ABSTRACT. Eye tracking is the process of tracking and measuring the motion of the eye movements relative to the head - i.e. where one is looking. It is a common technique used to objectively measure user’s attention and responses to information being presented to them. In particular, we believe that eye tracking can be used to gauge the effectiveness of different visualization styles that have been augmented to support analyst decision-making. However, assisting the analyst in making connections with augmented visualizations can be challenging if the information is not presented in a clear and concise way. An empirical study that seeks a correlation between visual augmentation style and decision effectiveness will produce insights into the factors that affect the task. These insights will lead to techniques that help analysts sift through vast amounts of information, making informed decisions on critical matters in a timely fashion. This study proposes to use eye tracking techniques to measure whether line thickness, as a visual cue, can increase the analyst’s situational awareness, and thus allow them to make decisions quicker.

ABSTRACT. Coalition partners use C2 information systems (C2IS) to achieve shared situational awareness in support of business processes. Typically, a C2IS presents battlespace objects on a map. However, not all relevant information can be indicated to the user by means of tactical symbols. Moreover, due to the dynamics of the battlefield, the statuses of battlespace objects change over time and these changes may go unnoticed by the operator. The authors propose the concept of a C2 newsfeed that turns structured operational data into short text messages to report on relevant changes in the theatre of operations. It takes into account contextual knowledge (time, place, role of the users, etc.), domain knowledge, and history (e.g., past status of an object) to produce concise textual descriptions. The newsfeed is designed as a micro service in a generic, web-based C2 demonstrator that supports the MIP4 Information Exchange Specification (MIP4-IES) and the MIP Information Model (MIM). In our paper, we will give a brief overview on its cloud-native architecture and the integration of the newsfeed.

ABSTRACT. The historical origins of the game theoretic predator-prey pursuit problem can be traced back to Benda, et al., 1985 [1]. Their work adapted the predator-prey ecology problem into a pursuit environment focused on the dynamics of cooperative behavior between predator agents. Modifications to the predator-prey ecology problem [2] have been implemented to understand how variations to predator [3, 4] and prey [5] attributes, including communication [6], can modify dynamic interactions between entities that emerge within that environment [7, 8]. Furthermore, the predator-prey pursuit environment has become a testbed for simulation experiments with computational multiagent systems [9 – 11]. This article theoretically extends previous work by providing 1) additional variations to predator and prey attributes for simulated multiagent systems in the pursuit problem, and 2) military-relevant predator-prey environments simulating highly dynamic tactical edge scenarios that Soldiers might encounter on future battlefields. Through this exploration of simulated tactical edge scenarios with computational multiagent systems, Soldiers will have a greater chance to achieve overmatch on the battlefields of tomorrow.

ABSTRACT. The military use of the Internet of Things within a battlefield environment aims to combine the information from a system of various heterogeneous sensors and actuators in order to create a cohesive model of the relevant battlefield so that intelligent agents can provide risk-aware decisions or take proper actions, to collectively give warfighters an edge. To do inference and reasoning under uncertainty efficiently, the most important and relevant features regardless of modality must be identified for each given context, classification task, and classification approach. This can minimize the computational costs required to build a specific model, increase the accuracy of the model and can allow the model to be generalized. However, the dynamic and adversarial nature of the battlefield may mean that the availability and reliability of sensors will vary over time. Adding a certain amount of redundancy in the set of features used to train a classifier may improve its robustness and minimize model uncertainty. One approach is modeling the feature space so that the likely importance of a given set of features can be estimated when context, classification task, or approach is varied. To efficiently understand the shape of a given feature space and to locate clusters of features in a locally distributed fashion, we surveyed methods to select important features and to describe or explore a given feature space.

ABSTRACT. Abstract We as a community must stop merging individual focus areas and functions (Command and Control (C2)) removing and diminishing the importance each of them. As with all things that evolve over time, Command and Control must continue to change as well. There is now the need to decouple command from control in order to achieve a basic understanding of each. We have done in the past with Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4), Command, Control, communications, Computers, Intelligence, surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), Coalition, and now Command, Control, Communications and Cyber “new C4”. If we start again by looking at Command as a focus area and function, we will see it as unique capability, function and activity that must not be diminished by appending it with other unique focus areas or functions. The same can be said about Control as a focus area and function. We no longer look at the two functions separately; we only see them as one “C2”. An example of how these two separate functions have become “one” is “Command and Control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2.” Joint Publication 1 “DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” August 2017. We will explore is we can truly have Command separated from Control and conversely you can have Control separated from Command in this paper.

ABSTRACT. ABSTRACT Group dynamics have several differing representation reference frames. The internal and the external group dynamics are represented and characterized. Those characteristics are sometimes different and sometimes similar representations. Either way those representations of dynamics may be in familiar terms, or new terms. Through his article, Suleman(1) points out that Huntington’s clash model(2) was not good enough; that the model had mixed differing characteristics in a ‘civilizational clash’ model. Namely that ‘culture and religion’ are not ahead of other ‘traditional factors’ when considering organizing frameworks. Further, Chua(3)(4) notes that frameworks like Huntington’s are modern constructs imposed on fundamental, older tribal ethnic frameworks. This suggests natural conflict exists between the differing organizational characteristics of the various organizations, tribes, groups, and sub-groups. The challenge is discovering fundamental organizing principles for understanding and aligning the characteristics to support direction and management – command and control. The frameworks support analysis, pattern recognition, and finding linkages and courses of action for outcomes. The Huntington, Suleman, and Chua approaches address group dynamics, though in differing aspects. Huntington mixed characteristic types in presenting his conflict model. Suleman argues that Huntington’s is a tainted framework. Chua cites a tribal based characteristic framework. This paper starts with Huntington’s framework, uses Suleman’s and Chua’s approaches along with definitions to parse, contrast, and compare Huntington’s characteristics. Next the several framework characteristics will be mapped to the Command and Control arena. The paper will close with framework alignment opportunities for action and outcomes.

(1) (Suleman, 2017) – Suleman, M. Arsalan. Return of the Clash: Operationalizing a Tainted Worldview. The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2018, Vol 40 - No. 4, p. 49-70. (Retrieved 22 Feb 2018 from https://doi.org/10.1080/063660X.2017.1406707.) (2) (Huntington, 1997) – Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order. Touchstone: Simon & Schuster Inc, New York:NY, 1997. (3) (Rauch, 2018) – Rauch, Jonathan. Review: Have our tribes become more important than our country? The Washington Post, Washington:DC, 16 Feb 2018. Retrieved 21 Feb 2018 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/have-our-tribes-become-more-important-than-our-country/2018/02/16/2f8ef9b2-083a-11e8-b48c-b07fea957bd5_story.html?utm_term=.fade09214382 (4) (Chua, 2018) – Chau, Amy. Political Tribes – Group Instinct and the Fate of Nations. Penguin Press: Penguin Random House LLC, New York:NY, 2018.

ABSTRACT. Abstract For several decades mission partners that include Coalitions, Alliances, Governments, Ministries, Departments, Bureaus, Agencies, Special Operations, and Conventional Forces have not been able to capitalize on a holistic learning environment. We collectively capture lessons learned and best practices from combat, exercises, training events, and external assessments to improve our processes and procedures enhancing command and control (C2) abilities. However, we collectively fail to institutionalize and apply the documented lessons learned and best practices because we approach this from an induvial organization/unit perspective verses a collaborative sharing environment for all. What is needed is a Coalition Multi-Domain Learning Environment to share and learn lessons from all types of operations and units’ experiences to address the challenges associated with working with different mission partners in any operation. This learning environment will encourage stakeholders to engage and grow the environment into a holistic learning ecosystem enabling analysis, studies, new policies, provide technical advice, and enable better C2 recommendations. The ecosystem will need to consider how to store data, simplified access with next generation encryption that is quantum resistant, content delivery (information sharing), multi-domain aggerating from lowest to highest levels of protection, and the ontology or lexicons

ABSTRACT. For years, adversaries have consistently been trying to disrupt U.S. and coalition force power projection capabilities with the development and proliferation of advanced weapons and systems that create "anti-access" and "area denial” A2/AD threats. These A2/AD threats increasingly challenge both military movement to and maneuver within areas of mutual interest, creating potentially contested environments. Some of these advanced systems include ballistic and cruise missiles; integrated air defense systems; space and cyber warfare capabilities specifically designed to disrupt U.S. communications and intelligence systems; anti-ship weapons like submarines, mines and swarming boats; and guided rockets, missiles, and artillery to name a few. Artificial Intelligence (AI) might be a solution to the above stated problem. Everyone is talking about the AI revolution and Harvard Business Review calls it, “the most important general-purpose technology of our era.” We believe AI can assist in preventing casualties and the loss of C2 capabilities to US and Coalition Forces in contested environments by identifying and providing solutions to avoid or counter those contested areas faster and earlier in the C2 decision process than leadership and coalition forces can react to those contested environments alone. This paper will explore the possibilities of using AI to observe, anticipate, detect, identify, classify and recommend courses of action to aid commanders in avoiding and/or countering contested environments developed by our adversaries advanced weapons.

ABSTRACT. Combat identification of aircraft is an important problem for militaries. Aircraft move quickly, may not aid identification, may be subject to system malfunctions, or may be miconfigured. Identification is also becoming more difficult because commercial aircraft are less often in airlanes, and we now have autonomous aircraft in the air on nonstandard routes. Nonetheless, we now have basic information about most major aircraft from satellite coverage such as by ADS-B, much available for every second. So combat identification today is a big-data problem, and this has disadvantages. Even if we have facilities to handle large amounts of data, often we have a limited bandwidth to transmit sensor data to them, and a central node is a single point of failure and thus a desirable target for adversaries. Our strategy is to push some of the processing and intelligence “to the edge” or to the platforms that collect data. We are developing methods whereby interesting and important data can be identified at an early stage. Full data will still need to be transmitted eventually, but early forwarding of time-critical information could help neighboring platforms (such as nearby aircraft) if we can identify it. Criteria we are exploring are anomalous counts in particular latitude-longitude bins, anomalous headings in the bins, anomalous speeds as a function of altitude, large variation from a straight track, anomalous times of observation, and unusual aircraft operators.

ABSTRACT. Situational Awareness (SA) is an important aspect of Command and Control, and a key enabler for military sovereignty. It is a critical element for the development of mission command capabilities. Developing SA requires information exchange between a tactical force's elements, including in a mobile scenario. We propose the use of the publish/subscribe paradigm to achieve this. In this paper, we present our experiments in the evaluation of two publish/subscribe mechanisms - based on Web Services Notification (WS-N) and Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) - applied to a realistic military scenario. Our analysis concluded that WS-N requires more network resources than MQTT to achieve the same functionality. According to our assessment, MQTT was the superior protocol. Furthermore, our evaluation showed that used network protocols, specifically OLSR and TCP, also play a significant role regarding the high use of network resources. In a mobile tactical environment, where network resources are scarce, it is recommended, as future work, to investigate optimisations or even alternative protocols that are better suited for this type of environments.

ABSTRACT. In the face of growing global uncertainty, the Navy, led by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson, has structured its strategy around a “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority” in which the Navy “will make our best initial assessment of the environment, formulate a way ahead, and move out.” Inherent in this “design” is the ability to “continually assess the environment.” In short, the uncertainty that the Navy faces necessitates deliberate course corrections and the use of constantly evolving strategy, tactics, and tools. Central among these tools is the need to have agile command and control (C2) software systems and updates that can be rapidly deployed on any of the plethora of naval systems. In recent years, SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific (SSC PAC) has invested significant resources into improving the Navy’s software distribution chain through the implementation of the SPAWAR Unified DevOps Orchestration Engine (SUDOE). Traditionally, the Navy has relied on highly trained engineers to perform time-consuming software installations on ships and other duty stations. SUDOE, on the other hand, follows a set of best practices and utilizes a suite of open source and custom built tools for provisioning management, code scanning, code compilation, automated software orchestration, and user friendly infrastructure controls that can be implemented remotely. SUDOE can be tailored and applied to DoD projects of varying requirements and complexity -- ranging from Programs of Records to small internally funded research projects. Implementation of the SUDOE has decreased time and cost, while increasing security and quality.

ABSTRACT. The use of military unmanned systems (UxS) is already creating strategic, operational, and tactical possibilities that did not exist a decade ago. One of the most cutting-edge—and challenging—aspects of autonomous systems is having systems that operate in different domains, that is having Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs), work together as a heterogeneous whole.

As autonomous systems become more important to military operators, the issue of command and control (C2) of cross-domain unmanned Vehicles (UxVs) will become more important. Today, while the performance of UxVs in all domains has improved dramatically, the C2 issues of controlling UxVs in multiple domains simultaneously remains an area requiring additional research, modeling and simulation, and operational testing.

This paper will present the results of operational testing of cross-domain UxVs in The Technical Cooperation Program (five-eyes) Hell Bay 4 experiment during NATO Exercise Unmanned Warrior 2016 at the British Underwater Test & Evaluation Centre (BUTEC). The primary objectives of this experiment focused on cooperative teaming of a UAV with UUVs to demonstrate extended range C2 of remotely deployed UUVs in a contested littoral environment. This paper will report on the objectives outlined in the Command and Control (C2) of Cross-Domain Unmanned Vehicles (UxVs) section of the Trial Plan.

ABSTRACT. The purpose of this paper is to propose a set of dimensions for the “Endeavour Space” and provide a set of examples of endeavours that can be utilized for future studies that seek to determine the appropriate of different C2 approaches for different locations (regions) of this Endeavour Space and that has to be developed.

ABSTRACT. This paper presents an introduction to why it is difficult, and still desirable, to integrate the perspectives of structure and behaviour when modelling command and control (C2). We use basic systems theory in combination with theories from the field of C2 as underpinning for our arguments. The structural perspective is necessary to describe the organization of, and relation between, entities relevant for C2. The behavioural viewpoint is necessary to put focus on the purpose of C2, which is to enable an adequate response to a problem or a situation at hand. The various problems are typically of a complex character, which includes dynamic changes and therefore has to be handled with feedback, or cybernetic, approaches. However, structure and behaviour are not easy to integrate, as will be evident in this paper.

ABSTRACT. Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780-1831) famously observed “Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln.” The appropriate translation is that war is a mere continuation of policy with other means; that is, war does not replace diplomatic, economic, and other means, but adds instruments of violence to the means employed. This may lead some to believe that since virtually all military operations have long been inherently multi-domain, nothing has changed and we do not need to do anything differently. While military operations have always involved multiple domains, this does mean that there are no significant differences between Multi Domain Operations (MDO) then and now. We will be well served if we can understand the character of 21st Century MDO and determine if, and how, the domains and the interactions between and among these domains have changed and the command and control implications of these changes. Should adaptations to our approaches to command and control be necessary, the tools exist, in the form of C2 Agility Theory and an accumulated body of evidence, to think through and make necessary adjustments to C2.

ABSTRACT. Ongoing advances in Internet of Things (IoT) technologies have prompted new research into their applicability for military use. Towards supporting C3I (Command, Control, Communications and intelligence) operations, a future Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) will require novel methods for supporting IoT service definition aimed to address: (1) Operation under resource-constrained, disruption prone networks; (2) Risk of adversary sabotage or injection of deceptive information; (3) Operation over dynamic asset spaces, covering diverse asset ownership; (4) Operation over dynamic mission requirements. Under such conditions, the potential risk of unforeseen IoT service malfunction makes support for human intervention highly desirable. Towards supporting C3I IoBT service management, this paper highlights the need for human-in-the-loop approaches. In turn, extensions to IoT middleware become desirable to support human-in-the-loop management of: (1) IoT asset discovery; (2) Pairing of IoT assets to services; (3) Definition of IoT service functionality, including techniques applied to process and disseminate IoT-derived information to end users.

ABSTRACT. It has never been more important for entities to partner with others in order to bring to bear the information, expertise, experience, capabilities and resources other military organizations, the inter-agency, and/or non-governmental and private organizations possess. The growing interest in Multi-domain C2 is directly related to the need to operate in and to integrate effects in multiple domains; domains as different as a physical domain (land) and cyberspace. Multi-domain C2 depends upon finding appropriate C2 approaches for domain operations as well as building and maintaining C2 relationships between and among entities operating in different domains. This paper provides a conceptual framework that can be used to find appropriate approaches to MDC2 for MDO. It considers one of the characteristics or capabilities of entities that can make them less than perfect partners, their ability to adopt different C2 Approaches. The paper concludes will a list of other characteristics or capabilities of entities that also need to be considered to suggest where further research is needed.

ABSTRACT. Achieving mobility, freedom to maneuver with enhanced force protection allow for tempo speed and surprise for CCMDs. Operational capabilities using autonomous platforms provide for power projection to expand battlespace awareness and situational awareness without Stop and Delay for CCMD User Operational Needs executing OPORD and FRAGORD for security and detect to engage missions (DTE) for Joint Service Use.

ABSTRACT. High profile emergency communication incident failures challenge us to come up with appropriate performance measures to understand how well first responders are prepared for emergency communications, how well they perform through the duration and how much they learn from resolved incidents. Performance measures provide needed transparency regarding incident handling, building organizational capabilities and performance. Efficient and effective measures are difficult to create due to the very nature of emergency communications: • Short-duration • Hard to predict • Difficult to capture • Having to meet diverse stakeholder needs • Varying requirements among different jurisdictions Incident emergency communications is one of few remaining areas in public / private enterprise space that still lacks measures to provide an objective assessment. Some approaches, such as the use of milestones with “yes / no” answers are not a substitute for true measures. Relatively large volume of incidents and limited data availability further complicate measure development due to significant cost and effort associated with data acquisition. Filtering incidents to minimize their volume without sacrificing accuracy and validity was an important consideration during the measure development process. At the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC), an entity within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working with first responders from across the country, a set of such measures was created. This is the first comprehensive attempt to develop such a measure set using consistent and rigorous methodology fortified with operational and business insights to guide measure development.

ABSTRACT. As the battle space becomes more complex, the adversary is less appeared, less organized and act in several domains, the current methods of battle space management - division to AORs and managing each function in a different layer - are no longer appropriate. especially when the battle occurs in multiple domains, and the answer is to be given from a variety of functions and from units from various origins and organizations. Add this the adversary's strive to deny our superiorities, and we get a call to develop new practices to maintaining our effectivity above him. This article will suggest a new approach to manage battlespace and the mutual cognition of the units in the battle group. Based on theories from teams' field of interest, especially the Task-oriented Shared Mental Model (TMS - Transactive Memory System); the mission oriented C2 approach, together with an independent suggestion of battle space division, this article will argue that originally dividing the theater into cells, will improve common language between all of the participants in the operation, from all echelons, focus on specified tactical goals, based on shared understanding of the operational end state, integration of capabilities and independent coordination between battlegroup members.

ABSTRACT. While unmanned systems increasingly impact all aspects of our life, it is their use as military assets that has garnered the most attention, and with that attention, growing concern. This heightened interest has occurred largely because one of the most rapidly growing areas of technology adoption by the U.S. military involves unmanned systems (UxS). The expanding use of military unmanned systems is already creating strategic, operational, and tactical possibilities that did not exist a decade ago. Indeed, at the highest levels of U.S. policy and strategy documents, unmanned systems are featured as an important part of the way the Joint Force will fight in the future. It is this ability to operate autonomously that makes unmanned systems a pacing technology as the United States seeks to regain the technological edge over a wide-range of adversaries listed in the most-recent National Security Strategy. Enhanced autonomy for military UxS is an important attribute, as warfighters increasingly recognize that the current concept of operations for military unmanned systems that often involves many-operators, many-joysticks, one unmanned system, is not sustainable. Thus, there is growing recognition that the only way to achieve the degree of autonomy necessary to achieve the full potential of unmanned systems to support U.S. military operators is to harness artificial intelligence and machine learning. With the prospect of military unmanned systems becoming more autonomous in the near-future, concerns have surfaced regarding a potential “dark side” of having armed unmanned systems—rather than military operators—make life-or-death decisions. While the DoD has issued strong guidance regarding operator control of autonomous vehicles, rapid advances in artificial intelligence and machine learning have exacerbated concerns that the military might lose control of armed autonomous systems. The challenge for autonomous systems designers is to provide the military with unmanned systems that take maximum advantage of artificial intelligence and machine learning, while concurrently providing operators with sufficient oversight and control.

ABSTRACT. Multi domain battle asserts that future operations will occur over more than one domain of sea, air, land, space, and cyber. This is in response to a projected complexity of the operational environment coupled with a sophisticated adversary. In order to maintain battle space dominance future militaries will have to execute command and control across these multiple domains. To help validate these developing concepts there is a need for a tactical network experimentation platform, such as the one being developed under a collaborative program between The US Army Research Laboratory (ARL) and Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group (DST) called SMARTNET.

ABSTRACT. This paper describes a recently started research project at the Swedish Defence Research Agency called “C2 of joint autonomous intelligent units”, which will run between 2018 and 2020. The project aims to investigate how the introduction of autonomous intelligent units, with the capability to interact with other autonomous intelligent units as well as humans, will affect C2 and supporting systems. Relevant aspects that will be included in the project are human decision makers, technology, and organisational aspects. The paper includes a general description of the problem domain, international collaborations, and the way ahead.

ABSTRACT. Introducing massively AI and Big Data technologies in military capabilities and cognitive processes is considered today as a paradigm change, a new revolution in military affairs.

In a fully connected world, where the lines between physical and informational domains are more and more blurred, Artificial Intelligence will make the world far more global than it is today and more intelligent, but harder to manage and anticipate. Artificial Intelligence will also make the world more vulnerable to cyber threats, and that has to be a leading concern in the development of augmented systems.

Thanks to Big Data and AI, future operations hold the promise of real-time information gathering, fusion and sharing on one hand, and on the other hand of an increase or even a substitution of human thought. This is the prospect of a real technological assistance in the management of complex crises that we are likely to face in the long term. In coherence, military decision cycles will need to be largely up-dated to make them more competitive during the compressed activities of future wars.