



Balance of Power in South Asia: Preceding in Discussion Balance of Physics in Relations Sino Indian Relations

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June 12, 2021

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Balance of Physics in Relations

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Abstract

Balance of power is a natural phenomena and every region should owe to follow it. Bases can be differing on strategic grounds but purpose is Panchsheel. South Asian region is one of an important region among several others in the world. Consist of many nations as India stands alone a major or bigger power within all these. All the major powers in the world today are Asian powers as a majority of them are on the continent except the United States, and all of them have vital interests and a direct impact on the politics of this region India surrounds by various neighbours they had assistance on various grounds. China create many economic corridors where as India is not lacking behind on these grounds. We can both honestly say we are not building relations in hostility against China; but it is right and proper for us to examine what to do if China acts in hostility against us. Welcome a rise of India view a strong India as an asset to their own interests. This paper dealt with cases of sub-continent countries in particular, South & East Asia in general in the shadow of Sino Indian Relations before the world.

Introduction:

There was a general optimism at the end of the Cold War that the world was moving towards democracy and a more stable and peaceful world order. Contrary to such expectations, it led to the unleashing of virulent nationalistic and religious passions. Paradoxically, it is the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democracies that allowed free expression of demands that lead to such explosive ethnic turbulence. In fact, regional militaries are increasingly faced with challenges from non-state actors, terrorists and radical extremists. Identity politics along with resource-based politics are increasingly becoming a predominant feature in/of Asian countries. For instance, India, China and Japan have become some of the largest regional and even global energy consumers, which in turn, have reflected increasing focus on aspects like safety of the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) and so on. Additionally, the varied responses to these issues by these powers have resulted in a heightened sense of insecurity. The fact that there are four major powers rising simultaneously in Asia has produced major insecurities, due to certain issues inherent in Asia. The region is a victim of several major boundary and territorial disputes, baggage of history and trust deficit among these powers. Given this background, there has been an increasing focus, at least in Asia, on increasing security, in terms of strengthening of conventional, non-conventional and strategic forces.

A second contextualising factor may relate. Perceptions are often more consequential than actualities, but that works both ways. China surely knows that how it appears to others inevitably shapes their policies. We should not fight shy of readying ourselves for unpleasant eventualities, nor imagine that these won't happen if we do not give China cause for misunderstanding. In this complex world, we must deal with many, varied concerns, but in regard to our national security there is surely a clear and imperative organising principle: do whatever you must to ensure territorial integrity what Panchsheel theory described through its principles. That imposes compulsions arising from one stark fact: two states already occupy substantial parts of our territory and claim more. Our differences certainly need not erupt in major violence; we should keep trying for a relationship, with both our neighbours, in which a realisation of the benefits of peaceful cooperation outweighs any calculations of gains from conflict. But the

surest way to preclude conflict is to manifest capabilities which make it too costly. If miscalculation or mischance should nevertheless cause eruption, nobody will help us: we would have to cope alone. We are nowhere near equipped for that, on the ground or, even more importantly, in our thinking. Japan's interest in us should at least be a stimulus for the thinking part, as well as leading potentially to improving our ground position. Why our political leaders refuse to see such obvious reality is incomprehensible and self-damaging. That nobody is preparation for tomorrow. Enhancing our capacity to ensure our territorial integrity brooks no slacking. It has already suffered political parties would agree on handful of issues of vital national importance. They have let our defence procurement become an inadequate patchwork, ignored both the essentiality of developing a strategic thinking defence apparatus and the disturbingly unhappy civil military relations and, not least, not allowed India to function as a serious player in the increasingly complex and demanding international arena. One simple question can be a surprisingly useful pointer in working out our international relationships: which countries welcome a rise of India, and which dislike it? Most countries wouldn't care; two definitely do not wish us well; a few view a strong India as an asset to their own interests. Often, we don't recognise some of these; much less take advantage of the opportunities they offer. Japan is clearly wishing us well, as we wish it for them. There is no point in pretending that China does not drive us both more than our bilateral hopes might do otherwise, but there is no harm in that reality.

We can both honestly say we are not building relations in hostility against China; but it is right and proper for us to examine what to do if China acts in hostility against us. Long dependent solely on its alliance with America for its national security, Japan is now looking for the best ways to rely more on itself, and play a greater role in the search for Asian stability. In our totally changed world, we ourselves have evolved to cooperate strategically with the U.S. Doing so with Japan is no less important. Just how reliable a partner Japan might consider us depends on our future functioning. That functioning is stifled by political bickering/argue and the dysfunction of our instruments of state. Not one vote will be changed in elections by the issues affected, but with elections approaching no improvement is conceivable for who knows how long. Fortunately, most political parties can be expected to welcome cooperation with Japan. In translating into policies his striking devotion to his country's greatness.¹

South Asian region is one of an important region among several others in the world. Consist of many nations as India stands alone a major or bigger power within all these. All the major powers in the world today are Asian powers as a majority of them are on the continent except the United States, and all of them have vital interests and a direct impact on the politics of this region.² As mentioned by the scholars that the 21st century is belong to the Asian region. And apart from treating each other on the grounds of foray these Asian particularly South & East Asian Region countries should go ahead and dependency on the military and geo-political strategies that these countries pursue with the cooperation. India should be alert about the Chinese tactic moves. Chinese dragon was sleeping for a long time now it is awoken and it is shacking whole world. Since 1949 and 1975 China under Mao Tse Tung had tremendous progress and changed the identity as marching sources towards super power and form Den Xiaoping China has further march its progress in various sorts of international life with super seeding India and India should be well aware about the Chinese efforts both on international and Asian power context. Especially its diplomatic moves in South Asia too important China was keep India engaged in Pakistan and bordering issues so this should not operate on international level. And it is trying to limit India and trying to

appear itself as a dominate power in Asia and dealing with the Trade & Commerce and the foreign relations in this context.

India had different considerations, as it was still far from becoming a global power of any reckoning/computation. India saw in the trilateral a mechanism to bring greater balance in the global order as it believed that a unipolar U.S. dominated world was not in the best interests of states like itself, even as strategic convergence deepened between Washington and Delhi. Moreover, all three countries realised the enormous potential in the economic, political, military and cultural realms if bilateral relationships among them were adequately strengthened. As a consequence, the trilateral did not lead to consequences of any great import. It merely resulted in declarations which were often critical of the West and of the U.S. in particular. Yet this was also a period which saw significant shifts in Indo-U.S. ties as bilateral relations expanded while Russian and Chinese links with the U.S. have witnessed a downward shift. The joint declaration of the recent trilateral meeting said: "Those committing, organising, inciting or supporting terrorist acts" must be held accountable and brought to justice under international law, including the principle of "extradite or prosecute."³

Cases of Pakistan, Bangladesh & Sri Lanka in Shadow of Sino-Indian Relations:

It's an established fact that Pakistan and Bangladesh proved their interest ties with China due to major reasons of obtaining assistance and the nature of development on the basis of infrastructure support to them. Financial assistance to these countries including Sri Lanka from 2005 to 2014 & 2015.⁴ These aids possible through as an alternative to International Financial Organisation (IOR).⁵ The Pakistan case study shows another successful story of China's String of Pearls strategy in the IOR. China's six economic corridors appear as one of its strategies to counter the U.S. strategy against China an isolation strategy. Further, this case study shows how China has engaged with an ally of the United States and a rival of India-Pakistan in its String of Pearls strategy. At the same time, China has invested considerable finances in the IOR for the construction of seaports and related facilities in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Using a common approach, China offers these countries a large number of agreements and MOUs that show the benefits for the lender, the investor, and the borrower: 51 MOUs with Pakistan and eight with Sri Lanka.⁶ Considering the geographical area and the demographic factors such as tribal areas in Pakistan where extremists and terrorist groups are operating the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is likely to entail additional challenges while developing the infrastructure in the corridor as well as in conducting these economic activities.

The geopolitical challenges that the China-Pakistan partnership poses to U.S. and India's interests in IOR affairs. By comparison, Pakistan enjoys greater freedom in conducting maritime activities in the Gwadar port with China, which might even extend from economic to military ones, or a covert combination. In such an environment, it is likely that the United States will play a more active role in IOR affairs, either through direct engagement or indirect engagement through a third party such as India. Further, how Sri Lanka manages and prevents the reemergence of China's naval elements in Sri Lanka's territorial waters, too, could become a critical factor when compared to the envisaged China-Pakistan maritime activities for balancing power in the IOR. Pakistan established diplomatic relations with China in the mid 20th century, and both countries have engaged in political and economic activities since then.¹⁵⁶ Pakistan has had diplomatic relations with China since 1951, and it became the first Muslim country to recognize the communist government of China the PRC.⁷ The bilateral relationship

between the two countries shares an animosity towards India, and this relationship has evolved into a close strategic cooperation since the 1960s.⁸ Following are the key milestones highlighting economic ties between the two countries since the 1960s: 1) the signing of a trade agreement in 1961 guaranteeing Pakistan the most-favored-nation treatment on a bilateral basis; 2) the Pakistani market in China for jute, textiles, and cotton in the mid-1960s, 3) the construction of the Karakorum highway linking Islamabad and the western Chinese city of Kashgar in 1972; and 4) the signing of a bilateral investment treaty in 1989.⁹ Further, bilateral trade between China and Pakistan in the late 20th century and early 21st century shows the healthy relations maintained by the two countries in recent history—US\$ 768 In turn, Pakistan has become a partner of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) strategy of China. OBOR is a development strategy proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 to upgrade infrastructure in 65 countries across Eurasia, and it includes developing economic integration in its regional and political cooperation.¹⁰

Cases of neighbouring nations like Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh & Bhutan is already dealt in this article the other closest neighbouring is Sri Lanka can be seen under the shadow of Sino-Indian relations. India and China are the two giants who help the small countries in the region to sustain their development. Recently, China seemed to be more favorable rather than India in the context of economic as well as in politics for Sri Lanka. On the contrary India is the nearest neighbor of Sri Lanka who has continued historical relation in social, economic and cultural context. As a small country in South Asia, Sri Lanka needs to maintain a neutral position within the competition between the two giants. Being favorable towards China will be a disadvantage to Sri Lanka in the region. Even though China is a friend of Sri Lanka, India is the most immediate neighbor it. Maintaining a neutral position among the giants will be the most suitable strategy for Sri Lanka to walk towards the development. In coming years, the Indian Ocean is likely to experience a period of considerable strategic uncertainty that will involve new players and new challenges. Although the United States is likely to continue to be the strongest military power in the Indian Ocean for a long time to come, there is a risk of a significant decline in its regional presence and in its credibility as a reliable security provider. At the same time, the emergence of India and China as major naval powers will lead to a much more multipolar region. Of particular concern is the growing strategic competition between India and China, which has the potential to profoundly impact the stability and security of the region.¹¹

Strategy of Distance:

On the contrary some other countries of South Asian region tends towards the East Asian China and on other hand in particular cases Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan & Maldives had Indian edge to grown under the mega power. NDA-II realises the strategy of distance with the unipolar world through the dialogue and practices under the umbrella of Indian origin NAM a non-align policy is being process to up heaves the Doklam conflict as what the governments of the respective countries described. Nepal's Deputy Prime Minister Krishna Bahadur Mahara said, that "Nepal will not get dragged into this or that side in the border dispute", it was under meeting with External affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj who had been in Khatmandu for the for the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) regional summit. On the point a Sri Lankan Minister in Colombo contended that India and China are "both important" to Sri Lanka.¹² Bhutan's Foreign Ministry has stuck to its line,

blaming China for violating agreements at Doklam, a favourable stand towards the mega power India. Which India can turn more supportive to Bhutan strategically.

Irrespective to Afghanistan and Pakistan had tending towards China. In which later one play major role to make India as a bystander in all the regional game Afghanistan stands in dilemma as historically connected with India Even thought in it particular case the Western Alliance were focusing to lure it and India don't want to be the non-player in this regional sum game. India is a rising power, but China shadowing more strategises ascent before the world. Beijing's influence will almost certainly continue to grow and has already upset Asia's geopolitical balance.¹³ India should deciding under NDA-II that how to secure its interests in this unbalanced environment by choosing among six potential strategic options: staying unaligned, hedging, building indigenous military power, forming regional partnerships, aligning with China, or aligning with the United States. An alignment with Washington likely represents India's best chance to counter China, while efforts to foster regional partnerships and cultivate domestic military capabilities, although insufficient by themselves, could play a complementary role.

Sino-Indian Maritime Cooperation:

As in more developmental form the recent one India reaffirmed that its Indo-Pacific strategy was not aimed at China's contentment. An Indian Embassy pres statement said that "The Indian side also elaborate on India's vision for the Indo-Pacific region as articulated in Prime Minister Modi's keynote address at this year's Shangrila Dialogue in Singapore", during the second India-China Maritime Affairs Dialogue held in Beijing, In his address, P.M. Modi had pointed to the ten countries of Southeast Asia as the junction of India and Pacific oceans in both manner of geographical and civilisation. "India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means does Indian consider it as directed against any country". A "perspective on maritime security and cooperation",¹⁴ A common ground was intended in the Indian Ocean and Pacific. As it was mentioned earlier in this article the strengthening the economy of both countries with practical cooperation. A further step into the cooperation was to provide strengthen on political ground and on strategic mutual trust. The maritime cooperation was "an important area of India-China bilateral relations" added in the statement. India had been concerned about China's swoop/incursion in the Indian Ocean including Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

Certitude of Affairs/Facets Materia/Attribute of Occurrences/Facts of Pith:

India's recent embrace of openness and globalization has had an especially dramatic effect on the country's role in the region. As the nations of the subcontinent jettison their old socialist agendas, India is well positioned to promote economic integration. Although the pace has been relatively slow, the process has begun to gain traction. The planned implementation of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement this summer signals the coming reintegration of the subcontinent's markets, which constituted a single economic space until 1947. At the same time, optimism on the economic front must be tempered by an awareness of the problematic political developments in India's smaller neighbors. The struggle for democracy and social justice in Nepal, interminable political violence and the rise of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh, and the simmering civil war in Sri Lanka underscore the potential dangers of failing states on the subcontinent. There are also the uncertain futures of Pakistan and Afghanistan: defeating religious extremism and creating modern and moderate

states in both countries is of paramount importance to India. A successful Indian strategy for promoting peace and prosperity within the region would require preventing internal conflicts from undermining regional security, as well as resolving India's own conflicts with its neighbors.¹⁵

In the past, great-power rivalries, as well as India's own tensions with Pakistan and China, have complicated New Delhi's effort to maintain order in the region. Today, all of the great powers, including the United States and China, support the Indian objective of promoting regional economic integration. Given the new convergence of U.S. and Indian interests in promoting democracy and countering extremism and terrorism, New Delhi no longer suspects Washington of trying to undercut its influence in the region. As a result, it is more prepared than ever to work with the United States and other Western powers to pursue regional goals. Regional balancing is a strategy India could pursue to align with other Asian countries in order to balance against China. Such partners could include Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam although, in the future, Indonesia and Malaysia could potentially be incorporated. These countries are also concerned about China's rise and aggressiveness, and they may be open to India playing a role in establishing a more favorable balance of power in the region.¹⁶ Over the last two decades, India's Look East and Act East policies have aimed at closer economic and strategic links with other countries in the region.¹⁷ But follow-up has been unsatisfactory, as India is still trading less with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations than even Australia or Hong Kong. India's inability to improve transportation infrastructure to its east is a serious problem.¹⁸

Conclusion:

Geo-politics in Asia are fast changing and becoming more complex today, with an important feature being the interplay between the US-led alliance structure and China's reinvigorated multilateral engagement in East Asia. As far as South Asia is concerned China tries to play single hegemonic with its assistance policy. A strategy of nonalignment, hedging, or alignment with China likely would not serve India's interests because China's power, geographical proximity, and policies already represent a clear danger to India's security and global interests. A closer alignment with the United States, further along the same policy path that India is already pursuing, represents the best way to meet the challenge of China's rise, because the United States is the only power that is stronger than China. Further New Delhi and Washington share a common interest in balancing Beijing. Among India's other strategic options, efforts to build indigenous military power and forge regional partnerships are necessary and complementary means of countering China. India is well versed with the resources of aid to any other country in Southern Asian region. More strategic, more plural & more realistic approach could become a key mantra to strengthen its power in the said region.

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