ABSTRACT. While Christianity (especially Protestantism) is still very much alive and even growing worldwide, it has ceased to govern the morality of Western societies since the mid-20th century. This occurred through a sudden rupture, accompanied by a radical nihilistic current. But nihilism never lasts long; it is a parenthesis and a passing phase. In the second half of the 20th century, Westerners adopted a post-Christian humanism, inspired by numerous European authors who are generally agnostic but drawn to Christian principles (the dignity of the person and personal freedom, a sense of truth, the importance of progress as a means of improving the world). These authors offer us a morality and a meaning of life that is both devoid of transcendence and imbued with Christian principles. A sort of spirituality without religion, yet, so to speak, haloed with the sacred. Christianity, as transcendence, is set aside, yet it remains “the spirit of the place.”

ABSTRACT. One of the characteristics of the post-Christian world is certainly the decline of religiosity. This process can be described, among other things, by the terms “secularization” and “desacralization”. This phenomenon was analyzed by Italian phenomenologists as a derivative of the phenomena of sacrality and religiosity. Domenico A. Conci (1936–2008) believes that secularization cannot be equated with the profane sphere and it is not a phenomenon specific to contemporary Western civilization. Conci attempts to show that the origins of secularization lie in the birth of Western civilization in ancient Greece. At this historical moment, there was a decline in trust in various forms of revelation. In his opinion, this is why, alongside secularization, we are now seeing a return to esoteric and mystical religions. Angela Ales Bello (1939–) defines the process of desacralization in terms she uses to analyze religious experience. The hyletic sphere is relevant for understanding the phenomenon of sacrality, while the noetic sphere is relevant for the phenomenon of religion. Thus, the noetic sphere is characteristic of developed cultures. In Western culture, philosophical reflection arises in a religious framework, as the path to truth begins in this context in ancient Greece. Philosophy is, therefore, a kind of intellectual response to the religious search for the Absolute. The phenomenon of desacralization is thus expressed in theoretical or practical atheism, or at least in religious indifference, which is spreading today in almost all cultures. Interestingly, Ales Bello suggests a connection between the relationship between philosophy and religious experience in Western culture and atheism. Paradoxically, it is precisely the closeness to God in Christianity, in her opinion, that is the area where atheism develops more easily, as there is room here for an intellectual understanding of faith. Stefano Bancalari (1972–) argues that questioning religious experience today is linked to nihilism, which contains certain characteristic features: the death of God, the decline of idols, and the devaluation of values. However, he proposes interpreting nihilism not in the light of the Latin term nihil, but in the light of the term boredom, which can be considered a derivative of the biblical expression “vanity of vanities” from the Book of Ecclesiastes. And he claims that nihilism in this sense appears to coexist with the phenomenon of religiosity. In my presentation I will therefore present the proposals of Italian phenomenologists for interpreting the phenomenon of secularization.

ABSTRACT. Edith Stein and Simone Weil were contemporaries who shared strikingly similar intellectual horizons. Both were shaped by the political and social crises of their time, both engaged deeply with philosophy, and both drew on classical sources in their attempts to understand the spiritual and cultural transformation of modern Europe. Their work also reflects a specifically female sensibility in the perception of the world – an attentiveness to concrete experience, suffering, and the embodied dimensions of human life. Yet despite these parallels, their responses to modernity move in radically different directions. This presentation situates Stein and Weil with regard to the central question of the meaning of love in their thought as a response to the spiritual and cultural fragmentation of the twentieth century. I will argue that love becomes, in both cases, a decisive interpretive key – yet it operates through paradoxically opposed trajectories. Methodologically, Stein’s thinking is constructive. She consciously identifies herself with the philosophical tradition of phenomenology, and seeks to develop its concepts from within. Her work participates in contemporary debates with the conviction that intellectual and theoretical clarification can shape society more effectively than direct political intervention. Even after her conversion, Stein’s writings remain disciplined, systematic, and rigorously academic, rather than public or polemical. Weil, by contrast, is fundamentally deconstructive. Her thought resists stable systems – whether philosophical, social, or political – and is driven by an almost instinctive demand for redemption. She distances herself from intellectual schools, distrusts collective ideologies, and reacts sharply against stereotypes and institutionalized forms of thought. Her engagement with politics is direct and openly critical, and she frequently condemns the mediating role of institutions, including the Church. Whereas Stein’s life moves toward confessional fulfillment, Weil embodies a form of mystical radicalism that remains intentionally unconfessional. After outlining these methodological differences, the presentation will examine their thematic consequences. Stein’s approach tends toward a theoretical elaboration of problems, while Weil’s remains practical, existential, and rooted in lived experience. Against this background, I will explore how Weil’s secular path toward mystical experience unexpectedly converges with theological insights that Stein articulates within a traditional Christian framework. In doing so, I aim to highlight a central paradox: that even where Stein and Weil diverge – confessional Christianity versus post-Christian spirituality – their concepts of love reveal overlapping answers to the same historical and philosophical crisis.

ABSTRACT. The aim of this presentation is to clarify the difference between the Christian ideal and Christian and post-Christian worldviews. This fundamental distinction, inspired by Kierkegaard’s thought, helps explain why there is no single Christian worldview and why such worldviews are subject to continual transformation and diversification. To grasp this problem, it is first necessary to distinguish the Christian ideal from the various secondary immanent ideals that appeal to it and generate different kinds of worldviews corresponding to the socio-cultural changes of a given period. According to Kierkegaard, the Christian ideal as such is one and unchanging. It is the model of an existential attitude exemplified by Jesus Christ in His life and death, and it can be realized in any place and at any time, regardless of the changing circumstances of the temporal world. By contrast, there are various worldviews that historically correspond to changing socio-cultural conditions and that constitute different forms of Christendom. The most important distinction that may be drawn from Kierkegaard’s thought is that no Christian or post-Christian worldview associated with a particular historical condition of Christendom or of the post-Christian world is directly connected to the Christian ideal, regardless of whether it affirms or denies that ideal. In short, the Christian ideal cannot be directly translated into any worldview; it can only be realized in the existential attitude of the subject. For this reason, existential attitude is not directly tied to any particular worldview. Thus, there may be individuals who embody the same Christian attitude in their lives while at the same time holding different worldviews. In this sense, the realization of the Christian attitude need not be directly linked to adherence to a specific Christian worldview. It may instead be linked to adherence to different worldviews inspired either by the Christian ideal or by post-Christian ideals. Consequently, there is no contradiction in the existence, in the contemporary world, of a person who is simultaneously committed to realizing the Christian attitude and who at the same time holds a post-Christian worldview. The fundamental problem, from this perspective, is the deeply rooted cultural tendency to identify the Christian ideal with the Christian worldview. This occurs both among supporters and opponents of Christianity and leads to numerous distortions in the socio-political sphere. Such distortions arise when a person representing a Christian worldview is treated as the spokesperson for the truth of Christianity, even though these belong to two entirely distinct ontological orders. From this perspective, although Christian worldviews are variable and remain subject to confrontation with other worldviews in the temporal world, including the post-Christian worldview, the Christian ideal and the Christian attitude that realizes it are independent of all worldviews that appeal to this ideal. In this sense, every direct appeal to the Christian ideal or to Christian truth within socio-political discourse in order to advance a particular social interest is always, to some extent, a falsification of the original Christian ideal.

ABSTRACT. The ongoing challenges to human society, life and values posed by technology-related developments demand a critically reflective, evaluatively engaged response, and this is surely true from both a Christian standpoint and one reflecting secular, purportedly “post-Christian” concerns. Nevertheless, for any such response to be politically meaningful it must be capable of fostering a broad social consensus. This is hard to achieve when the fundamental commitments driving our evaluative perspectives are contested, as in societies where one group adhere to more modern, secular and individualistic conceptions of what it is to be human, and another to more traditional, non-individualistic forms of understanding, in which metaphysical and religiously inspired commitments are inseparably intertwined.

Such a contested space of foundational commitment sets up a conflict between competing paradigms pertaining to the status of the individual human being as this relates to the axiological sphere. One group seeks to ground the irreducible value-conferring significance of the individual in conceptions whose initial point of departure is a theoretically posited subject (or its equivalent), while the other seeks to frame individuality against the background of a prior conception, generically specified in ways that are essentially non-individualistic in their evaluative implications, of what it means to be human.

A possible approach to resolving this conflict will be considered, suggested by themes occurring in the work of the early-twentieth-century German philosopher Herman Schmalenbach. Amongst other things, the latter elaborated a critical-historical account of the emergence of our modern culture of the individual that focused on the evolving intertwinement of ‘quantitative’ (individuation-based) and ‘qualitative’ (individualisation-based) ways of thinking about human individuality and its implications (Schmalenbach, 1920a). Around the same time, he also developed a view about the distinctive phenomenological character of personally lived religious experience within the Christian tradition, and about its distinctive relationship to individuality, in which a strong distinction is implied between synchronically and diachronically articulated forms of value-conferring commitment (Schmalenbach, 1920b).

The paper examines whether a fusion of these two elements of Schmalenbach’s thinking into a single analytical framework could furnish a viable way for modern secular conceptions of individuality as an irreducible value-generating phenomenon, and appeals to metaphysico-religious forms of understanding of the sort manifested in traditional versions of the Christian worldview, to be reconciled at a conceptual level. (Central to this is the thought that such a framework furnishes a novel conception of the conditions under which, in scenarios involving an evaluative determination, privileged first-person authority can be meaningfully affirmed or denied.) Consideration will be given to the practical challenges confronting attempts to translate such a conceptual reconciliation into an internally coherent and cohesive socio-political reality, and to whether this analytical framework is most usefully construed as an “object of comparison” in the later Wittgenstein’s sense.

Principal references:

Schmalenbach, H. (1920a) “Individualität und Individualismus,” Kantstudien 24, pp. 365-388. Schmalenbach, H. (1920b): “Die Genealogie der Einsamkeit,” Logos 8, pp. 62-96.

ABSTRACT. The post-Christian secular world offers fertile ground for evangelization—something neither foreign to Christian history nor its approach to preaching the kerygma. Although antagonistic to religious faith, the critiques of secular and even hostile atheistic philosophies can prove a rich source of engagement for Christian philosophical reflection.

One of Judaeo-Christianity’s greatest antagonists, Friedrich Nietzsche, famously critiqued Christianity as having the ability to assimilate any critique into its own self-justifying system, as interpreting everything according to its own schema and thereby manipulating human experience (Beyond Good and Evil, §188). While Nietzsche perceived this as an insidious hallmark of religious belief, I argue that it is a powerful prospect of a faith open to engagement—even with a post-Christian, religiously-hostile mindset. This paper examines the promise and possibility of creedal engagement with atheistic and secular thought as both the heritage and future promise of Christian philosophy.

A post-Christian philosophy, even in its secular and perhaps sometimes atheistic forms, provides a great yet nascent opportunity for the Church and those who seek to proclaim the Gospel. The Christian kerygma has a long history of engaging and synthesizing the prevailing philosophical schools of the day, and from its earliest encounters with Hellenistic and Neo-Platonic thought it set about translating its message into ways that the prevailing worldview or culture could understand. Some of the greatest contributions of Patristic theology, Medieval Scholasticism, and the periti of Vatican II stemmed from such engagement. The willingness to dialogue with secular philosophy also yielded great conceptual resources for the Church—deepening her understanding of God, Christ, the sacraments, and of the Church herself.   Yet the Church also has a history of intransigence and resistance to the wider culture, of a rejection that further isolated the Church and led to misunderstandings—ultimately setting up an antagonism with the wider culture, denigration in the eyes of other disciplines, and a failure to preach the Gospel in ways the world could grasp. Modernist controversies and a defensive attitude further isolated the Church; a lack of engagement or translation for the wider culture hampered the Church’s ability to "go forth and make disciples of all nations” (Matthew 28:19).

In the postmodern era there is an opportunity to engage from a perspective rooted in faith that need not be marked by fear and suspicion. There is a great need for dialogue and engagement with the contextual framework in which we are called to minister today. There is also a potential benefit: the mining of conceptual resources and enrichment of our own theological commitments through engagement with something that, on the surface, appears to be antagonistic or even antithetical to the faith. The Church had little to fear and much to reap from its engagement with pagan philosophies of the Hellenistic era; having little to lose and much to gain from engagement with the postmodern world.

ABSTRACT. In the contemporary cultural and social context, the issue of ecology is one of the main areas of public activity. Environmental protection and care for its condition are among the fundamental tasks faced by global and local governments, individuals, and independent institutions. These activities are referred to by the term “environmentalism.” In the strict sense, it is an ideological and philosophical movement that emerged in the second half of the 20th century. It involves broadening the meaning of humanism, focusing on human sensitivity to nature. From this perspective, the movement is oriented towards researching environmental protection and the significance of human existence in nature. The popularity of this trend is mainly due to large environmental groups that initiate various types of protest actions for the protection of the environment. Very often, the fundamental premises of these actions are strictly ideological, which entails the subjective and utilitarian nature of this type of social action (eco-terrorism). In this way, they set specific goals and strategies for action that significantly influence society's attitude towards the natural world. Such activist groups include Just Stop Oil, Last Generation, Extinction Rebellion, Earth First! and Youth Climate Strike. An analysis of the activities of these and similar groups clearly indicates a departure from traditional ecology, i.e., concern for the proper relationship between humans and their surrounding reality, in favor of something akin to an “ecological religion.” This means that environmentalism leads to a reinterpretation of the classical vision of man as a steward, obliged to care for creation, towards the superiority of nature over man. In this new vision, it is man who is to become a servant of nature and submit to it unconditionally. In this context, some activists also attack the Christian vision of the world, specifically Christian anthropocentrism. Accusations in this regard mainly concern the commandment in Genesis, when God told humans to “subdue the earth.” Religion appears here as a specific obstacle to the implementation of ecological changes. In this key, the aim of the paper is to draw attention to the impact of ecological movements, guided by environmentalism, on Christian identity in the created world and to indicate how theological reflection on creation can enrich and transform ecological engagement. To this end, it is reasonable to return to the text of the constitution Gaudium et spes, which has become a benchmark for the contemporary social teaching of the Church. Despite the passage of time, the interdependence between man and the world proposed by the Council Fathers is still relevant today. This naturally refers to the encyclical Humani generis by Pius XII, who stated that dialogue between religion and science is possible. A return to the teaching of the Council will allow us to reveal the constitutive elements for a harmonious and holistic theological reflection on nature. In this context, ecological theology/theology of creation, which is currently being implemented mainly through Pope Francis' encyclical Laudato si', becomes more concrete. In it, the Holy Father formulates, among other things, the ideas of integral ecology, which seeks to resolve the technocratic crisis in favor of care for the work of creation. In the context of the issue under study, it is reasonable to re-examine the concepts of creatio continua and integral ecology. To this end, specific arguments will be presented in favor of a critical analysis of the activities of ecological movements that reject Christian identity. This will therefore be an attempt to provide the necessary tools for the integration of environmentalists and theologians so that they can work together to protect the environment through educational and practical activities that are not ideological but rooted in an objective reflection on creation as a gift from God.

ABSTRACT. The past 50 years have witnessed a significant comeback for Christian philosophy. Particularly within analytic contexts, a considerable amount of intellectual energy has been poured into defending traditional doctrines like the incarnation, Trinity, and resurrection, along with related commitments like mind-body dualism and divine foreknowledge. As a result, classical Christian theism is now widely regarded as a philosophically respectable option. One component of classical Christian thought that has not fared as well, however, is the doctrine of Original Sin. Broadly construed, this doctrine holds (1) that all human beings are constitutionally sinful and liable to death and corruption, and (2) that this state of affairs arose through a freely chosen, historical defection from God by the human race (peccatum originale originatum and peccatum originale originans, respectively). This paper explores the tension between the doctrine of Original Sin (DOS) so construed and standard postChristian convictions. To frame my main contribution, I suggest that DOS faces both intrinsic and extrinsic difficulties. To the former, I note that many contemporary defenses lack plausibility due to widely accepted views about human origins and moral responsibility. Regarding the latter, I suggest that various aspects of DOS grate against core assumptions in much contemporary philosophical discourse, whatever the accuracy of these assumptions. To the extent that adherence to DOS is taken to be integral to Christianity, then, this tension risks undermining the broader credibility of the Christian philosophical project in a post-Christian intellectual context. With this framing in place, I proceed to the paper’s constructive aim of recommending and defending a nonlapsarian alternative, that is to say, an account of universal human sinfulness that does not depend upon a historical fall. I focus in particular on one desideratum frequently associated with the doctrine of Original Sin, namely, the inevitability of sin. Drawing upon recent discussions of the doctrine, I argue that a nonlapsarian account is capable of preserving this feature while avoiding some of the philosophical and cultural difficulties associated with traditional formulations of DOS. While not without cost, a nonlapsarian alternative may thus be better positioned to engage constructively with post-Christian modes of thought.

ABSTRACT. At the center of the Christian worldview lies the crucifixion (and the resurrection) of Jesus Christ. As argued by Chantal Delsol, René Girard, Tom Holland, and others, this event laid the foundation for the radical transformation of the Western culture. The dominion of the Roman Empire, built on its military power, was gradually transformed into the dominion of the cross—the ideal of self-giving and self-humbling love.

How can one account for this revolutionary potential of the cross, given that it is “a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to gentiles“ (1 Cor 1:23), and that it is grounded in paradoxes that transcend natural reason? The answer proposed in this paper is that it is the heart—which, in the famous Pascal’s formulation, “has its reasons which reason itself does not know”—that apprehends the paradoxical truth of the cross. The aim of this paper is to provide a philosophical-anthropological account of the heart as a part of human nature that is attuned to Christian revelation. Understanding the basis of the “success” of the Christian worldview within the Western culture may also shed light on the possibility of its renewal in post- and non-Christian contexts.

The presentation will begin with a brief exposition of the scandal of the cross and reasons why it remains paradoxical for natural human reason. It will then introduce the philosophical-anthropological conception of the heart, beginning with Augustine’s notion of the “restless heart,” which expresses the insatiable desire inscribed into human nature that only God can fulfill. The discussion will then turn to Pascal’s conception of the heart as constituting its own order of reasons, inaccessible to discursive reason (though not contradicting it). Two features of this concept are especially relevant: first, that it’s capacity for understanding is rooted in desire; second, that it is not dependent on intellectual abilities and is therefore particularly suited to grasping the existential truths conveyed through Christianity.

The central thesis is that the restless human heart can be fulfilled only by God’s infinite love, manifested in Christ’s sacrifice on the cross. The heart understands this because it itself desires love that, by its very nature, is inexhaustible. As Augustine suggests, to love is to desire what has already been given. The structure of love thus differs from that of other desires, which are exhausted once their object is attained. Furthermore, the insatiable longing of the heart for infinite love may be considered universal, providing fertile ground for the transformative power of the Christian worldview. The Christian ethical ideal— which profoundly shaped Western culture—is to love others as one has first been loved. The heart also grasps this in terms of desire and reciprocity, expressed in the Golden Rule: “In everything do to others as you would have them do to you, for this is the Law and the Prophets” (Mt 7:12).

ABSTRACT. The Malabar migration refers to the significant movement of Syrian Christians from Central Kerala to Northern Kerala (Malabar) during the twentieth century. Most historical research on this migration has linked it to colonial practices that exploited both land and the indigenous people. The primary cause of the Malabar migration was agricultural requirements; the availability of extensive, fertile land at lower prices prompted many farmers from Travancore, predominantly Christians, to relocate to Malabar. This strong presence of Christians led many to perceive the Malabar Migration as a venture supported by colonial interests. The British colonial government introduced the ‘grow more food’ scheme to combat food shortages and poverty. However, this does not necessarily imply that the Malabar migrants were driven by a desire to adopt exploitative colonial practices in Malabar. It is worth noting that the forests of Malabar had previously been heavily logged by feudal landlords, wood merchants, and British authorities. The agricultural lifestyle of Malabar migrants was not entirely eco-friendly, but it was also not wholly detrimental to the environment. It was more influenced by principles of Christian ecology than by British colonial ideologies. This research paper aims to provide critical insights into the life of Malabar migrants from the viewpoint of Christian ecology. The roots of this Christian ecological philosophy can be found in Biblical scriptures and the teachings of various Christian ecological thinkers, such as Pope Francis and St. Francis of Assisi. Malayalam literary depictions of Malabar migration, like Valli, Bespurkkana, and Anthill have been subjected here to explore the linkage of Christian ecology in the lives of Malabar migrants.

ABSTRACT. Georgia represents a unique case study in the post-Soviet space, where the intersection of religious plurality and political transformation has produced a complex and often contested landscape of interreligious relations. As a multi-confessional state, Georgia is home to the dominant Georgian Orthodox Church alongside significant Muslim, Armenian Apostolic, Roman Catholic, and Jewish communities, as well as a growing presence of non-traditional religious movements. The manner in which these communities coexist, compete, and negotiate their place within Georgian society is deeply shaped by the country's evolving political environment. This article examines the dynamics of interreligious relations in contemporary Georgia through the lens of political change, arguing that shifts in state ideology, governance structures, and geopolitical orientation have had a profound and measurable impact on interfaith coexistence. The study traces developments from the late Soviet period through the Rose Revolution, the reforms of the Saakashvili era, and the subsequent political transitions, demonstrating how each phase introduced distinct patterns of religious tolerance, institutional favoritism, and interreligious tension. Particular attention is given to the privileged constitutional status of the Georgian Orthodox Church and its implications for religious minorities, state neutrality, and democratic governance. The article further analyzes the role of civil society organizations, international institutions, and state bodies in mediating interreligious dialogue and addresses the challenges posed by rising religious nationalism. The findings suggest that sustainable interfaith relations in Georgia require not only institutional reforms but also a broader political commitment to pluralism and the equal protection of all religious communities under the law.

ABSTRACT. Contemporary political campaigns increasingly rely on tools shaped by a post‑Christian technological culture: AI‑driven microtargeting, algorithmic sentiment manipulation, and a strategic logic that treats opponents as risks to be neutralised rather than interlocutors to be persuaded. These instruments were refined in the service of secular, technocratic power, yet they are now adopted by Christian political movements seeking to defend religious freedom, moral values, and the dignity of the human person. This paper asks a philosophical question at the heart of the conference’s concerns: can such means serve Christian ends without deforming the very worldview they are meant to protect?

I approach this question through Karol Wojtyła’s personalistic norm, which grounds the Christian understanding of the person: a human being may never be treated merely as a means but always as an end, possessing an inviolable dignity that precedes and transcends political utility. I argue that the operational logic embedded in post‑Christian political technology contradicts this norm. These methods reduce the citizen to a bundle of behavioural data, replace deliberative persuasion with predictive control, and reframe political engagement as a zero‑sum struggle for systemic dominance. In doing so, they embody an implicit anthropology—a conception of the human person—that is fundamentally at odds with the Christian vision.

The tension is not merely prudential (whether such means are effective) but properly philosophical. It concerns the relationship between what the Aristotelian tradition distinguishes as techne (instrumental production) and praxis (action oriented toward the good). When Christian movements adopt post‑Christian means, they risk importing a logic of techne into the sphere of political action, thereby transforming the practice of witness into a form of technical optimisation. This, I suggest, constitutes a performative contradiction: the methods used to defend human dignity implicitly deny it by treating persons as manipulable data points.

To illustrate the stakes, I draw on recent electoral campaigns where Christian groups have deployed such techniques. Through the lens of Wojtyła’s personalism, these cases reveal a “Trojan horse” phenomenon—a quiet victory for the post‑Christian worldview achieved under the banner of Christian witness. I conclude by arguing that fidelity to the Christian vision of the person requires not only the defence of traditional moral positions but also a critical discernment of the forms of political engagement. The most insidious challenge of post‑Christianity, I propose, lies not in overt opposition but in the silent assimilation of its operative anthropology by those who seek to resist it.

This paper contributes to the conference’s exploration of the boundaries between Christian and post‑Christian worldviews by focusing on the internal crisis of Christian political practice. It suggests that the integrity of Christian witness depends on a coherence between ends and means that is both ethical and metaphysical—a coherence that the uncritical adoption of post‑Christian political technology threatens to undermine.

ABSTRACT. This presentation aims to shed new light on how Christian mystical concepts function within the post-Christian reality of the Western world. Inspired by the works of Michel de Certeau — primarily "La Prise de parole" (1968) and "La fable mystique" (1982) — I propose a dialectical reformulation of Carl Schmitt’s famous quote from "Politische Theologie" (1922), which states that all significant concepts of contemporary political theory are secularized theological ideas. I argue that de Certeau insightfully inverts this statement. In his works, religious texts are understood from a secular perspective, yet they cannot be reduced to pre-existing sociological categories. In "La fable mystique" de Certeau interprets 16th-century Catholic mysticism — exemplified by the works of St John of the Cross and St Teresa of Ávila — as a specific mode of speech and social practice, rather than merely an internal experience of a subject devoid of historical context. Such a non-religious, yet non-reductive, perspective allows Christian concepts to exist in a new way within contemporary discourse — both academic and political — as world-making factors transcending the truth–falsehood dichotomy. These considerations are relevant to the main theme of the presentation: the political events of the 20th century in France, commonly referred to as May ’68. Following de Certeau’s analysis of students’ protests in "La Prise de parole", I argue that the profound similarity between these two phenomena — the mystical genre and the civil unrest — can be traced in terms of power relations understood from a linguistic and epistemological perspective as a unique ‘capture of speech’. The very figure of Michel de Certeau — both a Jesuit priest and a professor of École des hautes études en sciences sociales — undermines typical discursive distinctions. Through a careful secularization of 16th-century mystics and a subtle spiritualization of the events of May ’68, de Certeau challenges both conservatives and revolutionaries. I argue that such subversion makes it possible to conceptualize new forms of spiritual experience within the post-Christian worldview.

ABSTRACT. The meaning of “post-Christian” is dependent on what is meant by the “Christian” that is thought to be left behind. In some prominent arguments, this leads to important theological reservations. Does Christianity itself, as a religion of incarnation, truly emphasize distance between the divine and the human or only difference and relationship? Does it, at heart, rest on the success of a political hierarchy, or is the latter only an effect of its intervention in the domain of worldly power? Must its proclamation be armed with rational assurance against every perceived challenge, as if the promise of salvation is no longer enough? To the degree that we may respond in the negative to such questions, it is tempting to conclude that the “post-Christian” somehow rests on a series of mistakes, or is the result of steps that were not necessary. I will forego these arguments, which moreover have been pursued in great detail by any number of scholars. Instead, I will investigate the conditions by which the steps that have been taken had their original appeal. I propose, further, to seek these conditions at the level of our being, and not at the level of the arguments for and against them. This will require some concentration on the evident precarity of Christian life, whereby one’s commitment to divine mystery may also be an exposure to the appeal of worldly solutions. My aim will be to define an existential ground for both the Christian and at least forms of the post-Christian.

ABSTRACT. In this presentation, I outline a proposal for developing ethics—specifically Christian ethics—within the framework of the contemporary scientific image of the world. I begin by clarifying my understanding of Christian ethics and identifying the key elements of its normative structure. I then discuss the concept of the scientific image of the world, drawing on the work of contemporary philosophers of science such as Wilfrid Sellars, Bas van Fraassen, Nancy Cartwright, and Michał Heller, who have analyzed the structure and implications of scientific accounts of reality.

In the third part, I examine how Christian ethics can be developed within a naturalistic worldview. My proposal is critical in nature: I highlight not only the possibilities opened by dialogue with naturalism but also the limitations arising from the anti-teleological and reductionist tendencies characteristic of the scientific image of the human being. I argue that the tension between the normativity of Christian ethics and the descriptive character of the natural sciences does not necessarily lead to conflict; rather, it can provide a space for creative reinterpretation.

Contemporary culture—shaped increasingly by methodological naturalism, the secularization of moral norms, and a distinctly post-Christian profile—requires a new form of Christian ethics capable of engaging with the scientific worldview. In response, I propose a model that integrates a naturalistic description of the human being with personalist normativity, avoiding both reductionism and dualism. I contend that such an approach may appeal to those who do not accept the traditional Thomistic framework as the sole foundation for Christian moral reflection, while also enabling a deeper rooting of Christian ethics within the intellectual landscape of contemporary culture.

ABSTRACT. Christian moral concepts continue to shape ethical judgments in contemporary societies, even when their theological foundations are neither shared nor explicitly referenced. This phenomenon does not indicate a loss of meaning intrinsic to Christian thought. Instead, it reflects a transformation in the social and philosophical contexts in which these concepts are received, interpreted, and debated. This paper examines this transformation as a question of moral intelligibility, specifically investigating how Christian moral insights, particularly those related to human dignity and the structuring of moral life, can be understood and maintained with a post-Christian cultural context through philosophical analysis.

To address this issue, the paper presents a discourse between two thinkers separated by over fourteen centuries, yet united by their concern for the coherence of moral life amidst conditions of narrative and institutional disruption: Boethius and Alasdair MacIntyre. Boethius, writing in the early sixth century during the collapse of the Roman political order, composed The Consolation of Philosophy within a context where inherited political and moral frameworks no longer reliably aligned. Notably, the work makes no explicit reference to Christian doctrine. Instead, consolation is pursued through philosophical reflection on happiness, providence, and the proper organization of the soul. This approach demonstrates how philosophy can function as a mediating discourse, preserving moral intelligibility when social and cultural supports are weakened, while still engaging with the underlying metaphysical commitments of Christian thought.

In After Virtue, MacIntyre identifies a structurally similar condition in contemporary ethical life. He argues that modern moral discourse retains concepts such as dignity, rights, and virtue, whose original intelligibility depended on Aristotelian and Christian teleological frameworks that are no longer regarded as primary authorities. Consequently, moral disagreement becomes persistent and often irresolvable, especially in bioethics, political deliberation, and human rights. According to MacIntyre, this situation does not indicate moral collapse but rather conceptual fragmentation: moral language persists, yet its rational foundation remains unclear and contested. As a result, the terms structuring public discourse risk functioning as rhetorical devices rather than as vehicles of shared moral rationality.

Together, Boethius and MacIntyre provide a framework for understanding the role of Christian philosophy in a post-Christian context. Boethius shows how philosophical reasoning can articulate moral meaning amid periods of cultural instability. MacIntyre, in turn, emphasizes the necessity of narrative and communal contexts, such as traditions of practice, liturgy, and sustained inquiry, to sustain ethical intelligibility over time. The post-Christian tradition, therefore, should be seen not as a failure of Christian meaning but as a challenge of mediation: moral insights persist but require renewed philosophical articulation to remain publicly intelligible and effective in guiding action.

The paper proceeds in four stages: First, it analyzes Boethius’ The Consolation of Philosophy as a model of philosophical mediation during the collapse of institutional narratives. Second, it applies MacIntyre’s critique of the “Enlightenment Project” to identify how contemporary moral concepts (dignity, rights) have become “emotive” fragments. Third, it synthesizes these perspectives to propose a “Philosophical Consolation” for the modern era, training philosophy as a bridge between metaphysical depth and pluralistic public discourse. Finally, it demonstrates how a process of retrieval can re-establish the intelligibility of concepts like personhood and vulnerability in contemporary bioethical and political debates.

ABSTRACT. The emergence of a “post-Christian” worldview has significantly reshaped the moral and philosophical foundations of contemporary bioethics. In many Western societies, the erosion of a shared Christian moral horizon has given rise to a pluralistic and often fragmented ethical landscape. This paper examines the implications of this transition through the thought of H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr., whose work offers one of the most incisive diagnoses of the moral condition of late modernity.

Engelhardt argues that we now inhabit a world of “moral strangers,” in which individuals and communities no longer share a common moral language capable of resolving fundamental ethical disagreements. In such a context, bioethics cannot rely on universally binding rational principles grounded in a shared metaphysical or religious framework. Instead, it becomes a procedural enterprise based on permission, negotiation, and consensus. This transformation reflects a broader cultural shift characteristic of the post-Christian condition, where moral authority is no longer derived from a unified vision of truth but from the coexistence of competing moral narratives.

This paper first analyzes Engelhardt’s concept of moral strangers as a philosophical articulation of the post-Christian worldview. It argues that his account accurately captures the epistemological and moral fragmentation present in contemporary bioethical debates, particularly in areas such as end-of-life decision-making, reproductive technologies, and the limits of medical intervention. The shift from truth-based to consensus-based ethics, while enabling coexistence in pluralistic societies, also risks reducing moral discourse to procedural agreement devoid of substantive moral content.

The second part of the paper explores Engelhardt’s later turn toward Eastern Orthodox Christianity, which reveals a critical tension in his thought. While acknowledging the inevitability of moral pluralism in the public sphere, Engelhardt insists that coherent moral reasoning ultimately depends on belonging to a concrete moral community rooted in a particular tradition. This move highlights the limits of post-Christian bioethics and raises the question of whether a purely procedural morality can sustain the ethical depth required in medicine and healthcare.

Finally, the paper proposes a constructive response grounded in personalist bioethics and relational anthropology. Rather than withdrawing from the public sphere or capitulating to relativism, Christian bioethics can engage the post-Christian world through a form of dialogical witness that respects pluralism while maintaining a commitment to truth. In this perspective, bioethics becomes not only a field of conflict between worldviews but also a privileged space of encounter, where the dignity of the human person can be rediscovered and articulated in ways that remain intelligible across moral divides.

The paper concludes that the post-Christian condition does not signal the end of Christian bioethics but rather calls for its transformation into a more dialogical, relational, and witness-oriented practice capable of addressing the ethical challenges of contemporary medicine.

ABSTRACT. In contemporary social thought, the interpretation of peace as a state of ceasefire or the achievement of political stability dominates. Such an understanding is reduced to external order, ignoring the internal moral dimension. In the Christian tradition, peace is a gift from God—a restoration of relationships between God, humanity, and all creation—which simultaneously demands human moral responsibility for justice and reconciliation. Therefore, a "just peace" cannot merely be the result of diplomatic agreements; it requires the restoration of justice, dignity, and truth. It is the result of synergy—the combination of divine grace and active human effort toward self and society. Historical experience shows that peace treaties often end wars formally without addressing their root causes. Impunity for aggression and the humiliation of human dignity remain unresolved, breeding new conflicts. In this context, peace becomes only a pause between wars. Peace has an ontological character, implying the restoration of the integrity of creation disrupted by sin and violence. The Christian understanding of peace transcends the political plane, pointing to a deeper level: reconciliation with God and one another. A just peace is neither exclusively divine intervention nor solely the result of human effort. It is born at the meeting point of divine grace and moral responsibility. Peace that ignores justice turns into a temporary silence before new upheavals. Conversely, peace rooted in truth, the protection of dignity, and responsibility becomes a real manifestation of God's gift in history. Thus, a just peace is possible only where grace inspires humanity to actively overcome evil through the establishment of justice.

ABSTRACT. In an era increasingly described as “post-Christian,” the tension between processes of secularization and the persistence and dynamism of the Christian worldview compels a renewed reflection on the rationality of eschatological beliefs. Contemporary science, pointing to the material (including neuronal) nature of cognitive processes, often treats death as the ultimate end of experience, which appears to close the door to traditional conceptions of the soul. At the same time, however, a millennia-old religious tradition and the widespread desire for survival have by no means disappeared. Moreover, within philosophy and scientific speculation, new, fully materialist and naturalist conceptions of life after death are emerging—from ideas of resurrection as the informational and structural reconstruction of bodies, to transhumanist visions of simulated universes, the replication of consciousness, or the “uploading” of the mind into new, more advanced substrates (E. C. Steinhart, 2014). This suggests that the concept of life after death need not be rejected but can instead be reformulated in a way consistent with current knowledge.

From the standpoint of strict empiricism, the question of the continuation of experience after death remains, at present, indeterminate—at least until a complete understanding of the nature of consciousness is achieved. Nevertheless, it carries fundamental existential significance. As Samuel Scheffler observes, the awareness of the absence of a future—for example, in a scenario involving the sudden extinction of humanity or the infertility of the species—would drastically undermine the long-term value and meaning of our present actions (Scheffler, 2013). The meaning of human actions depends on meaning itself, and meaning arises only where there is a real difference between possible states that follow from our choices. Conceptions that assume death to be total annihilation, as well as those that claim the postmortem fate is ultimately identical for all regardless of their actions (as in the idea of apokatastasis, defended, among others, by David Bentley Hart, for whom eternal hell is morally incompatible with the idea of a loving God) (Hart, 2019), render our choices devoid of ultimate, differentiating significance. Action deprived of decisive, alternative consequences becomes action in which, ultimately, “it makes no difference,” leading to a loss of meaning.

The central thesis of this article is that, in a situation of absolute indeterminacy, it is more rational to adopt a belief in the continuation of experience after death, which may take a differentiated form—positive (heaven) or negative (hell)—strictly dependent on our earthly attitudes, character, and the structure of our interpersonal relationships. In accordance with the pragmatism of William James, this constitutes a “live hypothesis” (James, 1896), opening entirely new frameworks for action, while in the perspective of Pascal’s Wager, this option appears the most advantageous and motivating. The recognition that one may end up either in heaven or in hell establishes a fundamental norm—it gives life an ultimate character and obliges one to assume full responsibility for one’s conduct.

Within this naturalistic framework, “heaven” and “hell” need not be understood in mythological terms. The postmortem dimension can be interpreted relationally: heaven as a community with which we are capable of and willing to coexist eternally, owing to a disposition of love and respect for truth cultivated during life, and hell as a state of isolation and destructive relationships. It is precisely the belief in an ultimate stake—our survival and its quality—that provides the strongest justification for adhering to categorical moral imperatives, for selfless concern for others, and for the continual pursuit of truth. In an age of transformation within Christianity, the choice of beliefs that preserve the ultimate weight of our actions is the most rational, as it motivates a more effective and morally improved way of living, both from the perspective of faith and under conditions of radical uncertainty.

Hart, D. B. (2019). That all shall be saved. In Yale University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300248739 William, J. (1896). The Will to Believe And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Longman's. Scheffler, S. (2013). Death and the afterlife. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199982509.001.0001 Steinhart, E. C. (2014). Your digital afterlives. In Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137363862

ABSTRACT. This paper offers a critical philosophical analysis of contemporary mindfulness as a paradigmatic form of post-Christian religiosity, arguing that its widespread adoption in late modern Western societies reflects not merely a process of secularization, but a substantive reconfiguration of religious and anthropological categories under post-Christian conditions. While mindfulness is typically presented as a value-neutral, scientifically grounded practice, the paper contends that it embodies a specific and normatively laden vision of the human person, one that is deeply indebted to its Buddhist origins yet significantly transformed through its contemporary reinterpretation. The study begins by situating mindfulness within the broader conceptual framework of post-Christianity, understood as a cultural and philosophical condition in which the Christian worldview is neither fully operative nor entirely absent, but persists in fragmented and displaced forms. Drawing on the analyses of Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, the paper examines how post-Christian societies retain the ethical and existential concerns of Christianity while progressively detaching them from their theological foundations. Within this context, mindfulness emerges as a practice that appears to fulfill spiritual functions traditionally associated with religion, yet does so within an immanent and non-theistic horizon. A central claim of the paper is that the Buddhist genealogy of mindfulness introduces a set of anthropological assumptions that are in tension not only with the Christian understanding of the person, but also with certain foundational intuitions of Western philosophical anthropology. Classical Buddhist thought, particularly in its emphasis on non-self (anātman), impermanence, and the attenuation of desire, offers a vision of human existence that contrasts sharply with the Christian conception of the person as a stable, relational subject oriented toward truth and communion with a personal God. When these assumptions are selectively appropriated and reframed within contemporary mindfulness discourse, they give rise to a model of subjectivity characterized by detachment, affective regulation, and the suspension of evaluative judgments.The paper argues that this model, while therapeutically effective in certain contexts, entails a reduction of the moral and metaphysical dimensions of human existence. By privileging experiential equilibrium over truth-oriented transformation, mindfulness risks obscuring the question of the ultimate good and undermining the normative structures that sustain ethical reasoning. In this respect, the apparent neutrality of mindfulness conceals a substantive redefinition of key philosophical categories, including personhood, freedom, and the nature of the good life. Furthermore, the paper critically examines the cultural translation of mindfulness from its Buddhist context into late modern Western societies. This process of decontextualization and instrumentalization results in a hybrid form of spirituality that simultaneously departs from its original religious framework and resists integration into a coherent philosophical or theological system. As such, mindfulness exemplifies the ambivalence of post-Christian religiosity: it is at once dependent upon inherited religious forms and indicative of their transformation and fragmentation. In conclusion, the paper contends that mindfulness should not be regarded as a neutral or purely therapeutic practice, but as a philosophically and theologically significant phenomenon that raises fundamental questions about the future of religiosity in a post-Christian age. Its critical examination thus contributes to a deeper understanding of the tensions between Christian and post-Christian worldviews, as well as the challenges posed by alternative spiritual anthropologies in contemporary culture.

ABSTRACT. In my research on post-Christianity, I argue that the decline of the significance of Christianity cannot be understood as a simple historical or cultural process of disappearance. Instead, I propose a more complex interpretation: the pluralization of eschatology. In the post-Christian condition, narratives concerning ultimate human destiny, the meaning of history, and the possibility of fulfillment do not vanish; rather, they multiply, transform, and interact with secular, technological, and cultural frameworks. I contend that recognizing this pluralization is crucial for assessing the contemporary philosophical relevance of the Christian perspective. My approach is interpretative and comparative. I analyze selected philosophical positions to demonstrate how post-Christian thought reshapes, rather than eliminates, eschatological structures. At the same time, I seek to clarify what is at stake in speaking of “eschatology” beyond strictly theological contexts, asking whether contemporary secular narratives genuinely replace, transform, or merely displace traditional structures of ultimate meaning. This methodological clarification allows me to frame pluralization not only as a sociocultural phenomenon, but also as a philosophical problem concerning the conditions of possibility of meaning, normativity, and teleology. Building on Gianni Vattimo, I emphasize the “weakening” of metaphysical certainties, which paradoxically allows Christian eschatological motifs to persist in attenuated and dispersed forms. Reflecting on Jürgen Habermas, I argue that religious traditions continue to function as semantic resources within post-secular moral and political discourse, preserving elements of eschatological thinking in translated vocabularies. Considering Peter Sloterdijk, I show that contemporary practices—technological, cultural, and anthropotechnical—can be interpreted as alternative eschatologies, offering visions of human transformation and fulfillment that both compete with and structurally resemble traditional Christian narratives. Drawing on Leszek Kołakowski, I underline the enduring and irreducible character of the religious question, arguing that secular narratives remain insufficient in addressing the human need for ultimate meaning. From a Christian perspective, I interpret this situation not merely as a loss, but as a transformation that generates a field of tension and dialogue. Post-Christian eschatology is neither homogeneous nor purely secular; rather, it constitutes a plural and contested space in which diverse visions of the ultimate—immanent, technological, ethical, or quasi-religious—coexist and interact. These visions remain implicitly connected to Christian categories such as hope, transcendence, and the idea of an ultimate good, even when they explicitly reject theological frameworks. In this context, I address several central questions posed by the conference: whether the transition to post-Christianity is irreversible, how post-Christian perspectives reshape ethical and political discourse, and how they transform concepts of truth, personal identity, and moral responsibility. I argue that the Christian perspective retains its philosophical significance not by resisting these transformations, but by critically engaging with them and revealing their implicit normative and eschatological assumptions. Ultimately, I claim that the pluralization of eschatology provides a key to understanding contemporary cultural and philosophical transformations. Post-Christianity does not mark the end of religious thinking; rather, it reconfigures it. Recognizing this process is not only an academic task but also a philosophical necessity, as Christianity continues to inform and challenge competing visions of human destiny, meaning, and the future, even in contexts where its explicit authority appears diminished.

ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to examine the possibility of dialogue between theology and neuroscience from the perspective of the classical formula of St. Anselm of Canterbury: fides quaerens intellectum - “faith seeking understanding.” The starting point will be the question of whether neurotheology, which studies the neural correlates of religious experience, prayer, meditation, attention, emotions, and memory, may become not so much a competitor to theological reflection as its partner in a deeper understanding of the human person as a being open to transcendence. The proposed interpretation assumes that theology and neuroscience operate at different levels of description of the same human experience. Neuroscience analyses the biological, cognitive, and affective mechanisms that accompany religious experience; theology, by contrast, asks about its meaning, truth, relation to God, and place in the human journey toward salvation. The integration of these perspectives, therefore, cannot consist in reducing theology to neuroscience or neuroscience to theology. Rather, its proper aim is to seek coherence between the empirical level and the hermeneutical-theological level. In this sense, neurotheology may be understood as a new context for the realization of Anselm’s postulate of fides quaerens intellectum. Faith, without abandoning its supernatural orientation, undertakes the effort to understand also those psychophysical processes through which the human person receives, experiences, and internalizes religious content. This has particular significance for theological education and pastoral ministry: knowledge of attention, memory, emotions, habituation, and the formation of habits can contribute to a more responsible transmission of faith, formation of conscience, and spiritual accompaniment. This, however, does not alter the proper aim of theology and faith, which remains the guidance of the human person toward truth, goodness, and ultimately salvation. The paper will therefore attempt to present neurotheology as a space for dialogue between Christian and post-Christian understandings of the human person, while also indicating the limits of reductionism and the possibility of an integral Christian anthropology.

ABSTRACT. This paper examines the issue of human identity in contemporary society through a philosophical and theological analysis of Father Seraphim Rose. During his 48 years of life, only 20 of which were dedicated to serving the Orthodox Church, Father Seraphim wanted to answer man's great existential questions. His life continues to be an important spiritual resource for anyone seeking Truth and resisting the indifference generated by consumer society. His works serve as a guide for people who want to understand the Christian vocation of man, where humanity comes from and toward what end it is directed, that is, between creation and eternal life. The study investigates Rose’s interpretation of modern nihilism, particularly his engagement with Nietzsche and the growing tendency to regard truth and identity as increasingly subjective and socially constructed. According to Father Seraphim, the loss of transcendent reference points produces a fragmented understanding of the human person, reducing identity to a fluid and unstable process shaped by cultural tendencies and digital media. Nietzsche's nihilistic ideas are today not only present at a theoretical level, but also materialized and amplified through contemporary technological environments. If Nietzsche anticipated the "death of God" and the disintegration of the absolute foundations of truth and morality, today's digital culture transforms these intuitions into an everyday experience. Social platforms, algorithms and the continuous flow of information favor the relativization of truth, the fragmentation of identity and the substitution of deep meaning with immediate and superficial experiences. Rose argues that human identity cannot be built only through individual self-construction, but needs a transcendent foundation that gives meaning and stability to human life. In the online environment, truth is no longer perceived as an objective reality, but as a construction dependent on perspective, popularity, or media influence. Moreover, technology accelerates the pace of life and creates a culture of constant distraction, in which inner reflection and the search for meaning are replaced by continuous entertainment and instant gratification. Thus, technological environments are not simply neutral tools, but spaces that can reinforce a nihilistic vision of existence, by reducing man to consumption, image, and absolute autonomy from any transcendent truth. Father Seraphim identifies in Nietzsche's writings the seeds of nihilism that propose new values suitable for a new man, in the context of a post-Christian world. In contrast to Nietzsche, who proposes abandoning the old orders founded on Christian values, René Guénon argues that the spiritual crisis of the Western world results from the rejection of tradition in favor of new philosophical, social, and religious constructions. He argues that tradition preserves the authenticity of supra-human elements and transcendent principles. Beyond all the philosophies that have cultivated an autonomous mentality in relation to God, none have affected the human mind as much as technological media does today. Digital technologies, through social networks, have managed to transform our attention into a consumer product. These platforms have managed to build an ecosystem in which time spent online is not only an act of consumption, but also one of identity formation. The new identity is therefore constructed around temporary trends that gradually replace spiritual identity. This analysis argues that the spiritual dimension should not be seen as an end in itself, but a path toward recognizing true values. Father Seraphim discovered in Orthodoxy a form of Tradition capable of giving meaning to the lives of contemporary people. The greatness of God is revealed in every era, because God does not distance himself from man, regardless of the state he is in, but rather the man who no longer knows his Christian roots who comes to believe that God has abandoned him. A deep spiritual analysis must not be an act of superficial introspection, but must call us to a sincere confession that Christ is the Way, the Truth and the Life. Father Seraphim does not stop at a factual discussion of the situation in which we find ourselves, but invites us through his own example to rediscover our spiritual identity, to be a living witness of God’s presence and to respond concretely to the challenges of today.

ABSTRACT. Late Antiquity (3rd–6th centuries) is a period that partially overlaps with religious Hellenism (Hans Jonas) or the era of early Byzantium. Some scholars, such as Peter Brown, would like to view it as a distinct era, different from antiquity and the Middle Ages, possessing its own unique characteristics. One such characteristic was the coexistence and rivalry of two paradigms: the Christian and the classical, primarily Neoplatonic. It was an era of transformation (Eric Dodds), perceived in very different ways—ranging from hope (the Church Fathers) to tragedy (Libanius). It seems, however, that most late-antique intellectuals situated themselves between these two extremes, combining both paradigms in proportions appropriate to their own perspectives. An example of such an intellectual was Synesius, Bishop of Cyrene. In his hymns and epistolary legacy, we see inspirations from Neoplatonism and Christianity. It seems that the term “Christian Neoplatonism,” rightly criticized in relation to patristic writers, may capture the nature of Synesius’s stance, and his work significantly complements the picture of late antiquity in the philosophical aspect, particularly the process of the clash between Christian and classical paradigms. I will focus my analysis primarily on his extensive correspondence, comprising one hundred and fifty-six letters, though I will also draw upon his complete works (primarily the Hymns). A reading of Synesius’s works leaves certain doubts regarding his ideological affiliation. On the one hand, he was a student of Hypatia, and on the other, a friend of St. Theophilus of Alexandria, who appointed him to the episcopal office. These and other ambiguities in Synesius’s life and attitude make him an interesting subject for analysis.

ABSTRACT. Elder Dionisie (1909-2004) from Colciu – Mount Athos – was a Romanian monk who dedicated to the monastery life for about 81 years (78 out of which, living in the Holy Mountain). He was one of the few monks in Mount Athos who lived in both the Christian and the Post-Christian periods, and he expressed himself regarding the changes inside the Christianity in the last decades, to which ones he was contemporary. Moreover, Saint Dionisie was seen by many as a true prophet of our times, presenting the repercussions that can affect the Church, if the general position of Christians will glide to the materialistic world, instead of the spiritual one.

ABSTRACT. The idea that truth has an origin, that it is not self-sufficient, rooted only in reality itself, may seem a post-modern notion. Christianity, via its deepest theological structure, requires one to accept Revelation as true and roots truth in the creative act of God the Logos, who Himself is Truth. One can thus be astonished that, already in its early development, Christian theology accepted as con-natural a semantic norm for speaking truly that came neither directly from facts nor from Revelation. Both in the East and the West, the semantic norm, established by Porphyry in his theory of predication, was relied upon in creating philosophical and theological discourse that was considered capable of conveying truth. The norm built by Porphyry into the structure of predication was, furthermore, as I argue elsewhere, metaphysical in character. What it provided Christianity with, and why it has been, for most part, abandoned, can be learned, somewhat paradoxically, from Michel Foucault’s inquiries into the raisons d’être of various forms of human discourse. These inquires show, in my opinion, not only the origin of the Modern model of discourse, in which norm is intra-linguistic, emergent on the crossing between rules of linguistic and laws of logic, but also the reasons for which the Porphyrian normative semantics was abandoned. Once an extra-linguistic norm embedded in the very semantic structure of the language stopped being recognized, we lost also, however, truth itself. Ultimately, Foucault denounces truth as a useless, improbable and dangerous game. My reflection on Foucault’s criticism shows that what he calls truth of discourse amounts to existence of a norm that presents some discourse as binding for the recipient, that is as both factual and verifiable, in that the very norm organizing acts of speech postulates, alongside, a kind of practice: a both moral and cognitive interaction with reality. For late Foucault, this norm is neither metaphysical nor dialectical, but social, political and oppressive, focused on imposing a morality, and on shaping the recipient’s subjectivity. The absence of such valid semantic norm, or even of a network of similar norms, does not prevent one, even in the eyes of Foucault, from making factual statements. Christian theology, still, needs a norm of this kind. Statements based on Revelation can be accepted as true only if they do not seem senseless. Their sense is rooted not in direct referential encounter with facts, but in the system of cognitive interactions with reality that human language assumes and prescribes. Such system does not require, however, a metaphysical normativity. The condition for existence of such system were first established by Augustine, a master theologian who himself was less enamored with Porphyrian logic than his contemporaries. As I shall argue, his theological notion of the authority of the teacher does provide us, indeed, with a model of creation of semantic norm. The notion of the authority of the teacher, such as he presents it, prescribes a practice which is both epistemic and moral, while nevertheless relying on an act of faith.

ABSTRACT. One of the most interesting and curious features of post-Christian morality is the disappearance of the idea of a virtue and the radical distortion of the idea of a right. As virtue disappears, anything that has to do with treating people and animals well is couched in the language of rights. Rights claims have expanded to include anything that could be considered treating humans and animals well. But there are many kinds of acts that harm the community but do not fit well into the category of rights, either because they are less serious than the violation of a human right, or because there is no set of individual victims. Acts against the virtues of civility, kindness, compassion, courage, temperance, and trustworthiness are examples of the former. Acts that harm our common physical environment or jeopardize the fairness of the economy are examples of the latter. When morality is all about rights, it becomes a battle between claims against others and a defensive response. Without an objective foundation in human nature, the battle focuses on feelings, and so we see claims that there is a right not to be offended. I believe that this situation is unsustainable.