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A General Position of Enactment Paradigm: Phenomenon of Procurement Enact.

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Extended Abstract[+]. There is a need by an agent to determine a generalized position of procurement enacts in an attractive interests or attractive attention. Agent parties are responsible to act by a chain of commands and that create an enactment game determined to be a win or loss.

Keywords. enactment game, agent parties, enaction, attention, enact, chain of command, PEEP, CPED, decision ratio, attractive interest.

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1 INTRODUCTION

In describing the abstract view of agent[2], it is assumed that an environment may be in any of a finite set E of discrete, instantaneous states:

$$E=\left\{e,e',\ldots.\right\}$$

Agents are assumed to have a repertoire of possible actions available to them, which transform the state of the environment. Let

$Ac=\left\{\alpha,\alpha',\ldots..\right\}$: Finite set of actions

The basic model of agents interacting with their environment is as follows:
A state is initiated in the environment and agent begins by choosing an action to perform on that state. As a result of action, the environment responds with a number of possible states. There is only one actual state to result. The agent chooses on a second state, the action to perform. The environment in *state-action cycle* responds with one of a set of possible states and agent then chooses another action to run and so on.

A run, of an agent in an environment is thus a sequence of interleaved environment states and actions :

$$r:e_0\rightarrow^{\alpha_0}e_1\rightarrow^{\alpha_2}e_2\rightarrow^{\alpha_3}e_3\rightarrow^{\alpha_1}e_4\rightarrow^{\alpha_{n-1}}e_n$$

- Le t R be the set of all such possible finite sequence.
- R^{AC} be the subset of these that end with (over E and Ac)
- $\Re$ be the subset of these that end with an environment state.

2 CHAIN OF COMMAND

Agent formulates a chain of command strategy to determine the phenomenon of enaction[3] or enactment[1]. It is given as:

Chain of Commands

Actor	Command	Actor 2	Rank
a_1	enacts	a_2	1
a_2	enacts	a_3	2
a_3	enacts	a_4	3
a_4	enacts	a_5	4
a_n	enacts	a_{n+1}	n

$Rank{:}Ac_i \, x \, Ac_j \rightarrow \Omega$, with respect to decision action(Ac):= { C, D} against decision outcomes (Ω):={P, E}.

CPED *Abbreviation:*

cooperate **:=**C *propose:*=P

defect:= D *enact:*=E

In tabulated decision form:

Outcome/Action	Cooperate	Defect
Propose	Ω_1	Ω_2
Enact	Ω_3	Ω_4

CPED Decision Ratio= Outcome over Action.

There are four decision outcomes in the command strategy. There are represented as P and E only. The possible results with incentive measure will be as:

Ω_1 *:* Propose over Cooperate = *P*

Ω_2 *:*Propose over Defect = *E*

Ω_3 *:* Enact over Cooperate *:= E*

Ω_4 *:Enact over Defect :=P*

PEEP Strategy:

1. A propose over cooperate has P attractive interest.
2. A propose over defect has E attractive interest.
3. A enact over cooperate has E attractive interest.
4. A enact over defect has P attractive interest.

In this chain of command, there are only 2 parties in the interaction, namely A_1 and A_2 with 5 attractive interests. Agent party, A_1 (Actor 1) interests can be represented as:

$$Interest\left(I_1\right)=\left\{a_1,a_2,a_3,a_4,.....a_n\right\} .$$

and A_2 (Actor 2) can also have its interest to be represented as:

$$Interest\left(I_2\right)=\left\{a_2,a_3,a_4,a_5,.....a_{n+1}\right\}$$

Actor 1 has only one eliminated interest from the set Actor 2 in the enactment. The chain of command strategy will be read as:

(1) Actor 1 has a_1 interest to enact Actor 2 interest, a_2 ,

(2) Actor 1 has a_2 interest to enact Actor 2 interest, a_3 ,

(3) Actor 1 has a_3 interest to enact Actor 2 interest, a_4 ,

(4) Actor 1 has a_4 interest to enact Actor 2 interest, a_5 ,

(5) Actor 1 has a_n interest to enact Actor 2 interest, $a_{|n+1|}$.

The scenario of procurement enact creates a tension needing a negogiation strategy. What Actor 1 or 2 procures is not quite known? What is known is their interest and the chains of commands. If Actor, A_1 enacts cause an interest to Actor, A_2 , what should be done in the situation? Procurement is based on effort made by actor to do business in an agent place but the chain of commands does not need to conflict with resources available to them.

The implication[4, 6] of chain of commands are:

1. Rank 1: $a_1 \overset{enact}{\rightarrow} a_2$,
2. Rank 2: $a_2 \overset{enact}{\rightarrow} a_3$,
3. Rank 3: $a_3 \overset{enact}{\rightarrow} a_4$,
4. Rank 4: $a_4 \overset{enact}{\rightarrow} a_5$,
5. Rank n: $a_n \overset{enact}{\rightarrow} a_{n+1}$.

The implication row is a chain of commands because for each rank of enactment Actor 1 has an interest a_n that is positioned at n than Actor 2 interest which is positioned at n+1.

Simply Actor 1 interest must cause Actor 2 interest in the procurement engagement. Actor engagement is established because Actor 1 interest fits into Actor 2 interest part and they start to ran together. The implication row of interest is to attract and keep other parties in agent interest and attention. An agent interest and attention in an engagement functions properly if there is a determined place/ location with a temporal notation.

Secondly, actor engagement in procurement is established again because Actor 1 employs Actor 2 to keep an agent interest and attention. Actor 1 cannot solely do business with the agent's conflict of interest. Actor 2 cannot also do so. There is a need for engagement in enactment handshake.

The negotiation strategy is communicated to agent parties before hand in any procurement enact. The legalized position in procurement scenario demands that agent parties know of the agent's interests and attention. What interest value of Actor 1 influences which interest value of Actor 2?

3 CONCLUSION

The behavior relationships of the agent interest and attention is determined from the linear order of the enact functions of engagement. The engagement functions[5] of enact are:

(i) $enact\left(a_1, a_2, rank_1\right)$,

(ii) $enact\left(a_2, a_3, rank_2\right)$,

(iii) $enact\left(a_3, a_4, rank_3\right)$,

(iv) $enact\left(a_4, a_5, rank_4\right)$,

(v) $enact\left(a_n, a_{n+1}, rank_n\right)$: **Generalized Enact Functions.**

The engagement functions of enact can be read as:

(i) An enactment will run if the enact parameters are a_1 , a_2 and $rank_1$ respectively.

(ii) An enactment will run if the enact parameters are a_2 , a_3 and $rank_2$ respectively.

(iii) An enactment will run if the enact parameters are a_3 , a_4 and $rank_3$ respectively.

(iv) An enactment will run if the enact parameters are a_4 , a_5 and $rank_4$ respectively.

(v) An enactment will run if the enact parameters are a_n , a_{n+1} and $rank_n$ respectively.

Compliance with Ethical Standards:

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Conflict of Interest:

Author, Dr. Frank Appiah declares that he has no conflict of interest .

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