

A Finite Model Property for Gödel Modal Logics

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1 Introduction

Gödel modal logics combine Kripke frames of modal logics with the semantics of the well-known fuzzy (and intermediate) Gödel logic. These logics, in particular, analogues GK (for “fuzzy” frames) and GK^C (for “crisp” frames) of the modal logic K, have been investigated in some detail by Caicedo and Rodríguez [5, 4] and Metcalfe and Olivetti [11, 12]. More general approaches, focussing mainly on finite-valued modal logics, have been developed by Fitting [7, 8], Priest [13], and Bou et al. [2]. Multimodal variants of GK have also been proposed as the basis for fuzzy description logics in [10] and (restricting to finite models) [1].

Axiomatizations were obtained for the box and diamond fragments of GK (where the box fragments of GK and GK^C coincide) in [5] and for the diamond fragment of GK^C in [12]. It was subsequently shown in [4] that the full logic GK is axiomatized either by adding the Fischer Servi axioms for intuitionistic modal logic IK (see [6]) to the union of the axioms for both fragments, or by adding the prelinearity axiom for Gödel logic to IK. Decidability of the diamond fragment of GK was established in [5], using the fact that the fragment has the finite model property with respect to its Kripke semantics. This finite model property fails for the box fragment of GK and GK^C and the diamond fragment of GK^C , but decidability and PSPACE-completeness for these fragments was established in [11, 12] using analytic Gentzen-style proof systems.

The first main contribution of the work reported here is a decidability proof for validity in full GK and GK^C that makes use of alternative Kripke semantics for these logics admitting the finite model property. The key idea of this new semantics is to restrict evaluations of modal formulas at a world to a particular finite set of truth values. A similar strategy is used to establish decidability, and indeed co-NP-completeness, for the crisp Gödel modal logic $GS5^C$ based on S5 frames where accessibility is an equivalence relation. Moreover, this logic, an extension of the intuitionistic modal logic MIPC of Bull [3] and Prior [14] with prelinearity and a further modal axiom, corresponds exactly to the one-variable fragment of first-order Gödel logic (see [9]).¹

2 Gödel Modal Logics

Gödel modal logics are defined based on a language $\mathcal{L}_{\Box\Diamond}$ consisting of a fixed countably infinite set Var of (propositional) variables, denoted p, q, \dots , binary connectives $\rightarrow, \wedge, \vee$, constants \perp, \top , and unary operators \Box and \Diamond . The set of *formulas* $\text{Fml}_{\Box\Diamond}$, with arbitrary members denoted φ, ψ, \dots is defined inductively as usual.

¹A full paper with the same title as this extended abstract will be presented at WoLLIC 2013 and may be downloaded from www.philosophie.ch/297.

We also fix the *length* of a formula φ , denoted $\ell(\varphi)$, to be the number of symbols occurring in φ and define $\neg\varphi = \varphi \rightarrow \perp$.

The standard semantics of Gödel logic is characterized by the Gödel t-norm \min and its residuum \rightarrow_G , defined on the real unit interval $[0, 1]$ by

$$x \rightarrow_G y = \begin{cases} y & \text{if } x > y \\ 1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The Gödel modal logics \mathbf{GK} and \mathbf{GK}^C are defined semantically as generalizations of the modal logic \mathbf{K} where connectives behave at a given world as in Gödel logic.

A *fuzzy Kripke frame* is a pair $\mathfrak{F} = \langle W, R \rangle$ where W is a non-empty set of *worlds* and $R: W \times W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is a binary *fuzzy accessibility relation* on W . If $Rxy \in \{0, 1\}$ for all $x, y \in W$, then R is called *crisp* and \mathfrak{F} , a *crisp Kripke frame*. In this case, we often write $R \subseteq W \times W$ and Rxy to mean $Rxy = 1$.

A \mathbf{GK} -*model* is a triple $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, V \rangle$, where $\langle W, R \rangle$ is a fuzzy Kripke frame and $V: \text{Var} \times W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is a mapping, called a *valuation*, extended to $V: \text{Fml}_{\Box\Diamond} \times W \rightarrow [0, 1]$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} V(\perp, x) &= 0 \\ V(\top, x) &= 1 \\ V(\varphi \rightarrow \psi, x) &= V(\varphi, x) \rightarrow_G V(\psi, x) \\ V(\varphi \wedge \psi, x) &= \min(V(\varphi, x), V(\psi, x)) \\ V(\varphi \vee \psi, x) &= \max(V(\varphi, x), V(\psi, x)) \\ V(\Box\varphi, x) &= \inf\{Rxy \rightarrow_G V(\varphi, y) : y \in W\} \\ V(\Diamond\varphi, x) &= \sup\{\min(Rxy, V(\varphi, y)) : y \in W\}. \end{aligned}$$

A \mathbf{GK}^C -*model* satisfies the extra condition that $\langle W, R \rangle$ is a crisp Kripke frame. In this case, the conditions for \Box and \Diamond may also be read as

$$\begin{aligned} V(\Box\varphi, x) &= \inf(\{1\} \cup \{V(\varphi, y) : Rxy\}) \\ V(\Diamond\varphi, x) &= \sup(\{0\} \cup \{V(\varphi, y) : Rxy\}). \end{aligned}$$

A formula $\varphi \in \text{Fml}_{\Box\Diamond}$ is *valid* in a \mathbf{GK} -model $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, V \rangle$ if $V(\varphi, x) = 1$ for all $x \in W$. If φ is valid in all \mathbf{L} -models for some logic \mathbf{L} (in particular \mathbf{GK} or \mathbf{GK}^C), then φ is said to be \mathbf{L} -*valid*, written $\models_{\mathbf{L}} \varphi$.

Let us agree to call a model *finite* if its set of worlds is finite, and say that a logic has the *finite model property* if validity in the logic coincides with validity in all finite models of the logic. In [5], it is shown that the formula $\Box\neg\neg p \rightarrow \neg\neg\Box p$ is valid in all finite \mathbf{GK} models, but not in the infinite crisp model $\langle \mathbb{N}, R, V \rangle$ where $Rxy = 1$ for all $x, y \in \mathbb{N}$ and $V(p, x) = 1/(x+1)$ for all $x \in \mathbb{N}$. That is, neither \mathbf{GK} nor \mathbf{GK}^C has the finite model property.

3 A New Semantics and Finite Model Property

In order for a \mathbf{GK}^C -model to render $\varphi = \Box\neg\neg p \rightarrow \neg\neg\Box p$ invalid at a world x , there must be values of p at worlds accessible to x that form an infinite descending sequence tending to but never reaching 0. This ensures that the infinite model falsifies φ , but also that no particular world acts as a “witness” to the value of $\Box p$. Our strategy is to redefine models to allow

only a finite number of values at each world that can be taken by box-formulas and diamond-formulas. A formula such as $\Box p$ can then be “witnessed” at a world where the value of p is merely “sufficiently close” to the value of $\Box p$.

Let us define a **GFK-model** as a quadruple $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, T, V \rangle$, where $\langle W, R, V \rangle$ is a **GK-model** and $T: W \rightarrow \mathcal{P}_{<\omega}([0, 1])$ is a function from worlds to finite sets of truth values satisfying $\{0, 1\} \subseteq T(x) \subseteq [0, 1]$ for all $x \in W$. If $\langle W, R, V \rangle$ is also a **GK^C-model**, then \mathfrak{M} will be called a **GFK^C-model**.

The **GFK-valuation** V is extended to formulas using the same clauses for non-modal connectives as for **GK-valuations**, together with the revised modal connective clauses:

$$\begin{aligned} V(\Box\varphi, x) &= \max\{r \in T(x) : r \leq \inf\{Rxy \rightarrow_{\mathbf{G}} V(\varphi, y) : y \in W\}\} \\ V(\Diamond\varphi, x) &= \min\{r \in T(x) : r \geq \sup\{\min(Rxy, V(\varphi, y)) : y \in W\}\}. \end{aligned}$$

As before, a formula $\varphi \in \text{Fml}_{\Box\Diamond}$ is *valid* in a **GFK-model** $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, T, V \rangle$ if $V(\varphi, x) = 1$ for all $x \in W$, written $\mathfrak{M} \models_{\mathbf{GFK}} \varphi$.

Observe now that for the formula $\Box\neg\neg p \rightarrow \neg\neg\Box p$, there are very simple finite **GFK^C-counter-models**: for example, $\mathfrak{M}_0 = \langle W, R, T, V \rangle$ with $W = \{a\}$, $Raa = 1$, $T(a) = \{0, 1\}$, and $V(p, a) = \frac{1}{2}$. It is easy to see that $V(\neg p, a) = 0$, $Raa \rightarrow_{\mathbf{G}} V(\neg\neg p, a) = 1$, and so $V(\Box\neg\neg p, a) = 1$. Moreover, $V(\Box p, a) = 0$ (since $Raa \rightarrow_{\mathbf{G}} V(p, a) = \frac{1}{2}$, and 0 is the next smaller element of $T(a)$); hence $V(\neg\Box p, a) = 1$ and $V(\neg\neg\Box p, a) = 0$. So $1 = V(\Box\neg\neg p, a) > V(\neg\neg\Box p, a) = 0$ and $\mathfrak{M}_0 \not\models_{\mathbf{GFK}^{\mathbf{C}}} \Box\neg\neg p \rightarrow \neg\neg\Box p$.

Indeed, it can be shown that every formula φ that is not **GFK-valid** (or **GFK^C-valid**) has a finite **GFK** (respectively, **GFK^C**) counter-model of size exponential in the length of φ . It follows that validity in **GFK** and **GFK^C** is decidable. Moreover, since validity in **GK** and **GK^C** can be shown to correspond exactly to validity in **GFK** and **GFK^C**, respectively, decidability follows also for these logics. More precisely, we have established:

Theorem 1. *For each $\varphi \in \text{Fml}_{\Box\Diamond}$:*

- (a) $\models_{\mathbf{GK}} \varphi$ iff $\models_{\mathbf{GFK}} \varphi$ iff φ is valid in all **GFK-models** $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, T, V \rangle$ satisfying $|W| \leq (\ell(\varphi) + 2)^{\ell(\varphi)}$ and $|T(x)| \leq \ell(\varphi) + 2$ for all $x \in W$.
- (b) $\models_{\mathbf{GK}^{\mathbf{C}}} \varphi$ iff $\models_{\mathbf{GFK}^{\mathbf{C}}} \varphi$ iff φ is valid in all **GFK^C-models** $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, T, V \rangle$ satisfying $|W| \leq (\ell(\varphi) + 2)^{\ell(\varphi)}$ and $|T(x)| \leq \ell(\varphi) + 2$ for all $x \in W$.

Moreover, validity in **GK** and **GK^C** is decidable.

4 A Crisp Gödel S5 Logic

The crisp Gödel modal logic **GS5^C** is characterized by validity in **GK^C-models** where R is an equivalence relation. This logic may also be viewed as the one-variable fragment of first-order Gödel logic (see [9]).

We define a **GFS5^C-model** as a **GFK^C-model** $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, T, V \rangle$ such that $\langle W, R, V \rangle$ is a **GS5^C-model** and also $T(x) = T(y)$ whenever Rxy (ensuring that formulas of the form $\Box\varphi$ and $\Diamond\varphi$ receive the same truth value in all worlds of the same equivalence class). We are then able to show that every non-**GFS5^C-valid** formula φ has a finite **GFS5^C-counter-model** of size linear in the length of φ . Since again we are able to establish a correspondence between **GFS5^C-validity** and **GS5^C-validity**, we obtain the following:

Theorem 2. For each $\varphi \in \text{Fml}_{\Box\Diamond}$: $\models_{\text{GS5}^C} \varphi$ iff $\models_{\text{GFS5}^C} \varphi$ iff φ is valid in all GFS5^C -models $\mathfrak{M} = \langle W, R, T, V \rangle$ where $|W| \leq \ell(\varphi) + 2$ and $|T(x)| \leq \ell(\varphi) + 2$ for all $x \in W$. Moreover, validity in GS5^C and the one-variable fragment of first-order Gödel logic is decidable and indeed co-NP-complete.

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