Traditional Critical Infrastructures (CIs) were intrinsically secure systems, due to a combination of factors, and in particular: 1) their operation was based (almost exclusively) on special purpose devices, using proprietary technologies; 2) they were closed systems composed of individual and isolated components; 3) they were largely based on dedicated (as opposed to shared) communication networks; and 4) they massively relied on proprietary software and communication protocols. In  the last few years rapid changes in technologies and their use contributed to set up a new scene where CIs are monitored by Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that are largely made of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components and subsystems being connected using standard communication protocols and through the infrastructure of the corporate Local Area Network (LAN), or even Wide Area Network (WAN) links, possibly including the public Internet, as well as wireless/satellite trunks. This technology shift brought many positive effects, such as the availability of a large base of standard and well-known protocols, the possibility of using shared and interconnected networks to support distributed SCADA systems, and the deployment of IP-based services and applications on top of SCADA systems. The other side of the coin is that current CIs are exposed to major security risks. Evidence is showing that coordinated and targeted cyber-attacks on Critical Infrastructures are increasing and becoming more sophisticated. It is worth emphasizing that we are witnessing a dramatic increase of external borne security incidents, while internal are basically stable, and accidental have increased only slightly (most probably, such a slight increase is mainly due to the increased complexity of the equipment, which results in more operator mistakes and interactions faults in general). 

We invite researchers and practitioners from the academia, industry, and  Public Administration to contribute original research articles that will stimulate the continuing efforts to cope with the ever increasing complexity of Critical Infrastructure Protection.

We are interested in articles describing how problems have been solved and/or discussing, which challenges will become critical in the next years. We particularly welcome contributions related to real world scenarios.

Submission Guidelines

All submissions will be peer-reviewed; all accepted papers will be included in the IEEE CPSCom-2017 conference proceedings published by IEEE Computer Society Press and indexed in IEEE Xplore. At least one of the authors of any accepted paper is requested to register the paper at the conference.

Selected papers in substantial extended form will be considered for publication in a Special Issue of Journal of High Speed Networks (http://www.iospress.nl/journal/journal-of-high-speed-networks/).

All papers will be submitted electronically in PDF format through the EasyChair submission website.

https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=cscip2017

The material submitted should not be published or under review elsewhere. Each paper is limited to six pages including figures and references using IEEE Computer Society Conference Proceedings Manuscript template available on the IEEE website.

Committees

Program Committee

• Luigi Coppolino (University of Naples Parthenope, IT)
• Abdelmajid Khelil (Landshut University of Applied Sciences, GE)
• Rafal Kozik (University of Science and Technology (UTP) in Bydgoszcz, PL)
• Andrea Ceccarelli (University of Florence, IT)
• Antonio Pecchia (University of Naples Federico II, IT)
• Wojciech Mazurczyk (Warsaw University of Technology, PL)
• Corrado Aaron Visaggio (University of Sannio, IT)

Organizing committee

• Salvatore D’Antonio (University of Naples Parthenope, IT)

• Michal Choras (University of Science and Technology (UTP) in Bydgoszcz, PL)

All questions about submissions should be emailed to salvatore.dantonio@uniparthenope.it