional objects being indeterminately identical? Friedell (2019) claims that – even though not all fictional realists are so committed - a specific version of abstract creationism (the one proposed by Evnine) is committed to paradoxical indeterminate identity. I contend that the specific version of abstract creationism considered by Friedell allows for indeterminate identity without paradox.

ABSTRACT. I will argue that panpsychism is false because phenomenal properties are not suitable candidates for the intrinsic grounds of the extrinsic properties of microphysics. Panpsychists postulate that there are fundamental phenomenal properties which ground both the extrinsic properties of microphysical entities and human consciousness. I will argue that extrinsic properties are public, while consciousness is essentially private. Thus, since consciousness is essentially private, the fundamental phenomenal properties are unobservable in a public way; thus, they are not apt to ground any public physical properties.

Topic: Philosophy of Mind and Action.

ABSTRACT. By considering some theoretical issues pertaining to classical and nonclassical logics, I will argue that the inference rule known as Consequentia Mirabilis (CM) and the Paradox of Non-Being are strictly related on different levels of analysis, logically and ontologically. Then, in light of the suggestions in Łukasiewicz (1963) with respect to the notion of possibility, I will put forward possible reasons for preferring a modal Meinongianism.

ABSTRACT. In this talk, I will give an overview of Ladyman & Ross’ ontological theory of real patterns. In it, they make use of information-theory, and I will discuss how they do so. In their resultant theory an interesting picture of the world emerges, wherein higher-level emergent phenomena are on equal footing with those of supposed fundamental physics, and existence should be thought of in terms of relational structures and informational patterns. However, I will present six possible problems with this view, the most severe of which are that real patterns cannot be defined independently of human interest and are not mind-independent, and that Ladyman & Ross’ use of information-theory is faulty.

ABSTRACT. Argumentation is the communicative activity of producing and exchanging reasons in order to support claims or challenge positions. Argumentation is a pivotal (but demanding) human practice: there are many instances in which argumentation does not achieve its presumed goals. In this symposium, the overarching question is: under which conditions is argumentation likely to foster epistemic improvement? To address this question, the papers in this symposium adopt the perspective of social exchange theory, a framework in sociology and social psychology that investigates social interactions as instances of exchanges of resources. The thought is that argumentation can be viewed as a form of epistemic exchange, and thus the findings regarding human exchanges in general may also apply to epistemic exchanges.

ABSTRACT. In this paper, I try to take a step towards finding a middle way between compatibilism and free will skepticism – two of the main opposing positions in the free will debate – by investigating the possibility that certain claims regarding retributive justice of each side are simultaneously true rather than mutually exclusive. Agreeing with both positions would entail that retribution is both a right of the victim and unfair to the wrongdoer. I argue that such a conclusion would have to affect the often overlooked moral practices of forgiveness.

ABSTRACT. Topic: Philosophy of Mind and Action

What it takes to have an ability is often explained in terms of how an agent acts across relevant non-actual scenarios. Kenny (1976) objects to the view that ability can be represented within the framework of possible world semantics that ability, unlike possibility, fails to distribute over disjunction, as required by axiom K. I reconstruct this objection as a set of three inconsistent premises and show that, rather than accepting Kenny’s conclusion, there are three ways to safeguard a modal account. I reflect on the source of friction between ability and axiom K and argue that the most compelling response reconsiders what kind of operator captures ability adequately.

ABSTRACT. Strong notions of free will are closely connected to the possibility to do otherwise and to an agent’s ability to causally influence her environment via her decisions controlling her actions. In this talk, we will employ techniques from the causal modeling literature to investigate whether a notion of free will subscribing to one or both of these requirements is compatible with naturalistic views of the world such as non-reductive physicalism to the background of determinism and indeterminism. We will argue that from a causal modeler’s perspective the only possibility to meet both requirements consists in subscribing to reductive physicalism and indeterminism.

ABSTRACT. This paper argues that in order to explain spontaneous group actions a theory must appeal to something more than the agents’ attitudes and their connections. The paper is divided into three parts. First, spontaneous group actions are defined as those which agents perform together without any prior interaction. Second, extrapolating from Michael Bratman’s theory of ‘shared agency’, it is argued that something beyond agents’ occurrent attitudes is needed to explain spontaneous group actions in order to satisfy another requirement on group action, i.e., explaining the bond between co-agents. Finally, I suggest that normative group-reasons can play this explanatory role.

ABSTRACT. The recent rise of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has led to intense discussions on their ability to achieve higher-level mental states or the ethics of their implementation. One question, which so far has been neglected in the literature, is the question of whether AI systems are capable of action. While the philosophical tradition based on Anscombe and Davidson appeals to intentional mental states, cognitive and computational scientists like Beer or Pfeifer reduce agency to mere behaviour. I will argue for a gradual concept of agency because both traditional concepts of agency fail to differentiate the agential capacities of AI systems.

ABSTRACT. Recent years have seen rapid progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and in the development of intelligent systems that rely on AI. AI skeptics have noted that the development and use of intelligent systems makes it difficult to assign responsibility, especially when the intelligent system causes damage. I argue that such responsibility gaps are not as problematic as they have been made to appear. My argument consists of three claims: 1) We should not give too much credit to retributive urges. 2) We need not be too concerned about the consequences of responsibility gaps. 3) The use of intelligent systems does not violate the norms of just war theory.

ABSTRACT. The epistemic condition of moral responsibility has been challenged by converging lines of evidence, suggesting that individuals do not have epistemic access to their behavioural drives and are rather passive or environmentally driven in the expression of their attitudes. While the standard literature focuses on how responsibility can be preserved in spite of external interferences, we argue that specific mechanisms of social learning are pivotal to the empowerment of individual responsibility. Assuming that such mechanisms can be put in place, we address the normative issue of whether and to what extent society has the institutional role/duty to morally educate individuals.

ABSTRACT. Topic: Ethics

I discuss an argument for the fact that lying is morally worse than merely deceiving, without making false statements. The argument, which I call “the responsibility argument”, states that, unlike lying, deception involves the hearer’s responsibility for drawing mistaken inferences. I argue that in many cases this argument does not work. First, I argue that the defenders of the responsibility argument cannot show why the distinction between lying and deceiving is ethically relevant. Secondly, I show that in “normal” situations the hearer is not responsible for being deceived, because she could not have been aware that she was misled.

ABSTRACT. Topics: Ethics/ Political Philosophy

Given that most citizens are politically ignorant, Jason Brennan’s voting ethics claims: 1) we have no individual moral obligation to vote, however 2) When we vote we have an individual moral obligation to vote well. The implication that abstaining from voting is always permissible runs the risk of leading to an extremely low voter-turnout, endangering democratic legitimacy. I argue for an individual moral responsibility for upholding a Quorum Requirement. Subsequently I add two positive voting duties: 3) Citizens ought to make an effort to become competent voters, 4) Once competent, one ought to participate in the voting process.

ABSTRACT. It is standardly assumed that morality is normative. Hence, it is thought that scepticism about normativity entails scepticism about morality. I separate these by showing that morality is not necessarily normative in the sense that normative sceptics take issue with. Moral error theory relies on the very specific claim that morality involves standard-independent authoritative normativity, as this is what is deemed problematic. I argue that this claim is implausible, even if we do need to ascribe some form of authoritative normativity to moral norms.

Topic: ethics

ABSTRACT. According to the influential so-called Adams’ Thesis (AT), the assessment of a conditional statement amounts to the assessment of the probability of the consequent given the antecedent. Lately, however, a variety of critical remarks have been levelled against AT as a sound basis for the analysis of conditionals. With this symposium, we mean to enrich the critical assessment of AT, and develop it in a constructive fashion. The symposium collects the results of four novel research projects on conditionals where AT and the ensuing logical analysis are significantly revised, corrected, or integrated. The issues and solutions discussed are expected to provide new insight in one of the eminently challenging areas of contemporary analytic philosophy, with widespread potential implications.

ABSTRACT. In his influential monograph, The British Moralists and the Internal Ought 1640-1740, Stephen Darwall explains that the move away from Aristotelian metaphysics is in great part responsible for the abandonment of virtue ethics. Philosophers dissatisfied with Aristotle's teleology, its link to Catholicism and its presupposition that all activity is measured according to an end and that there is an end to human life, which fits into an ordered universe, abandoned Aristotelian ethics, and began instead to formulate what we now call theories of obligation. Darwall's book focuses on Early Modern British male philosophers. Here I want to widen the field a little and ask whether women philosophers of that period in England and France also abandoned virtue ethics in favour of theories of moral obligation. Feminist historians of philosophy such as Annette Baier and Karen Green have suggested that early modern women may well have a moral theory of their own, one that doesn't necessarily fit in the models uncovered by male historians of philosophy. Following their cue I argue that Early Modern women philosophers in France and England, in their moral philosophical investigations, mixed elements from virtue ethic and theories of moral obligation, in particular the concept of the body politic, and the idea that reason and god are the source of obligation, and or the way of accessing it.

ABSTRACT. Extremism can be understood in ideological, methodological or psychological terms. My focus in this lecture will be on extremism in the psychological sense. Extremism in this sense is best understood as a mindset. A person’s mindset includes their preoccupations and attitudes. The extremist mindset is constituted, in part, by a preoccupation with purity, virtue and victimhood. I will propose an account of these preoccupations and their role in extremism. A key extremist attitude is hostility to compromise. Since hostility to compromise is also characteristic of a person of principle, there is the challenge of differentiating the uncompromising attitude that goes with being principled from that which goes with being an extremist.

The proposed account of the extremist mindset clarifies the relationship between extremism and fanaticism and the sense in which extremism is morally and epistemically problematic. Extremism as such is not emancipatory, although there are legitimate questions about whether there are circumstances in which it is necessary. The philosophy of extremism is a neglected field to which my lecture will be a contribution. I will end by discussing the methodological challenges facing this field. There are questions about whether and how philosophy can contribute to an understanding of extremism, and about the basis on which given features are included or excluded from the extremist mindset.